THE BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY AS PRESENTED IN MĪMĀṂSĀ-ŚLOKA-VĀRTTIKA

Vijaya Rani

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Bhaṭṭa, the renowned Mīmāmsak
the philosopher of the 7th cen. A.D,
given a store of. information regard
the Buddhist doctrines in his *magnum*
opus, Mīmāmsā-Śloka-Vārttika. It was, therefore, decided to take up this study. The relevant portions from the Śloka-Vārttika have been compiled, classified on well-defined lines, discussed and compared with the original Buddhist sources wherever possible.

It is for the first-time that Kumārila's presentation of the Buddhist-philosophy in his Śloka-Vārttika has been evaluated in a systematic way, and thus, it may prove to be a new pavement in the modern learning of Indian philosophy.

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MĪMĀṀSĀ-ŚLOKA-VĀRTTIKA

THE BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY AS PRESENTED IN MĪMĀṀSA-ŚLOKA-VĀRTTIKA

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with a foreword by

Dr. G. Bhattacharya
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To the Sacred Memory of
My Reverend Father
Late Shri Anand Prakashji,
A Great Scholar And An Orator

'अत्मदीपो भव'
[Be your own Light]
—Lord Buddha

BLESSINGS

It is a matter of great pride for all the concerned people that Mrs. Vijaya Rani took up her research on a subject of such a philosophical depth "The Buddhist Philosophy as presented in Mīmāṁsā-śloka-vārttika." It was with great joy that I read the pages of this remarkable research. I am sure that it will throw some new light on the study of the Buddhist Philosophy and Logic.

I would like to congratulate my daughter, Vijaya Rani for this work of a high philosophical value.

Kapilavastu
Meerut
May 1, 1982

D.N. Shastri

FOREWORD

It gives me genuine pleasure to introduce to the academic world the present work by Dr. (Mrs.) Vijaya Rani of the Department of Sanskrit, Kurukshetra University.

Literature on the early phase of the Buddhist logical and epistemic theories are, specially of Diṅnāga school, are scanty. Most of the works of Diṅnāga are lost in original Sanskrit but the post-Diṅnāga writers of the Buddhist school come to our help in reconstructing Diṅnāga's theories on many problems of philosophy. In addition to this, the non-Buddhist philosophers specially Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa have criticised the Buddhist position, whose works partly help us to reconstruct Diṅnāga's philosophy. In this book Dr. (Mrs.) Vijaya Rani has concentrated her attention on Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika* and has made a critical assessment of Kumārila's presentation of the Buddhist position. She was promted to this task on three grounds: First, Kumārila criticised the Buddhist position and his presentation appears, by and large, faithful and authentic, although it has been proved in the body of this work that there are occasions where Kumārila is not clear. Secondly, barring a few instances Kumārila's work throws light on Diṅnāga's doctrines which are either not extant in Sanskrit or partly extant. Thirdly, through such analysis on non-Buddhist texts where Buddhist position has been criticised one can expect to solve some of the knotty problems of chronology of some philosopher of ancient India, Dr. (Mrs.) Vijaya Rani has dealt with such problems as the cognition and its validity, the theory of dependent origination, the theory of momentariness, the theory of no-soul, a critique of external reality and the theory of Apoha which led the non-Buddhist philosophers like Kumārila to carry on a vehement attack on Diṅnāga. I have reasons to believe that this serious study of the present author will be well-received by the scholars of Buddhism and will serve as an impetus to other scholars to analyse the works of other non-Buddhist philosophers in their attempts to reconstruct the philosophy of Diṅnāga.

I congratulate Dr. (Mrs.) Vijaya Rani for this work, a product of commendable research.

Prof. and Head of the
Deptt. of Sanskrit G. BHATTACHARYA
Kurukshetra University
Kurukshetra.
May 1, 1982.

INTRODUCTION

Indian philosophy specially logic and epistemology has been developed through the conflict among different philosophical schools. Although the conflict has been traced in the works of early writers also, but it gets its culmination at the advent of Diṅnāga. On one side there was Diṅnāga school of the Buddhists, while on the other these were some Vaidika school like Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and Pūrva-mīmāṁsā. After Uddyotakara (the embodiment defence of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrines), the conflict was carried out by two of the greatest thinkers of Pūrva-mīmāṁsā school, viz. Kumārila and Prabhākara. Therefore the study of the works of Kumārila is very important rather essential to have a clear understanding of the Buddhist doctrines, specially when the early works of the Buddhist philosophy and logic are not extant or are partally extant to us.

The present work of Dr. (Mrs.) Vijaya Rani is a critical study of the Buddhist doctrines, presented in the Mīmāṁsā-Śloka-vārttika of Kumārila. I have no hesitation to say that she has devoted her full time and energy to this study, while working for her Ph.D. at Kurukshetra University and has succeeded in making some advancement in the world of knowledge. Her study of the subject from original Sanskrit sources is highly appreciable. I feel pleasure in commending her present work as a great contribution to Indian philosophy.

Ex-Dayanand Professor
Deptt. of Sanskrit
Kurukshetra University

SHRINIVAS SHASTRI

May 1, 1982

PREFACE

The present book is the result of my research work on 'The Buddhist Philosophy as presented in Mīmāṁsā-Śloka-Vārttika' which was submitted for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Kurukshetra University in 1977.

Study of the Buddhist philosophy occupies a very important place in the modern philosophical studies. Unfortunatly a large number of the original sources of the Buddhist philosophy have been lost. In course of time, they have been either destroyed or taken away to the foreign countries like China, Tibet, Mangolia etc.

During the past few decades, by the efforts of some renowned scholars like Prof. Stcherbatsky, H.N. Randle, Pt. Rahul Sāṁkṛtyāyana, and S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, it has come to light that the treatise of non-Buddhist philosophy, especially those belonging to the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā schools contain vast material related to the Buddhist philosophy. They give a store of information regarding Buddhist doctrines which they propose to refute. The Mīmāṁsā-Śloka-vārttika of Kumārila is a very important one among such works. A large part of that work is devoted to the refutation of Buddhism.

So far only a few scholars have undertaken the Buddhist studies on the basis of non-Buddhist treatises, such as Prof. Th. Stcherbatsky (in his Buddhist logic vol. II), Prof. D.N. Shastri (in critique of Indian Realism), Prof. S.N. Shastri (in his Bauddha Darśana Kā Vivecana) and Prof. Nagin J. Shah (in his Akalaṅka's criticism of Dharmakīrti's philosophy). Besides, there are some other modern works and a number of articles of Indian philosophy and logic, in which the portions related to the Buddhists, scattered in the non-Buddhist treatises, have been referred to and explained occasionally. 'History of Indian Logic' (by S.C. Vidyabhusana), 'Indian Logic in the Early Schools' and 'Fragments from Diṅnāga' (by H.N. Randle), 'Darśana-digdarśana' and other works (by R. Sāṁkṛtyāyana), 'Central Philosophy of Buddhism' (by T.R.V. Murti) and 'Dignāga, on Perception' (by M. Hattori) can be mentioned as the names of such works. But an exhaustive study of the Buddhist doctrines on the basis of Pūrva-mīmāṁsā treatises specially of the Mīmāṁsā-śloka-vārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, has not been done so far. Therefore, I took up this work, although it was of a very intricate nature. The basic source of this study is Mīmāṁsā-śloka-vārttika, necessary help from its four commentaries[1] has also been taken.

In the Śloka-vārttika, Kumārila's method of presentation of the Buddhist doctrines is two fold. Sometimes he presents them directly and clearly as *pūrvapakṣa*, but sometimes he just refers to them in his refutations without mentioning them in clear words, hence they lack lucidity and clarity. To have a clear and better understanding of Kumārila's presentation, first it was necessary to select all those verses from the śloka-vārttika, which throw light on the Buddhist views either directly or indirectly. After this the verses were translated into English, as the available translation of the text by Prof. G.N. Jha, seemed to be somewhat unintelligible at some places.[2] However, I wish to express my all indebtedness to Prof. Jha, whose translation was the first source book for me to show the path of the study of this voluminous and intricated work of Kumārila transtation of the selected verses related to Buddhism has been given in this book as and when required.

---

[1] (i) Tātparya ṭīkā of Bhattoṁveka.
(ii) Śarkarikā of Jayamiśra.
(iii) Kāśikā of Sucarita Miśra.
(iv) Nyaya-ratnākara of Pārthasārathi Miśra.

[2] See Dr. Jha's translation of the following verses and compare it with the translation given in the present work:
Pratyakṣa Kās 79-82 (compare infra pp. 62-64)
Śūnyavāda Kās 15-17, 113-14 (compare infra pp. 181-186)
Śabda Kās 35-37 (compare infra p. 87)
Apoha Kā 158 (compare infra p. 207)

To minimise the length of the work, it has not been given here as a separate section.

On the basis of the selected material, the book has been divided into eight chapters. First chapter deals with the origin and development of the Buddhist philosophy and logic, its conflict with other philosophical system and place of Śloka vārttika in the conflict. Second and third chapters deal in detail the Buddhist theories of *Pramāṇa* and *Prāmāṇyavāda*. Chapter four reflects upon the theories of *Pratītya-samutpāda* and Momentariness, whereas the fifth presents the nature of *Anātmavāda* and discusses how *karma-phala* and *punarjanma* is possible in the Buddhist theory. In the sixth chapter, doctrine of the non-existence of external world (*bāhyārthabhaṅgavāda*) has been treated in detail according to the Idealist Buddhists. Chapter seven, dealing with various theories regarding meaning of word, throws a significant light upon the nature of Buddhist *apoha* and their arguments in favour of this theory. Chapter eight is a resume of the whole work and evaluates Kumārila's presentation of the Buddhist philosophy. Lastly, in the Appendix, a list of the selected verses of the Śloka-vārttika, used in the present work, has been included alongwith the index and Bibliography.

The present work, thus, is an humble effort to study the Buddhist doctrines on the basis of Mīmāṁsā-śloka-vārttika. The selected reference have been discussed and compared with the original Buddhist sources, views of the modern thinkers have also been referred to, whereever possible. At some places, the Buddhist doctrines have been clarified through also. For an easy opproach, conclusions have been derived in the end of every chapter. An attempt has been made to fix up the chronology of some important philosophical personalities like Bhartṛhari, Diṅnāga, Kumārila and Dharmakīrti. I feel that the present study of the Mīmāṁsā-śloka-vārttika has thrown a significant light on some points of the Buddhist philosophy and logic, e.g.

(i) Identity of *Pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa-phala* according to Diṅnāga-school.

(ii) Apprehension of *liṅga* (mark) of *anumāna* through 'an indescribable *vikalpa*' following *pratyakṣa.*

(iii) Buddhist view of 'no-definite-regulation (*aniyama-pakṣa*) regarding the theory of *prāmāṇya.*

(iv) Some special features of the Buddhist theory of causation regarding sequence and simultaneity.

(v) Yogācāra's view of Ākāra-pracaya (accumulation of forms) in the cognition.

(iv) Different Buddhist views regarding the law of rebirth.

(vii) Vijñānavādin's several arguments to the non-existence of external world have been presented here in a systematic way.

(viii) Some notable points about the Apoha theory.

It, thus, seems that the present study, which evaluates Kumārila's presentation of the Buddhist doctrines in Mīmāṁsā-śloka-vārttika for the first time, may prove beneficial in the field of Buddhist studies. I have tried my best to be systematic and scientific throughout my work, yet I expect a sympathetic attitude from the readers for any discrepancy. It has been observed that in spite of being very careful, some press mistakes are still there, for which an errata has been regretfully added.

In the end, I should express my deep sense of gratitude and sincere indebtedness to my reverent teachers, Prof. D.N. shastri and Prof. S.N. Shastri for their invaluable and meticulous guidance, keen interest and constant encouragement, which I received from them throughout the present research work. I am all the more grateful to them for their kind 'Blessings' and 'Introduction' to the present edition. Great is my gratitude to Prof. G. Bhattacharya, (Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit, Kurukshetra University), for his valuable suggestions and kind encouragement during this work. I also owe to him much for kindly writing a 'Foreword' for this book.

I must express my heart felt gratefulness to Prof. Masaaki Hattori of Kyoto University, Japan, whose research papers and monographs, kindly sent by him to me have proved a great asset to me in the present study.

In the last, I wish to thank all those thikes, authors and co-workers, who help me directly or indirectly in this study. I would also like to record my gratefulness to Shri K.L. Joshi, Parimala Publications, Delhi, for taking keen interest in printing the book in the present form.

Deptt of Sanskrit
Kurukshetra University
Kurukshetra.
May 1, 1982.

VIJAYA RANI

ABBREVIATIONS

ABORI	Annals of Bhandarkara Oriental Research Institute.
ACDA	Akalaṅka's Criticism of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy.
AK	Abhidharma-Kośa.
AKBh	Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya
Ākṛti	Ākṛtivāda
ĀP	Ālambana-parīkṣā
Apoha	Apohavāda
AS	Apohasixdhiḥ
ASILM	Advanced Studies of Indian Logic and Metaphysics.
ĀSS	Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series,
BBS	Baudha Bhārati Series
BCA	Bodhicaryāvatāra
BCAP	Bodhicaryāvatāra Pañjikā
BCB	Basic Conception of Buddhism
BDD	Baudha-dharma-darśana
BDM	Baudha-darśana-mīmāṁsā
BDS	Bhāratīya-darśana-śāstra
BDV	Baudha darśana Kā Vivecana
BL	Buddhist Logic
BPUF	Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux
BSŚBh	Brahma-sūtra Śāṅkara-bhāṣya
Cal.SS	Calcutta Sanskrit Series
CBN	Conception of Buddhism Nirvāṇa
CCB	Central Conception of Buddhism
Ch.SS	Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series
CIR	Critique of Indian Realism
CPB	Central Philosophy of Buddhism
DD	Darśana-digdarśana

Dh. P or Dh. Pradeep	Dharmottara-pradeepa
DP	Dignāga, on Perception
DTM	Differentiation Theory of Meaning in Indian Philosophy.
FFD	Fragments from Diṅnāga
GOS	Gaekwada Oriental Series
HB	Hetubindu
HBT	Hetubindu Tīkā
HIL	History of Indian Logic
HIP	History of Indian Philosophy
IHQ	Indian Historical Quarterly
IR	Indian Realism
ITM	Indian Theories of Meaning
JN	Jñānaśrīmitra-Nibandhāvalī
JS	Jaiminī-Sūtra
Kāśi. SS	Kāśi Sanskrita Series
KURJ	Kurukshetra University Research Journal
MA	Madhyamakāvatāra
MK	Mādhyamika-kārikā
MKV	Mādhyamika-kārikā-Vṛtti
MM	Mānameyodaya
MNV	Manorathanadi Vṛtti
MVS	Madhyānta-Vibhāga-śāstra
NB	Nyāyabindu
NBh.	Nyāya-bhāṣya
NBṬ	Nyāyabindu-Tīkā
Nirālambana	Nirālambanavāda
N. Kaṇikā	Nyāya-kaṇikā
NCK	Nyāya-kumuda-candra
NM or N.Mañjarī	Nyāya-mañjarī
NMGB	Nyāya-mañjari-granthi-bhaṅga
N.Mukha	Nyāya-mukha
N. Praveśa	Nyāya-Praveśa-Vṛtti-Pañjikā
NR	Nyāya-ratnākara
NS	Nyāya-sūtra
NV	Nyāya-Vārttika
NVTṬ	Nyāya-Vārttika-tātparya-tīka
PBh.	Praśastapāda-bhāṣya
PKM	Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇda
PLC	Philosophy of Logical-construction
PMS	Pūrva Mīmāṁsā in its sources
PMṬ	Pramānamīmāṁsā Tippana
P. Pañcikā	Prakaraṇa-pañcikā

Pre-Diṅnāga BTL	Buddhist Texts on Logic
PS	Pramāṇa-samuccaya
PSṬ	Pramāṇa-samuccaya-Ṭīkā
PSV	Pramāṇa-samuccaya Vṛtti
Pud. Vini.	Pudgala-Viniścaya
PUIP	Problem of Universals in Indian Philosophy
PV	Pramāṇa-Vārttika
PVBh.	Pramāṇa-Vārttikabhaṣya or Vārttikālaṅkāra
P. Vini	Pramāṇa-Viniścaya
PWM	Philosophy of Word and Meaning
RN	Ratnakīrti-nibandhāvalī
Śar.	Śarkārikā
Śabda-nityatā	Śabdānityatā-adhikaraṇa
ŚBh	Śābarabhāṣya
SBT	Systems of Buddhist Thought
ŚD	Śāstra-dīpikā
SDS	Śarva-darśana-saṅgraha
SK	Śāṁkhya-kārikā
Sl.Vār	Śloka-vārttika
STK	Sāṁkhyatattva-kaumudī
Śūnya	Śūnyavāda
SVTṬ	Śloka-Vārttika-Vyākhyā-Tātparya-ṭīkā
Svārtha	Svārthānumāna-pariccheda
SWK	Six Ways of Knowing
TB(K.Miśra)	Tarkabhāṣā (Keśava Miśra)
TB(Mokśākara)	Tarkabhāṣā (Mokṣākara Gupta)
T Pariśuddhi	Nyāyavārttika-Tātpary-Pariśuddhi
TRV	Tattvārtha(rāja) vārttika
TS	Tattva-saṅgraha
TSN	Tri-svabhāva-nirdeśa
TSP	Tattvasaṅgraha-Pañjikā
TV	Tantra Vārttika
UH	Upāyahṛdayam
VMS	Vijñapti-mātrata-siddhi
VP	Vedānta-paribhāṣā
VPS	Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha
VS	Vaiśeṣika-sūtra
YBh.	Yoga-bhāṣya
YI	Yogācāra Idealism

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CHAPTER-I

THE BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY AND THE MĪMĀṀSĀ-ŚLOKA-VĀRTTIKA

1. 1. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY :

(i) *Origin of the Buddhist Philosophy* :

At the time of the origin of Buddhism, there were at least three main streams of thought : firstly, the Brāhmanical rituals and sacrifices through which one could get whatever he longed for ; secondly, the philosophy of the Upaniṣads regarding the ultimate reality, increasingly tending towards an esoteric and ascetic direction ; thirdly, the nihilistic conceptions, such as, there is no law, no abiding reality, everything comes into being by the unknown fate or by accident and so forth.[1] There are repeated references to the teachings of the six teachers e.g. Purāṇa Kassapa, Ajita Kesakamblī, Maṅkhali Gosāla, who preached about Akriyāvāda Niyativāda, Ucchedavāda, etc.[2] There was no rational basis behind them. Man was loosing faith in himself, in his actions and in his moral values. "At this time of deep and many-sided intellectual movements , when amateur studies of the dialectic routine had already grown up..., when dialectic scepticism began to attack moral ideas—at this time when a painful longing deliverance from the burden of being, was met by the first signs of moral decay, Gautama Buddha appears upon the scene."[3]

Gautama Buddha (570 B.C.-490 B.C.)[4] is "a unique and dynamic personality"[5], of Indian philosophy. He is "a great rationalist in philosophical thoughts and conceptions..., a great master of moral force, a great renouncer and the supreme physician in healing the human diseases of passion and torment. His revolt against the *Vedic karma-kāṇḍa* produced a powerful influence on men's minds .."[1]

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[1] cf. S N. Das Gupta, HIP, I, 80.

[2] See Dīghanikāya, I, Sāmañña-phala-suttam, pp. 45-52.

[3] Oldenberg, Buddha, pp. 69-70.

[4] S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, HIL, p. 225.

[5] R. Basak, Buddha and Buddhism, p. 78.

Buddha is fundamentally a religious thinker and a social reformer. His teachings are related mainly to the problems of this life and world. He is silent about the abstruse metaphysical problems like that of supreme reality, creation, destruction and so on, because they do "not lead to the turning from the earthly, to the subjection of all desire. to the cessation of the transitory, to peace. to knowledge, to illumination, to Nirvāṇa."[2] Nevertheless, his simple moral teachings consist of the seeds of important philosophical doctrines. which are later developed by the thinkers of different Buddhist schools and sects. Here lies the origin of Buddhist philosophy.

The fundamental doctrines which have been recognised by every philosophical system of the Buddhists, are as follows :

(a) *Four Noble Truths*—There is suffering (*duḥkha*), there is the cause of suffering (*duḥkha-samudaya*), there is the cessation of suffering (*duḥkha-nirodha* i.e. *Nirvāṇa*), and there is a path for the cessation of suffering (*duḥkha-nirodha upāya*) in the form of Noble eightfold Path (*aṣṭāṅgika-mārga*).[3]

(b) *Dependent-origination* (*pratītya samutpāda*) Dependent-origination is the central doctrine of the Buddhist philosophy. Its meaning is "there being the causes, the effect comes forth". The twelve *nidānas* of the cycle of birth and death (*bhava-cakra*) also take place under this very law. There is no scope for the creator or God in this philosophy because every event is bound to occur under this definite rule.[4]

(c) *Impermanence or the Theory of Flux*—Everything that exists, is impermanent or momentary (*yat sat tat kṣaṇikam*)[5]

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1. R. Basak, Buddha and Buddhism, pp. 78-79.
2. Saṁyutta-nikāya as quoted by Oldenberg, Buddha, p. 205.
3. (i) Mahāvagga. Dhamma-cakkappavattanam, p. 13;
   (ii) Rāhula Sāṁkṛtyāyana Baudha darśana, pp. 23-27.
4. (i) AK and AKBh, iii. 28
   (ii) Th. Stcherbatsky, CCB, pp. 23ff.
5. (i) Vayadhammā Saṅkhārā.
   (ii) Baudha darśana, p. 31.
   (iii) Th. Stcherbatsky, CCB, pp. 31ff.

(d) *Doctrine of No-Soul* (*Anātmavāda*)—Any permanent entity like soul or *ātman* has been denied by the Buddhists. The so called personality is only an aggregate of ever changing five elements called '*pañca skandhas*'. Rebirth is possible through the 'law of action and result' (*karma-phala-vyavasthā*).[1]

(ii) *Three Periods of the Buddhist Philosophy* :

The Buddhist philosophy flourished in India for about 1500 years (500 B.C. to 1000 A.D.). This time has been divided by Prof. Stcherbatsky into three periods.[2]

(a) *First period* (500 *B. C. to the beginning of* 1*st Cent. A.D.*)

This period belongs to the first 'Swinging of the wheel of Law,' when Lord Buddha preached about the four Noble Truths. The salient feature of this period is regarded to be the pluralism of elements called '*dharmas*'. The human personality is composed of these very elements. Man attains salvation or *nirvāṇa* through his own moral and intellectual perfection. Emphasis on moral and ethical aspects is the characteristic feature of this period.[3]

The original teachings of the Buddha have been recorded in the Pāli Canon, called '*Tripiṭaka*' or the 'Traid of Baskets.' They are: the Vinyayapiṭaka, the Sutrapiṭaka and the Abhidharmapiṭaka.[4] Among them, Abhidharmapiṭaka is of much importance from the philosophical point of view.[5] Besides, Milinda-pañho, a dialogue between King Menander and Bhikṣu Nāgasena, is of great philosophical value.[6] Buddhists of this period held three councils at different times and places. Their difference of opinions about minor matters of discipline and philosophy was gradually increased and at the time of king

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1. AK, iii. 18.
2. BL, I, p. 3; Baladeva Upādhyāya, BDM, p. 162.
3. BL, I, pp. 3-7, 14; S.N. Shastri, Introd. to NBT, p. 1.
4. J.N. Sinha, HIP, II, p. 279.
5. D.N. Shastri, BDS, p. 36.
6. J.N. Sinha, HIP, II, p. 280.

Aśoka, we find them split into 18 sects.[1] Among them, Sthaviravāda or the sect of Theras (old mandicants) is regarded to be the oldest one which follows the original teachings of the Buddha.[2] The Sarvāstivāda School of the Buddhists also sprang up from this very sect at the time of the third council.[3]

(b) *Second period* (*1st cent. A.D. to 5th cent. A.D*).

This is the period in which Buddhist religion and philosophy takes a turn from Hīnayāna to Mahāyāna, from the ideal of a human Buddha to the ideal of a divine Buddha (but not God), from the egoistic personal salvation (*arhatyāna*) to the universal salvation of every life (*buddha-yāna*),[4] from a radical pluralism of elements to a radical Monism of '*sūnyatā*'.[5] The terms 'Mahāyāna' and 'Hīnayāna' came into practice much later (perhaps at the time of Nāgārjuna) than the evolution of their tendencies. According to Kimura, the terms are, for the first time, coined and used by the Mahāsāṅghikas in order to show their superiority over the Sthaviravādins.[6]

In this period the second 'Swinging of the wheel of law' takes place, under which the meaning of dependent-origination changes. Now it is analysed more in the light of relativity (*sāpekṣatā*) than in the light of causal theory (*kāraṇavāda*).[7]

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[1] S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, HIL, pp. 246-47; Rāhula Sāṁkṛtyāyana, DD, p. 566

[2] Rāhula Sāṁkṛtyāyana, Introd. to Buddhacaryā, p. 7; A.C. Banerjee, Sarvāstivāda Literature, p. 3

[3] Rāhula Sāṁkṛtyāyana, Introd. to Buddhacaryā, p. 6

[4] To attain salvation, the Buddhists recognised three *yānas* (ways) namely *Śrāvaka* (=*arhat*) *yāna*, *Pratyekabuddha-yāna* and *Buddhayāna*. The aspirant could follow any one of them according to his own will. But the Mahāyāna sect of the Buddhists recognised only one i.e. the *Buddha-yāna* among them. For detail see, R. Sāṁkṛtyāyana, Introd. to Buddhacharyā, p. 8.

[5] cf. Stcherbatsky, BLI, p. 7; T.R.V. Murti, CPB, p. 76.

[6] R. Kimura, Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, pp. 9, 11, 12, 114.

[7] cf. S.N. Shastri, Introduction to NBT, p. 1.

Two kinds of reality, namely the ultimate reality (*paramārtha satya*) and the empirical reality (*saṁvṛti satya*), have been accepted and they supersede the former idea of four Noble Truths.[1] This is the period when Buddhism is developed more as a philosophy than as a religion. The four philosophical schools, viz. Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Mādhyamika and Yogāsāra came into existence.[2] Mādhyamika or Śūnyavāda remains in predominance.

(c) *Third period* (*5th cent. A.D. to 10th cent. A.D.*)

In the third period of its history, the stream of Buddhist thought has been given a new direction. The two great thinkers, Ārya Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, give rise to a new school, called Vijñānavāda. Assumption of *vijñāna* (consciousness) and specially of *svasaṁvedana* (introspection) has been emphasised, because "if we deny introspection we must deny conciousness itself, the whole universe will then be reduced to the condition of cecity."[3] The idea is, perhaps, directed against the extreme scepticism of the Mādhyamikas.[4] In this period, the no-element doctrine (*sarva-dharma-śūnyatā*) is replaced by the doctrine of no-external-existence (*bāhyārtha-śūnyatā*).[5]

From the advent of Diṅnāga, more emphasis is started to be laid down to the epistemological and logical aspects of philosophy than to its metaphysical and ontological aspects. A new school, which can be called as Buddhist logic (*Bauddha-nyāya*) or Diṅnāga school, has been founded. It develops and flourishes in India till the end of the 10th cent. A.D.

(iii) *Philosophical Schools of the Buddhists* :

Mainly four philosophical schools of the Buddhists, viz, Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika Mādhyamika and Yogācāra have been discussed by the scholars of Indian Philosophy.[6] Among them the former two belong to the Hīnayāna branch of the Buddhists, while the latter two are related to the Mahāyāna branch.[1]

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[1] cf. BL, I, p. 9.

[2] Rāhula Sāṁkṛtyāyana, Introd. to Buddhacaryā, p. 8.

[3] BL, I, p. 12.

[4] Ibid.

[5] S.N. Shastri, Introd. to NBT, p. 2.

[6] SDS, p. 35; TB (Mokṣākara), p. 33-39; HIL, p. 247; S.N. Shastri, BDV, pp. 32-34.

(a) *Vaibhāṣika*

The Vaibhāṣika school is fundamentally concerned with the old school of Theras, called Sthaviravāda, which is later developed as Sarvāstivāda. Generally it is supposed that according to the Sarvāstiyādins, everything, internal as well as external, exists.[2] But according to Vasubandu, "those who accept the existence of elements (*dharmas*) in all the three periods i.e. past, present and future, are called Sarvāstivādins."[3] The same authority mentions that the Sarvāstivādins were further split into four groups and that the Vaibhāṣikas belonged to the third group among them.[4] The appellation 'Vaibhāṣika', as has been explained by Yośomitra,[5] was given to them because they were the followers of Abhidharma-Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra or simply 'Vibhāṣa-śāstra', a commentary on 'Abhidharma-jñāna-prasthāna-śāstra' of Kātyāyanīputra.

The distinguishing features of this school are : (a) The external word exists and is perceptible,[6] (b) cognition does not have any form of its own,[7] (c) All elements (*dharmas*), internal (*citta ; caitta*) as well as external (*bhūta, bhautika*) exist in all the three periods,[8] (d) There is no *dharmins* (substance) except *dharmas* (attributes), no *avayavin* (whole) except *avayavas*

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1. S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, HIL, p. 247.
2. BSŚBh, p. 524; CCB, p. 35.
3. तदस्तिवादात् सर्वास्तिवादा इष्टाः ये हि सर्वमस्तीति वदन्ति अतीतमनागतं प्रत्युत्पन्नं च, ते सर्वास्तिवादाः AK and AKBh, V. 25.
4. (i) AK and AKBh, V. 25-26
   (ii) तृतीयः शोभनः इति वैभाषिकः । Sphuṭārathā, p. 808.
5. विभाषया दीव्यन्ति चरन्ति वा वैभाषिकाः, विभाषां वा विदन्ति वैभाषिकाः । उक्थादिप्रक्षेपाट् ठक् Spuṭārthā, p. 15.
   also S.C. Vidyāhūṣaṇa, HIL, p. 247.
6. SDS, p. 35.
7. BDV, p. 61.
8. AK and AKBh, V.24-25; CCB, pp. 62ff.

(parts). Thing is only an aggregate (*saṅghāta*) of different elements (*dharmas*).[1]

(b) *Sautrāntika*

The Sautrāntika school, like the school of Vaibhāṣikas, is an offshoot of the old Sarvāstivāda school. It has been admitted by many eminent writers of the Buddhist philosophy.[2] The fundamental difference between the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika lies in this fact that the Vaibhāṣika relies on commentaries (Vibhāṣā śastra etc.), while the Sautrāntika takes his inspiration only from the original Buddha-sūtras. Yaśomitra also says, "those who accept sūtras, not śāstras, as authority are called Sautrāntikas."[3] The word 'Śautrāntika' is derived from '*sūtrānta*' i.e. the original text.

Dharmottara or Uttaradharma, Kumāralabdha, Śrīlabdha, Yośomitra, etc., are regarded to be the chief exponents of this school.[4]

The distinct features of this school are : (a) Everything internal as well as external exists, but it exists only in the present, not in the past or the future[6] (b) All external things are inferrable (*anumeya*).[7] They can be inferred from their conformity (*sārūpya*) in the cognition.[8]

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1. न रूपाद्यतिरिक्तं द्रव्यं नाम किंचिदस्ति नाप्यवयवातिरिक्तः कश्चिदस्त्यवयवीति सौत्रान्तिका वैभाषिकाश्च प्रतिपेदिरे ।
NVTṬ, p. 609 (Cal. SS).
2. (i) Yamakami Sogen, Systems of Buddhist Thought, p. 44.
   (ii) Stcherbatsky, BL, I, p. 529.
   (iii) S.N. Shastri, 'क्या सौत्रान्तिक भी सर्वास्तिवादी है ?' KURJ, Vol. VI, No. 1, pp. 219-25.
3. ये सूत्रप्रामाणिकाः, न तु शास्त्रप्रामाणिकास्ते सौत्रान्तिकाः ।
Sphuṭarthā, p. 15
4. S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, HIL, p. 248.
5. HIL, p. 248.
6. AK and AKBh, V. 24-26.
Th. Stcherbatsky, CCB, pp. 62-68.
7. Bhāmatī, p. 546; SDS, p. 35; S.N. Shastri, BDV, pp. 62-63.
8. S.N. Shastri, BDV, p. 118-119.

(c) *Mādhyamika* (*Śūnyavādin*)

The school of Mādhyamika or Śūnyavādin is regarded to be "the real heart of Buddhism."[1] The name 'Mādhyamika' is derived from '*madhyamā*' the middle. The Mādhyamika philosophy is so called because, it avoids the two extremes and adopts the Middle Path (*madhyamā pratipadā*).[2] It is called Śūnyavāda because it accepts *śūnyatā* as its ultimate reality. *Śūnyatā*, the absolute of the Mādhyamika, is not void as is generally mistaken, but it is "devoid of finitude and imperfection."[3] The inaccessibility of the real to thought does not mean that the real is not.

Ārya Nāgārjuna (about 250-320 A.D.) is regarded to be the founder of this school. Some older works like Prajñāpāramitā etc. are the original sources of its doctrines. Besides, Mādhyamika-kārikā of Nāgārjuna, Mūla-mādhyamika-vṛtti of Buddhapālita, Hastabala of Āryadeva, Madhyamahṛdaya-kārikā of Bhavya, Mādhyamika-vṛtti (Prasannapadā) of Candra-Kīrti are other principle works of this schools.[4]

(d) *Yogācāra* (*Vijñānavādin*)

From the chronological point of view, the Yogācāra school is later than that of the Mādhyamikas.[5] The school of Yogācāra is so called because it emphasises upon yoga or the practice of meditation to attain the Buddhistic perfection.[6] It is also called Vijñānavāda, because it, in opposition to the Śūnyavāda, accepts the existence of *vijñāna*, as the ultimate reality, although it also rejects the reality of external world like the Mādhyamikas. The chief characteristics of the school are: (a) '*Vijñāna*' is the only reality and the external world does not exist,[7] (b) Two kinds of *Vijñāna*: *ālaya-vijñāna* and *pravṛtti-*

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1. T.R.V. Murty, CPB, p. 55.
2. HIL, p. 250.
3. T.R.V. Murty, CPB, pp. 332-33.
4. S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, HIL, p. 250.
5. cf. Baladeva Upādhyāya, BDM, p. 225.
6. cf. HIL, p. 249.
7. cf. विज्ञानमात्रमेवैतदसदर्थविभासनात्

Viṁśatikā Kā. 1 in VMS.

vijñāna,[1] (c) *anādi vāsanā* (impressions flowing from time immemorial),[2] (d) Three kinds of realities viz. *parinispanna*, *paratantra* and *parikalapita*.[3]

It is generally accepted that Maitreyanātha is the founder of this school.[4] The two brothers Asaṅga and Vasubandhu are also the early expounders of the system.[5] Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, Mahāsamaya sūtra, Sapta-daśa-bhūmi-śāstra, etc. are some old works,[6] while Mahāyānottara-tantra, Sūtrālaṅkāra and Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra of Asaṅga,[7] Vijñāptirmātratā-siddhi, Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa of Vasubandhu[8] are some other important works of this school.

The culmination of this school can be perceived in the works of Diṅnāga school (Buddhist logic), which is being discussed subsequently.

(iv) *Buddhist logic or Diṅnāga School* :

The term 'Buddhist logic' means a system of logic and epistemology, originated in the field of Buddhist philosophy with the advent of great master Diṅnāga.[9] It covers within its scope the study of pure sensation (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*), conceptual construction (*vikalpa*), inference (*anumāna*) including syllogism (*parārthānumāna*), validity of cognition (*jñāna-prāmāṇya*) and the art of conducting philosophic disputations in public (*vāda-vidhi*). In the words of Prof. Stcherbatsky, "It, thus, embraces the whole area of human knowledge, beginning with rudimentary sensation and ending with the complicated apparatus of a public debate."[10]

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1. cf. Bhāmatī, p. 547.
2. cf. Ibid.
3. cf. Trisvabhāvanirdeśa, Kā. 1.
4. cf. G. Tucci, Maitreya (Nātha), pp. 3. 17.
5. cf. Ibid., p. 3.
6. cf. S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, HIL, p. 249.
7. cf. Rāhula Sāṁkṛtyāyana, DD. p. 706.
8. cf. Introd. to VMS, p. 97.
9. Stcherbatsky, BL, I, p. 1
10. Ibid

So far as the seeds of Buddhist logic are concerned, they are present to some extent even in the teachings and discussions of Lord Buddha. It is quite evident from the Pāli Tripiṭakas that the discussions held between the Buddha and his opponents, are mainly based on apt illustrations (*dṛṣṭānta*) and analogies (*sādṛśya*). The dialectical discussions of 'Kathāvatthu' also suggest probability of the existence of some special manual on dialectical method in the Pāli literature.[1]

In the second period, there are two tracts—'Vigraha-vyāvartinī' and 'Vaidalya-sūtra and prakaraṇa'[2] of Nāgārjuna, in which he refutes *pramāṇa* etc. and establishes his own theory of relativity (*sāpekṣatā*) through a very unique dialectical method which shows his efficiency in dialecticism.[3] It is, however, true that an independent nature of the Buddhist logic was not yet developed. The tradition, laid down by the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas was being followed.[4]

Long after Nāgārjuna, there appear two brothers Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (in the 5th cent. A.D). Among them Vasubandhu has a good reputation as a logician. Hwen-thsāṅg's travel accounts inform us that Vasubandhu composed three works on the art of debate, viz., Vāda-vidhi, Vāda-mārga and Vāda-kauśala.[5] Their Sanskrit originals are lost, but an incomplete Chinese translation of one of them exists.[6] Besides these three, there is another treatise named as 'Tarka-śāstra', ascribed to Vasubandhu,[7] It has been restored in Sanskrit by G. Tucci.[8] Vasubadhu's views about perception, inference, syllogism, etc. have also been quoted and criticised by some non-Buddhist writers like Uddyotakara, Vācaspati-Miśra, etc.[9]

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[1] S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, HIL, pp. 225-40; BL, I. p. 28.

[2] cf. BL, I, p. 28.

[3] cf. Ibid.

[4] cf. S.N. Shastri, Introd. to NBT, pp. 2-3.

[5] cf. S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, HIL, p. 267.

[6] cf. Ibid. p. 29.

[7] cf. HIL, pp. 267-58.

[8] cf, G. Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga BTL.

[9] cf. S.N. Shastri, op. cit., p. 3.

From all this account, it appears that the background of the Buddhist logic had already been prepared by Vasubandhu and others, but a systematic line of thinking according to the idealistic thought of Yogācāra Buddhism was given to it only by Diṅnāga,[1] and this is the reason that he avails the privilege of being called the 'founder of the Buddhist logic.'[2] Diṅnāga (450-520 A.D.),[3] born near Kāñcī in South India, was the disciple of teacher Nāgadatta of the Vātsīputrīya sect. But due to some differences on doctrinal views, he left him after some time and became the disciple of Vasubandhu. He earned a big fame in the field of logic, defeated many non-Buddhist dialecticians of his time and got the title of '*Tarka-puṅgava*' (a hero in discussion).[4]

Several treatises are mentioned by his name. His two early works are : 'Abhidharma-kośa-marma-pradīpa' and 'Aṣṭa-sāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā-piṇḍārtha.' The rest of his words are devoted to logic. They are : (i) Ālambanaparīkṣā (with vṛtti), (ii) Trikālaparīkṣā, (iii) Hetucakra-samarthana, (or Hetu-cakra-hamaru), (iv) Nyāya-mukha (or Nyāya-dvāra), (v) Pramāṇa-samuccaya (with vṛtti), and (vi) Hetu-mukha. All these works are lost in Sanskrit and are preserved in Chinese and Tibetan translations.[5] Only the first chapter of Pramāṇa-samuccaya has been rostored in Sanskrit by H.R.R. Iyenger.[6] Recently Dr. M. Hottori of Japan has also restored some parts of it in Sanskrit.[7] Ālambana-parīkṣā and its vṛtti have also been restored in Sanskrit by N. A. Shastri, Adyar Library, Madras.

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1. cf. S.N. Shastri, op. cit., p. 3.
2. cf. S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, HIL, p. 270; D.N. Shastri, CIR, p. 1.
3. cf. HIL, p. 270.
4. cf. HIL, p. 272.
   Meaning of *tarka-puṅgava* as 'hero in discussion' seems to be more appropriate than a 'Fighting Bull' or 'Bull in discussion', given by Dr. S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa.
5. cf. Th. Stcherbatsky, BL, I, p. 33.
6. Pramāṇa-samuccaya, Ch. I. ed. and restored with Vṛtti and Ṭīkā by H.R.R. Iyenger, Mysore.
7. Dignāga on Perception.

Pramāṇa-samuccaya is the *magnum opus* of Diṅnāga. It contains six chapters, viz, Pratyakṣa, Svārthānumāna, Parārthānumāna, Hetu-dṛṣṭānta, Apoha and Jāti.[1] It is the first systematic treatise of Diṅnāga school. Its importance can be judged from this very fact that all the later thinkers of the non-Buddhist philosophical systems took it as a challenge and regarded it to be their own essential duty to criticise it first and then to establish their own theories on logic. Uddyotakara in his Nyāya-vārttika and Kumārila in his Śloka-vārttika have criticised it at every step.[2]

After Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti accepted the challenge of the opponents. He composed a voluminous work—'Pramāṇa-vārttika' which, infact, is a detailed commentary on Pramāṇa-samuccaya of Diṅnāga. In this work, Dharmakīrti has replied to the objections raised by the opponents like Kumārila,[3] against the views of Diṅnāga. His other works on logic are : Pramāṇa-viniścaya, Nyāya-bindu, Hetu-bindu, Sanbandhāntara-parīkṣa, Vāda-nyāya (or Codanā-prakaraṇa) and Santānāntarasiddhi.[4] Dharamakīrti has, thus, written seven logical works in total, which have become the fundamental works for the study of Buddhist logic and have even superseded the works of Diṅnāga. Among all of them, the Pramāṇa-vārttika is the most important one. It contains the main body of the system. A long series of commentaries and sub-commentaries,[5] written on this single work by the later Buddhist thinkers, is a very clear evidence as to how greatly the work was esteemed in the field of Buddhist logic.

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1. S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, BIL, p. 276.
2. cf. (i) M. Hattori, Introd. to DP, pp. 15-16.
   (ii) S.N. Shastri, Introd. to NBṬ, pp. 4-5.
3. Mahendra Kumāra Shastri's Introd. to Akalaṅkagranthatraya, pp. 18-21.
4. S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, HIL, pp. 306-19;
   Stcherbatsky, BL, I, p. 37;
   S.N. Shastri, Introd. to NBT, pp. 7-8.
5. HIL, pp. 319-37; BL, I, pp. 46-47 ; S.N. Shastri, Introd. to NBṬ, pp. 7-8.

In between Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, we find two other great Buddhist thinkers in the form of Śaṅkarasvāmin and Īśvarasena.[1] Śaṅkarasvāmin was a direct pupil of Diṅnāga. Nyāya-praveśa is regarded to be his important work, although there is quite divergence of opinion about its authorship.[2] Īśvarasena was also a renowned teacher of Buddhist logic. Dharmakīrti was his direct disciple.[3] No work by the name of Īśvarasena is yet found, although his views in the form of fragments are found scattered in the works of Buddhist and non-Buddhist writers.[4]

After Dharmakīrti, the tradition was followed by many eminent Buddhist logicians. A vast literature on the Buddhist logic was prepared. But unfortunately now only a few works are extant in Sanskrit.[5]

1.2. CONFLICT BETWEEN THE BUDDHIST AND OTHER INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS :

Buddhism originated as a revolt against the utterest *Karmakāṇḍa* and the theory of permanent soul of the Vaidika systems and also against the acute materialistic theories of the Cārvākas, who had totally discarded morality from life. Evidences of

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1. Baladeva Upādhyāya, BDM, pp. 319-20.
2. Ibid., p. 320; A.B. Dhruva, Introd. to NP, pp. v-xiii.
3. Baladeva Upādhyāya, BDM, p. 320.
4. S.N. Shastri "Ācārya Īśvarasena : A Historical and Philosophical Study," Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Vol. XXXIII, Nos. 1-4, 1976, pp. 93-99.
5. Tattva-saṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita, Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā of Kamalaśīla, Nyāya-bindu-ṭīka of Dharmottarācārya, Hetu-bindu-ṭīkā (or vivaraṇa) of Arcaṭa, Hetu-Bindu-Āloka of Durveka-Miśra, Pramāṇa-Vārttika-bhāṣya or (Alaṅkāra) of Prajñākara Gupta, Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali of Ratna-kīrti, Jñānaśrīmitra-nibandhāvali of Jñānaśrīmitra, Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākara Gupta, etc.

Note : For information about publication etc. see bibliography.

early conflict between Buddhism and other systems of Indian thought are traceable in the Pāli literature.[1]

The conflict can be traced even in the Sūtra literature. According to Jacobi, the Śūnyavāda doctrine has been repudiated in the Nyāya-sūtras and the Brahma-sūtras.[2] Pt. Rāhula Sāṁkṛtyāyana has tried to establish with proofs that in the 'Pramāṇa-parīkṣā' section of the Nyāya-Sūtras (2.1.8-19), Gautama, the Sūtrakāra has refuted the views of Nāgārjuna, expressed by him in his Vigrahavyāvartinī.[3] S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa has also found similarities of some passages of Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra as well as of Mādhyamika-sūtra with that of the Nyāya-sūtras.[4] It is a generally accepted view that only Śūnyavāda doctrines have been refuted in the Sūtra literature, Vijñānavāda was not developed till then.[5] However, as Woods asserts, idealism of Vijñānavāda has been attacked at some places in the Yoga-sūtras, although the Sūtras itself does not mention it explicitly as to which kind of idealism has been referred to there.[6]

So far as the Bhāṣya literature is concerned, it seems quite evident that the idealism of the Yogācāras has been repudiated at several times in the Śābarabhāṣya[7] as well as in the Yoga-bhāṣya.[8] It seems that Nyāyabhāṣya has also referred to and rejected the views of Vijñānavāda.[9] In the Praśastapāda-bhāṣya, there seems to be no clear reference to the Buddhists. It has, however, been observed by H. N. Randle that there is a similarity in the definition of *trirūpa-liṅga*, presented by Praśastapāda and Diṅnāga.[10] It had been a point

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1. Dīghanikāya, Pt. I, Brahmajāla-sutta and Sāmaññaphala-sutta.
2. Jacobi, "Dates of the Philosophical Sūtras of Brāhmaṇas", JAOS, XXXI (1911), as cited in CIR, p. 81 and in BDV, p. 20.
3. Introduction to Vigrahavyāvartinī, pp. iv-v.
4. HIL, pp. 46-47.
5. S.N. Shastri, BDV, p. 21.
6. J.H. Woods, Introduction to Yoga-system of Patañjali, pp. xvii-xviii.
7. SBh, 1.1.5.
8. Woods, op. cit.
9. NBh, 1.1.10.
10. FFD, p. 23.

of controversy for some time as to who was earlier between Praśastapāda and Diṅnāga. But now it is accepted by the majority of scholars that Praśastapāda was either prior to or contemporary of Vasubandhu and hence Diṅnāga, being the pupil of Vasubandhu, was much posterior to Praśastapāda.[1]

Diṅnāga, who has aptly been called the founder of the Buddhist logic, had, in fact, invoked a revolution in the whole of Indian thought. This period has been regarded as the most glorious period of Indian philosophy.[2] Several valuable and thought-provoking doctrines were propounded in this very time. Two branches—the Buddhist and the non-Buddhist grew side by side, reacting upon and influencing each other. One cannot be fully understood and appreciated without the background of the other.[3]

Diṅnāga, in his *magnum opus*, Pramāṇa-samuccaya as well as in his other philosophical treatise like Ālaṁbana-parīkṣā, bitterly criticised the naive realism of the Vaidika systems, specially of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mimāṁsā, and propounded his own theories on logic and metaphysics. He refuted the Nyāya-sūtra and the Vātsyāyanabhāṣya with all his efforts.[4] The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers had to accept the challenge and hence, Uddyotakara (about 6th cent. A.D.)[5] plunged into the field. He composed a big treatise, named 'Nyāya-vārttika', which was intended to be a defence of the Sūtra and Bhāṣya against the attacks of Diṅnāga. He himself declares in the opening stanza of the Nyāya-vārttika that 'the work is being composed to dispell the darkness caused by the pseudo-philosophers'.[6] Vācaspati Miśra has explained that the pseudo-philosophers referred to by Uddyotakara are none else than Diṅnāga, etc.[7] Uddyotakara not only replied to the

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1. S.N. Shastri, BDV, p. 22.
2. CIR, p. 95.
3. Cf. Ibid., p. 26.
4. PS, Chap. I (Adyār ed.); Dignāga, on Perception; Ālaṁbana-parīkṣā.
5. Gopinātha Kavirāja's Introd. to Gautama's Nyāya-sūtras, p. XV; CIR, p' 109.
6. कुतार्किकाज्ञाननिवृत्तिहेतुः NV, p. 1 (Cal. SS).
7. कुतार्किकैः दिग्नागप्रभृतिभिः NVTṬ, p. 2 (Cal. SS)

objections raised by Diṅnāga, but also criticised and repudiated with equal force, the Buddhist doctrines, set forth by Vasubandhu and Diṅnāga.

After Uddyotakara, the reins of Realism (*Bāhyārthavāda*) were held on behalf of the Vaidika systems, by the thinkers of Pūrvamīmāṁsā school, specially by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara.[1] They will be discussed later on. Although we are mainly concerned with the conflict between the Buddhists and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, it would not be out of place to give a brief account of the conflict between the two camps of Indian philosophy, which took place after Kumārila.

The objections raised by Uddyotakara and Kumārila against the Buddhist theories, specially against Diṅnāga, were replied by Dharmakīrti, the great exponent of Diṅnāga. Dharmakīrti, in his *magnun opus*, Pramāṇavārttika and also in his other philosophical treatises, met with the objections.[2] He explained the theories of Diṅnāga and sometimes gave a new touch to them in order to safeguard the Buddhist position.[3] He imposed some fresh charges as well, upon the rival theories.

Probably in the same period, a similar type of conflict was going on in India between the Buddhists and the school of Uttaramīmāṁsā (Vedānta), chief representative of which was Ādi Śaṅkarācārya. He wrote commentaries on the Prasthānatrayī[4] and established the doctrine of Advaita Vedānta. While propounding his own views, he referred to and repudiated the Buddhist doctrines vehemently.[5]

After Śaṅkara, there appears in the field of Indian philosophy a dynamic personality in the form of Vācaspati Miśra. He, through his versatile genius and all-round learning, wrote many important and authoritative critical commentaries on almost all the Vaidika systems of Indian philosophy. His exposition of every philosophical system is so faithful and dispassionate that it appears as if he is the true follower of the same school of which he is expounding.[1] Although he has not composed any commentary or independent treatise on the Buddhist philosophy, he faithfully presents the Buddhist views as *pūrvapakṣa* and also refutes them vehemently. Nyāya-vārttikatātparya-ṭīkā, Nyāya-kaṇikā and Bhāmatī are his most valuable works from the point of view of the conflict between the Buddhist and the Vaidika systems.[2]

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[1] cf. CIR, p. 6.

[2] ct. D.N. Shastri, CIR. pp. 6, iii; Mahendra Kumara, Introd. to Akalaṅkagranthatraya, pp. 19-21.

[3] cf. BL, I, p. 37, CIR, p. 111.

[4] Upaniṣads, Brahmasūtra, and Śrimad Bhagavad Gītā, are called as Prasthānatrayī in Indian Philosophy.

[5] BSŚBh, 2.2.18-32; Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, IV, 3. pp. 566 ff.

There is a big contribution of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also to the conflict. He is the author of Nyāya-mañjari, which is regarded as one of the three invaluable jewels of Indian philosophy, the remaining two being Dharmakīri's Pramāṇavārttika and Kumārila's Śloka-vārttika.[3] Jayanta flourished in the reign of King Śaṅkaravarman (885-902 A.D.).[4] According to the investigations of Dr. Nagin J. Shah, he was prior to or a senior contemporary of Vācaspati Miśra.[5] He is famous for "his rare wit, sharp repartee and delightful lucidity."[6]

Next to Jayanta, there are the names of two great masters, Udayana and Śrīdhara. They both belong to the close of the 10th century A.D.[7] Contribution of all these thinkers is great to the conflict which continued for a period of several centuries until the Buddhist religion and philosophy totally disappeared from the Indian soil.

1.3. THE CONFLICT AND THE SCHOOL OF PŪRVA-MĪMĀṀSĀ :

In the beginning, the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsa school was concerned mainly with the rituals and sacrifices of the Brāhmaṇa Granthas. It had very little to do with the problems of metaphysics and epistemology.[8] But when, from the time of Śabara

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1. S.N. Shastri, BDV, p. 9.
2. Ibid., pp. 13-17.
3. cf. Nagin J. Shah, Introd. to NMGB, p. 3.
4. cf. op. cit. p. 2.
5. cf. op. cit.
6. D. N. Shastri, CIR, p. 7.
7. loc. cit.
8. cf. CIR, pp. 6-7

svāmin, the Buddhist philosophers began to come forward to attack the doctrines of *Karma-kāṇḍa* and *bāhyārthavāda* (realism), when the authority of Vedas was freely questioned and criticised by the Buddhists and other anti-Vaidika thinkers, the exponents of the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā system were compelled to review and re-establish their theories. The necessity produced two great thinkers, namely, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara.[1] It were they alone who, for the first time, gave a strong philosophical background to this system.[2]

From the advent of Kumārila and Prabhākara, the system of Pūrva-mīmāṁsā, due to the divergence of opinions, was divided into two distinct schools known as the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara schools, after the names of their expounders.[3] Both the thinkers wrote many valuable commentaries on the Śābarabhāṣya.[4] They could establish their theories only after refuting the opponents' theories, specially of Diṅnāga school. In fact, the Buddhist doctrines have given a creditable stimulus to the metaphysics and epistemology of Pūrva-mīmaṁsā, "Prabhākara and Kumārila, however, in the course of their defence of realism, evolved certain epistemological theories, which were strikingly bold and original in conception."[5]

No doubt, Kumārila and Prabhākara both took upon their shoulders equally the burden of repudiating the Buddhist tenets, but the real opponent was Kumārila, because it was he alone who opposed the Buddhist views with sound arguments. On the other hand, Prabhākara has been called by Prof, Stcherbatsky as the "bastard son of Buddhism,'[6] as he was influenced by the Buddhist philosophy to a great extent.

Kumārila rejects the Buddhist doctrines in his works—Śloka-vārttika, the Tantra-vārttika and the Ṭupṭīkā, while Prabhākara did the same in his treatises, Bṛhatī and Lāghvī.

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1. cf. K.S. Ramaswami Sastri, Introd. to Tarkarahasya, pp. xiii-xiv.
2. cf. CIR, p. 65.
3. cf. G.N. Jhā, PMS, p. 15.
4. (i) Śl. Vār., TV and Ṭupṭīkā of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.
   (ii) Bṛhatī and Lāghvī of Prabhākara.
5. D.N. Shastri, CIR, p. 7.
6. BL, I, p. 51.

After Kumārila and Prabhākara, we can consider the names of Bhaṭṭoṁveka,[1] Jaya-miśra,[2] Pārthasārathi Miśra.[3] Sucarita Miśra,[4] Śālikanātha Miśra,[5] etc., as the later Mīmāṁsā thinkers, who went ahead on the path of conflict with the Buddhists, although their contribution is not as substancial as that of Kumārila and Prabhākara.

1.4. LIFE, DATE AND WORKS OF KUMĀRILA BHAṬṬA (THE AUTHOR OF ŚLOKA-VĀRTTIKA) :

(i) *Life* :

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, author of the Śloka-vārttika, occupies a unique place not only in the history of Pūrva-mīmāṁsā, but also in that of the whole Indian philosophy, inasmuch as he was one among the chief critics of Buddhism and the defender of the Vaidika religion and philosophy.[6]

We know very little about his life, as only a few points are known about him. He was a learned scholar of Mīmāṁsā, having an extra-ordinary talent and is regarded as an incarnation of Kumāra Kārtikeya.[7] The first verse of the Śloka-vārttika reveals him as a devotee of Lord Śiva.[8]

There are some stories about his life, coming down to us through tradition. According to a story, Śaṅkarācārya once decided to meet Kumārila to ask him to compose a Vārttika on his Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya. At Prayāga he heard that Kumārila had decided to burn himself in *tuṣānala* (fire of paddy husk). He hurried to him, but by that time Kumārila had entered the fire. Śaṅkarārcārya tried to prevent him from self-immolation, but Kumārila was firm on his decision. He told Śaṅkarācārya that he had committed two serious sins. First he had insulted his Buddhist teacher by defeating him in debate in a big assembly; secondly, he had repudiated the existence of God, the creator. In order to make amends for these two sins, he had decided to depart from his life in this way. Kumārila advised Śaṅkarācārya to defeat Maṇḍana Miśra (a disciple of Kumārila) in debate and to make him the follower of his system.[1]

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[1] Śloka-Vārttika-Vyākhyā, (Tātparya-ṭīkā).
[2] Śarkarikā.
[3] Nyāya-ratnākara, Nyāyaratnam, Śāstra-dīpikā.
[4] Kāśikā-ṭīkā.
[5] Prakaraṇa-pañcikā.
[6] BL, I, p. 35.
[7] (i) इत्यूचिवांसमथ भट्टकुमारिलं त-
मीषद्विकस्वरमुखाम्बुजमाह मौनी ।
श्रुत्यार्थकर्मविमुखान् सुगतान्निहन्तुं
जातं गुहं भुवि भवन्तमहं तु जाने ॥
Śaṅkara-digvijaya : VII, 106.

(ii) Introd. to NR, p. 4.
[8] Śl. Vār., 1.1.1.

There is another story related to Kumārila and the renowned Buddhist scholar Dharmakīrti, which runs thus : Dharmakīrti, desirous of being acquainted with the secret doctrines of the Vaidika system, went southwards disguised as a slave. On inquiring he found Brāhmaṇa-Kumārila as a suitable master. He started working as a slave for him. When Dharmakīrti alone performed the work of 50 slaves in his service, Kumārila and his wife were greatly satisfied. They allowed him to hear the secret doctrines of the Vaidika system. Having thus obtained the knowledge of the secret Vaidika doctrines, he left him. Then he challenged the followers of Vaidika systems, entered upon debates and being victorious, converted them to Buddhism. Kumārila was enraged at it and appeared with 500 followers for a debate with him. Kumārila was defeated and in pursuance of his extra-ordinary pledge, accepted Buddhism alongwith his followers.[2]

The relation of Kumārila with Prabhākara is a matter of controversy. According to a tradition, Prabhākara was a pupil of Kumārila This tradition is supported by the Sarvasidhānta-rahasya attributed to Śeṣa.

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1. Śaṅkara-digvijaya, Canto VII.
2. HIL, p. 304-5.
3. मीमांसावार्त्तिकं भाट्टं भट्टाचार्यकृतं हि तत् ॥
   तच्छिष्योल्पभेदेन शाबरस्य मतान्तरम् ।
   प्रभाकरगुरुश्चक्रे तद्धि प्राभाकरं मतम् ॥
   Sarvasiddhānta-rahasya as cited in PMS, p. 16.

According to Dr. P.V. Kane Kumārila seems to have been an inhabitant of the Tamil or Malayalam country in South India, as he mentions many words (p. 157, Tantravārttika) in these dilects, though he seems to have been familiar with the popular dilect of Lāṭa (a district near modern Surat p. 200, p. 989).[1]

(*ii*) *Date* :

The date of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa has not yet been definitely fixed. There are different views among scholars. Some place him before Dharmakīrti, while others regard him as posterior to him. According to some scholars he was the teacher and an older contemporary of Prabhākara, while some other hold that Prabhākara was senior to him Some scholars opine that he was an older contemporary of Śaṅkarācārya, the propounder of Advaita Vedānta.

There are mainly three views regarding his date ; some place him in the middle of the 6th century A.D., others put him in the 7th century A.D., and still others have fixed his time in the 8th century A.D.

Prof C. Kunhana Raja has fixed Kumārila's date in the middle of the sixth century A.D.[2] But a majority of scholars is of the opinion that Kumārila flourished during the 7th century A.D.,[3] although they too have diverse views regarding

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1. P.V. Kane, "A Brief Sketch of the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā system", ABORI, Vol. VI, Pt. I, (July 1924), p. 15.
2. Introduction to SVTṬ, p. XIII.
3. (i) G.N. Jhā, PMS, p. 21.
   (ii) S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, HIL, p. 138 (fn. 1.)
   (iii) S. Radhakrishnan, Bhāratīyadarśana, Vol. II, p. 372.
   (iv) Paśupatinātha, Sastri, Introd. to Pūrva-mīmāṁsā, p. 63.
   (v) S. Kuppuswami, Sastri, Introd. to Brahmasiddhi, p. LVIII; "The Prabhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā" II AIOC, 1922, pp. 407-12.
   (vi) V.A. Ramaswami Sastri, Preface to SV Kāśikā, p (i)
   (vii) K.S. Ramaswami Sastri, Introd. to Tarkarahaṣya, p. XVI.
   (viii) A. Subramanyam Sastri, Introd. to P. Pañcikā, p. 22.
   (ix) Pt. Mahendra Kumar Shastri, Introd. to Akalaṅkagranthatraya, p. 21.

his exact-date. His priority or posteriority to Prabhākara and Dharmakīrti is also not certain according to them.

Kumārila and Prabhākara : As mentioned above, Prabhākara is regarded as a pupil of Kumārila according to the tradition.[1] But Dr. Gaṅgānātha Jhā is of the opinion that the internal evidence of the works of the two protagonists is against this view and that Prabhākara's works must be assigned to a period before Kumārila, inasmuch as the works of Prabhākara do not presuppose Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's vārttika, while the latter might, in all probability, be said to presuppose Prabhākara's works,[2] Dr. A.B. Keith and Prof. Paśupatinātha Sāstri have also agreed with Dr. Jhā's opinion, and Dr. Keith seems to go a step further in assigning both Prabhākara and Sālikanātha to a date earlier than that of Kumārila.[3]

Prof. P.V. Kane also sees the possibility of Prabhākara's being older than Kumārila, because in the Prabodha-candrodaya (II.3) four great thinkers of the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā have been mentioned in the sequence of Gurū, Kumārila, Śārika (Śālikanātha) and Vācaspati.[4] The last three names have been mentioned here according to the priority in time, hence it is quite possible that Prabhākara was little older than Kumārila.[5]

But Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, another renowned scholar of Mīmāṁsā, after a thorough investigation of some manuscripts of Prabhākara's works, has reached the following conclusions :

(a) "The tradition that Prabhākara-guru was one of Kumārila's pupils, cannot be brushed aside easily, particularly because it is supported by the historically acceptable grounds."[6]

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[1] P.V. Kane, "The Pūrva-mīmāṁsā system" ABORI (1924) Vol. VI, pt. I, pp. 15-16,

[2] PMS, pp. 17-18.

[3] cf. (i) A.B, Keith, Karma-mīmāṁsā, p. 9, n. 2.
(ii) Pāśupatinātha Śāstri, Introd. to the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā, pp. 43, 63.

[4] नैवाश्रावि गुरोर्मतं न विदितं कौमारिलं दर्शनं तत्त्वज्ञानमहो न शारिकगिरां वाचस्पतेः का कथा ।

[5] P.V. Kane, "The Pūrva-mīmāṁsā system," ABORI (1924), Vol. VI, Pt. I, p. 16.

[6] S. Kuppuswami Sastri, "Prabhākara School of Pūrva-mīmāṁsā" II AIOC Calcutta, held in 1922 (1923), p. 411.

(b) "Prabhākara's Bṛhatī could not be assigned to a date earlier than that of Kumārila, if the high authority of Sālikanātha and Bhavanātha is accepted.'[1]

(c) The Vārttikakāra, referred to in the manuscript of Ṛjuvimalā, must be Kumārila, because, if the Vārttikakāra mentioned here is other than Kumārila, he would not have invoked Prabhākara's views to offer refutatory comments.[2]

(d) The Vārttikakāra, referred to in the Mīmāṁsa-nyāyakośa of Prabhākara is not different from Kumārila, because the identity of this Vārttikakāra with Kumārila is strongly supported by the text of the Śloka-vārttika.[3]

Thus, according to Prof. S.K. Sastri, Kumārila was a senior contemporary of Prabhākara.

Kumārila, Dharmakīrti and Diṅnāga : According to the Tibetan tradition, Kumārila and Dharmakīrti are regarded as contemporaries.[4] The story mentioned before[5] about Dharmakīrti and Kumārila, also affirms this very view. But the question is still undecided as to who among them was senior. It is believed by Prof. K.B. Pathak that Kumārila has referred to and criticised Dharmakīrti in his works. In support of his contention Prof. Pathak points out the commentaries of Pārthasārathi Miśra and Sucarita Miśra and some verses of the Ślokavārttika, about which he presumes that they have been quoted there from Pramāṇa-vārttika of Dharmakīrti. But a careful study of these verses, will reveal the fact that the verses quoted by Kumārila originally belong either to the works of Vasubandhu or of Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti has only reproduced them in his work.[6]

On the other hand, the fact is that Dharmakīrti has refuted and replied the works of Kumārila. Pt. Mahendra Kumara

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1. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, "Prabhākara School of Pūrvamīmāṁsā" II AIOC Calcutta, held in 1922 (1923) p. 411.
2. Ibid., p.4 09.
3. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, "Further light on the Prabhākara problem," III AIOC, Madras, held in Dec. 1924 (1925) pp. 474-75.
4. Bhattacharya, Introd. to TS, p. 80.
5. Supra I, 4. i.
6. cf. M.K Śastri, Introd. to Siddhi-viniścaya-ṭīkā, p. 38 and Introd. to Akalaṅkagranthatraya, pp. 18-19.

Shastri, the learned editor of so many Jain treatises, has vividly shown in his introduction to Akalaṅkagranthatraya, etc. as to how Dharmakīrti has replied to the question of *sarvajñatva-dharmajña-tva* of Lord Buddha and *Śabda-nityatva-anityatva*, etc., raised by Kumārila in his works. He has clearly shown on the basis of internal evidence, that Kumārila was an older contemporary of Dharmakīrti and fixed his time from 620-690 A.D.[1]

The above view can be established from this fact also that Kumārila has refuted the definition of *pratyakṣa* accepted by Diṅnāga (*pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham*), but not that held by Dharmakīrti (*pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam*).[2] Kumārila has referred to and criticised Diṅnāga's view, very frequently, specially in the Apohavāda section of the Śl. Vār.,[3] while it does not seem that he refers to Dharmakīrti at any place.

It can, therefore be derived that Kumārila was definitely later than Diṅnāga but earlier than Dharmakīrti. Dates of Diṅnāga have been approximately fixed by E. Frauwallner and M. Hattori as A.C. 480-540.[4]

Kumārila and Bhartṛhari : It has been found by Dr. Hattori that Diṅnāga has quoted some verses from the Vākyapadīya in the fifth chapter of his Pramāṇa-samuccaya.[5] On this basis it can be presumed that Diṅnāga was later than Bhartṛhari and hence there is no room for doubt that Kumārila flourished after Diṅnāga as well as Bhartṛhari. It is further evident from the fact that Kumārila has referred to and criticised Bhartṛhari's views in his works several times,[1] specially in the Sphoṭavāda.[2]

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[1] cf. (i) Introd. to Akalaṅkagranthatraya, pp. 19-21.
(ii) Introd. to Siddhiviniścaya-ṭīkā, pp. 38-39, 42.

[2] cf. Śl. Vār., 1.1.4.137.

[3] (i) Śl. Vār., 1.1.5. Apohavāda, also its commentaries;
(ii) M. Hattori, "A study of the chapter on apoha of the Mīmāṁsā-śloka-vārttika." Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, No. 14 & 15 (1973, 74).

[4] M. Hattori, Introd. to 'Diṅnāga, on perception,' pp. 4, 6

[5] Ibid p. 6.

It is generally accepted on the basis of I-Tsing's records that Bhartṛhari lived in 650 A.D. but recent researches of Muni Jambuvijayaji have suggested that Bhartṛhari must have lived during the last quarter of the 4th cent. A.D.[3] Prof. Bruno had already fixed 450 A.D. instead of 603-653 A.D. as his date.[4]

Kumārila and Śaṅkarācārya : Kumārila has been regarded as an older contemporary of Śaṅkarācārya on the basis of the story, mentioned in different Śaṅkara-digvijayas.[5] The date generally accepted for Śaṅkara is 788-820 A.D.[6] But Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri on the basis of the new data, collected by Dr. T. R. Cintāmaṇi in his article, has assigned Śaṅkara's literary activities to the period of 632 to 664 A.D-[7]

It can, therefore, be concluded in the light of the above discussion, that Kumārila was later than Bhartṛhari as well as Diṅnāga, but was a senior contemporary of Prabhākara, Dharmakīrti and Śaṅkarācārya, although the chronolngical order of the later three thinkers is not definite. As the dates of Diṅnāga, who is regarded to be later than Bhartṛhari, have been fixed A.D. 480-540 and the dates of Śaṅkarācārya are accepted as A.D. 632-664, the dates of Kumārila can be assumed in between the secondhalf of the 6th century and the first half of the 7th century A.D.

(iii) *Works* :

The fundamental treatise of the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā system is in the form of Mīmāṁsā-sūtras of Jaimini, which are perhaps, the oldest among all the sūtra literature of Indian Philosophy. At present Śābara-bhāṣya is the only available commentary on these sūtras, although the reference of other commentators

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1. (i) Vākyapadīya 2.81 and TV. p. 251-253.
   (ii) Vākyapadīya 1.7 and TV. p. 209-10.
   (iii) Vākyapadīya 2.1-2 and Śl. vār. Vākyādhikaraṇa Kā 5
2. Śl. Vār., Sphoṭavāda.
3. M.K. Shastri, Introd. to Siddhiviniścaya-ṭīkā, p. 36-37.
4. C. Kunhana Raja, Introd. to SVTṬ, p. xiii.
5. Supra 1.4.1.
6. (i) Introd. to NR, p. 1.
   (ii) S.N. Dasgupta, HIP, I, pp. 370-71.
7. Introd. to Brahmasiddhi, pp. LVII-LV III.

like Upavarṣa, Bhavadāsa. Bhartṛmitra, Hari, etc. are found scyttered in different philosophical works. Their works are not extant to us.[1]

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa wrote a voluminous commentary called *Vārttika* on the whole of Śābara-bhāṣya. The term *Vārttika* has been derived from the word *Vṛtti* or *Vārtā*. It has been defined by scholars as "the exposition of the meaning of that which is said, of that which is left unsaid and of that which is ill or imperfectly said."[2] The Vārttika of Kumārila brings into light not only those meanings of the bhāṣya, which are lying latent here but it also discusses such matters in detail, which are not even spoken of in the bhāṣya. It is an encyclopaedic treatise on all the philosophical and epistemological problems of the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā school and nearly supersedes the bhāṣya text itself. All the later thinkers of Pūrva-mīmāṁsā support their views by the passages quoted from it. In fact this Vārttika enjoys a very unique place in the history of Pūrva-mīmāṁsā system.[3]

The Vārttika, written on all the 12 chapters of the bhāṣya, has been divided into three parts, which are generally regarded as three separate works of Kumārila. They are named as : (i) Mīmāṁsā-śloka-vārttika, (ii) Tantra-vārttika and (iii) Ṭupṭīkā.[4] In addition to these, two other works, named Madhyma-ṭīkā and Bṛhaṭṭīkā, are also attributed to Kumārila by Mādhava Sarasvatī in his Sarva-darśana-kaumudī, but they are not extant to us at present.[5] Apart from being an exponent of Indian philosophy, Kumārila is also believed to have been a poet and some of his metrical compositions are cited in later literature.[1] The necessary available information about his works is given below :

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[1] cf. (i) G.N. Jhā, PMS, p. 13.
(ii) D.V. Garge, Citations in Śābara-bhāṣya, pp. 7-8.

[2] cf. (i) उक्तानुक्तदुरुक्तचिन्ता वार्त्तिकम् Kāvya-mīmāṁsā, p. 11.
(ii) Monier Williams, Skt. Eng. Dictionary, p. 945, col. 2.

[3] cf. T.V. Rāmacandra Dikṣita, Preface to Tantraratnam, pt. III, p. क.

[4] cf. PMS, pp. 20-21.

[5] तत्र सहस्राधिकरणद्वादशलक्षण्या मीमांसायाश्चतुर्विशतिसहस्रं शवरस्वामिकृतं भाष्यम् । तदुपरि प्रस्थानद्वयम् भाट्टं प्राभाकरमिति । तत्र भट्टाचार्याणां पञ्चव्याख्यानानि भाष्यस्य, एका बृहट्टीका, द्वितीया मध्यमटीका, तृतीया टुप्टीका, चतुर्थी कारिका, पञ्चमं तन्त्रवार्त्तिकमुक्तानुक्तदुरुक्तचिन्तकम् । तत्र बृहन्मध्यमटीके सम्प्रति न वर्तेते ।
Mādhava Sarasvatī's Sarva-darśana-kaumudi (T.S.S. ed. No. 135, p. 90), as cited in Introd. to Kāśikā, p. 1.

(i) *Mīmāṁsā-śloka-vārttika* : Kumārila's first part of *Vārttika* named as 'Mīmāṁsā-śloka-vārttika' distinguishes itself from other Vārttikas and śloka-vārttikas of Indian philosophy and grammar.[2] A detailed information about this treatise is being supplied subsequently.[3]

(ii) *Tantra-vārttika* : The second part of this *vārttika* has been named as 'Tantra-vārttika'. It deals with the subjects of the bhāṣya, starting from the second *pāda* of the first chapter and ending with the eighth *pāda* i.e. the last *pāda* of the third chapter. It has been composed mainly in prose, but Kārikā form has also been used very frequently.[4] The second, third and fourth *pāda* of the first chapter deal with *artha-vāda-prāmāṇya*, *smṛti-prāmāṇya* and *nāmadheya-prāmāṇya* respectively. The first three *pādas* of the second chapter deal with the 'differentiation among actions' (*Karma-bheda*). The fourth i.e. the last *pāda* of the second chapter discusses differentiation of usages' (*Prayoga-bheda*). The third i.e. the last chapter of this vārttika gives a detailed account of 'auxiliaries' (*aṅgatva-vicāra*).

This is a unique work, which shows deep learning of the author. Here Kumārila has shown his mastery over the other

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1. C. Kunhana Raja, Introd. to SVTṬ, pp. XXII-XXIII.
2. There are various *vārttikas* in Indian philosophy and grammar e.g. Nyāya-vārttika, Pramāṇa-vārttika, Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārttika, Nirukta-vārttika, Vyākaraṇa-vārttika (of Kātyāyana), Jaina-Śloka-vārttika, etc. Some of them are composed in verse form, some others are in sūtra form and some are the mixture of prose and verse.
   cf. Vedapati Miśra's "Vyākaraṇa-vārttika Eka Adhyayana."
3. Infra., 1.5.
4. cf. T.V. Rāmacandra Dīkṣita, Preface to Tantra-ratnam, Pt. II, p. 'क'
5. For a detailed information, see TV (ASS) and 'Mīmāṁsānukramaṇikā' of Maṇḍana Miśra.

schools of thought as well. Tantra-vārttika, being the *magnum opus* of Kumārila, seems to have attracted several commentators.[1] 'Nyāyasuddhā', known as 'Rāṇaka' by Someśvara Bhaṭṭa is the most popular commentary on the work.[2]

(iii) *Ṭupṭīkā* : Ṭupṭīkā is the third part of his commentary. It comments upon the rest nine chapters of the Śābara-bhāṣya. It is very brief and is composed of brief and subtle sentences like sūtras.[3] Although 'Ṭupṭīkā' is not so important, it has attracted several scholars to write commentaries. The most important one is the 'Tantraratna' by Pārthasārathi Miśra. It has been partly published in Saraswati Bhavana Sanskrit Text Series, Banaras.

(iv-v) *Bṛhaṭṭīkā and Madhyamaṭīkā* : Two other works named as 'Bṛhaṭṭīkā' and 'Madhyamaṭīkā' are also supposed to be the works of Kumārila, although they are not extant to us. In the Catalogus Catalogorum of Dr. Aufrecht, the Bṛhaṭṭīkā is entered on p. 375 as a work of Kumārila.[4] In the Catalogus of Hall it appears on p. 170-71 as : "The author of Tantracūḍāmaṇi or Kṛṣṇadeva asserts that Vārttika is a common name of five separate works of Kumārila. The Bṛhaṭṭīkā, , Maddhyamaṭīkā, Kārikā, Tantraṭīkā and Ṭupṭīkā, these compositions diminishing as to size from first to last in the order in which their appellations are here arranged."[5]

It is evident from a verse of the Nyāyasudhā also that Kumārila was the author of a work other than the three extant treatises. Bhaṭṭa Someśvara states that for his commentary, Nyāyasudhā, he is dependent upon a celebrated work of Kumārila, which probably deals with only the first four chapters of the

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1. G.N Jhā, PMS, p. 22.
2. Nyāyasudhā of Someśvara Bhaṭṭa, (Ch. SS.)
3. Preface to Tantra-ratnam, Pt. III. p. 'क'
4. K.S. Ramaswami Sastri and A. Sanskaran, "Kumārila and Bṛhaṭṭīkā" III AIOC Madras, p. 526.
5. Ibid.

Mīmāṁsā-Śāstra.[1] This work might have been the Bṛhaṭṭīkā.

Further, in the Nyāyasudhā, some references and extracts have been found from the Bṛhaṭṭīkā,[2] whereas no reference or extract from Madhyamaṭīkā has so far been noted anywhere Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri is of the opinion that the *daśapākṣī* (ten interpretations attributed to Vārttikakāra) referred to in the beginning of the Nayaviveka was originally given by Kumārila in one of his two lost works—Bṛhaṭṭīkā or Madhyamaṭīkā.[3]

A much more convincing evidence of Bṛhaṭṭīkā has been found in the works of two Buddhist philosophers—Ratnakīrti and Śāntarakṣita. Ratnakīrti has quoted 23 verses from this book of Kumārila, whereas Śāntarakṣita has given only 22 verses.[4] There are fourteen more verses from some Mīmāṁsā work which are quoted in the Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī and Tattvasaṅgraha both. Prof. Ananta Lal Thakur is of the opinion that they also may be from some work of Bhaṭṭa Kumārila.[5]

1,5. MĪMĀṀSĀ-ŚLOKA-VĀRTTIKA AND ITS COMMENTARIES:

Mīmāṁsā-śloka-vārttika presents an extensive commentary on the first *pāda* i.e. the Tarkapāda of the first chapter of the Śābara-bhāṣya in 3349 verses. Tarkapāda is the most essential part of the Mīmāṁsā and it is due to this that the system of Pūrva-mīmāṁsā has been raised to the status of an independent system of philosophy.[6] It has been divided in eight *adhikara-*

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[1] (i) तस्मात्सर्वान्निबन्धानपरमपि चतुर्ष्वेव भट्टप्रणीतं
मीमांसासारविद्वद् बहुमतनिचयं चोपजीव्यादरेण ।
युक्तीश्चालोच्य सम्यग् बहुविदभिमतो माधवार्यस्य सूनुः
सोमेशः कर्तुमैच्छत्सकलविवृतये तन्त्रटीकां सुटीकाम् ॥
Nyāyasudhā, p. 1546

(ii) K.S. Ramaswami Sastri, op. cit. p. 526.

[2] Nyāyasudhā, pp. 201, 329, 330, 393.

[3] S. Kuppuswami Sastri, "Further light on the Prabhākara problem," III AIOC, Madras (1925), p. 475.

[4] A.L. Thakur, Preface to RN, p. 28.

[5] Ibid. p. 28.

[6] Introd. to Tarka-rahasya, p. xvii

ṇas. The main object of Kumārila in writing the Vārttika on the bhāṣya is to establish the Mīmāṁsā-śāstra as an *āstika-darśana*, especially because it was being thought in certain respects very near to the *Lokāyata* philosophy due to the explanations of some previous commentators.[1]

The first *adhikaraṇa* of this *Vārttika* explains the *pratijñā-sūtra i.e.* '*athāto dharma-jijñāsā*', in which enquiry of *dharma* has been made as the first and foremost purpose of the Mīmāṁsāśāstra.[2]

The second *adhikaraṇa* containing the sūtra '*codanālakṣaṇo-artho dharmaḥ*' explains the nature of *dharma*. It exclaims that *codanā* i.e. the Vaidika-injunction is the only authority on *dharma*. It (*codanā*) has the supreme and extraodinary power to make known the objects of the past, present and future, gross and subtle, remote and near. Other *pramāṇas* like *pratyakṣa* do not have this unique power.[3] The Vaidika texts, being *apauruṣeya*, are self-valid (*svataḥ pramāṇa*). The doctrine of validity of cognition (*jñāna-prāmāṇya*) has been discussed at length in this *adhikaraṇā*.[4]

The third *adhikaraṇa* containing the sūtra *tasya-nimitta-parīṣṭiḥ* proposes an examination of the means of knowing *dharma*.[5]

The fourth *adhikaraṇa* containing the fourth sūtra explains that the *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* cannot be the source of knowing *dharma*, since it generates cognitions with objects that exist only at present.[6] In this *adhikaraṇa*, Kumārila examines the views of other philosophical systems like that of the Buddhists and the

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[1] cf. प्रायेणैव हि मीमांसा लोके लोकायतीकृता ।
तामास्तिकपथे कर्तुमयं यत्नः कृतो मया ।
Śl. Vār., I, 1.1. kā. 10.

[2] Śl. Vār., I. 1.1. kā. 11.

[3] SBh., I. 1. ii.

[4] Śl. Vār., I. 1. ii.

[5] Śl. Vār., I. 1. iii.

[6] सत्संप्रयोगे पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजन्मतत्प्रयक्षमनिमित्तं विद्यमानोपलम्भनत्वात् ॥ JS. I. 1. iv.

Vedāntins and discusses in detail the nature and kinds of *pratyakṣa* according to the Mīmāṁsā philosophy.[1]

The fifth *adhikarṇa* containing the fifth sūtra[2] establishes that since word. meaning and their relation are eternal, the Vaidika injunctions (*upadeśa* or *codanā*) is the infallible authority on *dharma*, which cannot be known from other sources. Under this *adhikaraṇa*, there are about 18 sections in the Vārttika. There is a section, in which Vṛttikāra's interpretations have been discussed in detail. Two separate sections, named as Nīrālambanavāda and Sūnyavāda have been composed in order to reject the doctrine of 'the non-existence-of-external-world' (*bāhyārthabhaṅgavāda*) of the Yogācāras and the Mādhyamikas[3] and to establish to objective reality of the world.

Anumāna, śabda, upamāna, arthāpatti and *abhāva pramāṇas* have been defined and discussed by Kumārila in this very *adhikaraṇa*, but each in one separate section. After that there are two sections on *Citrākṣepa* and *Sambandhākṣepa*. In the subsequent sections, viz., Sphoṭavāda, Ākṛtivāda. Apohavāda, Vanavāda, etc., the problem of meaning of word has been discussed at length according to the different thoughts of Indian philosophy. In Ātmavāda section, the existence and eternity of soul has been established according to the Mīmāṁsā philosophy and adversaries' views regarding soul have been refuted.

The last three *adhikaraṇas* (i.e. 6th, 7th, 8th) have been named as 'Śabda-nityatā-adhikaraṇa,' 'Vākyādhikaraṇa,' and 'Veda-nityatā-adhikaraṇa.' The 'Śabda-nityatā-adhikaraṇa' discusses in detail the problems of the eternity of word; 'Vākyādhikaraṇa' deels with the nature and meaning of sentence and the last *adhikaraṇa* establishes that the Vedas are eternal and

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[1] Śl. Vār., I. 1. iv.

[2] औत्पात्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धस्तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशोऽव्यतिरेकश्चाऽर्थेऽनुपलब्धे तत्प्रमाण वादरायणस्यानपेक्षत्वात् ॥ JS, I. 1. v.

[3] The titles 'Nīrālambanavāda' and Śūnyavāda' seem to be referring to the Yogācāra's theory of *bāhyārthaśūnya*, and the Mādhyamika's theory of *vijñāna-śūnya* respectively, but the fact is that both the sections refute only the theory of '*bāhyārthaśūnya*' being commonly acceptable to both the schools. Also see Infra., VI. 2.

apauruṣeya and hence they are the only source of knowing *dharma*.

Commentaries :

There are four commentaries on the Śloka-vārttika so far known to us, viz., Ślokavārttikavyākhyā-Tātparyaṭīkā of Uṁveka Bhaṭṭa, 'Śarkarikā of Bhaṭṭaputra Jayamiśra, Kāśikā of Sucarita Miśra and Nyāya-ratnākara of Pārthasārathi Miśra.

(i) *Śloka-vārttikavyākhyā Tātparyaṭīkā* : It is the earliest available commentary on Kumārila's Mīmāṁsā-Śloka-vārttika. It was first published in 1940 under Madras University Sanskrit Series (No. 13). It is based on an incomplete unique manuscript, available in the Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras. It is an old palm-leaf manuscript in Malayalam script, starting from the very first verse of the Śloka-vārttika and ending with its Sphoṭavāda section.[1]

Uṁveka is an ancient authority on Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā, well known in the academic circles and popular in legends. His name is differently mentioned in different works. Uṁveka, Uṁbeka, U(ṁ)veyaka, Oṁbeka, etc. Only two of his works are known : the commentary on Maṇḍanamiśra's Bhāvanāviveka and the present commentary on the Śloka-vārttika.[2]

Uṁveka's personality has been identified with so many personalities of India, such as Maṇḍana Miśra, Viśvarūpa, Sureśvara, Bhavabhūti, etc. He has also been regarded as a disciple of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.[3] But Prof. C. Kunhan Raja does not seem to be supporting the above views.[4]

The date of Uṁveka is also not certain. After a long discussion, Prof. K. Kunjunni Raja has reached the conclusion that Uṁveka may be assigned to the period A.D. 700-750.[5]

Uṁveka has quoted several Buddhist scholars in his commentary, such as Nāgārjuna, Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. He quotes Diṅnāga mostly by name,[1] but the name of other Buddhist thinkers have not been mentioned.[2]

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[1] cf. K. Kunjunni Raja, Perface to SVTṬ, p. iii.

[2] cf. Ibid., p. v.

[3] cf. C. Kunhan Raja, Introd. to SVTṬ, p. ii.

[4] cf. Ibid., pp. xiii ff.

[5] cf. K. Kunjunni Raja, Preface to SVTṬ, pp. viii-x.

(ii) *Śarkarikā* : The Śarkarikā ṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa-putra Jayamiśra is based on a single manuscript, which also contains the Tātparya-ṭīkā of Bhaṭṭoṁveka.[3] It starts exactly from that very point, where the latter breaks off and it continues till the first half of the 39th *kārikā* of the Sambandhākṣepaparihāra.[4] It was edited by C. Kunhana Raja and was published for the first time by the University of Madras in Feb., 1945.[5]

According to Prof. C. Kunhan Raja, it is merely a chance that the said two commentaries have been found in one single manuscript. But it is no proof in establishing any relationship between the two authors.[6] On the basis of some internal evidences, Prof. C. K. Raja has formed a firm opinion that "Jayamiśra had written the commentary for more portions than what is available in the manuscript and that his commentary is quite an independent one and not a complement to the commentary of Uṁveka."[7]

Nothing is known about the life and date of Jayamiśra. On the basis of the appellation 'Bhaṭṭaputra', some have conjectured that he was the son of Kumārila, but such a conjecture cannot be acceptable in the absence of any sound proof.[8] Prof. C.K. Raja is of the opinion that he must have lived before the eleventh century.[9]

The style of the commentary is lucid, forceful and dignified. The Buddhist position has been put forth as *pūrva-pakṣa* without any prejudice[10] and has been repudiated with an effective force. Lines from Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti have been quoted

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1. SVTṬ, pp. 224, 227, 228, 231, 238, 320.
2. Ibid., pp. 45, 196, 243, 245, 269, 278. and so on.
3. Preface to Śar., p. i.
4. Śloka-Vārttika-ṭīkā Śarkarikā.
5. Preface to Śarkarikā.
6. Introd. to Śar., pp. viii-ix.
7. Ibid., p. x.
8. Ibid., p. xi.
9. Ibid., p. xiii.
10. Śar. pp. 24-27, 46, 54 and so on.

profusely.[1] In brief, the commentary is an invaluable piece of literature of Indian philosophy.

(iii) *Kāśikā* : The Kāśikā ṭikā of Sucarita Miśra has been published in three volumes by Travancore University under Trivandrum Sanskrit Series from the beginning of the Śloka-vārttika till the Sambandhākṣepa-parihāra. According to the editor, V. A. Ramaswami Sastri,[2] the commentator Sucarita Miśra was posterior to Uṁveka Bhaṭṭa and earlier than Pārthasārathi Miśra. The earliest reference to Sucarita Miśra and his Kāśikā have been made by Pārthasārathi Miśra in Śāstradīpikā and by Cidānandapaṇḍita in Nītitattvāvirbhāva. The date of these two writers are not certain, but he has assigned the eleventh century as the date of Sucarita Miśra just before Pārthasārathi Miśra.[3]

To be more specific about his time, we can consider another point as : Ratnakīrti, the Buddhist philosopher has quoted. Sucarita Miśra as 'Kāsikākāra' in his nibandhas several times.[4] As Prof. Ananta Lal Thakur, after a long discussion, has given a probable date of Ratnakīrti as the first half of the eleventh cent. A.D.,[5] the period of Sucarita Misra's literary work may be conjectured in between the last of 10th cent. A.D. and the beginning of 11th cent A.D.

About the style of Kāśikā, E. Krisṇamācāriar says that among the three commentaries (Tātparyaṭīkā, Kāśika and Nyāyaratnākara), the Kāśikā is matured and elaborate in style; it is full of such words which have profound and multifarious meanings; it is specially engaged in repudiating the adversaries' views, hence, in comparison with the other commentaries, it occupies a unique place.[6]

While presenting the Budnhist views as *pūrvapakṣa*, Sucarita Miśra often quotes the Buddhist texts, but never mentions the name of the thinker or of the treatise.[7]

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1. Śar. Apohavāda, passim.
2. Śl. Vār., Kāśikā, Pt. III.
3. Preface to Kāśikā Pt. III, p. 1-2
4. RN, pp. 8, 16,22,42.
5. Introduction to RN, p. 22
6. Sanskrlt Introduction to Kāśikā, pp. 8-9
7. Kāśikā, pp. 6, 26, 37, 65, 77-78 and soforth.

(iv) *Nyāya-ratnākara* : Nyāya-ratnākara of Pārthasārathi Miśra was edited by Pt. Tailaṅga Rāma Śāstrī and was published under Chaukhambha Sanskrit Series in 1898 in three volumes.[1]

We know very little about the life of Pārthasārathi Miśra. According to Dr. Umesh Miśra, he was most likely a native of Mithila.[2] He was the worshipper of Lord Śiva as is evident from the *maṅgala-śloka* of the Nyāya-ratnākara.[3] He learnt the Mīmāṁsā-śāstra from his father 'Yajñātman', who was a learned scholar of Mīmāṁsā, as is told by Pārthasārathi himself in the end of his Nyāyaratnamālā.[4]

So far as his date is concerned it is not yet decided. According to Pt. Tailaṅga Rāma Śāstri, Pārthasārathi was later than Kumārila, whose works he has commented upon and was prior to Mādhavācārya (1391 A.D.) who has referred to Pārthasārathi's Śāstra-dīpikā in his work. Not being able to give any definite date, he approximately fixes his time in between 838 A.D. and 1213 A.D. which is a period after Kumārila and before Mādhavācārya.[5]

Dr. S.N. Dasgupta has placed Pārthasārathi in the 9th century and Mm. Gopinatha Kaviraj has placed him in the thirteenth century. But Dr. Umesh Miśra in his critical bibliography of Mīmāṁsā' expresses that Pārathasārathi Miśra must have lived before Halāyudha and can easily be placed in the 10th century A.D., as Halāyudha, the Rājpaṇḍita of king Lakṣmaṇasena of Bengal (ruled from 1170 to 1200 A.D.), has quoted freely from the Nyāya-ratnākara and Śāstra-dīpikā of Pārthasārathi Miśra.[6]

Apart from the Nyāya-ratnākara, Pārthasārathi Miśra has composed three other works on Mīmāṁsā-śāstra (i) the Śāstra-dīpikā, an independent commentary on the sūtras, (ii) the Tantra-ratna, a commentary on Ṭupṭīka and (iii) the Nyāya-

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1. Nyāya-ratnākara Vols. I, II & III (Ch. SS).
2. 'Critical Bibliograpey of Mimāṁsā', an appendix to PMS, p. 37
3. NR, Vol. I, p. 1.
4. Nyāya-ratnamālā, p. 212.
5. Sanskrit Introduction to NR, pp. 5-6.
6. Umesh Miśra, op. cit., p. 38.

ratna-mālā, an independent treatise, a *prakaraṇa-grantha* dealing with some selected topics.[1]

The Nyāya-ratnākara as a commentary is neither very extensive nor very brief. It is lucid, elaborate and profound in character. It makes us known the underlying meaning of the words of the text in an easy way.[2] Pārthasārathi is fully successful in presenting the Mīmāṁsā-śāstra according to the Bhāṭṭa school. To present the Buddhist views, he frequently quotes *kārikās* from the Buddhist treatises[3] but rarely mentions the name of the thinker, from whom he is quoting.[4]

1.6. PRESENTATION OF THE BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY IN THE MĪMĀṀSĀ-ŚLOKA-VĀRTTIKA :

As already mentioned, the Buddhists are the chief opponents of Kumārila in the field of philosophy. He, in his works, has repudiated their doctrines with great enthusiasm and force and throws a good deal of light upon the Buddhist doctrines. Through an analytic survey of the Śloka-vārttika, we come to know that his method of presentation of the Buddhist views is manyfold. It can be understood as follows :

(i) In some cases, Kumārila first puts forth the Buddhist view as *pūrvapakṣa*, and then repudiates it with arguments, as we find in Nirālambanavāda and Śūnyavāda sections.[5]

(ii) In most of the cases, Kumārila does not present the Buddhist view as *pūrvapakṣa*, he keeps the view in mind and presents its refutation directly. It is from the refutation alone that one can gather as to what and whose view is being repudiated there. In such cases, Kumārila has raised objections against the Buddhist, taking only a few words from the opponents' text. e.g. "*Kalpanāyāḥ svasaṁvittau indrīyādhīnatā*

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1. G.N. Jha, PMS, p. 22.
2. Sanskrit Intro., to Kāśikā, p. 9.
3. NR, pp. 144. 150, 158, 181, 183, 218, 272 and so on.
4. NR, p.p. 250, 258 where name of Diṅnāga is mentioned
5. See Śl. Vār., Codanāsūtra. Kā. 38-39; Nirālambana, Kā. 5-27, 167-68, 185-186; Śūnyavāda, Kā, 1-63

kathaṁ"[1] Here Kumārila raises objection against the introspection of *kalpanā*, accepted by Diṅnāga in the Pramāṇa-samuccaya and in this refutation he has taken the first few words from Diṅnāga's original *kārikā*.[2] The number of such instances is enormously big in the Śloka-vārttika.[3]

(iii) A comparative study of the Śloka-vārttika with the original Buddhist treatises shows that Kumārila has opposed the views mostly of Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu and Diṅnāga. Even among them, Diṅnāga is his chief opponent. From the Apohavāda section it appears that Kumārila while writing it, has criticised each and every word of the Apoha chapter of the Pramāṇa-samuccaya of Diṅnāga,[4] but strange enough he never refutes his opponent Diṅnāga by name. He does not mention the names of other Buddhist thinkers too, but to serve his purpose, he uses words such as '*yaḥ*', '*yena*', '*yasya*', '*paraḥ*' or '*paraiḥ*', '*bhavān nyāyavid*', '*vaḥvṛddhaiḥ*', *Buddha* or *Buddhādi*, *Bauddha* or *Bauddhādi*, *Śākyaiḥ*, etc.[5] At two or three places he used the word '*nyāyavid*' and '*vṛddhaḥ*' for Diṅnāga.[6]

(iv) Kumārila has mentioned the names of three schools of the Buddhists, viz, Mādhymika or Śūnyavādin,[7] Yogācāra[8]

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1. Śl. Vār., I 1, iv. Kā. 134.
2. कल्पनापि स्वसंवित्ताविष्टा नार्थे विकल्पनात् ।
   PS, 1, kā. 7 ab. (in DP.)
3. Śl. Vār., I. I. iv. kās 77-87, Nirālambana kā. 140 Śūnyavāda, Kās, 153, 158, 193 and so on.
4. M. Hattori, "A Study of the Chapter on '*apoha*' of the Mīmāṁsā-śloka-vārttika", Kyoto University, Japan.
5. Śl. Vār. I. 1. ii. Kās. 76, 174, 182;
   Śl. Vār., I. 1. i, Kās. 96, 112, 130, 140;
   Śl. Vār., Nirālambana, Kā. 154;
   Śūnyavāda, Kās. 1, 134; Anumāna, kā. 149 & so forth.
6. Śl. Vār., Nirālambana, Kās. 148 and 168.
7. (i) तस्याप्यभावमिच्छन्ति ये माध्यमिकवादिनः ॥
   Śl. Vār., Nirālambana, Kā. 14 cd.
   (ii) अधिकारोऽनुपायत्वान्न वादे शून्यवादिनः ॥
   Ibid., Kā. 129 ab.
8. तत्रार्थशून्यं विज्ञानं योगाचाराः समाश्रिताः ॥
   Ibid., Kā. 14 ab.

and Sautrāntika.[1] The name of the Vaibhāṣika does not seem to be used by him.

Kumārila's presentation and criticism of the Buddhist philosophy relates almost to all the important topics of epistemology, logic and metaphyics. Theories of *pramāṇa* (means of cognition) and *prāmāṇya* (validity of cognition), doctrines of *Kṣaṇabhaṅga* (momentariness), *pratītya-samutpāda* (dependent-origination), *aṇātma* (no-soul), *bāhyārtha-bhaṅga* (non-existence of external world) and *apoha* (exclusion of others)—all have been presented and repudiated in the Śloka-vārttika. These are being represented in the subsequent chapters.

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[1] नित्यमात्मास्तिता कैश्चिद् यदा सौत्रान्तिकं प्रति ॥
Śl. Vār., Anumāna, Kā. 103 cd.

CHAPTER II

THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF PRAMĀṆA

2.1. THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF PRAMĀṆA AND THE ŚLOKA-VĀRTTIKA :

The Buddhist philosophy is fundamentally based on reason. It has a critical and anti-dogmatic tendency from the very beginning. Not only did it reject the traditional authority of the Veda, but also it did not accept blindly the Buddhist scriptures at least in its earliest period. It "relies upon individual experience and rationalism in matters of religion and philosophy, untrammelled by any code of set-beliefs".[1] The Great Master Buddha calls his teachings as '*dhamma-anitiha*'[2]—not based on tradition—but based on self-confirmation. On one occasion, while delivering his message, he himself, advised his followers thus : "Do not O Bhikṣus ! accept my words out of mere respect for me, but accept them what they are worth for, after properly scrutinizing them, just as a piece of gold is accepted by an expert after burning it in fire, cutting it and testing it on a touchstone."[3] This tendency of reasoning and argumentation accelerated the development of logic in the hands of Buddhist thinkers. Prof. Stcherbatsky rightly remarks, "Later Buddhism continued this critical spirit with the result that the ontology and psychology of preceding period were entirely superseded by a system of logic and epistemology. It forsook the dogmatical method of mere assertions and turned its face to an investigation of the source and limits of cogni-

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1. D.C. Chatterji, "Buddhist Logic" ABORI Vol. XIII, Pt. I (1931), pp. 77-85.
2. न+इतिह=अनितिह—Suttanipāta, 1053, Niddeśa. II, 49, 151, as cited in the above article.
3. तापाच्छेदाच्च निकषात् सुवर्णमिव पण्डितैः ।
   परीक्ष्य भिक्षवो ग्राह्यं मद्वचो न तु गौरवात् ॥ TS. Kā. 3587

tion."[1] Diṅnāga the father of the Buddhist Logic, begins his treatise, Pramāṇa-samuccaya with the verse offering salutations to Lord Buddha "who is recognised to be the personification of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa-bhūta*)."[2] Dharmakīrti also devoted almost all his works for the exposition of the theory of *pramāṇa*.

Since the Buddhist Logic came into being as a separate science, there arose a type of intellectual conflict between the Buddhists and the other systems of Indian philosophy. The Buddhist thinker like Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti and others, in course of propoundation of their own tenets regarding logic and epistemolcgy, criticised the theories of other systems like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika etc. The other systems, too, in their turn, criticised and refuted the Buddhist doctrines and vindicated their own ones. For this purpose they had to explain the tenets of their opponents as *pūrvapakṣa*. It is to be noted in this connection that the learned scholars of the opposite camp like Uddyotakara,[3] Kumārila,[4] Prabhākara,[5] Śaṅkara,[6] Vācaspati,[7] Jayanta,[8] Pārthasārathi Miśra,[9] etc, appear to have possessed profound knowledge of the Buddhist logic, which they exhibit in course of their criticism of the Buddhist. The non-Buddhist treatises have thrown a considerable light on the Buddhist theories. The Śloka-vārttika of Kumārila is very important one among them. It considers the following points about the Buddhist theory of *pramāṇa* :

(a) Nature of cognition.
(b) Definition and kinds of *pramāṇa*.
(c) Objects of *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa-vyavasthā*.

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[1] BL, I, 75.

[2] cf. प्रमाणभूताय जगद्धितैषिणे प्रणम्य शास्त्रे सुगताय तायिने ।
प्रमाणसिद्धये स्वमतात्समुच्चय करिष्यते विप्रसृतादिहैकतः ॥
PS, I, Kā. 1.

[3] Nyāya-vārttika.

[4] Śloka-vārttika.

[5] Bṛhatī.

[6] Śāṅkara-bhāṣya.

[7] Bhāmatī, Nyāya-vārttika tātparya-ṭīkā, Nyāya-kaṇikā.

[8] Nyāya-mañjarī.

[9] Śāstra-dīpikā, Nyāya-ratnākara.

(d) Identity of *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa-phala.*
(e) Nature, process, and kinds of *pratyakṣa.*
(f) Nature, objects and kinds of *anumāna.*
(g) Other *pramāṇas* like *Śabda* etc. are not acceptable.

All these points will be discussed in the subsequent sections.

2.2. NATURE OF COGNITION :

As regards the nature of cognition there is a sharp difference of opinion among different systems of Indian philosophy. Some systems hold that cognition is self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*), while the others assume that it can be revealed only by some other means of cognition.

Self-luminosity of cognition means that a piece of cognition is cognised by itself. It does not require any other cognition for its own illumination.[1] It illumines itself and its object simultaneously. When a man has the cognition of something blue (*nīla*) he has at the same time the awareness of the cognition of something blue (*nīla-dhī*). This awareness is caused by cognition itself. But the term non-self-luminosity (*para-prakāśatva*) means that a piece of cognition is cognised by some other means of cognition i.e. by perception or by inference.

The self-luminosity of cognition is accepted by the Buddhists, the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas, the Advaita-Vedāntins and the Jainas.[3] Cognition (*buddhi* or *mahat*) being unconscious, is realised by *puruśa*,according to the Sāṁkhyas. Ii is perceptible through *anuvyavasāya* (apperception), as held by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. But it is merely inferrable through *jñātatā* (cognisedness) as accepted by Kumārila. It is to be noted in this connection that each school of Indian philosophy has recognised the ideas regarding nature of cognition in accordance with its views on either realism or idealism.

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1. Cf. TS, Kā. 2011.
2. cf. तस्मादपराधीनप्रकाशा संविदुपेत्तव्या ।
Bhāmatī, p. 35 line 7.
3. cf. (i) प्रमाणं स्वपरावभासि
Nyāyāvatāra 1, as cited in PM, p. 3.
(ii) ज्ञानं प्रकाशमानमेवार्थं प्रकाशयति प्रकाशकत्वात् प्रदीपवत् ।
PM, p. 3, line 27.

The Sāṁkhyas maintain that the cognition, being evolved from *prakṛti*, is of material nature. As such cognition is unconscious by itself[1] and is illumined by *puruṣa*, which alone is self-conscious.[2]

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas put forward the theory of *anuvyavasāya* (apperception). When the external sense-organ comes into contact with an object, there arises the apprehension (*vyavasāya*) of the object. This apprehension is not self-luminous. Its awareness arises by the apperception (*anuvyavasāya*) through the medium of internal sense-organ or the mind (*manas*), which takes the first apprehension as its object.[3] Thus according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, cognition is not self-luminous, but is apprehensible only through another piece of cognition, which is called *anuvyavasāya* (appereception).

Kumārila expounds a different view. He, showing himself a greater realist than the Nyāy-Vaiśeṣikas, goes a step further. In order to show the pre-dominance of external objects, he esserts that cognition cannot be cognised perceptually, but is merely inferred through its effect. He contends that, "It cannot apprehend itself while it is busy in apprehending an object. Though it is of illuminating nature, yet it depends upon 'something else' for its own manifestation. Just as the visual organ can manifest colour, but connot manifest itself, so a cognition can manifest an object, but not itself. Its power of illumination is exhausted in manifesting an external object."[1] Then the question arises, what is that 'something else' (*anyat*) which illumines the cognition ? That thing is 'manifestedness' or 'connisedness' (*prakaṭatā* or *jñātatā*), which, after the manifestation of the object, is produced in that object as its new property. The process is like this : "When an object comes in contact with the sense, the knowledge of that object is produced in the soul. That knowledge being formless and not self-luminous,

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1. cf. श्रध्यवसायश्च बुद्धिव्यापारो ज्ञानम् । ...बुद्धितत्त्वं हि प्राकृतत्वाचेतनमिति तदीयोऽध्यवसायोऽप्यचेतनः घटादिवत् ।
STK, on Kā. 5.
2. cf. तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनवद्रिव लिङ्गम् ॥ SK. 20ab.
3. सर्वत्र प्रत्यक्षविषये ज्ञातुः इन्द्रियेण व्यवसायः पश्चान्मनसाऽनुव्यवसायः ।
NBh, 1.1.4.
4. Śl. Vār., Sūnya, Kā 184-87.

cannot be directly perceived, but produces a new quality called 'manifestedness' in the object. It is from this quality that the knowledge is inferred."[1] In this connection we may refer to one sarcastic remark of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa against the *jñātatā* theory of Kumārila. He says, "Fearing whom, alas, have these Vedic-scholars (*śrotriyāḥ*) developed such a defeatist mentality."[2]

Against this strong realistic attitude of Kumārila, Prabhākara, under the influence of Buddhism, takes a bold step and expounds his famous theory of *tripuṭī-saṁvit*, according to which *saṁvit* (consciousness) being of self-luminous character, cognises the three factors simultaneously—(i) it cognises the object (ii) it cognises itself and (iii) it also cognises the knower (the soul), and hence his theory is called *tripuṭī-saṁvit* or *tripartite* perception.[3]

Now comes the Buddhist view. The Buddhists, whether they are the Vaibhāṣikas, the Sautrantikas or the Idealists, are unanimous on this point that cognition is self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*). Even in an early work like the Milinda-pañho, explaining *prajñā* to the King, Nāgasena says, "Self-luminosity is also a character of *prajñā*."[4] The Buddhists are so certain about the self-luminosity of cognition that they assert: "If cognition does not cognise itself, the cognition of the object is not possible."[5] In the Śloka-vārttika, Kumārila explains the same view of the Buddhists thus : "And so long as the illumination in the form of cognition (*jñānākhya-prakāśa*) is not comprehended, even the object will not be apprehended, because its apprehension depends upon the cognition, just as the illumination of a jar depends upon the illumination of the

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1. D.N. Shastri, CIR, p. 474;
2. अहो बत इमे केभ्यो बिभ्यतः श्रोत्रियाः परं किमपि वैक्लव्यमुपागताः ।
NM, p. 16.
3. (i) मेयमात्रावभासरूपो संविदेका । P. Pañcikā, p. 171
() प्राभाकरमीमांसकास्तु सर्वदा ज्ञानमुत्पद्यमानं विषयात्मानौ प्रकाशयदेव प्रकाशते दीपवत् इति वदन्तः ।
Nyāyasiddhi on P. Pañcikā, p. 172.
4. अपि च ओभासनलक्खणा पञ्चा । Milinda-pañho, 2, 23.
5. अप्रसिद्धोपलम्भस्य नार्थवित्तिः प्रसिद्धयति । TS, Kā. 2073.

lamp."[1] Explaining the same, he further asserts "Even if the objects have been produced, their apprehension, some-times, does not occur either due to the absence of luminosity (as in case of peak darkness) or due to the presence of some impediment (like the obstruction of a wall); while in the case of cognition, there is no impediment (in its illumination) at the time of its origination, nor is it of a non-luminous nature, on account of which it may not be apprehended (i.e. it is self-luminous and hence it is always apprehensible)."[2] It is further added, "cognition is always produced before the apprehension of the object and its consciousness (*saṁvedanam*) must also occur at the same time (i.e. at the time of its origination), because if it is not cognised at the same time, it cannot be cognised even afterwards."[3]

It is thus, evident from the above acount that according to the Buddhist, cognition is of self-luminous nature. It originates before the apprehension of the object and is cognised at the same time.

The Buddnists are totally against the theory of 'non-self-luminosity' (*par-prakāśatva*) of cognition, maintained by the realists, specially by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas. The Buddhists, as presented by Kumārila refute the opponents' theories of *anuvyavasāya* (apperception) and *jñātatā* (cognisedness) thus: "cognition does not require the origination of another cognition, because if it is held that the cognition of previous cognition depends upon the latter one, there would occur *regressus ad infinitum*."[4] At another place,

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[1] न चागृहीते ज्ञानाख्यप्रकाशे*ऽर्थोऽवधार्यते ।
तदधीनप्रकाशत्वाद् दीपाभासे यथा घटः ।।
Śl. Vār., Sūnya, Kā, 22 (Madras).
*Chaukhambā edition reads it as 'ज्ञानाख्ये प्रकाश्यो'

[2] उत्पन्नेष्वपि चार्थेषु प्रकाशाऽभावतः क्वचित् ।
प्रतिबन्धकयोगाद्वा संवित्तिर्नोपजायते ।।
ज्ञानस्योत्पद्यमानस्य प्रतिबन्धो न कश्चन ।
न चाऽप्रकाशरूपत्वं येनाऽस्यऽग्रहणं भवेत् ।
Śl. Vār., Śūnya Kā. 23, 24 (Chaukhambhā).

[3] प्राक् चाऽर्थग्रहणादिष्टा तस्योत्पत्तिस्तदैव च ।
संवेदनं भवेदस्य न चेत् कालान्तरेऽपि न ।। Ibid., Kā. 25

[4] ज्ञानान्तरस्य चोत्पत्ति प्रकाशो न प्रतीक्षते ।
तस्य तस्यापि चान्येन संवित्तावस्थितिर्भवेत् ।। Ibid., Kā. 27

Kumārila explains the Buddhist view further : "If it i.e. cognition is cognised by another cognition, there would be *regressus ad infinitum*. But having found that recollection (*smṛti*) occurs about two things—i.e. about the object as well as its cognition, it is assumed that all is apprehended (at one and the same time). Thus in case of apprehending all by one cognition only, (it can be concluded that) every thing is possible by that alone (and no other cognition is required)."[1]

What the Buddhist really means to say is : when a person, after apprehending an object, say jar, recollects it afterwards, there arises in his mind the recollection of the jar as well as the cognition of the jar. This two-formed recollection of a cognition (*dvi-rūpa-smṛtiḥ*) shows that at the time of the apprehension of the jar, the person had cognised its cognition too, which proves the self-luminous nature of cognition.[2] This idea, mentioned in the Śloka-vārttika, fully corroborates with a verse of Pramāṇa-samuccaya of Diṅnāga.[3] Later on the same idea of two-formed recollection (*dvi-rūpa-smṛtiḥ*) is conveyed by Dharmakīrti,[4] Śāntarakṣita[5] and Kamalśila[6] in their respective treatises.

Besides the self-luminosity of cognition, it is also to be considered regarding its nature whether the form, which we experienee at the time of perception, really belongs to the cognition or to something else. Here also there are different opinions which will be discussed later on.[7]

2.3. DEFINITION OF PRAMĀṆA :

The origination of knowledge presupposes a subject, an object, a source or means to acquire knowledge and the resultant cognition. Vātsyāyana aptly remarks : "He, who is induced to an action out of any desire to seek or shun an object, is

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[1] अन्येन वाऽनुभावेऽस्रावनवस्था प्रसज्यते ॥
तत्र तत्र स्मृतिं दृष्ट्वा सर्वानुभवकल्पना ॥
एकेन त्वनुभूतत्वे सर्वं तत्रैव सम्भवेत् ॥
Ibid., Kā. 187 cd, 188.

[2] Cf. NR, p. 321.

[3] ज्ञानान्तरेणानुभवेऽनिष्ठा तत्रापि हि स्मृतिः । PS, I, Kā. 12ab.

[4] PV, Pratyakṣa, Kā. 513-514ab.

[5] TS, Kās. 2022-24.

[6] TSP, on above Kārikās, p. 688-89.

[7] Infra, Chap. 4. 4.

pramātā. The object that is cognised, is *prameya*. The knowledge of the object is *pramiti*. And the appratus whereby the object is apprehended is *pramāṇa*. With these four, the circuit of cognition of an object completes itself."[1]

Of these four, first we have to consider the definition of *pramāṇa*. The word *pramāṇa*, is derived from the root *mā* (=to know) with the prefix *pra* and the affix *lyuṭ*. With this *affix*, the word *pramāṇa* can literally give us three different meanings—(i) the valid cognition (=*pramā*), when the affix is used in the abstract sense (*bhāva*), (ii) the cogniser (*pramātā*) when it is used in the sense of agent (*kartṛ*) and (iii) the means of valid cognition (*sādhana*) when it is used in the sense of instrument (*karaṇa*).[2] In Indian philosophy it has been used in all the three senses.

Here we are mainly concerned with the Buddhist view-point about *pramāṇa*, but we should see its development in other Indian systems also especially in the pre-Diṅnāga philosophy.

In the tradition of logic, Gautama, the author of the Nyāya-sūtras, stands first. He has not laid down any separate sūtra for the definition of *pramāṇa*. But Kaṇāda, the author of the Vaiśeṣika sūtras, has defined valid cognition (*pramā*) as *aduṣṭam vidyā*.[3] i.e. non-defective cognition, from which a general definition of *pramāṇa* can be inferred that the cause of a valid piece of cognition should be pure or free from defects. Later on, in the Nyāya system, Vātsyāyana defines *pramāṇa* as an instrument of cognition.[4] There is no definition of *pramāṇa*, found in the Yoga-sūtras, but Bhāṣyakāra Vyāsa has indicated in the Bhāṣya that a *pramāṇa* is that which apprehends a real object.[1]

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[1] यस्येप्साजिहासाप्रयुक्तस्य प्रवृत्तिः स प्रमाता, सः येनार्थं प्रमिणोति तत्प्रमाणं योऽर्थः प्रतीयते तत्प्रमेयं यदर्थविज्ञानं सा प्रमितिः चतसृषु चैवं विधासु अर्थतत्वं परिसमाप्यते । NBh, p. 24 (Cal. S.S.).

[2] अयं प्रमाणशब्दः भावे कर्तरि करणे च वर्तते । तत्र भावे...प्रमा प्रमाणमिति । कर्तरि‥ प्रमिणोति प्रमेयमिति प्रमाणम् । करणे... प्रमिणोत्यनेनेति प्रमाणम् । TRV, I. 49.

[3] VS, IX, 2. 12.

[4] उपलब्धिसाधनानि प्रमाणानि समाख्यानिर्वचनसामर्थ्यात् बोद्धव्यम् । NBh, 1.1.3.

Among the orthodox Sūtrakāras, Jaiminī is the first who has given a definition of *pramāṇa* as different form *pramā*. According to him, "the relation of word with its meaning is eternal. Its knowledge can be attained through *upadeśa* (Vedic-injunctions), which is regarded as valid means (of knowing *dharma*) as it is uncontradicted and gives information about hitherto unknown objects. It is vaild also because of its independent nature (i.e it does not depend upon any other cognition or any other person for its validity). It is the view of Bādarāyaṇa (also)."[2] Although Śabara Svāmin has explained each and every word of the above sūtra in his Bhāṣya, but Pārthasārathi gives a more clear definition of *pramāṇa*. He says: *pramāṇa* is that which apprehends an object hitherto unknown, which is free from the defects of its causes and which is uncontradicted.[3] Kumārila and others have also given more or less similar definitions.[4]

The Buddhist definition of *pramāṇa* is also similar to that of Kumārila and his followers. They agree on this point that a *pramāṇa* apprehends an object hitherto unknown.[5] In the Śloka vārttika, there is a verse, which indicates the Buddhist view rather indirectly that a *pramāṇa* apprehends an object hitherto unknown by any other means of cognition. There the Buddhist argues like this :

> If an object has already been cognised by *pratyakṣa*, how can there be any validity attached to them (i.e. to the *anumāna*, *upamāna*, etc.) with regard to the same object, (Similarly) when an object has been comprehended by them (i.e. by *anumāṇa* etc.,) then the same will not be apprehensible by the senses.[6]

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1. भूतार्थविषयत्वात् प्रमाणस्य । YBh., 1.8.
2. औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धस्तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशोऽव्यतिरेकश्चार्थेऽनुपलब्धे तत्प्रमाणं वादरायणस्यानपेक्षत्वात् ॥ JS, 1.1.5.
3. कारणदोषबाधकज्ञानरहितं अग्रहीतग्राहिज्ञानं प्रमाणमिति SD, p. 45.
4. (i) Śl. Vār., 1.1.5. Kā. 10, 11ab.
   (ii) तस्मादज्ञाततत्त्वार्थज्ञानसाधनमेव नः ।
   प्रमाणमिति··· · ··············· । MM, p. 8 (Adyar)
5. अनधिगतार्थगन्तृ प्रमाणमिति ।
   Cited in TB. (K. Miśra) p. 39 (Ch. SS.)
6. प्रत्यक्षाऽवगते चाऽर्थे कुतस्तेषां प्रमाणता ।
   तैर्यदा स प्रतीयेत तदा नाऽक्षस्य गोचरः ॥
   Śl. Vār., 1. 1.4. Kā. 91.

The Buddhist means to say: *Anumāna* cannot work with regard to an object already known by *pratyakṣa* and *pratyakṣa* cannot work with regard to an object already known by *anumāna* etc. So a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is only that which apprehends an object hitherto unkown by any other means of cognition.

This idea has been indicated by Diṅnāga in his Pramāṇā-samuccaya-vṛtti. According to him, "Such mental faculties as recollection (*smṛti*), desire (*icchā*), anger (*dveṣa*), etc. are not independent means of valid cognition, since they operate upon an object already cognised."[1] This statement conveys the sense of "*anadhigatārthagantṛ pramāṇam*". Again Dharmakīrti supported the same idea in his Pramāṇa-vārttika[2] and also Dharmottara in his Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā.[3] In Later period, Jinendra Buddhi, another commentator of Diṅnāga, while commenting upon the above lines of Pramāṇa-Samuccaya vṛtti, formulates a general definition of *pramāṇa* that *pramāṇa* is that which informs us of an object hitherto unknown.[4]

In addition to this, another special feature of *pramāṇa* has been pointed out by Dharmakīrti. According to him "that cognition is *pramāṇa* which is not contradicted by subsequent experience."[5] An uncontradicted cognition is that which is capable of producing the efficient-action, indicated by the object. Because non-contradiction (*avisaṁvādanam*) means nothing but the capability (to prove the cognition) to be valid.[1] Dharmottara also observes: "In common life, a person is called trustworthy, if he makes us reach the object, which he has first pointed out; similarly a cognition is also accepted as valid when it makes us reach an object, pointed out by it."[2] But this special feature i.e. *avisaṁvādakatva* of cognition, mentioned by Dharmakīrti, is found neither in the available text of Pramāna-samuccaya and its vṛtti, nor in the Ślokavārttika. Hence, it may be probable that this aspect of *pramāṇa*, was introduced by Dharmakīrti alone to defend the Buddhist theory of *pramāṇa* against the attacks of the opponents.

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[1] 'यदुक्तम्, स्मृतीच्छाद्वेषादिवत् पूर्वाधिगतविषयत्वात् पुनः पुनरभिज्ञानं न प्रमाणमिति ।

PSV. I, 2, restored by Dr. M. Hattori in his work 'Dignāga, on perception'; Also cited in TRV., p. 56,8.9.

[2] अज्ञातार्थं प्रकाशो वा·············॥

PV. 1.7. See its MNV also.

[3] अतएव चानधिगतविषयं प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणम् ।

NBṬ, p. 11. line 2-5.

[4] अज्ञार्थज्ञापकं प्रमाणमिति प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणम् ।

PSṬ. p. 11, line 15-16 (Iyenger)

[5] प्रमाणमविसंवादि ज्ञानम्·········PV. 1.7.

It is, thus, obvious that a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) has two characteristics, viz. *anadhigantṛtva* (hitherto unknown) and *avisaṁvādakatva* (non-contradiction). Perception and inference, both have been accepted in the Buddhist logic as *pramāṇa* in as much as the cognition derived through them is always uncontradicted and hitherto unknown. The only difference between them is that the perception cognises the object directly, while inference determines the efficient-object (*arthakriyākṣama*) indirectly i.e. through the invariable mark (*avinābhāvi liṅga*).[3]

A question may be raised in this connection how inference (*anumāna*) is *pramāṇa*, even when it apprehends only the generic form, which is not regarded as a real object in the Buddhist logic. An answer to this question has been found in the works of post-Diṅnāga Buddhist logicians, especially in Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā of Dharmottara. He maintains that a means of valid cognition has its object twofold: one to be apprehended (*grāhya*) and the other to be realised (*adhyavaseya*) or to be

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1. (i)......अविसंवादनम् ।
   अर्थक्रियास्थितिः......।। PV, 1.7.
   (ii) यथोपदर्शितार्थस्य क्रियायाः स्थितिः प्रमाणयोग्यता अविसंवादनम् ।
   MNV on PV, p. 3-4.
2. लोके च पूर्वमुपदर्शितमर्थं प्रापयन् संवादक उच्यते । तदवज्ज्ञानमपि स्वयं प्रदर्शितमर्थं प्रापयन् संवादकमुच्यते । NBṬ, p. 10 (Meerut)
3. cf. S.N. Shastri, Introduction to NBṬ, p. 15, line 10-17

obtained (*prāpya*).[1] The apprehended and realised objects are rather different. What is apprehended through perception is only one moment, the thing-in-itself; what is realised through determinate cognition is always a compact chain of moments—a generic form.[2] On the other hand an inference apprehends a generic form (*sāmānya lakṣaṇa*) which is not real, but this unreality is definitely realised as a reality (particular or *sva-lakṣaṇa*), when it resulted in efficient action. Thus, being a source of obtaining an uncontradicted and hitherto uncognised object, inference is also regarded as a means of valid cognition.[3]

2.4. NUMBER OF PRAMĀṆAS

There is a difference of opinion about the number of *pramāṇas* in Indian philosophy. The Cārvākas accept only one *pramāṇa*, the Sāṁkhya-Yoga accept three, the Naiyāyikas four, the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas five, Kumārila and the Advaita-Vedāntins six; but the Buddhists, the Vaiśeṣikas and the Jainas admit only two *pramāṇas*.[4]

The Buddhists, although accepted more than two *pramā-*

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[1] द्विविधो हि विषयः प्रमाणस्य—ग्राह्यश्च यदाकारमुत्पद्यते, प्रापणीयश्च यमध्यवस्यति । अन्यो हि ग्राह्योऽन्यश्चाध्यवसेयः ।

NBṬ, p. 70, line 1-2

[2] प्रत्यक्षस्य हि क्षण एको ग्राह्यः । अध्यवसेयस्तु प्रत्यक्षबलोत्पन्नेन निश्चयेन सन्तान एव । सन्तान एव च प्रत्यक्षस्य प्रापणीयः ।

Ibid., pp. 75-71, line 2, 1-2

[3] तथाऽनुमानमपि स्वप्रतिभासेऽनर्थेऽर्थाध्यवसायेन प्रवृत्तेरनर्थग्राहि । स पुनरारोपितोऽर्थो गृह्यमाणः स्वलक्षणत्वेनावसीयते यतः, ततः स्वलक्षणमध्यवसितं प्रवृत्तिविषयोऽनुमानस्य ।

Ibid., p. 72, line 1-3

also cf. S.N. Shastri, Hindi Commentary on NBṬ, p. 73 and 81.

[4] See (i) TB (Moksākara), p. 3-4
(ii) VP, p. 6 (Adyar)
(iii) V. Sūtropaskāra, 9.2.12
(iv) प्रमाणं द्विधा प्रत्यक्षं परोक्षञ्च । PM, I, 9-10

ṇas before the time of Diṅnāga,[1] but from Diṅnāga onward they admit only two kinds of *pramāṇas*, namely, perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*), because according to them there are only two kinds of objects to be cognised, viz., the unique particular (*Sva-lakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*).[2] Apart from these two, there is no other object to be cognised[3] and hence, the means of cognition (*pramāṇas*) have also been recognised only two in number. The number of Buddhist *pramāṇas* is not directly mentioned in the Śloka-vārttika, but in its commentary the Nyāya-ratnākara, the Buddhists, have been called as '*pramāṇa dvyaya-vādinaḥ*' i.e. the upholders of two *pramāṇas*.[4]

2.5. OBJECTS OF PRAMANAS AND PRAMĀṆA VYAVASTHĀ :

In Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti, Diṅnāga asserts : *Pratyakṣa* (perception) can cognise only the *sva-laksaṇa* (unique particular) and *anumāna* (inference) can cognise only the *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* (generic form)."[5] This Buddhist view has been indicated by Kumārila in some of his refutative verses. At one place, he asks : "How can the unique particular (*viśeṣa*) be the object of *pratyakṣa*."[6] At another place, he repudiates the Buddhist view of inference as :

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1. (i) G. Tucci, Introduction to Pre-Diṅnāga BTL, p. xvii.
   (ii) चतुर्विधं प्रमाणं—प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानागमश्चेति ।
   Upāyahṛdayam, restored by G. Tucci in the above book, p. 13
2. (i) प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च प्रमाणे, यस्माद् लक्षणद्वयं ।
   प्रमेयं...... ...... ।। PS,I, Kā. 2.
   (ii) मानं द्विविषं विषयद्वैविध्यात् ।। PV, II. 1.
3. न हि स्वसामान्यलक्षणाभ्यामन्यत्प्रमेयमस्ति । PSV. I. Kā. 2.
4. ये तु शाक्याः प्रमाणद्वयवादिनः...... NR. p. 446
5. स्वलक्षणविषयं हि प्रत्यक्षं सामान्यलक्षणविषयमनुमानमिति ।
   PSV, on Kā. 2
6. प्रत्यक्षाऽऽनम्बनत्वं च विशेषस्य कथं भवेत् ।
   Śl. Vār., Anumāna, Kā. 174 ab

> "He, who assumes that universal (*sāmānya*) cannot be cognised without inference, (will have to face *regressus ad infinitum* in his theory)".[1]

In the Buddhist system, thus, there are only two *pramāṇas* corresponding to two kinds of objects i.e. *svalakṣaṇa* (unique-particular) and *Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* (generic form). According to Th. Stcherbatsky, "the difference lying between the two sources of cognition, is in the Buddhist system, a redical one, a real one, and it is, moreover, what we shall call in the sequel, a transcendental one. What is cognised by the senses is never subject to cognition by inference and what is cognised by inference, can never be subject to cognition by senses."[2] In the Śloka-vārttika, Kumārila, presenting the same view, said : if an object is cognised by perception, it cannot be an object of inference, and if it is cognised by inference, it cannot be an object of perception.[3] This verse, thus, gives us an idea of the Buddhist theory of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā*. The Realists (the Mīmāṁsakas and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas), on the other hand, accept the theory of *pramāṇa-saṁplava*, according to which one and the same object can be cognised by different *pramāṇas*. It can be cognised by perception at one time and by inference at another time We see a fire in the kitchen by visual organ and infer it also at a hill through its mark i.e. smoke. But the Buddhists, as pointed out before, maintain that among the two kinds of objects, the unique particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) can be cognised only by perception and the generic form (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) only by inference.

2 6. IDENTITY OF PRAMĀṆA (MEANS OF COGNITION) AND PRAMĀṆA-PHALA (ITS RESULT) :

There are two diverse opinions about the relationship of *Pramāṇa* (means of cognition) and *pramāṇa-phala* (its result).

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[1] सामान्यं नानुमानेन विना यस्य प्रतीयते ।
Śl. Vār., Anumāna, Kā. 149 ab

[2] BL, I, p. 73, 7-12

[3] प्रत्यक्षाऽवगते चार्थे कुतस्तेषां प्रमाणता ।
तैर्यदा स प्रतीयेत तदा नाऽक्षस्य गोचरः ॥
Śl. Vār., Pratyakṣa, Kā. 91

Some systems hold that they are different, while the others maintain them as identical. The realist schools hold that the means of cognition and its result are altogether two different entities. It is a well known fact, according to them, that an instrument is always different from its result.[1] If blade (*kṣura*) is the instrument, the cutting down of something with it, is its result and these two are, apparently different factors.

Further, the act of cognising, according to the Realists, must be associated, like any other act of our every day life, with an agent, an object, an instrument and a mode of procedure. When a wood-cutter cuts down a tree in the forest, he is the agent (*chettā*), the tree is the object (*chedya*), the axe is the instrument (*sādhana*) and its lifting and blowing upon the wood is the mode of procedure (*vyāpāra*), which produces the result (*phala*) in the form of cutting down the tree. The same is true in case of cognition. When one perceives a blue patch, the perceiver is the agent, the blue patch is the object, his sense of vision is the instrument and the contact of the eye with the object and its act of delivering the impression of the patch to the soul via *manas*, is the mode of procedure. The right cognition of the blue patch is the result (*phala*).[2]

The Buddhists, on the other hand, maintain that the means of cognition and the result are identical. They discard the soul and hold that cognition itself is the cogniser, the cognisable object, the means of cognition, and the result.[3] Dharmakīrti declares : The cognition is the means of Valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*); that which is not cognition (*ajñāna=jñāna-bhinna*), such as the sense or the (sense-object) contact, is not the means of valid knowledge.[1] It is held by Dharmottara that "one and the same cognition is the means of valid knowledge and also the result (*pramāṇaphala*).[2] This theory of non-distinction of the *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa-phala* has been vehemently attacked by Kumārila :

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[1] 'साध्यसाधनयोर्भेदः लौकिकः' Śl. Vār., Pratyakṣa, Kā. 72

[2] cf. (i) BL, I, p. 68
(ii) S.N. Shastri, "The Means of Right Cognition and its Result according to the Buddhist Logic", KURJ vol. IV, No. 2 (1972), p. 207

[3] cf. (i) यदाभासं प्रमेयं तत्प्रमाणफलते पुनः ।
ग्राहकाकारसंवित्ती त्रयं नातः पृथक्कृतम् ।।
PS, I, Kā. 10

(ii) अविभागो हि बुद्ध्यात्मा विपर्यासितदर्शनैः ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तिभेदवानिव लक्ष्यते ।।
PV, Pratyaksa, Kā. 350

> "One, who, desiring to prove the oneness of the object, asserts that the means of cognition is also the well-known distinction between the cause and the effect."[3]
>
> "As, when the axe is applied to the Khadira wood, the cutting does not belong to a log of the *palāśa* — so (we see that) in ordinary experience, there is no identity between the axe (the means) and the cut (the result)."[4]

This objection clearly refers to a verse of Pramāṇa-samuccaya, where Diṅnāga asserts about the identity of *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇa-phala* :

"(We call the cognition itself) *pramāṇa* (a means of cognising), because it is usually conceived to include the act (of cognising), although primarily it is a result."[5]

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1. ज्ञानं प्रमाणं नाज्ञानम् इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादि । PV, I.3
2. तदेव ज्ञानं प्रमाणं तदेव प्रमाणफलम् । NBṬ, p. 86 (Meerut)
3. विषयैकत्वमिच्छंस्तु यः प्रमाणं फलं वदेत् ।
साध्यसाधनयोर्भेदो लौकिकस्तेन बाधितः ॥
Śl. Vār., Pratyakṣa, Kā. 7
4. छेदने खदिरप्राप्ते पलाशे न च्छिदा यथा ।
तथैव परशोर्लोके छिदया सह नैकता ॥ Ibib., Kā. 75
5. (i) 'सव्यापारप्रतीतत्वात् प्रमाणं फलमेव सत्' । PS, I, Kā. 7
(ii) This verse is also referred to by Uṁveka, in his SVTṬ, p. 138

In holding this view, Diṅnāga based his thought upon the *Sākāra-jñāna-vāda*, the followers of which were the Sautrāntikas and some of the Yogācāras.[1] They maintained that the form (*ākāra*) of the object which is possessed by the cognition within itself, is the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the cognition in the form of the apprehension of the object (*viṣayādhigati*) is the result (*prāmāṇa-phala*).[2] The resulting cognition (*pramāṇa-phala*) arises bearing in itself the conformity (*sārūpya*) of the form of the cognised object and thus, is understood to include the act of cognising (*savyāpāra*). For this reason it is metaphorically called the *pramāṇa* of the resulting-cognition '*viṣayādhigati*'.[3] Inasmuch as the conformity (*sārūpya*) of the object with the cognition is not different from the apprehension of the object (*viṣayādhigati*), it has been asserted in the above mentioned verse[4] that *pramāṇa* and its *phala* are identical (*abhinna*). The cognition itself is the *pramāṇa* and the *phala* both. This fact is true in case of perception as well as of inference.[5] This issue continued to be a matter of long discussions between the Buddhists and the other thinkers of Indian philosophy in the later period also Akalaṅka,[6] Jayanta Bhaṭṭa[7] Vācaspati Miśra,[8] etc. have raised the same objection as has been raised by Kumārila, but it has been replied by the later Buddhist logicians in a satisfactory manner.

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1. cf. M.Hattori, DP, p. 98, line 31-33
2. cf. S.N. Shastri, "Means of Right Cognition and its Result according to the Buddhist Logic" KURJ Vol. IV, No. 2, 1972, p. 210
3. PSV on Kā. 7, in 'Diṅnāga, on Perception', p. 28
4. 'सव्यापारप्रतीतत्वात् प्रमाणं फलमेव सत्' । PS, I. Kā. 7
5. यत्तु भिक्षुणा विषयैकत्वतृष्णया ज्ञानमेव प्रमाणफलं चेति प्रत्यक्षे दर्शयित्वा तदेवानुमानेऽप्यादिष्टं पूर्ववत्फलमस्येति ।
   NR, p. 361, line 6-7
6. TRV, Pt. I, p. 56, 12-14
7. Nyāya-mañjarī, 1, p. 66
8. Nyāya-kaṇikā, pp. 254. 12—260. 22

2.7. PRATYAKṢA (PERCEPTION)

The theory of perception is closely associated with the formulatian of a theory regarding ultimate reality, for instance, the theory of indeterminate perception or pure sensation (*nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*) of the Buddhists is in full accordance with their theory of momentariness (*kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda*) and the Realists' theory of determinate perception (*savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*) is in consistence with their theory of permanent reality.

(i) *Definition of Pratyakṣa* :

The etymological explanation of the word '*pratyakṣa*', is given by Diṅnāga in his Nyāya-mukha, according to which *pratyakṣa* is so named because it occurs in close connection with (*prati*) each sense (*akṣa*).[1] The question naturally arises why *pratyakṣa* is named after the sense (*akṣa*) and not after the object (*viṣaya*), while actually the origination of cognition depends upon the both.[2] Diṅnāga replies to this querry in his Nyāya-mukha, and Pramāṇa-samuccaya. He says : "*Pratyakṣa* is named after the sense, because it is its specific cause (*asādhāraṇa hetu*)."[3] The object (*viṣaya*) is, of course, common both to perception and inference. Kumārila, while explaining his own theory of perception, also gives the same explanation for naming *pratyakṣa* after the sense.[4] Perhaps he has followed

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1. 'अक्षम् अक्षं प्रति वर्तंत, इति प्रत्यक्षम्' ।
   N. Mukha (cited in DP., p. 77); N. Praveśa, p. 7, line 13-14; Dh. Pradeep p. 38, line 26
2. अथ कस्माद् द्वयाधीनायामुत्पत्तौ प्रत्यक्षमुच्यते न प्रतिविषयम् ।
   PSV, Kā. 4, See "Dignāga, on preception; PVBh. p. 277, line 24; PV. Pratyakṣa, 191.
3. (i) असाधारणहेतुत्वादक्षैस्तद् व्यपदिश्यते । PS, I, Kā. 4 ab
   (ii) असाधारणकारणत्वाद् ।
   N. Mukha (cited in DP, p. 77 & 87)
4. cf. योगस्य द्व्याश्रयत्वेऽपि भवत्यन्यतराश्रयः ।
   व्यपदेशोऽथवाऽप्यक्षं तत्राऽसाधारणं भवेत् ॥
   Śl. Vār, Pratyakṣa, Kā. 65

Diṅnāga in this regard. This etymology given by Diṅnāga and also followed by Dharmottara[1] cannot include such cases as *mānasa pratyakṣa*, *yogi-pratyakṣa*, and *sva-saṁvedana* which are independent of the sense. Hance Dharmottara distinguishes between the etymological origin and the actual meaning of the word. After offering the etymology of the term '*pratyakṣa*', he says that all sorts of direct awareness (*sākṣātkārijñāna*) are actually implied by the word '*pratyakṣa*'.[2]

As regards the definition of *pratyakṣa*, there is a marked divergence of opinion among different schools of Indian Philosophy—not only between the Buddhist and the Realist schools but also in the Realist school themselves. A common idea, however, we can gather from the Realists' definitions of perception.[3] According to them, a cognition derived from the contact of a sense with an object is perception (*pratyakṣa*) and it includes the '*nirvikalpaka*' and '*savikalpaka*' cognitions both. The Buddhist view of perception, however, is altogether different. Kumārila refers to the Buddhist view as follows :

> "Although the dependence upon that (i. e. upon *manas*) is similar (in case of perception as well as

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1. प्रतिगतमाश्रितमक्षम् । NBṬ., p. 28, line 3
2. cf. अक्षाश्रितत्वं च व्युत्पत्तिनिमित्तं शब्दस्य । न तु प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् अनेन त्वक्षाश्रितत्वेनैकार्थसमवेतमर्थसाक्षात्कारित्वं लक्ष्यते तदेव शब्दस्य प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् । ततश्च यत्किञ्चिदर्थस्य साक्षात्कारिज्ञानं तत्प्रत्यक्षमुच्यते । Ibid., p. 28, line 5-8
   also cf. Dh. P., p. 39, line 8-9
3. cf. (i) इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम् । NS, 1.1.4.
   (ii) VS, 3.1.18
   (iii) प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टम् । SK, 5
   (iv) इन्द्रियप्रणालिकया चित्तस्य बाह्यवस्तूपरागात्तद्विषया सामान्यविशेषात्मनोऽर्थस्य विशेषाऽवधारणप्रधाना वृत्तिः प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् । YBh, 1.7
   (v) सत्संप्रयोगे पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजन्म तत्प्रत्यक्षम् । JS, 1.1.4.

> in other cognitions like inference etc.) yet the Buddhist, having defined perception as 'free from conceptual-construction' has accepted only a few cases as *pratyakṣa*."[1]

This is a clear reference to Diṅnāga's definition of *pratyakṣa*, which is mentioned in Pramāṇa-samuccaya as : "*Pratyakṣa* (perception) is that which is free from conceptual-construction (*kalpanā*)."[2] What is conceptual-construction (*kalpanā*) ? He replies : "The association of name (*nāman*), genus (*jāti*) etc. (with a thing, perceived, is conceptual-construction)."[3]

It is, thus, obvious that only the indeterminate knowledge (*nirvikalpaka jñāna*) in which only the external reality as it exists, is apprehended and nothing is added by the mind to the bare perception of the senses, is called *pratyakṣa*. In Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti, Diṅnāga explains : "One who has the ability to perceive, perceives something blue, but does not conceive that this is blue. In respect to an object, he has the sense of the object (*arthasaṁjñī*) but has no sense of its properties (*na dharmasaṁjñī*).[4]

There are several references where Kumārila, during refutation, refers to the Buddhist view of perception (sensation or *nirvikalpakajñāna*).[5] Th. Stcherbatsky rightly observes :

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[1] तदधीनत्वसाम्येऽपि कल्पनापोढशब्दनाद् ।
प्रत्यक्षं किञ्चिदेवेष्टं............... ॥
Śl. Vār., Pratyaṣa, Kā. 137

[2] प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनाऽपोढम् PS, Kā. 3a

[3] नामजात्यादि योजना । Ibid., Kā, 3b

[4] चक्षुर्विज्ञानसमङ्गी नीलं विजानाति न तु नीलमिति ।
अर्थेऽर्थसंज्ञी न त्वर्थे धर्मसज्ञी । PSV, on I.4. (See in DP.)

[5] (i) निर्विकल्पकपक्षे तु सुतरामनिमित्तता ।
साध्यसाधनसम्बन्धेनाऽविकल्प्य हि गृह्यते ॥
Śl. Vār., Pratyakṣa, Kā. 86
(ii) प्रत्यक्षाऽग्रहणं यत्तु लिङ्गादेरविकल्पनात् ।
तन्नेष्टत्वाद्विकल्पस्याप्यर्थरूपोपकारिणः ॥ Ibid., Kā. 111
(iii) कथं प्रत्यक्षपूर्वत्वमनुमानादिनो भवेत् ।
यदा स्मृत्यसमर्थत्वान्निर्विकल्पेन्द्रियस्य धीः ॥ Ibid., Kā. 87

> "Therefore, the salient feature of sense-perception (*pratyakṣa*) is that it is not constructive. It is followed by the construction of the image, but it is itself non-constructive....It is sensation and even pure sensation, the sensational core of perception."[1]

It is to be noted here that Kumārila has referred to only Diṅnāga's definition of perception and does not refer to that of Dharmakīrti, according to whom, "perception is that which gives non-conceptual and non-erroneous cognition."[2] The epithet 'non-erronous (*abhrānta*)' has been introduced by Dharmakīrti and was not included in Diṅnāga's definition. So, it appears that Kumārila was not acquainted with Dharmakīrti's definition of perception and hence he was either a predecessor or an earlier contemporary of Dharmakīrti.

(ii) *Savikalpaka-jñāna* (Determinate knowledge) *is not pratyakṣa* :

Two kinds of perception viz. the indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) and the determinate perception (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*) have been discussed in Indian Philosophy for a long period. Vindhyavāsin, an older contemporary of Vasubandhu is, perhaps, the first thinker who declared that only '*avikalpaka jñāna*' i.e. cognition without conceptual construction, is *pratyakṣa*.[3] Diṅnāga, however, provides a logical basis to this declaration. He establishes on sound arguments that only indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpaka jñāna*) is perception (*pratyakṣa*).

But Kumārila, laying the foundation of the orthodox view that both the indeterminate and the determinate knowledges are included in *pratyakṣa*, declares : "First of all there arises a cognition in the shape of mere reflection (*ālocanamātra*), which is indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and is similar to the cognition of the infant and the dumb arising purely from the pure object. At that stage neither particularity (*viśeṣa*) nor the universal nature (*sāmānya*) is experienced, but only the indivi-

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1. BL, 1, p. 149
2. प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनाऽपोढमभ्रान्तम् । NB, I.4
3. 'श्रोत्रादिवृत्तिरविकल्पिका प्रत्यक्षम्' इति वृद्धसांख्याः । PM, I, 114

duality (*vyaktiḥ*) as their substratum is apprehended."[1] He further asserts : "After that an object is determined by its attributes like the universal etc. (*jātyādi*) and that too is a perception."[2] Here it is to be noted that Kumārila has accepted determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka jñāna*) as perception and therefore, he emphasises upon the words 'that too is a perception.'[3] Obviously these words have been addressed to his opponent, the Buddhist, who does not accept the determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka jñāna*) as *pratyakṣa*. According to the Buddhist, the determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka-jñāna*), although a later stage of indeterminate-cognition (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*), is an outcome of our mental construction (*mānasa-kalpanā*). The unique-particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*), which alone is regarded by the Buddhist as the ultimate reality (*paramārtha-sat*), is not the object of *savikalpaka-jñāna*. Its object is only the empirical reality (*samvṛti-sat*) which is characterised by the generic form (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*).

The determinate cognition includes five aspects within itself—name (*nāman*), universal (*jāti*), qualification (*guṇa*), action (*kriyā*), and substance (*dravya*). These are purely the mental constructions (*kalpanā*) and are the superimpositions of mind (*adhyāsa*) upon the pure object. Hence according to the Buddhist, cognition about them is not *pratyakṣa*, but only *pratyakṣābhāsa*.[4] The Buddhist view that *savikalpaka*

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1. अस्ति ह्यालोचना ज्ञानं प्रथमं निर्विकल्पकम् ।
बालमूकादिविज्ञानसदृशं शुद्धवस्तुजम् ।
न विशेषो न सामान्यं तदानीमनुभूयते ।
तयोराधारभूतात्तु व्यक्तिरेवावसीयते ॥
Śl. Vār., Pratyakṣa, Kā. 112, 113

2. ततः परं पुनर्वस्तु धर्मैर्जात्यादिभिर्यया ।
बुद्ध्याऽवसीयते साऽपि प्रत्यक्षत्वेन संमता ॥ Ibid., Kā. 120

3. साऽपि प्रत्यक्षत्वेन संमता ।

4. cf. यदृच्छाशब्देषु नाम्ना विशिष्टोऽर्थं उच्यते डित्थ इति ।
जातिशब्देषु जात्या गौरिति । गुणशब्देषु गुणेन शुक्ल इति ।
क्रियाशब्देषु क्रियया पाचक इति । द्रव्यशब्देषु द्रव्येण दण्डी
विषाणीति । ..यत्रैषा कल्पना नास्ति तत्प्रत्यक्षम्
PSV,I, on Kā. 3 Restored in DP).

jñāna is not *pratyakṣa*, has been presented by Kumārila as follows :

> "There arises a determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka dhī*) when the universal etc. (*jātyādi*) being different from the real, are superimposed upon it (the real object); hence this cognition is just like that of mirage."[1]

Just as the knowledge of water in the desert, is nothing but an illusion, similarly the knowledge of name, universal, etc. (*nāma-jātyādi*) in the pure object (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) is only a pseudo-perception (*pratyakṣābhāsa*)

At another place the Buddhist argument for refuting the idea of *savikalpaka* as *pratyakṣa* has been presented by Kumārila thus :

> "As there is no substratum (*dharmin*) except the attributes (*dharmas*), the idea of cow etc. is only an aggregate (*saṅghamātra*) of those (attributes such as *rūpa*, *rasa*, etc.) as in the case of forest."[2]

The sense is : When we perceive an aggregate of so many trees, we call it 'forest', similarly when a number of attributes (*dharmas*) is found in close proximity, it seems as if it is one substratum (*dharmin*) and therefore, we call it by one name 'cow'. But in reality, this assumption of name, universal, etc. is nothing but the creation of our own mind. The substratum (*dharmin*) like cow, does not really exist. The aggregate of attributs (*dharmas*) gives us the idea of a substratum (*dharmin*), which is only a determinate knowledge and cannot be accepted as *pratyakṣa*.

In *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* and its Vṛtti, Diṅnāga has declared that the erroneous cognition (*bhrāntijñāna*), cognition of empirical reality (*saṁvṛti-jñāna*), inference (*anumāna*), etc. are only pseudo-perceptions (*pratyaksābhāsāh*).[1] As the determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka-jñāna*), in the form of name, universal, etc. (*nāma-jātyādi*), is of an empirical reality, it is also a pseudo-perception (*pratakṣābhāsa*).

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[1] जात्याद्यर्थान्तरं यस्मादतद्रूपेऽपि वस्तुनि ।
भवत्यध्यस्य धीस्तस्मान्मृगतृष्णादिभिः समा ॥
Śl. Vār., Pratyakṣa, Kā. 140

[2] ननु धर्माऽतिरेकेण धर्मिणोऽनुपलम्भनात् ।
तत्सङ्घमात्र एवायं गवादिः स्याद्वनादिवत् ॥
Śl. Vār. 1.1.4, Kā. 151

It is, thus, clear from the above discussion that determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka-jñāna*) is not *pratyakṣa* but only *pratyakṣābhāsa* according to the Buddhist view.

(iii) *Process of Pratyakṣa* :

There are diverse opinions about the process of *pratyakṣa* in the Buddhistic and the non-Buddhistic philosophies. Kumārila, while repudiating the opponents, has referred to the processes of *pratyakṣa*, accepted by the Sautrāntikas and the Yogācāras, but not of the Vaibhāṣikas who hold the cognition as formless. Prof. Stcherbatsky, however, gives a clear and brief exposition of the Vaibhāṣikas' process of *pratyakṣa* :

> "A moment of colour (*rūpa*), a moment of the sense of vision-matter (*cakṣuḥ*) and a moment of pure consciousness (*citta*), arising simultaneously in close contiguity, constitute what is called a sensation (*sparśa*) of colour."[2]

Kumārila has refuted the Sautrāntika's *pratyakṣa* as :

> "It is not proper to hold that the self-cognition (*sva-saṁvitti*) is the result, because that is refuted (in the *Śūnyavāda* section). And it is also not proper to assert that the conformity of the object (*viṣayākāra*) is the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*, because (in such an assertion) the object (*viṣaya*)

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1. cf. (i) भ्रान्तिसंवृतिसज्ज्ञानमनुमानानुमानिकं ।
स्मार्ताभिलाषिकं चेति प्रत्यक्षाभं सतैभिरम् ।
PS, Kā. 7cd & 8 ad

(ii) संवृतिसज्ज्ञानं संवृतिसत्स्वर्थान्तराध्यारोपात्ताद्रूपकल्पना-प्रवृत्तत्वात्प्रत्यक्षाभासम् ॥ PSV. on the above Kārikās

2. CCB, p. 55

is different (in case of *pramāṇa* and its result)."[1]

Kumārila here objects two points—(i) the Self-cognition as the result, (ii) the two fold objectivity of *pramāṇa* (means of cognition) and its *phala* (result). If it is held that conformity of the object in the cognition (*viṣayākāra*) is the means of valid knowledge and self-cognition (*sva-saṁvitti*) is the result, it would follow that the means of knowledge and the result take different things as their objects. The object (*viṣaya*) of the *pramāṇa* (*viṣayākāra*) would be an external thing, while the object of the result (*sva-saṁvitti*) would be the cognition itself. This difference in objects in case of the means of knowledge and its result is not at all tenable.[2]

This refutation clearly refers to the Sautrāntika theory of perception according to which the external thing is the object to be cognised (*prameya*), the conformity of the object (*viṣaya-sārūpyaṁ*) in the cognition is the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the self-cognition is the result.[3] It has been originally mentioned in the Pramāṇa-samuccaya as :

> "Or (it can be maintained that) the self-cognition (*sva-saṁvitti*) is here the result (of the act of cognising), because the determination of the object (*artha-niścaya*) conforms with it (i.e. with the self-cognition). The means of cognising it, is simply the form of the object in the cognition, (because) the object is known only through that (i.e. the form of the object in the cognition)."[4]

Explaining it in the Vṛtti, Diṅnāga asserts that the form of the object as reflected in the cognition (*jñāna viṣayākāram*) is regarded as the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*), because "whatever form of an object appears in the cognition, as for example, something white or non-white, the object is cognised in the same form."[1] Thus it is only the conformity of the object (*viṣayāsārūpyam*) in the cognition which is the means to dertermine the actual form of the object, such as blue white etc., hence it is regarded as the means of valid cognition.[2]

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[1] स्वसंवित्तिफलत्वं तु तन्निपेधान्न युज्यते ।
प्रमाणे विषयाकारे भिन्नार्थत्वान्न युज्यते ।
Śl. Vār. 1.1.4, Kā. 79

[2] cf. NR, p. 158

[3] cf. (i) NR, p. 158
(ii) TṬ, p. 139

[4] स्वसंवित्तिः फलं वात्र तद्रूपो ह्यर्थनिश्चयः ।
विषयाकारतैवास्य प्रमाणं तेन मीयते ॥
PS, I. Kā. 9 (Restored in DP).

Refering to the Yogācāra's process of perception Kumārila raises an objection like this :

> "Except self-comprehension of cognition (*sva-saṁvitti*), no other entity has been found in the form of itself (*svākāra*), which may be regarded as the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) with regard to the result, self-cognition (*sva-saṁvitti*). Besides, the form of itself (*svākāra*) cannot be cognised without another form, and this latter will require another form. Thus there would be no end of series of forms. So long as the 'form of itself' (*svākāra*) remains uncognised, its existence cannot be ascertained; and if the cognition appeared in the form of object (*viṣāvākāra*) is accepted as the object to be cognised (*grāhya*), no other entity as the apprehender (*grāhaka*) is found."[3]

This refutation refers to the following Kārikā of Diṅnāga, in which he has given a clear exposition of the Yogācāra's theory of perception :

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[1] यथा ह्यर्थस्याकारः शुभ्रादित्वेन ज्ञाने प्रतिभाति तत्तद्रूपः स विषयः प्रतीयते PSV, on Kā. 9 cd. (Restored in DP)

[2] cf. सारूप्यं व्यवस्थापनहेतुत्वात् प्रमाणं सिद्धं भवति
NBṬ, p. 91, line 10

[3] स्वकारश्च स्वसंवित्ति मुक्त्वा नाऽन्यः प्रतीयते ।
प्रामाण्यं यस्य कल्प्येत स्वसंवित्तिफलं प्रति ॥
स्वाकारस्य परिच्छेदो न चाऽऽकारान्तराद्विना ।
तस्याप्येवं तथा च स्यान्नाऽऽकारान्तः कदाचन ॥
न चाऽसंचेतितः सत्तां स्वाकारः प्रतिपद्यते ।
ग्राह्ये च विषयाकारे ग्राहकोऽन्यो न लभ्यते ॥
Śl. Vār, 1.1.4 Kās 80,81,82

> "The form in which it (the cognition) appears, is the object to be cognised (*prameya*). The cognition in the form of cogniser (*grāhakākāra*) and the self-apprehension of cognition (*saṁvitti* or *sva-saṁvitti*) are respectively the means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) and the result (*phala*). Therefore, these three (factors of cognition) are not separate from one another".[1]

The sense is : There is no external object like blue, yellow, etc. Cognition (*vijñāna*) is the only reality, which alone serves the purpose of the object (*prameya*), the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and the result (*phala*). When it appears in the form of objects (*viṣayākāra*) like blue etc. due to *anādi-vāsanās*, it is called the object to be cognised (*prameya*) ; when it remains in its own form (*svākāra*) it is called the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*); and when it comprehends itself, it is called the result (*phala*).[2] Dharmakīrti has also explained the Yogācāra's viewpoint in his Pramāṇa-vārttika in similar way.[3]

It is also to be noted that the Yogācāras accept two forms of cognition, namely the form of object (*viṣayābhāsa or grāhyākāra*) and the 'form of itsalf' (*svābhāsa* or the *grāhakākāra*).[4] It will be discussed later on.[5]

(iv) *Kinds of Pratyakṣa* :

As far as the kinds of *pratyakṣa* are concerned, Kumārila has referred to and criticised different kinds of *pratyakṣa* of the Buddhists, but he has not given any definite number. Pārthasārathi, however, clearly mentions four kinds of *praryakṣa* of the Buddhists—(i) *Indriya pratyakṣa* (sense-perception), (ii) *Mānasa pratyakṣa* (mental perception), (iii) *Sva-saṁvedana* (Self apprehension or introspection) and (iv) *Yogi-pratyakṣa* (perception of the yogis).[1] Perhaps Pārthasārathi has followed Dharmakīrti and Kumārila has followed Diṅnāga in this regard, inasmuch as Diṅnāga does not mention any difinite number of its kinds:[2] while Dharmakīrti has clearly mentioned four kinds of *pratyakṣa.*

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[1] यदाभासं प्रमेयं तत्प्रमाणफलते पुनः ।
ग्राहकाकारसंवित्ती त्रयं नातः पृथक्कृतम् ॥ PS, I. Kā. 10

[2] cf. (i) NR. on Kā 80, p. 159, line 7-9
(ii) TṬ. on Kā, 80, p. 139

[3] अविभागोऽपि बुद्धयात्मविपर्यासितदर्शनैः ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तिभेदवानिव लक्ष्यते ॥
PV, Pratyakṣa, Kā. 354

[4] द्वयाभासं हि ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते स्वाभासं विषयाभासं च ।
PSV on Kā. 9a, see DP

[5] Infra. Chapt. VI, 8

(a) *Indriya prayakṣa* (*Sense-perception*) :[3]

The cognition which is dependent upon the senses for its origination, is called *indriya-jñāna* (sense-perception).[4] There are four causes (*pratyaya*) of every cognition. For instance, in case of a visual sensation (i) the visual sense is called *adhipati pratyaya,* (ii) the object (e.g. a patch of blue) is called *ālaṁbana pratyaya,* (iii) the light is called its *sahakāri pratyaya* and (iv) the previous moment of consciousness is called *samanantara pratyaya.* When there occurs a co-ordination or a kind of harmony among the four *pratyayas,* a new cognition arises.[5] It contains no conceptual content and hence is called by Prof. Stcherbatsky as "Sensation and even pure sensation, the sensational core of perception."[6] Kumārila has referred to this kind of *pratyakṣa* thus :

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[1] NR, p. 160, line 18-19

[2] PS & PSV Chap. I, Kās. 2-7

[3] तच्चतुर्विधम् । इन्द्रियज्ञानम् ।...मनोविज्ञानम् ।...आत्मसंवेदनम् । ...योगिज्ञानं चेति ।।

[4] cf. इन्द्रियस्य ज्ञानम् इन्द्रियज्ञानम् । इन्द्रियाश्रितं यत् तत्प्रत्यक्षम् । NBṬ, 1.8., p. 55

[5] cf. (i) Dr. S.N. Shastri, NBṬ, p. 58 and 118
(ii) D.N. Shastri, CIR, p. 451

[6] BL, I, p. 149, line 27-28

> "When, being incapable of recollection, *indriya-jñāna* is only non-conceptual (*nirvikalpaka*), how can it be possible that inference etc. may be preceded by *pratyakṣa* ?"[1]

It shows that cognition which is originated through senses (*indriyas*) is always non-conceptual according to the Buddhist logic. Diṅnāga also indicates the same view : "A thing possessing many properties cannot be cognised in all its aspects by the sense. The object of the sense is the form which is self-comprehensible and inexpressible."[2] He further adds in its Vṛtti that perception, caused by any of the five kinds of sense-organs, is devoid of conceptual construction.[3]

Aprāpyakāritva of the senses - As regards the functioning of the senses, there are two different views. Some systems like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā hold that all the five external senses are of the nature of cognising their respective objects only by obtaining them directly, no matter whether the sense reaches the object or the object reaches the sense.[4] But the Buddhists think that two of the external senses, viz. visual (*cakṣus*) and auditory (*śrotra*) function without obtaining the object directly, they are *aprāpyakārins*. Kumārila presents the two objections of the Buddhists against the *prāpyakāritva* view of the senses : (i) *Sāntara-agrahaṇam*—An object which is at some distance from the eye or the ear, would not be grasped by the sense, if it is accepted that the sense cognises the object only after getting it directly (*prāpya-grahaṇa-pakṣa*), because the eye and the ear, being only physiological organs, are incapable of

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1. कथं प्रत्यक्षपूर्वत्वमनुमानादिनो भवेत् ।
   यदा स्मृत्यसमर्थत्वान्निर्विकल्पेन्द्रियस्य धीः ।।
   Śl. Vār. 1.1.4. Kā. 87

2. धर्मिणोऽनेकरूपस्य नेन्द्रियात्सर्वथा गतिः ।
   स्वसंवेद्यमनिर्देश्यं रूपमिन्द्रियगोचरः ।। PS. 1.5

3. DP, p. 27, line 8-9

4. इन्द्रियाणि वस्तुप्राप्यप्रकाशकारीणि ।
   ṬB (K. Miśra), p. 117, line 7-8 (Ch. S)

moving from their places of their respective objects to get them directly. (ii) *Adhiṣṭhāṇādhikasya agrahaṇam* – The other objection is that one would not be able to apprehend an object which is larger in size than the sense-organ itself as happens in case of skin and the rest. The skin can apprehend only as much as there comes in its direct contact. So the eye also would not be able to cognise a hill or an elephant and the ear would not hear the loud sound of a drum in that case, because they are larger in size than that of the eye and the ear.[1]

The above objections have originally been raised by Diṅnāga. Speaking against the Mīmāṁsakas, he asserts : "If there were direct contact (of the senses) with all objects, then, inasmuch as there could be no interval (between the sense and the object), those cognitions which we experience of colour and sound, where there is an interval or where there is an excess of size (of object over sense), would be impossible."[2] Exactly the same criticism has been imposed by Diṅnāga upon the Naiyāyikas also,[3] which has been referred to by Uddyotakara[4] and Vācaspati Miśra.[5]

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1. cf. ततश्चाप्राप्यकारित्वाद् यद्बौद्धैः श्रोत्रचक्षुषोः ।
   लक्षणव्याप्तिसिद्ध्यर्थं संयोगो नेति कीर्त्यते ॥
   प्राप्यग्रहणपक्षेऽपि सान्तराऽग्रहणं किल ।
   अधिष्ठानाधिकश्चार्थो न गृह्येत त्वगादिवत् ॥
   Śl. Vār., 1.1.4 Kās 40-41
2. (i) सर्वेणार्थेन योगश्चेद् यद् दृष्टं रूपशब्दयोः ।
   ज्ञानं सान्तरमधिकं तद् बाधितं निरन्तरे ॥
   cited in DP, p. 165; See Trans. by M. Hattori in DP, p. 65.
   (ii) Also see PS I, Kā. 41 (Iyengar)
3. सान्तरग्रहणं न स्यात् प्राप्तौ ज्ञानाधिकस्य च ।
   अधिष्ठानाद् बहिर्नाक्षं न शक्तिर्विषये क्षणे ॥
   PS, 1. Kā. 20 (Iyengar)
4. NV, p. 101 (Cal S.S)
5. NVTṬ, p. 102 (Cal, SS)

One point to be noted regarding the Buddhist view is that Vasubandhu has accepted three senses, viz., *cakṣus, śrotra* and *manas*, as *aprāpyakārins*,[1] while Diṅnāga accepts only two external senses *cakṣus* and *śrotra* as *aprāpyakārins*. He mentions nothing about *manas*, possibly because he does not hold *manas* as a physical organ.

(b,c) *Mānasa Pratyakṣa* (*mental perception*) *and sva-saṁvedana* (*self-apprehension or introspection*) :

The stanzas, where Kumārila refutes the Buddhist view of *mānasa* and *sva-saṁvedana pratyakṣa*, or vindicates his own one with reference to them, are as follows :

> "How can there be any sense-dependence in case of self-apprehension of *kalpanā* (conceptual construction). If it is asserted that (here) mind (*manas*) is the (grasping), sense, then similar is the case with *gotva* etc. (i.e. the cognition of *gotva* etc. should also be included in *pratyakṣa*)."[2]

He further adds :

> "As in your (Buddhist's) theory, perceptibility (*pratyakṣatā*) is assumed with regard to the cognition of the *manas* being a sense, similarly in our case, perceptivility (of *savikalpaka-jñāna*) will be due to the dependence upon *manas*."[3]

Of these two verses, the first attacks upon Diṅnāga's declaration that even *kalpanā* (conceptual construction), so far as its self-apprehension is concerned, is admitted as an object (*viṣaya*) of *pratyakṣa*, because in this case, there is no conceptual construction with regard to the object,[1] The second verse refers to another statement of Diṅnāga, in which he seems to define *mānasa pratyakṣa* as well as *sva-saṁvedana pratyakṣa*.[2]

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[1] cf. चक्षुश्श्रोत्रमनोऽप्राप्तविषयं त्रयमन्यथा । AK, 1.43 cd

[2] कल्पनायाः स्वसंवित्ताविन्द्रियाधीनता कथम् ।
मनस्तत्रेन्द्रियं चेत् स्याद् गोत्वादावपि तत्समम् ।
Śl. Vār., 1.1.4 Kā. 134

[3] मनसस्त्विन्द्रियत्वेन सुखदुःखादिबुद्धिषु ।
यथा प्रत्यक्षतैवं नस्तदधीना भविष्यति ॥ Ibid., Kā. 136

In fact the two lines of Diṅnāga, are rather confusing. It is difficult to judge from them whether Diṅnāga accepts *mānasa* and *sva-saṁvedana* as two separate perception or he regards them as one. Even the two editions of Pramāṇa samuccaya and Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti (Ch. I), available at present, give two different readings of these two references. From Dr. Hattori's Sanskrit restoration and English translation, it seems that Diṅnāga admitted only mental perception which includes the mental cognition of external objects as well as self-apprehension of desire, anger, pleasure, pain etc.[3] and which also includes self-consciousness of *kalpanā*.[4] But Iyengar's Sanskrit restoration of these passages expresses the view, "Having cognised the colour etc. (by the external senses), *citta* (*vijñāna* or congition), remains in the form of experience and is without any *vikalpa* or conceptual construction (hence it is called *pratyakṣa*) while self-apprehension of desire, anger, attachment pleasure, pain, etc., being independent of any sense-organ, is *sva-saṁvedana pratyakṣa*."[5] From these readings, it appears that here Diṅnāga accepts two different types of perception i.e. *mānasa* and *sva-saṁvedana*.

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[1] cf. कल्पनापि स्वसंवित्ताविष्टा नार्थे विकल्पनात् ।
PS, I.7 ab (see in DP)

[2] मानसं चार्थरागादिस्वसंवित्तिरकल्पिका । PS, I. 6 ab. (See in DP)

[3] PS. I.6 ab and its Vṛtti which runs as follows :
मानसमपि रूपादिविषयालम्बनमविकल्पकमनुभवाकारप्रवृत्तं, रागादिषु च स्वसंवेदनमिन्द्रियानपक्षेत्वाद् मानसं प्रत्यक्षम् ।
Restored by M. Hattori in his DP.

[4] PS, I.7 ab and its Vṛtti translated by Dr. Hattori, See DP, p. 27-28

[5] PS, I. 6ab and its Vṛtti, which runs as follows :
चित्तमपि रूपादीनुपलब्ध्वा यदनुभवाकारेण वर्तते तन्निर्विकल्पकमेव, इच्छाक्रोधमोहसुखदुःखादिकं हि इन्द्रियमनपेक्ष्य भवतीति स्वसंवेदन-प्रत्यक्षम् । (Iyengar's restoration)

In such a position, nothing can be said with certainly about Diṅnāga's view on *mānasa* and *sva-saṁvedana pratyakṣa* and this is the reason as to why Kumārila's refutation and exposition of the Buddhist view is not very clear. However, from the works of Dharmakīrti it is explicitly clear that *mānasa* and *sva-saṁvedana* are two different kinds of perception.[1] He defines *mānasa pratyakṣa* as :

> *Mano-vijñāna* (mental perception) is produced by *indriya-jñāna* (sense-cognition), which is its immediately preceding homogenous cause (*samanantara pratyaya*) and which is associated with the second-moment-object (*dvitīya-viṣaya-kṣaṇa*) arising consecutively after the first-moment-object of *indriya-jñāna* (sensation)"[2]

That is, the moment of pure sensation (*indriya-pratyakṣa*) is immediatly followed by a moment of mental perception. In one and the same stream of thought there are two consecutive moments, which are related as cause and effect. They are homogenous, because they belong to the same stream of thought. Prof. Stcherbatsky observes : "this mental sensation is an intermediate step between pure sensation and the work of the understanding."[3]

The *sva-saṁvedana-pratyakṣa* is defined as : There arises self-apprehension of every cognition and every mental phenomenon,[4] and it is called *sva-saṁvedana pratyakṣa*.

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[1] NB, 1.7-11

[2] (i) स्वविषयानन्तरविषयसहकारिणेन्द्रियज्ञानेन समनन्तरप्रत्ययेन जनितं तन्मनोविज्ञानम् ॥ NB, 1.9

(ii) तस्मादिन्द्रियविज्ञानान्तरप्रत्ययोद्भवम् ।
मनोऽन्यमेव गृह्णाति विषयं नान्यदृक् ततः ॥
PV, I. Kā. 243

[3] BL, I, p. 162, line 7-8

[4] 'सर्वचित्तचैत्तानामात्मसंवेदनम्' NB. 1.10

One point is, however, notable that Kumārila's presentation of the Buddhist view that (i) self-apprehension of *kalpanā* and (ii) the cognition regarding pleasure, pain, etc. is *pratyakṣa* due to *manas* being a sense,[1] is not in consonance with Diṅnāga's view, because Diṅnāga regards them as *pratyakṣa,* not because they are dependent upon the sense *manas,* but because they are free from conceptual construction (*vikalpa*). *Manas* is not an *indriya* in his theory, it is only a stream of consciousness.[2]

(d) *Yogi-pratyakṣa* (*perception of yogis*) :

Discussing the problem whether '*dharma*' (duty) can be an object of *pratyakṣa* or not, Kumārila presents the Buddhist conception of *Yogi-pratyakṣa* as follows :

> "Regarding the objects even of the past and the future, and the objects very subtle and interrupted, perception of the yogis has been accepted by some (the Buddhists) and perception of the liberated-souls by some others (the *Ārhatas*)."[3]

Commenting upon this, Pārthasārathi says, the Buddhists maintain that the preception of the yogis, originated through deep contemplation (*bhāvanā-balajam*), can cognise all the objects belonging to the past and the future and objects which are very subtle; it can also cognise even *dharma* and *adharma.*[4]

Diṅnāga's definition of *yogi-pratyakṣa* as found in Pramāṇa-samuccaya and its Vṛtti is as : The *yogi-pratyakṣa* is that which is not associated with any conceptual-construction of the *āgama* (i.e. the authoritative words of the teachers) and apprehends only a thing-in-itself (*sva-lakṣaṇa*).[1]

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[1] (i) मनस्तत्रेन्द्रियं चेत्......।
(ii) मनसस्त्विन्द्रियत्वेन......॥

[2] cf. BDV, pp. 128-29

[3] अतीताऽनागतेऽप्यर्थे सूक्ष्मे व्यवहितेऽपि च ।
प्रत्यक्षं योगिनामिष्टं कैश्चिन्मुक्तात्मनामपि ॥
Śl. Vār., 1.1.4, Kā. 26

[4] योगिनां हि भावनाबलजं प्रत्यक्षं सकलाऽतीतऽनागतसूक्ष्मादिविषयं धर्मऽधर्मावपि गोचरयतीति शाक्यादयो मन्यन्ते । NR, p. 141.

From the above account it appears that Kumārila's and Pārthasārathi's presentation of perception of the yogis is not in conformity with the definition given by Diṅnāga. But it does not mean that this presentation is wrong in any way. It is a well known fact in the history of Buddhist logic that the yogin's intuition is capable of cognising all objects belonging to the present, the past and the future and also the objects which are very subtle and distant. Prof. Stcherbatsky observes : "If we would posses the other intuition, the intuition by the intellect, which would understand reality as directly as we feel it in the first moment of sensation, our knowledge would be illimited. We would know the remote as the near, the past and the future just as the present."[2] The statement of Prajñākara Gupta, in his Pramāṇa-vārttika-bhāṣya, also expresses this very view about *yogi-pratyakṣa*.[3]

2.8. ANUMĀNA (INFERENCE) :

(i) *Definition of Anumāna*

All the system of Indian philosophy except the Cārvākas, unanimously maintain that *anumāna* is an independent means of valid cognition. While perception is a knowledge which does not depend upon any previous cognition, inference is dependent upon the previous knowledge of a *liṅga* (mark). Kumārila, while repudiating the view of *anupalabdhi liṅga*, presents the Buddhist definition of inference as follows :

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[1] cf. (i) योगिनां गुरुनिर्देशाव्यतिभिन्नार्थमात्रदृक् । PS, I. 6cd
(ii) योगिनामप्यागमविकल्पाव्यवकीर्णमर्थमात्रदर्शनं प्रत्यक्षम् ।
PVS, on verse 6cd.

[2] BL, I, p. 162

[3] cf. अत्र वैभाषिका आहुः । ...योगिनान्त्वतीतमनागतविषयज्ञानमतीतानागतस्य विमानत्वात् । pVBh. p. 327, line 8-11

> "That which is originated through the middle term (*hetu or liṅga*) having the three characteristics, is accepted as inferential cognition."[1]

It clearly refers to Diṅnāga's definition of inference, quoted by Bhaṭṭa Uṁveka, Pārthasārathi Miśra and Sucarita Miśra etc. Although these commentators do not mention the original source of this fragment, but undoubtedly it belongs to Diṅnāga, as it has been ascribed to him by some eminent scholars[2] on the basis of Pramāṇa-samuccaya (Tibetan Version). The definition runs as follows :

> "The cognition of an object through its mark (*liṅga*), characterised by the three aspects, is called inference."[3]

Three aspects of a liṅga or hetu (*mark*) :

In the above definition, the word 'mark with three aspects' *tri-rūpa-liṅga* (replaced as '*tri-lakṣaṇa*' by Kumārila) requires some clarification, 'That which causes to know a hidden or unperceived object, is called *liṅga* or *hetu* (mark or the middle term).[4] The words *liṅga* and *hetu* are synonymous. The three aspects of a *liṅga* are : it (*liṅga*) should be present in the subject or minor term (*pakṣa*), where the thing is to be inferred, (ii) it should be present in the homologue (*sapakṣa*) and (iii) it should be absent from the heterologue (*vipakṣa*).[1] For instance, the hill has fire, because it has smoke. Here the mark (*liṅga or hetu*) is 'smoke', which is characterised by the three aspects -- it is present in the hill (*pakṣa*) and also present in the kitchen (*sapakṣa*) and is absent from the tank (*vipakṣa*). Hence it fulfils all the three requisites of an efficient mark (*sad hetu or liṅga*). Kumārila, besides using the word *trilakṣaṇa*, has also mentioned the term *tri-rūpa-liṅga*[2] during his criticism of the Buddhist view of inference, but he does not explain its meaning in any of his verses.

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[1] 'त्रिलक्षणेन या बुद्धिर्जन्यते साऽनुमेष्यते ।

Śl. Vār., Abhāva, Kā. 44

[2] (i) H.R.R. Iyengar, Kumārila and Diṅnāga, IHQ (1927), p. 603-606
  (ii) S.C. Vidyābhūshan, HIL, p. 280
  (iii) Th. Stcherbatsky, BL, I, p. 236
  (iv) C. Kunhan Raja, Index to TṬ. p. 588

[3] त्रिरूपाल्लिङ्गतोऽर्थदृक् अनुमानम् ।

PS. II (vide Iyengar's above mentioned article Quoted in TṬ, p. 223, 224; NR, p. 488; Kāśika, III. p. 37 & 209

[4] (i) लिङ्ग्यते गम्यतेऽनेनाऽर्थं इति लिङ्गम् NBṬ, 2.3., p. 38
(ii) लीनमर्थं गमयति इति वा लिङ्गम् ।

NPV Pañjikā, p. 78, line 10

It has been said by an eminent scholar, Sugiura, that the significance of the middle term (*liṅga or hetu*) for inference and for the theory of reasoning is for the first time discussed by Diṅnāga and the result of his study is the famous doctrine of *trai-rūpya liṅga*.[3] But it is a point of controversy among scholars as to whom the origin of this idea should be ascribed.[4] The idea of '*tri-rūpa-liṅga*' has been found in a verse of Praśastapāda-bhāṣya also.[5] Prof. Stcherbatsky is of the opinion that this idea is already present in the three rules of Vasubandhu, which has been endorsed by Diṅnāga in the later period.[6] So far as the priority or posteriority of Diṅnāga and Praśastapāda is concerned, Prof. Stcherbatsky himself is not of a definite view. But he is of the opinion that the developed *trai-rūpya* theory is essentially Buddhistic.[1] It is evident from the later Buddhist treatises that this doctrine, laid down by Diṅnāga has been followed by all the post Diṅnāga-Buddhist logicians.[2] However, it has been refined to some extent by Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara in order to avoid the criticism.[3]

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[1] cf (i) 'अनुमेयेऽथ तुत्तुल्ये सद्भावो नास्तिताऽसति' ।
Quoted in NV, 1.1.5 & extracted in HIL, p.
(ii) 'किं पुनस्त्रैरूप्यम् । पक्षधर्मत्वं, सपक्षे सत्त्वं विपक्षे च असत्त्वमिति'
N. Praveśa, p. 1.

[2] न चापि वासनामात्राल्लिङ्गज्ञानस्य सम्भवः ।
लिङ्गिज्ञानं च तद्वत्स्यात् त्रिरूपाल्लिङ्गतो न तत् ॥
Śl. Vār., Anumāna, Kā. 167

[3] cf. Sugiura, Hindu Logic as preserved in China & Japan, as quoted in Introd. to N. Praveśa, I, p. xxiv.

[4] See FFD, p. 23

[5] यदनुमेयेन सम्बद्धं प्रसिद्धं च तदन्विते ।
तदभावे च नास्त्येव तल्लिङ्गमनुमायाम् ॥
P Bh., p. 162 (Ch. SS.).

[6] cf. BL, I, p. 243.

Definition of hetu or liṅga (mark or the middle term) :

Apart from the three aspects of *hetu*, Kumārila has referred to its definition also as : '*A hetu* (mark, probans or the middle term) is that which is invariably concomitant with the part of probandum (i.e. *sādhyāṅśa*=major term=fire).[4] This very definition with some change of words has been quoted by Uddyotakara[5] and is ascribed to Diṅnāga by Vācaspati miśra.[6] It has also been quoted by Pārthasārathi Miśra[7] and Sucarita Miśra[8] by the name of Bhikṣu. Meaning of this fragment is : "one attribute of the subject or minor term (i.e. *grāhyadharma* or *pakṣadharma*) which is invariable concomi-

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1. cf. BL, I, p. 346 fn. 2.
2. (i) अनुमानं लिङ्गादर्थदर्शनम् । लिङ्गं पुनस्त्रिरूपमुक्तम् ।
   N. Praveśa, p. 7.
   (ii) त्रिरूपाल्लिङ्गाद् यदनुमेये ज्ञानं तदनुमानम् ।
   NB, 2. 3.
   (iii) त्रिरूपतो लिङ्गादनुमेयार्थदर्शनम् । TS, Kā. 1361
   (iv) त्रिरूपाल्लिङ्गादनुमेये परोक्षविषये ज्ञानं—अनुमानम्
   TB (Mokṣākara) p. 13, line 6-7.
3. See NB and NBT, 2.5.
4. साध्यांश व्याप्त हेतु.........। Śl. Vār., Anumāna, Kā. 140 ab.
5. ग्राह्यधर्मस्तदंशेन व्याप्तो हेतुः NV, p. (Ch. SS.)
6. दिङ्नागस्यैव प्रदेशान्तरहेतु लक्षणम् ।
   NVTṬ, 291 (Ch. SS).
7. यत्तु भिक्षुणा पक्षधर्मस्तदंशेन व्याप्तो हेतुरिति । NR, p. 377
8. See, Kāśikā, III, p. 65, line 24.

tant with another attribute of the same (i.e. *tadaṁśena*=major term), is called *hetu*."

On the basis of Vācaspati Miśra's statement, H.N. Randle is of the opinion that this fragment is an extract from Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti.[1] He also asserts that "the fragment is important because in it (and in it alone) the doctrine of *vyāpti*, with which Diṅāga's name is always connected, is explicitly stated."[2]

Three Kinds of hetu or liṅga :

It has been accepted in the Buddhist logic that there are three kinds of *hetu* : (i) *Kārya* (effect) (ii) *Svabhāva* (identity) and (iii) *Anupalabdhi* (negation).[3]

The *kārya liṅga* (middle-term in the form of effect) is that which is associated with its *liṅgin* (the major term) by the cause and effect relationship e.g. smoke is the effect of fire.[4]

The *svabhāva liṅga* (middle term in the form of identity) is that which is associated with its *liṅgin* (the major term) by the relation of identity (*tādātmya*), e.g. *śiṁśapātva* (i.e. nature of being *śiṁśapā*), is identical with *vṛkṣatva* (treeness).[5]

Both these two kinds of *liṅga* do not seem to be referred to and refuted by Kumārila. However, a reference to *anupalabdhi liṅga* has been found there. Establishing the separate existence of *abhāva pramāṇa* and therefore, refuting the *anupalabdhi liṅga* of the Buddhists, Kumārila asserts.

> "The non-origination of *pratyakṣa* etc. will not serve the purpose of a *liṅga* (with regard to the cognition of non-existence of anything like pot etc."[6]

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1. FFD, p. 47.
2. Ibid., p. 48.
3. त्रिरूपाणि च त्रीण्येव लिङ्गानि । अनुपलब्धिः स्वभावः कार्यंचेति ॥
   NB, 2.10-11
4. cf. HIL, p. 280;
   cf. NB, & NBṬ, 2.17
5. cf. HIL, p. 280
   cf. NB, & NBṬ, 2. 15-16
6. प्रत्यक्षादेरनुत्पत्तिर्न तु लिङ्गं भविष्यति ।
   Śl. Vār., Abhāva, Kā. 38ab.

This refutation clearly refers to the Buddhist view of *anupalabdhi liṅga,*[1] according to which the non-perception of a thing is a middle term or liṅga for the cognition of non-existence thereof, e.g. non-perception of a pot at a place (where it should be seen, if present) is a *liṅga* or mark for the cognition of its non-existence.[2]

(ii) *Object of Anumāna* :

Here we have to consider two points : (a) the object of inference is *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* (generic-form) and (b) the probandum (*anumeya* or *sādhya*) of inference is minor term (*pakṣa*) qualified by the major term (*sādhya-dharma*).

(a) Refuting the Buddhist view of inference, Kumārila points out that those who accept the generic form (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) to be apprehended only through inference, would be indulged in the discrepancy of *regressus ad infinitum,* because the *liṅga* (mark or middle term), being of generic form would require another inference for its own apprehension. Another inference for its own origin, would require a *liṅga*, which in turn would require a further inference and thus, this series of inference would go infinitely.[3] From this criticism of Kumārila, it is clear that according to the Buddhists, the object of inference is the generic form (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*).

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[1] (i) अत्रेदानीमनुपलब्धिलिङ्गवादिनो बौद्धस्य प्रत्यवस्थानमाह प्रत्यक्षादेरिति । Kāśikā (Pt. III), p. 207. line 3-4.
(ii) NR, p. 486 on Kā. 38.

[2] cf. HIL, p. 281.

[3] सामान्यं नानुमानेन विना यस्य प्रतीयते ।
न च लिङ्गविनिर्मुक्तमनुमानं प्रवर्तते ॥
असामान्यस्य लिङ्गत्वं न च केनचिदिष्यते ।
न चाऽनवगतं लिङ्गं किञ्चिदस्ति प्रकाशकम् ॥
तस्य चाप्यनुमानेन स्यादन्येन गतिः पुनः ।
तदुत्पत्तिश्च लिङ्गात्स्यात्सामान्यज्ञानसंहतात् ॥
तस्य चाप्यनुमानत्वाद् भवेल्लिङ्गेन चोद्भवः ।
अनुमानान्तरादेव ज्ञानेनैवं च कल्पने ॥
लिङ्गलिङ्ग्यनुमानानामानन्त्यादेकलिङ्गिनि ।
गतिर्युगसहस्रेषु बहुष्वपि न विद्यते ॥
Śl. Vār. Anumāna. Kā. 149-153

This view can be confirmed from Diṅnāga's own statment that there are only two types of object—the particular (*viśeṣa* or *sva-lakṣaṇa*) and the generic form (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*). Among them *pratyakṣa* can cognise only the particular and inference can apprehend only the generic form.[1]

As far as Kumārila's objection of *regrassus ad infinitum* is concerned, it has been properly answered by the later Buddhist logicians. Kumārila himself presents the Buddhist reply that 'the *liṅga* (mark or middle term), although of generic form (*sāmānya-bhūta*), can be comprehended through something else (other than inference).[2] This 'something else' has been explained in Kāśikā and Nyāya-ratnākara as 'an indescribable—*vikalpa*, originated through the perception of the *sva-lakṣaṇa* of smoke etc., on account of which there would be no *regressus ad infinitnm*.'[3] This view can be confirmed through the statement of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa, according to whom apprehension of the generic-form (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) through the *anumāna*, does not mean that it (*sāmānya*) can be apprehended only through *anumāna*, but it does mean that *anumāna* can apprehend only the generic form, and not the particular (*viśeṣa*). Therefore the *liṅga* of inference, which is of generic nature, can be apprehended according to the Buddhists, through the *vikalpa*, based on the perception of *dhumādi-sva-lakṣaṇa* and hence there can occur no *regressus ad infinitum*. Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa, giving a distinct idea of the Buddhist view, says : "In our (Buddhists) theory, the generic form can be apprehended, due to the natural illusion, even by the '*vikalpa*' based on perception. The *liṅga-vikalpa* is also confirmatory (*avisaṁvādaka*) because of its being based upon the perception of the *sva-lakṣaṇa* (particularity) of the *liṅga*....."[1] He further explains : "When it is said that 'the object of *anumāna* is the generic form (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*), it does not mean that only inference can apprehend the generic form, because it can be the object of that *vikalpa* also, which is based upon perception and also of other *vikalpa* (like recollection etc.), but it does mean that *anumāna* can cognise only the generic form *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* (and not the particular i. e. *sva-lakṣaṇa*).[2]

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[1] न हि स्वसामान्यलक्षणाभ्यामन्यत्प्रमेयमस्ति । स्वलक्षणविषयं हि प्रत्यक्षं सामान्यलक्षणविषयमनुमानमिति ।
PSV on Kā. 2. Restored by M. Hattori in DP.

[2] अथ सामान्यभूतेऽपि लिङ्गेऽन्यस्माद् गतिर्भवेत् ।
Śl. Vār., Anumāna, Kā. 154 ab.

[3] cf. (i) 'न तद्ग्रहणार्थमनुमानमपेक्ष्यते, धूमादिस्वलक्षणदर्शनप्रभवविकल्पवेद्यत्वात्तस्य । न चासावप्रमाणम्, अर्थक्रियासमर्थवस्तुप्रतिलम्भात् । न च प्रमाणमनर्थविषयत्वात् । अतोऽनिर्वचनीयविकल्पसिद्धत्वात् लिङ्गस्य नानवस्था भवतीति ।
Kāśikā, Pt. III, p. 89

(ii) NR, p. 395, line 9-11

(b) Kumārila has discussed at length his view about *anumeya*. He has devoted about 20 verses (27-47) on this point and the essence of his discussion is : The minor term (hill) characterised by the major term (fire) is *anumeya* i.e. the object of inference.[3] But strangely enough we find no reference or no refutation of the Buddhist view during all this long discussion about the *anumeya*.

Diṅnāga in Pramāṇa-samuccaya (Ch. II) first refutes the two views about probandum—firstly, the inference of fire from smoke and secondly, the inference of relation between the fire and the hill, and then he establishes his own view that we infer from smoke the place (hill) qualified by fire. In other words, we infer the minor term (*pakṣa*=*dharmin*) qualified by the major term (*sādhya* = *dharma*).[1] If we compare this view with that of Kumārila, a close similarity is found in them, as also observed by H.N. Randle.[2]

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[1] 'अस्माकं तु प्रत्यक्षपृष्ठभाविनाऽपि विकल्पेन प्रकृतिविभ्रमात् सामान्यं प्रतीयते । लिङ्गविकल्पस्य च स्वलक्षणदर्शनाश्रयत्वात्...अविसंवादकम्'
HBṬ, p. 24, line 1-3

[2] यत्तूक्तम् 'सामान्यलक्षणविषयमनुमानम् इति तत्र नैवमवधार्यते—सामान्यलक्षणविषयमनुमानमेवेति । प्रत्यक्षपृष्ठभाविनो विकल्पस्यापि तद्विषयत्वात् तदन्यस्य च विकल्पस्य । किन्तु सामान्यलक्षणविषयमेवानुमानमित्यवधार्यते ।
HBṬ, p. 24., line 9-13

[3] See (i) एकदेशविशिष्टश्च धर्म्येवाऽत्राऽनुमीयते ।
तस्माद्धर्मविशिष्टस्य धर्मिणः स्यात्प्रमेयता ॥
Śl. Vār., Anumāna, Kā. 25ab, Kā. 47 cd. respectively
(ii) For its complete discussion, see Ibid., Kā. 27 to 47

It appears that Kumārila was fully acquainted with, rather much influenced by Diṅnāga's view. He accepted the view as such, but did not admit his debt to the great Buddhist logician and remained silent about his name. On this point A.B. Dhruva observes : "Kumārila, who comes a few centuries after Diṅnāga, discusses the problem in the Śloka-vārttika in a set of verses, which in point of reasoning bear a close resemblance with the verses quoted from Pramāṇa samuccaya. However, it is difficult to believe that the anti-Buddhistic Brāhmaṇa would have swallowed the view of Diṅnāga, if it were a pure heresy from the orthodox logic."[3] Dr. Satkari Mookerjee also accepts that the theory of *anumeya* was an important contribution of Diṅnāga to Indian Logic. That is why the later logicians specially Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and also Kumārila Bhaṭṭa accepted this view.[4]

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[1] केचिद्धर्मान्तरं मेयं लिङ्गस्याव्यभिचारत. ।
सम्बन्धं केचिदिच्छन्ति सिद्धत्वाद्धर्मधर्मिणोः ।।
लिङ्गं धर्मे प्रसिद्धं चेत्किमन्यत्तेन मीयते ।
अथ धर्मिणि तस्येव किमर्थं नानुमेयता ।।
सम्बन्धेऽपि द्वयं नास्ति षष्ठी श्रूयते तद्वति ।
अवाच्योऽनुगृहीतत्वान्न चासौ लिङ्गसङ्गतः ।।
लिङ्गस्याव्यभिचारस्तु धर्मेणान्यत्र दृश्यते ।
तत्र प्रसिद्धं तद्युक्तं धर्मिणं गमयिष्यति ।। PS, II

(i) Quoted in NVTṬ, p. 152 (Cal.SS), (ii) Tibetan Version of these in HIL, p. 281 and (iii) extracted by H.N. Randle in FFD, p. 18-19.

[2] "This is the topic discussed in NV, pp. 52-54, and Śl. Vār, anumāna-pariccheda, verses 23-34; both passages being closely parallel to the present fragment and written with Diṅnāga's discussion in view." FFD. p. 21, 6-9.

[3] Introduction to N. Praveśa, p. xxii or xxiii

[4] BPUF, p. 354

(iii) *Kinds of anumāna* :

In the Buddhist logic two kinds of *anumāna* have been accepted : (i) *svārthānumāna* (inference for oneself) and (ii) *parārthānumāna* (inference for others).[1] In the Śloka-vārttika, there seems to be no apparent reference to the Buddhist view regarding this division of *anumāna*. However, the Kāśikākāra, at one place, quotes a Buddhist kārikā, which gives a distinct idea about it. The Kāśikākāra says :

> "And the Buddhists have divided this *anumāna* into two kinds, viz. *svārtha* and *parārtha* as has been asserted : *Anumāna* is of two kinds, (i) cognition of an object through the middle term (*liṅga* or *hetu*) characterised by the three aspects is called *svārthānumāna*, (inference for oneself); (ii) but communicating (to others) the knowledge of that object, cognised by oneself (through inference) is called *parārthānumāna* (inference for others)."[2]

The above mentioned verse, quoted by Sucarita Miśra, has been referred to in parts in Nyāya-ratnākara[3] and Tātparya-ṭīkā[4] at several places. The verse originally belongs to Diṅnāga as can be verified from some reliable sources.[1] In fact, this division of inference into two—*svārtha* and *parārtha*, is an original contribution of Diṅnāga to the Buddhist Logic, as held by Keith and Randle.[2] It is, perhaps, an original contribution to the Indian logic also, although it is a point to be decided as to who first set forth this division of inference—either Praśastapāda or Diṅnāga.[3]

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[1] अनुमानं द्विधा । स्वार्थं परार्थं च । NB, 2. 1-2

[2] तच्चेदमनुमानं द्वेधा बौद्धा विभजन्ते स्वार्थं परार्थं चेति । यदाहुः—
अनुमानं द्विधा स्वार्थं त्रिरूपाल्लिङ्गतोऽर्थदृक् ।
परार्थमनुमानं तु स्वदृष्टार्थप्रकाशकम् ।। इति
Kāśikā, III, p. 37, line 17-19

[3] (i) भवदीयत्रिरूपाल्लिङ्गतोऽर्थदृगमनुमानमित्यनुमानलक्षणात् ।
NR, p. 488, line 17
(ii) भवदीयेनाऽपि परार्थमनुमानं तु स्वदृष्टार्थप्रकाशकमिति लक्षणेन
NR, p. 252-53

[4] (i) भवत्पक्षे नित्यविपक्षानुमानस्येदं लक्षणम्, त्रिरूपाल्लिङ्गतोऽर्थदृक् इति
SVTṬ, p. 223; also see p. 224, line 12
(ii) उक्तं च परार्थमनुमानं तद्दृष्टार्थप्रकाशकम् इत्यर्थः
Ibid., p. 224, line 18-19

It is, thus, evident from the above discussion that the two kinds of *anumāna*, *svārtha* and *parārtha*, are fundamentally different from each other. *Svārthānumāna* is the knowledge of a thing derived by one's own self through the knowledge of *avinābhāvi liṅga* or invariable mark, having three characteristics. To know by self is its essential nature. But *parārthānumāna* is the statement of one's inferential knowledge in words in order to communicate it to others.[4] To be verbal (*śabdātmaka*) is its essential nature.

(iv) *Members of syllogism* (*Avayava of parārthānumāna*)

There are different views about the members of syllogism in the different systems of Indian logic. The Naiyāyikas maintain that there should be five members in a syllogism, viz. *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *dṛṣṭānta*, *upanaya* and *nigamana*,[5] although a reference has been found of ten members also in the Nyāyabhāṣya.[6] The Mīmāṁsakas (Bhāṭṭa), dropping the last two-*upanaya* and *nigamana*, accept only three, *pratijñā*, *hetu* and *dṛṣṭānta*.[7] They also add that the two members, either the last two or the first two, can be dropped from the five members accepted by the Naiyāyikas.[1]

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[1] (i) H.R.R. Iyengar, "Kumārila and Diṅnāga", IHQ, 1927, Vol. p. 603-606
(ii) S.C. Vidyābhūsaṇa, HIL, p. 280, 282
(iii) MNV on PV, p. 363, line 9-10

[2] BL, I, p. 290 fn. 2

[3] cf. S.N. Shastri, BDV, p. 160

[4] cf. परार्थानुमानं शब्दात्मकम्, स्वार्थानुमानं तु ज्ञानात्मकम् ।
NBṬ, 2.1

[5] प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनान्यवयवाः । NS, 1.1.32

[6] NBh, 1.1.32

[7] तच्च वाक्यं प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदृष्टान्तैः सावयवम् ।
NR, p. 361, line 19-20

As far aṣ the Buddhist logic is concerned, there are different views about the number of members of syllogism. Vasubandhu in his Vādavidhi, accepted three members –*pratijñā*, *hetu* and *dṛṣṭānta*, whereas the view of five membered-syllogism has also been ascribed to him by some scholars.[2] Diṅnāga seems to be in favour of the three membered-syllogism.[3] He defines *pratijñā* in his Nyāya-mukha.[4] But Dharmakīrti and the later commentators point out that in Diṅnāga's view, *pratijñā* is not a member of syllogism,[5] although he (Diṅnāga) has given the definition of *pratijñā* for certain reasons.[6] In Dharmakīrti's own view, only two members of syllogism—*hetu* and *dṛṣṭānta*—are sufficient,[7] while in case of intellectuals, only *hetu* can serve the purpose.[8]

Commenting upon a verse[9] of Kumārila, which establishes

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1. तस्मात् त्र्यवयवं ब्रूमः पौनरुक्त्यासहा वयम् ।
   उदाहरणपर्यन्तं यद्वोदाहरणादिकम् ॥ MM, p. 64
2. cf. G. Tucci, Introduction to Pre-Diṅnāga BTL.
3. cf. Ibid.
4. cf. MNV, on PV, p. 390 (BḂ)
5. cf. (i) तत् पक्षवचनं वक्तुरभिप्रायनिवेदने ।
   प्रमाणं संशयोत्पत्तेस्ततः साक्षान्न साधनम् ॥ PV, 4.16
   (ii) नन्वाचार्यस्य पक्षवचनमसाधनत्वेनेष्टमिति कथं ज्ञायते— निर्दिष्टाऽऽचार्येण तत्रानुमेयनिर्देशो हेत्वर्थविषयो मतः— इत्यनेन ग्रन्थेन । MNV, 4.18
   (iii) द्वयोरप्यनयोः प्रयोगयोर्नावश्यं पक्षनिर्देशः ॥ NB, 3.34
   (iv) स्वरूपेणैवेति साध्यत्वेनैवेष्टो न साधनत्वेनापि ॥ NB, 3.40
6. See NBṬ, 3.38
7. cf. NB, 3.34; BDV, p. 163
8. cf. NB, 3.121, BDV, p. 163
9. अनुमानगृहीतस्य तेनैव प्रतिपादनात् ॥
   परेभ्यो वाञ्छता वाच्यः पूर्वपक्षो यथोदितः
   Śl. Vār., Anumāna, Kā. 53cd. 54ab

the necessity of *pakṣavacana* or *pratijñā*, the Kāśikākāra presents a view of some opponent (perhaps of the Buddhist) that 'there is no need of *pakṣavacana* or *pratijñā* as a member of syllogism, because even in its absence purpose is served through *hetu* alone.'[1]

It can, thus, be concluded :

(i) Vasubandhu accepts three or fiive members
(ii) Diṅnāga accepts three or two members
(iii) Dharmakīrti accepts two or only one member.

There seems to be no exact reference in the Śloka-vārttika about the Buddhist view regarding the number of members in a syllogism.

(v) *All Inferential Relations are Merely Ideal* :

In the section of Nirālambanavāda, Kumārila argues against the Idealist Buddhists that they cannot consistently use reasoning to establish their own position, as they maintain all external objects (including the means of cognition etc.) as unreal. In response to this, Kumārila presents the Buddhist's reply thus : 'inspite of the absence of external object, all worldly affairs like that of *anumāna*, *anumeya*, etc. can be assumed through the superimposed cognition, which is the result of *vikalpas* (conceptual constructions), caused by different types of impressions (*vāsanās*) and words.[2]

Commenting upon this, Bhaṭṭa Uṁveka and Pārthasārathi Miśra have quoted, by the name of Diṅnāga, a statement which makes the Buddhist position explicitly clear :

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[1] cf. इदं तु पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञापरनामानमेके नानुमन्यन्ते । वदन्ति च किमनेनार्थकेन, अन्तरेणापि पक्षवचनमपेक्षितं सिध्यत्येव । हेतुर्हि साध्यसाधकः । Kāśika, III, p. 38, line 20-22

[2] cf. नन्वसत्यपि बाह्योऽर्थेबुद्ध्यारूढेन सिध्यति ।
वासनाशब्दभेदोत्थविकल्पप्रविभागतः ॥
न्यायविद्भिरिदं चोक्तं धर्मादौ बुद्धिमाश्रिते ।
व्यवहारोऽनुमानादेः कल्प्यते न वहिः स्थिते ॥
Śl. Vār., Nirālambana, Kās. 167-68

> "It has been asserted by Diṅnāga that 'all this business of probans and probandum (*anumāna-anumeya-vyavahāra*) depends upon the substance and atiribute relation (*dharma-dharmi-nyāya*)—a relation that is imposed by ideas (alone); and it does not require any external existence (or non-existence)."[1]

This fragment has been cited by Vācaspati Miśra[2] also and attributed to Diṅnāga. But it has not been traced so far as which work of Diṅnāga it belongs to. It is obvious, however, from this statement that according to him all inferential relations like that of *anumāna-anumeya* etc. are based merely on mental-constructions (*vikalpas*) caused by *anādi vāsanās* (impressions).

2. 9. OTHER PRAMĀṆAS AND THE BUDDHISTS :

(i) *Śabda Pramāṇa* (*Verbal testimony*) :

Some systems like Nyāya, Sāṁkhya, and Pūrva-Mīmāṁsa have accepted *śabda* (verbal-testimony) as an independent means of valid cognition. But the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas regard it as a case of inference only.[3] "The Buddhists, holding identity between *śabda* (verbal testimony) and *anumāna* (inference) assert that cognition derived through the assertion of a trustworthy person is infallible and it is just like the inferential cognition."[4] The idea is that there is an invariable conco-

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1. (i) सर्वं एवाऽयमनुमानाऽनुमेयव्यवहारो बुद्ध्यारूढेन धर्मधर्मिन्यायेन न बहिः सत्तामपेक्षत इति दिङ्नागेनोक्तमिति ।

NR, p. 258, line 19-21

(ii) उक्तं च दिङ्नागेन—'सर्वं एवायमनुमानानुमेयव्यवहारो बुद्ध्यारूढेन धर्मधर्मिन्यायेन, न बहिः सदसत्त्वमपेक्षते ।

SVTṬ. p. 231, line 23-24

2. NVTṬ, p. 162, line 27-29 (Cal. SS)

3. तत्राऽनुमानमेवेदं वोद्धैर्वैशेषिकैः श्रितम् ।

Śl. Vār., Śabda, Kā. 15 ab

4. (i) ......उक्ता चान्यैरभिन्नता ।

आप्तवादाविसंवादसामान्यादनुमानता ॥ Ibid., Kā. 23

(ii) Also see NR, p. 412, line 17-18; Kāśikā, III, p. 111

mitance between the assertion of a trustworthy person (*āptavāda*) and the infallible cognition originated from it, which is a necessary condition for inference. This argument of the Buddhist, given in favour of identity between *śabda* and *anumāna*, is ascribed to Diṅnāga by Vācaspati Miśra,[1] Manorathanandin[2] and S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa.[3]

At another place in the Śloka-vārttika, some other arguments have also been given to assert identity between the said two *pramāṇas*. The arguments are as follows :

> "There is an identity between the verbal testimony and the inference, because—
>
> (i) the cognition, arising from words is just like the inferential cognition of fire from smoke. (a) Both have positive and negative concomitance, (b) direct perception of one (i.e. of *liṅga*), and (c) pre-knowledge of the (invariable) relations ;
>
> (ii) both (*śabda* and *anumāna*) are different from sense-perception;
>
> (iii) both cognise the object, uncognised by perception;
>
> (iv) object (*viṣayo*) of both is generic form (*sāmānya*) and
>
> (v) both refer to the objects belonging to all the three times (present, past and future)."[4]

Pārthasārathi Miśra and Sucarita Miśra, have ascribed these arguments to the Buddhists.[5]

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[1] NVTṬ, p. 205 (Ch. SS)

[2] MNV on PV, 3.216, p. 324, line 11-12

[3] HIL, p. 288

[4] शब्दाऽनुमानयोरैक्यं धूमादग्न्यनुमानवत् ।।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामेकप्रत्यक्षदर्शनात् ।
सम्बन्धपूर्वकत्वाच्च प्रतिपत्तिरितो यतः ।।
प्रत्यक्षाऽन्यप्रमाणत्वात्तददृष्टार्थबोधनात् ।
सामान्यविषयत्वाच्च त्रैकाल्यविषयाश्रयात् ।।
Śl. Vār., Śabda, Kās. 35cd., 36,37

[5] NR. p. 416; Kāśikā, III, p. 115

(ii) *Upamāna Pramāṇa (Analogy)* :

Upamāna (analogy) is also recognised as a separate means of valid cognition by some systems like Nyāya, Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta. According to Kumārila, 'the thing, remembered with the similarity or the similarity, remembered with the thing' is regarded as the object (*prameya*) of *upamāna* pramaṇa.[1] For instance, when a person having seen a cow, goes to the forest and perceives a *gavaya*, he remembers his own cow and cognises the similarity of *gavaya* with his cow. Through this cognition of similarity he comes to the conclusion—'my cow is like this *gavaya*'. To ascertain the independent existence of *upamāna* Kumārila argues :

> "Though similarity (*sādṛśya*) is cognised by perception, and the cow is being remembered, yet 'cow as qualified by similarity' cannot be cognised by any other means, hence *upamāna* is accepted as a distinct means of valid cognition."[2]

But the Buddhists do not agree with this view. Representing the Buddhist view, Kumārila says : "And according to those who accept only *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* (sensation), this (cognition-of-similarity) is only a pseudo-perception. And it cannot be accepted as a valid cognition, inasmuch as there exists no object to be comprehended (in the form of similarity or *sādṛśya*)."[3] Parthasarathi Miśra and Sucarita Miśra, explain it thus : Neither can it (*sādṛśya*) be said to be different from its substance (i.e. *āśraya*) because it is never found as a separate entity, nor can it be asserted that it is identical with the substance. Neither can it reside in its object with entirety, nor partly and nor is it one among *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma* etc. There-

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1. तस्माद्यत्स्मर्यंते तत्स्यात्सादृश्येन विशेषितम् ।
प्रमेयमुपमानस्य सादृश्यं वा तदन्वितम् ।।
Śl. Vār., Upamāna, Kā. 37
2. प्रत्यक्षेणावबुद्धेऽपि सादृश्ये गवि च स्मृतौ ।
विशिष्टस्याऽन्यतोऽसिद्धेरुपमानप्रमाणता ।। Ibid., Kā. 38
3. प्रत्यक्षाभासमेतत्तु निर्विकल्पकवादिनाम् ।
प्रमेयवस्त्वभावाच्च नाऽभिप्रेता प्रमाणता ।। Ibid., Kā. 17

fore, according to the Buddhist, the existence of *sādṛśya* similarity) cannot be proved on any ground and hence the *upamāna pramāṇa* of which the *sādṛśya* is regarded as the object, cannot be accepted as an independent means of valid cognition, as held by the Mīmāṁsakas.[1]

Now the question arises, in which *pramāṇa* the *upamāna* has been included by the Buddhist. Nothing has been stated explicitly in the 'Śloka-vārttika. However, from Kumārila's[2] refutation and from Pārthasārathi's[3] commentary over it, it can be understood that the Buddhist and the Sāṁkhyas reduce this *pramāṇa* into *anumāna* (inference).

(iii) *Arthāpatti* (*Presumption*) :

When an object, known through any of the six means of valid cognition is found otherwise inconsistent, the assumption of an unseen object to make it consistent, is called *arthāpatti* or presumption.[4] It has been held as a separate means of cognition by the Mīmāṁsakas and the Vedāntins. But the Buddhists reduce it into inference as has been clearly mentioned by Śāntarakṣita[5] and Mokṣākara Gupta.[6] From Śloka-vārttika also it seems that it has been included in inference by some systems, because Kumārila opposes its inclusion into inference in several kārikās.[1] But it has not been mentioned there clearly as to whose view is being opposed to.

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[1] cf. (i) सादृश्यं हि न तावदाश्रयेभ्यो भिन्नमनुपलम्भात् । अभेदे चाश्रयात् तन्मात्रापातात् । कथं चाश्रयेषु वर्तते । न तावत् कार्त्स्न्येन भेदप्रसङ्गात्, ...न च भागशः, तदभावात् । किं चेदं सादृश्यं? न तावद् द्रव्यगुणकर्मणामन्यतमम्...। अतः कल्पनामात्रकल्पितं...सादृश्यं न प्रामाणिकमिति । प्रमेयाभावादपि नोपमानाङ्गमन्यद् वा सादृश्ये प्रमाणमित्याक्षेप इति ॥ Kāśikā, III, pp. 142-44

(ii) Also see NR, p. 438

[2] Śl. Vār., Upamāna, Kā. 43,ff.

[3] ये तु शाक्याः प्रमाणद्वयवादिनः—अस्यानुमानाऽन्तर्भावं मन्यन्ते तान्प्रत्याह न चेति । NR, p. 446-47

[4] प्रमाणषट्कविज्ञातो यत्राऽर्थो नाऽन्यथा भवेत् ।
अदृष्टं कल्पयेदन्यं साऽर्थापत्तिरुदाहृता ।
Śl. Vār., Arthāpatti, Kā. 1

[5] TS, Kā. 1646

[6] TB (Mokṣākara), p. 6-7

(iv) *Abhāva* (*Negation*) :

In case of an object where the five means of cognition do not function for the comprehension of its existence, the means of valid cognition is called *abhāva* (negation), according to the Mīmāṁsakas.[2] But the Buddhists do not hold it to be a separate *pramāṇa* and include it into inference.[3] According to them, non-origination of perception etc. is a *liṅga* or mark (called *anupalabdhi liṅga*) for the cognition of non-existence of an object at a certain place. This Buddhist view of *anupalabdhi liṅga* has been referred to by Kumārila during his criticism.[4]

2. 10. CONCLUSION :

Thus the Buddhist theory of *pramāṇa* can be summarised as :

(i) Cognition is of self-luminous nature. It is originated and cognised at one and the same time.[5]

(ii) A means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) is that which cognises an object hitherto unknown and which makes us reach an uncontradicted object i.e. an efficient-object.[6]

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[1] Śl. Vār., Arthāpatti, Kā. 10 to 50, 60-71

[2] प्रमाणपञ्चकं यत्र वस्तुरूपे न जायते ।
वस्तुसत्ताऽवबोधार्थं तत्राऽभावप्रमाणता ॥
Śl. Vār., Abhāva, Kā. 1

[3] cf. शाक्यानामेवाऽनुपलब्धिलिङ्गाऽनुमेयभावम् ।
NR., p. 400, line 13-14

[4] (i) प्रत्यक्षादेरनुत्पत्तिर्न तु लिङ्गं भविष्यति ।
Śl. Vār., Abhāva, Kā. 38
(ii) NR & Kāśikā on above Kārikā on p. 486 & p. 207 respectively.

[5] See supra 2.2

[6] See supra 2.3

(iii) *Pramāṇa* is of two kinds, viz. *pratyakṣa* (perception) and *anumāna* (inference), as in the Buddhist logic there are only two types of objects to be cognised, *svalakṣaṇa* (thing-in-itself) and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* (generic-form).[1]

(iv) The Buddhists have recognised *pramāṇa-vyavasthā*, according to which an object can be cognised only through one means of valid knowledge—either through perception or through inference.[2]

(v) Indentity between the *pramāṇa* (means of valid cognition) and *phala* (the result) has been accepted.[3]

(vi) *Pratyakṣa* is defined as the cognition 'free from conceptual construction'. It is only *nirvikalpaka* (i.e. indeterminate).[4] *Savikalpa jñāna* (determinate knowledge) is not included in *pratyakṣa.* Object of *pratyakṣa* is only *svalakṣaṇa* (particular or thing-in-itself).[5]

(vii) According to the Sautrāntikas, external thing is the object (*prameya*) of *pratyakṣa*, conformity of the object (*viṣaya-sārūpya*) is the *pramāṇa*, and the self-cognition in the form of apprehension of the object is the result, while in the Yogācāra system, there being no external object, cognition (*vijñāna*) alone serves the purpose of *prameya*, *pramāṇa* and *phala* in the form of *grāhyākāra; grāhakākāra* and *sva-saṁvitti* respectively.[6]

(viii) Four kinds of *pratyakṣa* viz. *indriya-jñāna, mānasa, sva-saṁvedana* and *yogi-jñāna* have been recognised in the Buddhist logic.[7] The visual and auditory organs are held to be *aprāpyakārins.*[1]

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[1] See supra 2. 4-5
[2] See supra 2.5
[3] See supra 2.6
[4] See supra 2.7 (i)
[5] See supra 2.7 (ii)
[6] See supra 2.7 (iii)
[7] See supra 2.7 (iv)

(ix) *Anumāna* (inference) is defined as the cognition derived through the mark (*liṅga*), characterised by the three aspects—*pakṣa-dharmatva, sapakṣe sattvam, vipakṣe asattavam.*[2]

(x) The middle term (*hetu or liṅga*) is defined as *sādhyāṁśa-vyāpta-hetu* i.e. that which is invariably concomitant with one part of the probandum (*anumeya*).[3]

(xi) There are three kinds of *hetu* : *kārya* (effect), *svabhāva* (identity) and *anupalpabdhi* (non-existence).[4]

(xii) The object of *anumāna* is only generic-form (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) and its probandum (*anumeya*) is the minor term (*pakṣa*) qualified by the major term (*sādhya-dharma*).[5]

(xiii) Two kinds of *anumāna* : *svārtha* and *parārtha*. The first one is the inference by one-self. through the three formed mark (*trirūpa-liṅga*), and the second one is the imparting of inferential knowledge to others through the help of syllogism.[6]

(xiv) The syllogism, according to Diṅnāga has either three members—*pratijñā, hetu, dṛṣṭānta* or only the last two.[7]

(xv) All inferential relations like that of *anumāna-anumeya* etc. are merely ideal (i.e. *buddhi-kalpita*), not real.[8]

(xvi) *Śabda* (verbal-testimony), *upamāna* (analogy), *arthāpatti* (presumption) and *anupalabdhi* or *abhāva* (negation), being not acceptable as independent means of valid cognition, have been immerged by the Buddhists in inference.[9]

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1. See supra 2.7 (iv) (a)
2. See supra 2.8 (i)
3. See supra 2.8 (i)
4. See supra 2.8 (i)
5. See supra 2.8 (ii)
6. See supra, 2.8 (iii)
7. See supra 2.9
8. See supra 2.8 (v)
9. See supra 2.9

CHAPTER III

THEORY OF VALIDITY OF COGNITION (Prāmāṇyavāda) AND THE BUDDHISTS

3. 1. THEORY OF PRĀMĀṆYA (VALIDITY OF COGNITION

The word '*prāmāṇya*' is derived from '*pramāṇa*'. The *tadhita* suffix '*ṣyañ*', which is generally used to denote abstract sense, is added to it.[1] As mentioned before, the word '*pramāṇa*' can convey three different meanings—(i) *pramā* (valid cognition), (ii) *pramākaraṇa* (means of valid cognition) and (iii) *pramātā* (cogniser).[2] The word '*prāmāṇya*' is related to its first meaning i.e. valid cognition and denotes the validity of cognition.[3] '*Aprāmāṇya*' is just opposite to it and conveys the absence of validity of cognition.[4] Hence the theory, which deals with the problems regarding validity and invalidity of cognitions, is called *prāmāṇyavāda* or the theory of validity of cognition.

In the beginning the problem of validity was related to the Vaidika injunctions only. There were two chief contending parties—one comprising the Jainas and the Buddhists who were the advocates of the invalidity of Vaidika injunctions and the other comprising the Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṁsakas and so on, who were the proponents of the validity of the Vedas, although on different grounds.[5] The theistic Naiyāyikas established the validity of Vedas on the ground of their divine origin,[1] while the Mīmāṁsakas, who did not accept the existence of God, held that the Vaidika injunctions, being eternal and impersonal (*apauruṣeya*) are self-vaild (*svataḥ pramāṇa*) and that they do not require any personal agency for their validity.[2] For this very reason the Mīmāṁsakas have also refuted the Buddhist conception of Omniscient being (*sarvajña*) with vehement arguments.[3]

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[1] See V.S. Apte, Skt.-Hindi-Kośa, p. 690

[2] See supra, Chap. II, 3. p. 66

[3] ज्ञानस्य याथार्थ्यं-लक्षणं-प्रामाण्यम्

TB. (K' Miśra), p. 141, line 4 (Ch. SS)

[4] अप्रामाण्यं हि नाम प्रामाण्याभावः SVTṬ., p. 45, line 1

[5] cf. Sukhalālji Saṁghavi, ASILM, p. 38

It is, thus, evident that originally the question of validity was related only to the Vaidika testimony, but gradually its scope was extended to all kinds of cognitions. While discussing the problem of Vaidika testimony, Kumārila has pointed out that the question of validity should be examined with regard to all kinds of cognitions.[4]

The question arises as to how the validity and invalidity of cognitions originate and are ascertained. In other words, it may be asked 'whether the causes which produce knowledge also produce at the same time, its reliability or is knowledge produced one way and its reliability established by a subsequent operation of the mind.'[5] When validity of cognition, for its origin (*utpatti*) does not require any extraneous cause, other than the causes of the origin of its cognition, it is called 'intrinsic validity in origin' (*utpattau svataṣtvam*).[1] Similarly, when the validity, for its ascertainment (*jñapti*), does not require any external cause other than the causes, required for the apprehension of its cognition, it is called 'intrinsic validity in ascertainment' (*jñaptau svatastvam*).[2] Contrary to it, the view that the validity of knowledge, in respect of its origin and ascertainment both, depends upon the fulfilment of an extra condition, is known as *parataḥ prāmāṇya* or the theory of validity from outside.[3]

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[1] (i) विश्वात्मना तदुपदेशपराः प्रणीता-
स्तेनैव वेदरचना इति युक्तमेतत् ॥
N. Mañjarī, I., p. 220
(ii) तस्मादाप्तोक्तत्वादेव वेदाः प्रमाणम् Ibid., p. 226
(iii) वेदे तु परमाप्तश्रीमहेश्वरेण कृतं सर्वमेव वाक्यं प्रमाणम्
TB. (K. Miśra), p. 111. (ch. SS)

[2] (i) JS., 1.1.5
(ii) औत्पत्तिकगिरा दोषा कारणस्य निवार्यंते ।
अबाधोऽव्यतिरेकेण, स्वतस्तेन प्रमाणता ॥
Śl. Vār., 1.1.5., Kā. 10
(iii) वेदस्याऽपौरुषेयत्वे सिद्धा त्वेवं प्रमाणता ।
Ibid., 1.1.2, Kā. 97 ab

[3] Śl. Vār., 1.1.2, Kās 111-40

[4] सर्वंविज्ञानविषयमिदं तावत्प्रतीक्ष्यताम् । Ibid., Kā. 33 ab

[5] BL, I, p. 65

Thus the validity or invalidity of cognitions can be of two kinds—intrinsic (*svataḥ*) and extrinsic (*parataḥ*). Each of them can be divided further into two parts from the point of view of its origin (*utpatti*) and ascertainment (*jñapti*). Hence the validity or invalidity can be of four kinds :


Validity of Cognition
Intrinsic (*svataḥ*)
Extrinsic (*parataḥ*)
in origin (*utpattau svatastvam*)
in ascertainment (*jñaptau svatastvam*)
in origin (*utpattau paratastvam*)
in ascertainment (*jñaptau paratastvam*)

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1. विज्ञानसामग्रीजन्यत्वे सति तदतिरिक्तहेत्वजन्यत्वं प्रमायाः स्वतस्त्वमिति
SDS, p. 565

2. ज्ञानग्राहकातिरिक्तानपेक्षत्वं स्वतस्त्वं प्रामाण्यस्य
TB, (K. Miśra), p. 136 (Ch. SS)

3. M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 261
See (i) अप्रामाण्यं तु परतः, तत् खलु उत्पतौ ज्ञानोत्पादक-कारणाऽतिरिक्तं दोषाख्यं कारणान्तरमपेक्षते
NKC, I, p. 196. 16-17
(ii) ज्ञानग्राहकातिरिक्तापेक्षत्वम् परतस्त्वम्
TB, (K. Miśra), p. 131 (Ch. SS)

From the point of view of intrinsicality (*svatastvam*) and extrinsicality (*paratastvam*) of validity and invalidity of cognition, there are various views in Indian philosophy.

3. 2. VARIOUS VIEWS REGARDING THE THEORY OF PRĀMĀṆYA IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY :

Discussing the problem, Kumārila says, 'it is to be considered whether the validity and invalidily of cognitions are intrinsic or extrinsic.'[1] Elucidating Kumārila's viewpoint, Pārthasārathi mentions four different views, which are as follows:

(i) Validity and invalidity both are intrinsic, (ii) both of them are extrinsic, caused by the merits and demerits of the source of cognition, (iii) invalidity is intrinsic and validity extrinsic and (iv) validity intrinsic and invalidity extrinsic.[2]

Neither Kumārila nor his commentators have mentioned the names of the upholders of these theories, but it is evident from the statements of the later thinkers like Mādhvācārya that the four views belong to the Sāṁkhyas, the Naiyāyikas, the Buddhists and the Vedavādins (Mīmāṁsakas and Vedāntins) respectively.[3]

(i) *Validity and Invalidity both are Intrinsic* (*svataḥ*) :[4]

'Some people hold that both validity and invalidity of cognition are intrinsic, because the thing, which by itself is non-existent (*asat*), cannot be produced by any means.'[1] As mentioned above, this view belongs to the Sāṁkhya system. It is also in agreement with its theory of *Satkāryavāda*, according to which 'an effect pre-exists in its cause.'[2] If validity or invalidity does not exist intrinsically in the cognition, it can never be produced or ascertained by any extraneous means as nobody is able to get smell from fire or oil from sand.[3]

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[1] प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वे स्वतः किं परतोऽथवा ।।
Śl. Vār., 1.1.2, Kā. 33cd

[2] किं ज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यमप्रामाण्यं च स्वत एव निर्णीयते ? किं वोभयमपि कारणगुणदोषादिना निरूपयितव्यम् ? उताऽप्रामाण्यं स्वतः प्रामाण्यं परतो विपरीतं वेति ? NR., p. 41
Also See TSP, p. 903; N. Mañjarī, I, p. 146-47

[3] प्रमाणत्वाप्रमाणत्वे स्वतः सांख्या समाश्रिताः ।
नैयायिकास्ते परतः, सौगताश्चरमं स्वतः ।।
प्रथमं परतः प्राहुः प्रामाण्यं वेदवादिनः ।
प्रमाणत्वं स्वतः प्राहुः परतश्चाप्रमाणताम् । SDS., p. 557

[4] द्वयमपि स्वतः N. Mañjarī, I, p. 146.

The view has been repudiated by Kumārila on the ground that the two aspects cannot be accepted as intrinsic in one cognition, because they are mutually contradictory.[4] If it is argued that contradiction would not take place, because the two aspects i.e. validity and invalidity belong to two different cognitions, even then the view would not hold ground, because in that case, it would be difficult to ascertain without the help of any extraneouse means as to which cognition is valid and which is invalid.[5] Hence the theory is not plausible.

(ii) *Validity and Invalidity both are Extrinsic* (*parataḥ*) :[6]

Some others hold that validity and invalidity both are extrinsic (*parataḥ*), because both depend upon the ascertainment of merits and demerits produced in the cognition by its cause.[7]

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1. स्त्रतोऽसतामसाध्यत्वात्केचिदाहु द्वंयं स्वतः ।
Śl. Vār., 1.1.2, Kā. 34 ab
2. (i) SK, 9
(ii) तस्मात् कारणव्यापारादूर्ध्वंमिव ततः प्रागपि सदैव कार्यमिति ।
STK. on Kā. 9
3. cf. न ह्यग्नौ गन्धादि सिकतासु वा तैलादि शक्यते साधयितुमिति ।
SVTṬ, p. 43
4. स्वतस्तावद् द्वयं नास्ति विरोधात् Śl. Vār., 1.1.2, Kā. 35 ab
5. cf. विज्ञानव्यक्तिभेदेन भवेच्चेदविरुद्धता ।
तथाप्यन्याऽनपेक्षत्वे किं क्वेति न निरूप्यते ॥
Śl. Vār., 1.1.2, Kā. 37
6. उभयमपि परतः N. Mañjarī, I, p. 146
7. cf. अपरे कारणोत्पन्नगुणदोषावधारणात् ॥
Śl. Vār., 1,1.2, Kā. 34 cd;
also see SVTṬ. and NR thereon.

Evidently this view belongs to the Naiyāyikas.[1] Vātsyāyana clearly says that the object having been cognised through the means of knowledge, the cognition can be established as valid on the basis of subsequent efficient action.[2]

This theory has been repudiated by Kumārila on the ground that in that case, the cognition would prove to be devoid of any character.[3] He has further argued that there would occur *regressus ad infinitum*, if validity is accepted as extrinsic. If one cognition requires other cognition for the ascertainment of its validity, the other would require still other and so on. Hence there would be no end of series of cognition and no ascertainment of the validity of cognition.[4] This argument has been adduced by Kumārila in refutation of the view of extrinsic validity. It is applicable to the Buddhists as well as to the Naiyāyikas.

(iii) *Invalidity Intrinsic and Validity extrinsic* :[5]

The Buddhists hold a different view. According to them, cognition is intrinsically invalid (*apramāṇa*) and is proved as valid by some extraneous means.[6] The theory will be discussed in detail later on.[7]

(iv) *Validiy intrinsic and invalidity extrinsic* :[8]

The Mīmāṁsakas and the Vedāntins maintain that all our experiences are intrinsically true, but sometimes they are rendered illusory or erroneous by some extraneous causes.[1] Kumārila, while establishing his own theory of self-validity, says : "You must understand that validity is inherent in all types of cognitions, for, a faculty by itself non-existing, cannot possibly be brought into existence by any other agency."[2] Invalidity appears in it only in two exceptional cases : (i) when it is repudiated by a subsequent stronger cognition, as in case of the illusion of snake, which is proved false by the subsequent knowledge of rope; (ii) when its origin is proved deficient such as in case a person perceives white conch-shell as yellow owing to bile in his eyes.[3]

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[1] cf. स्थितमेतदर्थक्रियाज्ञानात् प्रामाण्यनिश्चय इति । ...तस्मादप्रामाण्यमपि परोक्षमित्यतो द्वयमपि परत इत्येष एव पक्षः श्रेयानिति ।
N. Mañjarī, I, p. 160. 11-13

[2] प्रमाणतोऽर्थप्रतिपत्तौ प्रवृत्तिसामर्थ्यादर्थवत् प्रमाणम् ।
N. Bh., p. 1 (Cal. SS)

[3] ... ... परतो न च ।
निःस्वभावत्वमेवं हि ज्ञानरूपे प्रसज्यते ।।
Śl. Vār., 1.1.2, Kā. 35

[4] Ibid., Kās. 49-51

[5] अप्रामाण्यं स्वतः प्रामाण्यं तु परतः । N. Mañjarī, I, p, 147

[6] ... ... सौगतश्चरमं स्वतः ।।
प्रथमं परतः प्राहुः प्रामाण्यं ... ... ।
SDS, Jaimini-darśanam, p, 557

[7] Infra. 3. 3

[8] प्रामाण्यं स्वतः अप्रामाण्यं तु परतः । N. Mañjarī. I, p. 147

Similarly, the Vedāntins also assert that validity of all types of cognitions is produced as well as ascertained by itself, but invalidity is always born and ascertained by something else.[4]

This view has been repudiated by the Buddhists :[5] 'If validity is accepted as natural and invalidily as extrinsic, who would, then, be able to refute validity even in a dream-cognition ?'[1] That is, in that case, the dream-cognition, being of the nature of a cognition, would be proved as self-valid, while our experience shows otherwise. Hence the view that cognition is valid by itself, is not plausible.

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[1] cf. वेदवादिनः प्रामाण्यं स्वतः प्राहुः परतः चाप्रामाण्यम्
SDS, p. 557

[2] स्वतः सर्वप्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यमिति गम्यताम् ।
न हि स्वतोऽसती शक्तिः कर्तुमन्येन शक्यते ॥
Śl. Vār., 1.1.2, Kā. 47

[3] (i) तस्माद् बोधात्मकत्वेन प्राप्ता बुद्धेः प्रमाणता ।
अर्थान्यथात्वहेतूत्थदोषज्ञानादपोद्यते ॥ Ibid., Kā. 53

(ii) प्रामाण्यं स्वतः प्राप्तं सदर्थान्यथात्व-कारणदोषज्ञानाभ्यामवगम्यमाने न प्रामाण्येन अपोद्यते इति । SD, p. 20

[4] (i) एवमुक्तानां प्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यं स्वत एवोत्पद्यते ज्ञायते च ।
VP, p. 109

(ii) परत एवाप्रामाण्यमुत्पद्यते ज्ञायते चेति । VP, p. 112

[5] The name of the opponent is not mentioned by Kumārila, but from the commentaries, it is evident that the opponent is none else than the Buddhist.

It has also been rejected by the later Buddhist[2] and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers[3] with several arguments. But it is not desirable here to go through all of them. Now we have to discuss the Buddhist viewpoint regarding the validity of cognition.

3. 3. THE BUDDHIST VIEW REGARDING THE THEORY OF PRĀMĀṆYA :

On the basis of the available texts of Buddhist logic, it seems that Dharmakīrti was first among the Buddhists to discuss the problem of validity of cognition.[4] But as Kumārila, an earlier contemporary of Dharmakīrti, has discussed the Buddhist viewpoint in detail,[5] it seems probably that some Buddhist logician before Kumārila—either Diṅnāga or someone else—had thrown light on the problem, but in the absence of any convincing evidence, nothing can be said authentically.

In the later period the theory was discussed at length by Śāntarakṣita,[6] Kamalaśīla,[7] Manorathanandin[8] and Prajñākara Gupta[9] in their respective treatises. The Tattva-saṁgraha and the Pañjikā, are regarded as the most authentic sources for the

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[1] प्रामाण्यं हि यदोत्सर्गात्तदभावोऽस्य कृत्रिमः ।
तदा स्वप्नादिबोधेऽपि प्रामाण्यं केन वार्यते ॥
Śl. Vār., 1.1.2, Kā. 40

[2] TS, and TSP, Chap, *Svataḥ-prāmāṇya-parikṣā.*

[3] NVTṬ, pp. 11-14 (Ch. SS); N. Mañjarī, pp. 155ff.; N. Kandalī, pp. 523ff.

[4] PV. 1, Kā. 3-7

[5] Śl. Vār. 1.1.2., Kās. 38ff:

[6] TS, *Svataḥ-prāmāṇya-parīkṣā.*

[7] TSP, *Svataḥ-prāmāṇya-parīkṣā.*

[8] MNV on PV, pp. 3-7

[9] PV Bh., pp. 3-29

Buddhist view on the validity of cognition. But here we have to discuss it mainly on the basis of Śloka-vārttika.

(i) *Invalidity is intrinsic* (*svataḥ*) :

The Buddhist, as presented by Kumārila, maintains that invalidity should be accepted as natural feature of cognition,[1] because 'invalidity, being a non-entity, cannot be originated from the discrepancies of the cause.,[2] Elucidating the intrinsicality (*svatastvam*) of invalidity, he asserts that sense-organs and their merits are the cause of validity and the absence of that (i.e. invalidity) can happen in two ways - either when there is some defect in the sense-organs or when there is adsence of any one of them.[3] That is, when the sense-organs are affected by some disease like partial blindness etc. (*timirādi-doṣaiḥ*), there would occur absence of merits and then invalidity would come *per se*. Besides, when there is an absence either of sense-organs themselves (as in case of dream-cognition), or of merits in the sense-organs (as in the cognition of two moons etc.), there would be no origination of validity and hence invalidity, being a negation, comes by itself.[4]

Raising an objection against the Mīmāṁsakas, the Buddhist argues : 'It is an error on the part of the Mīmāṁsakas to assume that invalid cognition is caused by the demerits. In fact there is an invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the demerits and the absence of merits. Whenever the demerits are present in the cause, absence of merit comes in its wake and

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1. तस्मात्स्वाभाविकं तेषामप्रमाणत्वमिष्यताम् ।
Śl. Vār., 1.1.2, Kā. 38ab
2. अप्रामाण्यमवस्तुत्वान्न स्यात्कारणदोषतः । Ibid., Kā. 39ab
3. इन्द्रियादिगुणाश्चास्य कारणं तदसद् द्विधा ।
दुष्टत्वादिन्द्रियादीनामभावेऽन्यतरस्य वा ॥ Ibid., Kā. 42
The compound '*indriyādiguṇāśca*' has been interpreted differently by Uṁveka and Pārthasārathi Miśra. The above exposition follows the former. The latter interprets it as '*indriyādigatā guṇāḥ*' i,e. merits of the sense-organs.
4. SVTṬ, p. 46., line 14-25

invalidity becomes inevitable.[1] Demerits are not active in producting invalidity, their function is merely to remove merits. When the merits are removed, invalidity comes *per se* in the cognition.

A further evidence of the fact that invalidity is not caused by the demerits, is found in the cause of ignorance (*ajñāna*). It is argued by the Mīmāṁsaka that invalidity should be accepted as caused by the demerits, because a positive and negative concomitance is always found in them.[2] But the Buddhist does not accept this argument, because the said invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) is not true in case of ignorance (*ajñāna*), which is also a kind of invalid knowledge. In fact, invalidity does not belong to ignorance (*ajñāna*) due to the demerits in the cause, but it belongs to it due to the absence of the causes of cognition,[3] It is, thus, established that invalidity comes to the cognition in its natural course and is known through the absence of merits.[4]

(ii) *Validity is Extrinsic* (*parataḥ*) :

According to the Buddhists, validity of cognition should be accepted as extrinsic.[5] The argument adduced by him is : "validity, being a positive entity, is originated in the cognition by the merits (of the cause),"[6] which have also been called

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1. अतएव च वो भ्रान्तिर्दोषैर्मिथ्यात्वधीरिति ।
तद्व्याप्तेस्तु गुणाभावस्तत्कृता ह्यप्रमाणता ॥
Śl. Vār., 1.1.2., Kā. 43
*Chaukhamba edition reads it as 'वचोऽभ्रान्ति' The above exposition follows Madras edition.
2. अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामप्रामाण्यं दोषत इति ।
NR, p. 58, line 18-19
3. अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामप्रामाण्यं न दोषतः ।
नाऽज्ञाने दृश्यते ह्येतत्कारणाभावहेतुके ॥
Śl. Vār., 1.1.2, Kā. 45
4. स्वभावतोऽप्रमाणत्वं तदभावेन लक्ष्यते* । Ibid., Kā. 44 cd
*Madras edition reads it as 'लभ्यते' ।
5. प्रामाण्यञ्च परापेक्षम् ... ... ॥ Śl. Vār., 1.1.2, Kā. 38 c
6. वस्तुत्वात्तु गुणैस्तेषां प्रामाण्यमुपजायते ॥ Ibid., Kā. 39 cd

by him as ‘purity of cause’ (*kāraṇa śuddhatva*).[1] It is also indicated by some refutative verses of the Śloka-vārttika that corroboration (*saṁgati or saṁvāda*)[2] is admitted by the Buddhists as the cause for ascertaining validity.[3] Corroboration can be of two kinds : homogeneous (*sajātīya*) and heterogeneous (*vijātīya*). If the cognition produced by one sense is confirmed as valid by another cognition produced by the same sense, it would be a case of homogeneous corroboration. On the other hand, if cognition produced by one sense is established as valid by the cognition of other sense, it would be a case of heterogeneous corroboration. For example, if one, passing through a forest, hears the sound of a lute, goes ahead and finds someone playing on lute, it will be a case of heterogeneous corroboration (*vijātīya saṁvāda*) between the auditory cognition and the visual one. The Buddhist view that validity of auditory cognition can be established through visual and one has been elucidated in detail by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.[4]

On the basis of the above discussion it can be concluded that the Buddhist logicians, before Kumārila, had accepted merits (*guṇāh*) or purity of cause (*kāraṇa-śuddhatva*) as the productive cause (*utpatti-kāraṇa*) and corroboration (*saṁgati or saṁvāda*) as the ascertaining cause (*jñapti-kāraṇa*) of the validity of cognition. They had also admitted that validity of auditory cognition can be ascertained through heterogeneous conformity.

So far as the Buddhist sources are concerned, Dharmakīrti, the great exponent of Diṅnāga, asserts that validity can be ascertained through experience.[5] i.e. cognition of an efficient action (*artha-kriyā-jñāna*) as explained by Manorathanandin.[1] Besides, while defining valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*), Dharmakīrti says : "valid knowledge is that which is uncontradictory (*avisaṁvādaka*) and uncontradiction (*avisaṁvādana*) means conformity of cognition with the real state of things."[2] From this definition of *pramāṇa*, it can be inferred that Dharmakīrti had indirectly accepted corroboration (*avisaṁvāda* or *saṁvāda*) as the source of ascertaining validity. It has, however, not been traced in the available text of Dharmakīrti as to what views he holds about the origin of validity in the cognition.

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[1] तस्मात्कारणशुद्धत्वं ज्ञानप्रामाण्यकारणम् ।
Śl. Var., 1.1.2, Kā. 44ab

[2] It is to be noted that Kumārila has used the term *saṁgati* instead of *saṁvāda* for corroborative cognition.

[3] Śl. Vār., 1.1.2, Kās. 73-77 and NR thereon.

[4] TS, and TSP, Kās 3079-81

[5] प्रामाण्यं व्यवहारेण PV, I. 7a

In the later period, Śāntarakṣita, at one place, expresses that validity of cognition can be established either through the cognition of efficient action or through someone else (*anyad vā*).[3] The term 'someone else' has been explained by Kamalaśīla as 'the cognition of purity of cause' (*hetu-śuddhi-jñāna*).[4] At another place, Śāntarakṣita as well as Kamalśīla accept purity of cause (*kāraṇa-śuddhi*) and corroboration (*saṁvāda*) as the means of ascertaining validity.[5] Besides, Śāntarakṣita has also used the term *saṁvāda* in association with some other words like *artha*, *kārya*, *vastu*, etc.,[6] from which it appears that *saṁvāda* is a general term, and *artha-saṁvāda kāryasaṁvāda*, *vastusaṁvāda* etc. are its particular terms. So it seems that according to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśila, there are only two means of ascertaining validity, viz., cognition of purity of cause (*hetu-śuddhi-jñāna*) and corroboration (*saṁvāda*). Cognition of efficient action (*artha-kriyā-jñāna*) is infact, a kind of corroboration (*saṁvāda*) itself.

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[1] प्रामाण्यं व्यवहारेण अर्थ-क्रियाज्ञानेन ।

[2] प्रमाणमविसंवादिज्ञानम्, अर्थक्रियास्थितिः ।
अविसंवादनम् ... ... ॥ PV, I.3 abc
Also see MNV thereon.

[3] तस्मादर्थक्रियाज्ञानमन्यद् वा समपेक्ष्यते ।
निश्चयायैव ... ... ॥ TS, Kā. 2835

[4] अन्यद्वेति हेतुशुद्धिज्ञानम् । TSP, p. 910

[5] (i) शुद्धिसंवाददृष्टौ तु नाशङ्का सुधियो भवेत् ॥
TS, Kā. 3018 cd
(ii) निःसंशया हि धीस्तस्य शुद्धिसंवाददर्शने । Ibid., Kā. 3019 cd
(iii) प्रतिपादितमेतद्यथा कारणशुद्धिसंवादज्ञानाभ्यां शङ्का निवर्तते ।
TSP, p. 957, line 22

[6] TS, Kās. 2958, 2988 and others

Pārthasārathi Miśra, a commentator on the Śloka-vārttika, however, mentions that validity can be produced in the cognition through the merits of the causes,[1] while its ascertainment can be made through any of the three means, viz. cognition of merits of the cause (*kāraṇa-guṇa-jñāna*), cognition of corroboration (*saṁvāda-jñāna*) and cognition of efficient action (*arthakriyā-jñāna*).[2] From this exposition by Pārthasārathi it can be inferred that the three means for the ascertainment of the validity of cognition had definitely been accepted by some Buddhist authority.

It is, thus, evident from the above account that according to the Buddhists, validity of cognition is extrinsic (*parataḥ*). However, their views regarding the means of validity of cognition have changed from time to time. In the beginning validity was regarded as having been caused by merits or purity of cause, as presented by Kumārila. It was regarded to be ascertained by corroboration (*saṁgati* or *saṁvāda* or *arthakriyā-jñāna*) as referred to by Kumārila and mentioned by Dharmakīrti. But in the later period, the number of means of ascertaining validity increased to two or three, as is evident from the expositions of Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Pārthasārathi Miśra.

(iii) ***Validity is sometimes Intrinsic and sometimes Extrinsic*** :

Repudiating the theory of extrinsic validity (*parataḥ prāmāṇya*), Kumārila points out that there would cccur the

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1. प्रामाण्यं तु वस्तुत्वाद्गुणजन्यं सत्तदवधारणाधीननिर्णयमिति युक्तम्
NR, p. 56, line 19

2. (i) अतोऽवश्यं गुणसंवादार्थक्रियाज्ञानानामन्यतमेनैव घटज्ञानस्य यथार्थतालक्षणं प्रामाण्यं निर्णेतव्यमिति ।
Ibid., line 21-22

(ii) पश्चात्कारणगुणज्ञानात्संवादज्ञानादर्थक्रियाज्ञानाद्वा प्रामाण्यात्...।
SD, p. 21

discrepancy of *regressus ad infinitum*, if the validity of cognition is accepted to be ascertained either through the cognition of purity of cause[1] or through that of corroboration (*saṁvāda* or *saṁgati*);[1] and if, in order to avoid *regressus ad infinitum*, the validity of any of the succeeding cognitions is accepted to be intrinsic (*svataḥ*), then why such a feeling of disregard with regard to the first cognition, which, infact, is similar to the succeeding ones.[3]

This refutation indicates that at the time of Kumārila, this view had secured ground among the Buddhists that the succeeding cognition like that of efficient action or of corroboration is valid *per se*, it requires no further cognition for its own validity and hence there is no chance of *regressus ad infinitum*. Uṁveka and Pārthasārathi, explaining the *pūrvapakṣa*, also assert, 'although validity of the cognition of a jar is dependent upon the cognition of efficient action like bringing of water etc., the cognition of efficient action does not require any other cognition for the ascertainment of its own validity, because it is valid by itself.'[4] It has been declared by Dharmakīrti also that the knowledge which is in conformity with the real state of things is valid.[5]

In the later period, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla clearly state that the Buddhists do not accept any of the four theories mentioned above[6] regarding the validity of cognition; they favour the theory of 'no-definite-regulation' (*aniyama pakṣa*), according to which, in some cases validity of cognition is self evidenced, while in others, it can be ascertained by some other means.[1] Elucidating the same Kamalaśīla says ; 'the Buddhists have accepted some cognitions as self-valid, such as, self-introspection, perception of yogis, cognition of efficient action, inference and repeated cognition, These cognitions are regarded as self-evidenced, because the cause of invalidity has been removed from them by the force of repetition (*abhyāsa*). There are some other cognitions, validity of which is ascertained by some extraneous means. Cognition of Vaidika injunctions, which is the principle cause of controversy regarding validity and invalidity, and the perceptual-knowledge in which the possibility of invalidity still exists, are such type of cognition, in as much as they have not yet reached the stage of repeated cognition (*abhyāsa-jñāna*) or that of efficient action (*artha-kriyā-jñāna*).[2] Manorathanandin, a commentator on Pramāṇavārttika, also [agrees with the view of 'no-definite-regulation', and mentions that cognition of efficient action, repeated cognition and the inferential cognitions are valid by themselves.[3]

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[1] Śl. Vār., 1.1.2, Kās. 49-51

[2] Ibid., Kā. 75

[3] कस्यचित्तु यदीष्येत स्वत एव प्रमाणता ।
प्रथमस्य तथाभावे प्रद्वेषः किंनिबन्धनः ॥ Ibid., Kā. 76

[4] (i) अर्थक्रियार्थी पूर्वस्मात् प्रवर्तमानो व्यभिचारदर्शनेन संवादमपेक्षते, अर्थक्रियाज्ञानस्य तु पुरुषार्थत्वादुत्पन्ने तस्मिन्न काचिदपेक्षेति ।
SVTṬ, p. 65, line 5-7

(ii) ननु विषयज्ञानस्यार्थक्रियाज्ञानाधीनं प्रामाण्यं तच्च स्वतः प्रमाणमिति नाऽनवस्था । NR. p. 69, line 9-10

[5] प्रमाणमविसंवादिज्ञानमर्थक्रियास्थितिः अविसंवादनमिति PV, I.3.
Also quoted in NR, p. 69

[6] Supra., 3. 2

From the above discussion, it appears that in the begining, the Buddhists, in opposition to the Mīmāṁsakas, accepted the theory of intrinsic invalidity and extrinsic validity; but having found the discrepancies of infinite regress etc., they gave a second thought to their view and then formed the 'no-definite-regulation' theory (*aniyama pakṣa*). It, however, appears from the refutation by Kumārila that this theory of 'no-definite-regulation' was not very clear in his time. It has been distinctly mentioned only by the later thinkers of the Buddhist philo-

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1. (i) किञ्चित् स्वतोऽन्यत् किञ्चित् परैश्चानियमो मतः ।
TS. Kā. 2944
(ii) नहि बौद्धैरेषां चतुर्णामेकतमोऽपि पक्षोऽभीष्टः, अनियमपक्षस्येष्टत्वात् । TSP, p. 981, line 13-14
2. तैः किञ्चित् स्वतः प्रमाणमिष्टम्, यथास्वसंवेदनप्रत्यक्षम्, योगिज्ञानम्, अर्थक्रियाज्ञानम्, अनुमानम्, अभ्यासवच्च प्रत्यक्षम्, तद्धि स्वत एव निश्चीयते, अभ्यासबलेनापहस्तितभ्रान्तिकारणत्वात् । किञ्चिदन्यतः, यथा—विवादास्पदीभूतं चोदनाजनितं ज्ञानम्, प्रत्यक्षं चानपगतभ्रान्तिनिमित्तम्, अभ्यासार्थक्रियाज्ञानयोरनवाप्तत्वात् ।
TSP, p. 938, line 19-23
3. See MNV on PV, p. 4.

sophy like Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. It is difficult to say as to who propounded this theory first in the Buddhist system.

3.4. CONCLUSION :

On the basis of the above discussion, following conclusions can be derived :

(i) The theory which deals with the problems regarding validity and invalidity of cognitions is called *Prāmāṇyavāda* or the theory of validity of cognition.[1]

(ii) Originally this problem was related to the Vaidika injunctions only. But gradually its scope got extended. It began being discussed with all kinds of cognitions, whether the validity of cognition is intrinsic or extrinsic.[2]

(iii) Validity or invalidity of cognition can be of four kinds- (a) intrinsic validity in origin (b) intrinsic validity in ascertainment (c) extrinsic validity in origin and (d) extrinsic validity in ascertainment.[3]

(iv) There are mainly four different views in Indian philosophy regarding the validity of cognition (*prāmāṇya*) : (a) Validity and invalidity both are intrinsic, as held by the Sāṁkhyas, (b) both are extrinsic, as admitted by the Naiyāyikas, (c) invalidity is intrinsic and validity extrinsic, supposed to be related to the Buddhists and (d) validity is intrinsic, invalidity extrinsic, as accepted by the Mīmāṁsakas and the Vedāntins.[4]

(v) The Buddhists maintain that invalidity is a natural feature of cognitions, because, it, being a non-entity (*abhāva*), cannot be caused by any extraneous means.[5] Validity of cognition is, however, extrinsic (*parataḥ*). It can be produced in the cognition by the merits or purity of cause, and can be ascertained either through the knowledge of purity of cause or through corrobora-

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1. See supra., 3.1
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. 3.2
5. Ibid. 3. 3 (i)

tion (*saṁvāda* or *saṁgati*). It can be ascertained through the knowledge of efficient action also.[1]

(vi) It appears from some refutative verses of Kumārila that a different view in the form of 'no-definite-regulation' (*aniyama pakṣa*) was also present among the Buddhists at that time. 'No-definite-regulation' means : there is no hard and fast rule about the extrinsicality or intrinsicality of validity. In same cases it can be extrinsic (*parataḥ*) and in others it can be intrinsic (*svataḥ*), e.g. validity of the knowledge of jar requires the knowledge of efficient action in the form of water etc., but the knowledge of efficient action is valid by itself and hence there occurs no *regressus ad infinitum*.[2]

It seems that in the beginning, the Buddhists accepted the view of intrinsic invalidity and extrinsic validity as presented by Kumārila, but after sometime, they, having found the discrepancies of *regressus ad infinitum* etc., thought over their former view and established that there is 'no-definite-regulation' regarding validity. In some cases, it can be ascertained by some other means, as in case of Vaidika injunctions or of perceptions, where doubt is present, and in a few other cases, it is natural as with regard to efficient action, repeated cognition, inference, corroboration, etc. This very view has been favoured by the later Buddhist logicians like Śāntarakṣita and others.[3]

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[1] See supra 3.3 (ii)

[2] Ibid., 3.3 (iii)

[3] Ibid., 3.3 (iii)

CHAPTER IV

DEPENDENT ORIGINATION AND THE THEORY OF FLUX

4.1. SIGNIFICANCE AND MEANING OF DEPENDENT ORIGINATION (PRATĪTYA-SAMUTPĀDA) :

The Buddhist theory of causation is called *pratītya-samutpāda* or the theory of dependent origination. It is one of the basic and the most important theories of the Buddhist philosophy. "It is the cheif jewel among all the teachings of Lord Buddha."[1] Lord Buddha himself declares : "He, who sees *pratītya-samutpāda*, sees *dharma*."[2] This theory has a very wide scope. It covers the problem of causal relationship, the theories of momentariness, of disconnected flow, of no-soul, of nihilism (*śunyatā*) and so forth.[3]

The term '*pratītya-samutpāda*' is composed of two words (i) *pratītya* and (ii) *samutpāda*. The word *pratītya* has the root '*iṇ*' (meaning 'motion') with the prefix '*prati*' and the Suffix '*lyap*' and it means 'after-getting'. The word '*samutpāda*' is formed of the root '*pad*' meaning 'existence'[4], with the prefix '*sam*' and '*ut*', and the suffix '*ghañ*', and thus it means 'origination'. The total meaning of the term '*pratītya-saymut-*

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1. प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाददेशनाप्रधानमिदं भगवतः प्रवचनरत्नम् ।
TSP, p. 13, line 8
2. यो भिक्षवः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादं पश्यति स धर्मं पश्यति ।
Quoted in BCAP, p. 186; Sphuṭārthā, p. 452
3. cf. S.N. Shastri, BDV, p. 196
4. According to the 'Dhātu-pāṭha the root '*pad*' means '*motion*' i.e. *gati*, but here Vasubandhu takes it connoting as 'existence' i.e. '*sattā*'. He has done so, perhaps, because 'the roots have various meanings' ("वह्वर्था अपि धातवो भवन्ति" Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya, 6.1.9)

pāda' is, thus, 'origination after getting (the causes) i.e. there being the causes, there is the effect'.[1] Prof. Stcherbatsky, however, observes in this regard that here the prefix '*sam*' means 'combined' and the term '*pratītya-samutpāda* means "the combined origination (*samutpāpa*) of some elements with regard (*pratītya*) to other elements,"[2] or "combined-dependent-origination."[3] This observation of Stcherbatsky is similar to that of Yaśomitra, in his Sphuṭārthā.[4]

Kumārila repudiating the Buddhist theory of causation, has used the term '*tad-bhāva-bhāvitā*'[5], which literally means 'that being there, this appears'. In fact this term is another mode of expression of '*asmin sati asya bhāvaḥ, asya utpādāt idam utpadyate iti*',[6] which is the first and foremost meaning of '*pratītya-samutpāda.*' In Majjhima-nikāya also, the same meaning has been expressed : "There being this; it occurs, at the existence of this, it is originated and there not being this, it does not occur, at the cessation of this, it also ceases to be."[7] It is, thus, evident that there is an invariable concomitance between the cause and the effect; the effect comes forth only when the cause is there and in the absence of cause, the effect also does not occur.

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1. cf. (i) अथ प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादः इति कः पदार्थः ? 'प्रतिः' प्राप्त्यर्थः, 'एतिः' गत्यर्थः । उपसर्गवशेन धात्वर्थपरिणामात् प्राप्येति योऽर्थः सोऽर्थः प्रतीत्येति । पदि सत्तार्थः, समुत्पूर्वः प्रादुर्भावार्थः । तेन प्रत्ययं प्राप्य समुद्भवः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादः । AK. Bh., 3.28 ab, p. 453
   (ii) Narendra Deva, BDD, p. 231
2. CCB, p. 28
3. BL, I, p. 119
4. cf. न कश्चिद्धर्म एक उत्पद्यते, सहोत्पादनियमात्तु रूपादीनाम् ।
   Sphuṭārthā 3.28, p. 456
5. Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 153c
6. AK. Bh., 3. 28 ab., p. 455
7. इमस्मिं सति इदं होति, इमस्स उप्पादा.इदं उप्पज्जति, इमस्मिं असति इदं न होति, इमस्स निरोधा इदं निरुज्झति ।
   Majjhimanikāya, 3.2.5

This very idea of invariable concomitance between the cause and the effect has been expressed by Lord Buddha himself. Vācaspati Miśra in his Bhāmaṭī has presented the Lord like this :

"*Pratītya-samutpāda* has been defined in brief by the Buddha as, 'it (effect) is the result of its causes; the causal relationship (*dharmatā*) of the cause and effect element (*dharmāṇām*) can be determined by the origin and non-origin (of the effect). The effect element comes forth only when the cause element is there (*dharma-sthititā*), because there is an invariable concomitance (*niyāmakatā*) in the cause element for the origin of the effect thereof. Thus origin of the effect after getting the causes is called causal relationship (*dharmatā*)."[1]

This presentation of *pratītya-samutpāda* by Vācaspati Miśra is based upon the original Buddha-Sūtras which had been the source of further developments of this theory in the Buddhist philosophy.[2]

A different interpretation of this theory has also been presented by Kumārila according to which the effect is produced only after the destruction of the cause and not otherwise.[3] This very interpretation has been found in one of the Nyāya-sūtras of Gautama as *pūrvapakṣa*[4] and has been explained by Uddyotakara.[5] It is also explained by Vācaspati Miśra in his Nyāya-vārttikatātparya-ṭīkā[6] and Bhāmatī.[7] He explains

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1. संक्षेपतो हि प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादलक्षणमुक्तं बुद्धेन 'इदं प्रत्ययफलम्' इति । 'उत्पादाद्वा तथागतानामनुत्पादाद् वा स्थितैषा धर्माणां धर्मता । धर्मस्थितिता धर्मनियामकता प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादानुलोमता' । इति
Bhāmatī, p. 526
2. cf. S.N. Shastri, BDV, p. 197
3. विनाशे कारणस्येष्टः कार्यारम्भः नाऽन्यथा ।
Śl. Vār., Nirālambana, Kā 193 cd
4. अभावाद्भावोत्पत्तिर्नानुपमृद्यप्रादुर्भावात् । NS, 4.1.14
5. न ह्यविनष्टे कारणे कार्यमुत्पद्यत इति । यथा बीजविनाशोत्तरकालमङ्कुरः प्रादुर्भवति । ...तस्माद्बीजविनाशोऽङ्कुरकारणमिति ॥
NV. on 4.1.14, p. 454 (Ch. SS)
6. NVTṬ, p. 590-91
7. Bhāmatī, p. 538-39

the word '*pratītya*' as '*pūrvabhāvaṁ vikṛtya*' i.e. having destroyed the preexisting thing.[1]

It seems that this interpretation of the Buddhist theory of causation, mentioned in the Nyāya-sūtras as well was present long before the time of Kumārila. So far as its original Buddhist source is concerned, it is difficult to say anything authentically. According to M.M. Gopinath Kaviraj, this view is "as old as the Upaniṣads, and is found in the Pali literature."[2] It is traceable to some extent in the Śālistamba-sūtra, where it is argued that the seed and the sprout are not one and the same thing, sprout is different from the seed; moreover, the seed is annihilated and the sprout is originated.[3] In Yogācāra-bhūmi of Asaṅga, *pratītya-samutpāda* is explained thus, "when the destruction of the one and the origination of the other take place in series (*santatyā*), it is called dependent origination or *pratītya-samutpāda*."[4]

Further, in the Mādhyamika system this theory was developed in an altogether different way. Nāgārjuna, the renowned exponent of this system, has interpreted *pratīya-samutpāda* as *śunyatā* viz. relativity,[5] which again connotes the unreality of the separate elements. About relativity Prof. Stcherbatsky observes : "Relativity is the most important discovery of modern science. What science has discovered today, the great Buddha had discovered two thousand five hundred years before."[6] The

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[1] 'प्रतीत्यपूर्वंभावं विकृत्य इत्यर्थः ... NVTṬ. p. 367 (Ch. SS)

[2] Introduction to the Eng. Trans. of Gautama's Nyāya-sūtras by Dr. G.N. Jhā, p. xi.

[3] cf. 'कथं न शाश्वतत इति ? यस्मादन्योऽङ्कुरोऽन्यद् बीजम्, न च यदेव बीजं स एवाङ्कुरः, अथ च पुनर्बीजं निरुध्यते अङ्कुरश्चोत्पद्यते ।
Mahāyāna-sūtra-saṅgraha, p. 109 line 18-19

[4] cf. पुनः प्रतिगत्य प्रतिगत्य सन्तत्योत्पादः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादः । विनश्य विनश्येत्यर्थः । Yogācārabhūmi III-V, p. 214

[5] यः प्रतीत्य समुत्पादः शून्यतां तां प्रचक्ष्महे MK, 24.18

[6] CBN, p. 23

Mādhyamikas believe that the elements (*dharmas*) are totally dependent upon their cause and conditions for their origination and hence it cannot be said that they are independent entities.[1] In fact, they being conditioned, do not have their own real nature and, therefore, are *niḥsvabhāva* (devoid of real nature). It is the fundamental meaning of *pratītya-samutpāda*, the *śunyatā* according to Nāgārjuna. He says "there is no real independent existence of entities in the *pratyayas* i.e. conditions."[2] Candrakīrti, the learned expounder of Nāgārjuna, has explained *pratītya-samutpāda* as "the origination of entities as relative to the causes and conditions."[3]

Some Buddhists have objected to this interpretation complaining that the Mādhyamikas have effectively reducced Buddha's key doctrine, *pratītya-samutpāda* to nullity. But the Mādhyamikas have met with the objcetion by saying that the earlier Buddhists have missed the real meaning of the Master's teaching. "In declaring that 'this is dependent on that' the Revered Tathāgata has clearly said that there is noting in itself—every thing is relative."[4]

It is, thus, obvious from the above discussion that the meaning of *pratītya-samutpāda* has been changed from time to time. In the early period it only meant 'origination after getting the causes.'[5] In some later period, it was interpreted, in the light of momentariness, as 'origination after the destruction of the causes'[6] and in the Prasannapadā, it is explained as 'origination in relation to the causes (*hetu*) and conditions (*pratyaya*).'[7]

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[1] T. Stcherbatsky, CBN, p. 23

[2] नहि स्वभावो भावानां प्रत्ययादिषु विद्यते MK, 1.5

[3] हेतुप्रत्ययापेक्षो भावानामुत्पादः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादार्थंः ।
Prasannapadā (in CBN), p. 2

[4] See (i) T.R.V. Murti, CPB, p. 194
(ii) MKV, 159

[5] प्रत्ययं प्राप्य समुद्भवः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादः AKBh, p. 453

[6] विनष्टे कारणस्येष्टः कार्यारम्भः ।
Śl. Vār., Nirālambana, Kā. 193 cd.

[7] हेतुप्रत्ययापेक्षो भावानामुत्पादः प्रतीत्य समुत्पादार्थः ।
Prasannapadā (in CBN), p, 2

4.2. NO ACTION BUT ONLY SEQUENCE (ĀNANTARYA) IS REQUIRED FOR CAUSATION :

Showing the inconsistencies in the Buddhist theory of causation, Kumārila, at one place, argues : "Although the destruction (of the preceding thing) and the origination (of the succeeding one) are simultaneous according to the Buddhist, they, being indipendent of each other, cannot have causal relationship, inasmuch as the previous thing being evenescent, does not have any moment at its disposal to perform any action for the origination of the next one. Until there is an action in the cause before the appearance of the result, it cannot be called a cause. Only sequence (*ānantarya-mātram*) is not sufficient for being a cause.'[1]

From this refutation, it follows that according to the Buddhists, only sequence is necessary for causal relation and no action (*vyāpāra*) is required for it. Pārthasārathi's commentary on it also presents the same view as *pūrvapakṣa*. He says, "causality is not dependent upon the action, it requires only preexistence of the cause."[2]

In the later period, Śāntarakṣita elaborates this Buddhist view in clear words, "The very existence (*sattā*) of the cause is action (*vyāpṛti*), inasmuch as the existence (of the cause) being there, the effect comes forth. It is only the law of sequence (*ānantaryaniyama*), which is called *apekṣā* or dependence (of the effect upon the cause). Thus, at the time of origination of the effect, the invariable existence of the cause is called

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1. cf. नाशोत्पादसमत्वेऽपि नैरपेक्ष्यात् परस्परम् ।
न कार्यकारणत्वे स्तस्तद्व्यापाराऽननुग्रहात् ॥
न ह्यलब्धात्मकं वस्तु पराऽङ्गत्वाय कल्पते ।
न विनष्टं, न च स्थानं तस्य कार्यकृतिक्षमम् ॥
तस्मात् प्राक्कार्यनिष्पत्तेर्व्यापारो यत्र दृश्यते ।
तदेव कारणं तस्य न त्वानन्तर्यमात्रकम् ।
Śl. Vār., Śabdanityatā, Kās 430-31, 433

2. न व्यापाराधीनं कारणत्वं, किं तु पूर्वक्षणवर्तित्वमिति ।
NR, p. 841

'action' (*vyāpāra*)."[1] In the words of Kamalaśīla, "action (*vyāpāra*) of a thing is nothing except its existence."[2] He further adds, "It is, therefore, concluded that it is sequence only (*ānantarya-mātrameva*) and not action which constitutes the causal relationship."[3] Prof. Stcherbatsky also observes, "Neither the cause nor the effect really do any work, they are forceless, out of work, unemployed."[4]

4.3. SIMULTANEITY (YAUGAPADYA) IN CAUSE AND EFFECT IS ALSO ACCEPTABLE :

The Buddhist school of Vijñānavāda maintains that consciousness is the only reality, it appears in two forms viz. subjective form (*grāhakākāra*) and the objective form (*grāhyākāra*).[5] The objective form (*grāhyākāra*) serves the purpose of the object cause (*ālambanapratyaya*) and the subjective form (*grāhakākāra*) arises only when the objective form (*grāhyākāra*) is there. In this way there is a sense of concomitance (*tadbhāva-bhāvitā*) in the *grāhya* and *grāhaka* forms of consciousness, although the two forms of consciousness exist simultaneously. According to the Vijñānavādins, sense of *tad-bhāva-bhāvitā* can exist in two simultaneously arising objects. Referring to this view, Kumārila refutes their theory of causation thus :

> "Mere concomitance (*tad-bhāva-bhāvitā-mātram*) between cause and effect, without there being any succession or sequence (*paurvāparya*), cannot be accepted as the definition of causation, inasmuch

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[1] सत्तैव व्यापृतिस्तस्यां सत्यां कार्योदयो यतः ।।
य आनन्तर्यनियमः सैवापेक्षाऽभिधीयते ।
कार्योदये सदा भावो व्यापारः कारणस्य च ।।
TS, Kās 520 cd. and 521

[2] न चापि सत्ताव्यतिरेकेण व्यापारः परार्थस्यास्ति TSP, p. 222

[3] cf. तस्मादानन्तर्यमात्रमेव कार्यकारणव्यवस्थानिवन्धनम्, न व्यापार इति स्थितमेतद् ।। Ibid., p. 224

[4] BL, I, p. 121

[5] See Infra, 6, 8

> as succession without concomitance or concomitance without succession is not sufficient for causal relationship."[1]

Commenting upon it Pārthasārathi puts forth the Buddhist view of causation as *pūrvapakṣa* :

> "Only invariable concomitance (*tad-bhāvabhāvāvyabhicāra*) is the definition of causation and that is present even in the two simultaneously arising objects too, as is said 'Due to the invariability (*avyabhicāritvāt*), the simultaneously originated consciousness can also be the cause (*pratyaya*).' "[2]

In Kumārila's refutation and Pārthasārathi's presentation of the Buddhist view, as shown above, there is a clear reference to a statement of Diṅnāga. In Ālambana-parīkṣā, he has asserted that the objective aspect (*grāhyāṁśa*) of consciousness, though arising simultaneously, is the cause of another aspect of consciousness, because it is invariably associated with it.[3]

Kumārila,[4] Pārthasārathi[5] and also Uṁveka[6] have referred to and refuted the example of lamp and its light, as well as of balance (*tulā*), given by the Buddhists to prove simultaneity (*yaugapadya*) of cause and effect. The Buddhists hold that the cause and the effect can exist simultaneously, just as the lighting up of the lamp and the appearance of the light happen at one and the same time, and just as the going up and coming down of two sides of a balance occur simultaneously. The example of lamp and its light (*pradīpa-prabhā*) could not be traced in the Buddhist literature. The second example is traceable in the Madhyamaka-śālistamba-sūtra. Here it has been asserted, "when the seed ceases to be, the sprout comes forth at the same time, just is in the case of going up and coming down of the two sides of a balance."[1] Putting forth the Buddhist view of simultaneity of cause and effect as *pūrvapakṣa*, Uddyotakara has also given the same illustration.[2] It can be induced from the refutation by Uddyotakara, Uṁveka and Pārthasārathi Miśra that the example of balance (*tulā*) was, perhaps, present in the works of Diṇnāga, although it cannot be said authentically, as all the works of Diṅnāga are not extant.

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[1] cf. तद्भावभावितामात्रं हेतुः कैर्नैव वर्ण्यते ।।
पौर्वापर्यविनिर्मुक्तं कार्यं कारणलक्षणम् ।
गवाश्वस्य यथा नास्ति पौर्वापर्येऽपि तत्तथा ।।
युगपज्जायमानेऽपि सन्तत्यन्तरजे क्षणे ।
रूपादिषु घटे यद्वत् तस्मात्पूर्वमवस्थिते ।।
यो यस्माज्जायते पश्चात्स तत्कार्यमितीष्यते ।
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kās. 153 cd. to 156 ab

[2] ननु तद्भावाभावाऽव्यभिचार एव कार्यकारणलक्षणं तच्च युगपद्भाविनोरपि विद्यत एव, यथाऽऽहुः प्रत्ययोऽव्यभिचारित्वात् सहेति ।
NR, p. 311

[3] cf. एकांशः प्रत्ययोऽवीताद्, सहभूतोऽपि अव्यभिचाराद् अन्यजातस्य प्रत्ययो भवति ।। ĀP, Kā 7a and its Vṛtti

[4] हेतुहेतुमतां सिद्धं यौगपद्यनिदर्शनम् ।।
यत्प्रदीपप्रभायुक्तं सूक्ष्मः कालोऽस्ति तत्र नः ।
Śl. Vār., Sūnya, Kās 156 cd & 157 ab

[5] NR, p. 311

[6] SVTṬ, p. 277

It is, thus, evident from the above account that some Buddhists like Diṅnāga have accepted the law of simultaneity (*yaugapadya*) also in their theory of causation, although the law of succession or sequence (*paurvāparya*) is not totally ignored by them. In Ālambanaparīkṣā while meeting with the Naiyāyika's objection, it has been pointed out by Diṅnāga that the objective form of consciousness (*grāhyākāra*) can be the cause through succession also by transmitting its force (*śakti* i.e. *vāsanā*).[3] This view has been referred to and refuted by both

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1. अपि च बीजं च निरुध्यते, तस्मिन्नेव समयेऽङ्कुर उत्पद्यते तुलादण्डोन्नामावनामवत् ।

   Mahāyāna-sūtra-saṅgraha, p.109, line 21-22
2. cf. NV, 3.2.12, p. 409 (Ch. SS)
3. cf. शक्त्यर्पणात् क्रमेण (वा) ।

   क्रमेणापि सोऽर्थावभासः स्वानुरूपकार्योत्पत्तये शक्तिं विज्ञानधारां करोतीत्यविरोधः ॥ ĀP, Kā 7b and its Vṛtti

Kumārila[1] and Pārthasārathi Miśra.[2]

4.4. NATURE OF MOMENTARINESS :

The theory of flux or *kṣaṇabhaṅga* is the fundamental doctrine of the Buddhist philosophy. '*Sarvam kṣaṇikam*' or '*sarvam anityaṁ*' i.e. "all things are momentary' is the most important maxim of the Buddhists. Lord Buddha, emphasizing upon the transitory nature of things, has expressed this view several times. It has been noted in the Pāli literature that "all things in the universe are transitory, painful and of changing nature."[3] Even at the time of his *Mahā-parinibbāna*, Lord Buddha preached, "*Vayadhammā saṅkhārā*" i.e. all the produced things are of the vanishing nature.[4] This basic idea, was the doctrine of momentariness or *kṣaṇabhaṅga*. All the Buddhist schools, in spite of having diversity of opinions about different tenets, have unanimously accepted this doctrine. Minute defferences can, however, be found there in its explanation according to the particular thinking of different schools.

On the other hand, the thinkers of opposite camp are the advocates of permanence i.e. the non-transitory natnre of things, and hence Uddyotakara, Kumārila, Vācaspati Miśra, Jayanta, Śrīdhara, Udayana, etc. have refuted the doctrine of flux with sound arguments.

In the Śloka-vārttika, Kumārila has pointed out that according to the Buddhists, 'the thing after having accomplished, does not stand even for a moment.'[5] He has used the word *utpanna-vinaṣṭatvāt*,[6] which means that 'the nature of a thing is of being destroyed as soon as it is produced', and this is what the Buddhists hold about their theory of momentariness. Vasubandhu says: "What is *kṣaṇa* (moment)? The nature of a thing of vanishing away just after getting its existence, is called *kṣaṇa* (moment) and the object which possesses this nature is called *kṣaṇika* (momentary)."[1] It is derived from the word *kṣaṇa* and the possessive affix *ika* (*ṭhan*).[2] Thus *kṣaṇika* is that which does not stay after getting its existence, which appears and vanishes away in one and the same moment.[3] Yaśomitra also asserts: "A light is extinguished by itself due to its nature of being produced and destroyed at the same time."[4] It may be noted here that constant light of a lamp is nothing but series of momentary flames. Uddyotakara, in his Nyāya-vārttika, has also used the term *utpanna-pradhvaṁsinaḥ* for *kṣaṇika*, while discussing the Buddhist theory of momentariness.[5] In the light of these similar references from Uddyotakara, Kumārila and Yaśomitra, it seems quite possible that this term *utpanna-pradhvaṁsin* or *utpanna-vinaṣṭa* for *kṣaṇika* might have been first conceived by Diṅnāga, who was the earliest among them. But nothing can be said with certainty. This very idea of momentariness has also been explained by Śāntarakṣita[6] and Kamalaśīla.[7]

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[1] न च शक्त्यर्पणद्वारं क्रमेणाऽऽलम्बनं भवेत् ।
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā 158 cd

[2] मा भूद् यौगपद्यं, क्रमभाविनोस्तु.... तदुक्तं शक्त्यर्पणक्रमादिति
NR, p. 312

[3] सब्बे भवा अनिच्चा दुक्खा विपरिणामधम्मा
Aṅguttara-nikāya, 4.19.5

[4] Mahā-parinibbāna-sutta, 92, p. 102

[5] cf. न तस्यास्ति निष्पन्नस्य क्षणं स्थितिः ।
Śl. Vār., Nirālambana, Kā 188 ab

[6] Ibid., Kā 188 c

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[1] कोऽयं क्षणो नाम ? आत्मलाभोऽनन्तरविनाशी, सोऽस्यास्तीति क्षणिकः। AKBh., p. 568

[2] क्षण+ठन्, अत इनिठनौ, पाणिनि अष्टा० ५।२।११५

[3] सर्वं हि संस्कृतमात्मलाभादूर्ध्वं न भवतीति यत्रैव जातं तत्रैव ध्वस्यते। AKBh, p. 569, line 1-2

[4] स हि उत्पन्नप्रध्वंसितत्वात् स्वयं विनष्टः प्रदीपः। Śphuṭārthā, p. 572, line 12

[5] अथोत्पन्नप्रध्वंसिन इति। ...उत्पन्नाः प्रध्वंसिनः इति। NV, 3.2.14, p. 837 (Cal. SS)

[6] उत्पादानन्तरास्थायि स्वरूपं यच्च वस्तुनः।
तदुच्यते क्षणः सोऽस्ति यस्य तद् क्षणिकं मतम्॥ TS, Kā 388

[7] TSP on Kā 388

4.5. DESTRUCTION AND ITS KINDS :

(i) *Destruction is Natural* (*without any cause*) :

Representing the Buddhist view about destruction, Kumārila has asserted : "destruction is accomplished by itself, it requires no cause. An entity, which has a cause, necessarily undergoes destruction, just as is observed in case of sprout and the rest; as there is no destruction of the 'destruction', it must be without any cause."[1] Uddyotakara also presents the Buddhist view in a similar way.[2] The Buddhist logician Vasubandhu asserts : "The destruction of existent things is without any cause (*ākasmika*=*ahetuka*), why ?—because a produced thing has its cause, but destruction is only the negation of existence and hence nothing can be done of that which itself is non-existent."[3] Kamalaśīla has also expressed the same view about destruction.[4] Thus, according to the Buddhists destruction is natural.

It can, however, be objected that how can destruction be assumed as natural when we find that the wood is burnt by fire and the jar is destroyed by the stroke of a hammer.[5] Meeting with this objection the Buddhist replies : "It is the production of the series of glowing charcoals and not the destruction of wood, that is caused by fire. Similarly it is the production of the pot-sherds (*kapālas*) and not the destruction of jar, that is caused by the stroke of a hammer. In fact destruction is naturally bound with every produced thing. It requires no extraneous cause for its occurrence."[1] It is, however, true that sometimes it is perceptible in gross form and sometimes, being subtle, it remains imperceptible, as will be explained further. This idea of natural destruction, has been expressed by Vasubandhu[2] and also by Yaśomitra in detail. The latter says: "The thing, with the action of which destruction (of something) takes place, is not the cause of that destruction. The lamp is extinguished when it has contact with air, but it does not mean that extinguishment of the lamp is caused by the contact with air. The extinguishment of lamp takes place by itself due to the acceptance of momentary nature of things."[3] "It can, thus, be concluded", says Vasubandhu, "that the existent things have no cause for their annihilation. They go to decay by themselves due to their nature of being momentary."[4] In the later period, this very idea has been explained in detail by Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita in Pramāṇa-vārttika[5] and Tattva-saṅgraha[6] respectively.

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[1] cf. आहुः स्वभावसिद्धं हि ते विनाशमहेतुकम् ।
हेतुर्यस्य विनाशोऽपि तस्य दृष्टोऽङ्कुरादिवत् ॥
विनाशस्य विनाशस्तु नास्ति तस्मादकृत्रिमः ।
Śl. Vār., Śabda-nityatā, Kā 24 & 25 ab

[2] cf. अथ मन्यसे न विनाशकारणमस्ति तस्मादुत्पन्नमात्र एवायं भावो विनश्यतीति...अथाविनाशित्वादकारणो विनाश इति मन्यसे ।
NV, 3.2.14, p. 833-34 (Cal.SS)

[3] cf. आकस्मिको हि भावानां विनाशः । किं कारणम् ? कार्यस्य हि कारणं भवति, विनाशश्चाभावः । यश्चाभावस्तस्य किं कर्तव्यम् ।
AKBh, p. 569, line 6-7

[4] cf. भावस्य हि करणं भवति, नाभावस्य, ...अतो भावाभावात्मकः भावनिषेधात्मको नाशो न केनचित् क्रियते, अवस्तुत्वाद्, खरविषाणवत्
TSP, p. 170-71

[5] cf. दृष्टो वै काष्ठादीनामग्न्यादिसंयोगाद् विनाशः । न च दृष्टाद् वरिष्ठं प्रमाणमस्तीति । न च सर्वस्याकस्मिको विनाशः ।
AKBh, p. 569. line 10-11

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[1] cf. भवति ह्यग्निसम्बन्धात् काष्ठादङ्गारसन्ततिः ॥
मुद्गरादिहताच्चापि कपालं जायते घटात् ।
स्वाभाविको विनाशस्तु जातमात्रप्रतिष्ठितः ॥
Śl. Vār., Śabda-nityatā, Kā 25 cd & 26

[2] See AK and ABKh., IV. 2

[3] न हि यस्यापाते यो विनाशो भवति स तद्हेतुक इति । वायुसंयोगपाते हि सति प्रदीपस्य विनाशः, न च स विनाशो वायुसंयोगकृतः । क्षणिकत्वाभ्युपगमाद्धि प्रदीपस्याकस्मिको विनाश इष्यते ।
Śphuṭārthā, p. 569-70

[4] cf. तस्मान्नास्ति भावानां विनाशहेतुः । स्वयमेव तु भङ्गुरत्वाद् विनश्यन्त उत्पन्नमात्राद् विनश्यन्तीति । AKBh., p. 573

[5] PV, III. 193-97, III. 270-283

[6] TS, Kās. 353, 355

(ii) *Destruction Leaving no Residue* (*niranvaya-vināśa*) :

The view that destruction is not only natural (without any cause) but is also of the nature of without leaving any residue has been mentioned by Kumārila in the Śloka-vārttika at several places, while refuting the Buddhist theories of impression (*vāsanā*)[1] and causation.[2] Destruction without leaving any residue, means that the thing, being evanescent, vanishes away without leaving even a little trace of it. The next thing, which arises after it, is totally a new production.[3] Prof. Stcherbatsky has observed : "There is, therefore, as Śāntarakṣita says, in every next moment not the slightest bit left of what has been existent in the former moment."[4]

It seems that the view of *niranvaya-vināśa* was present in the Buddhist system even before Kumārila, although is it quite difficult to determine as to where its original source lies. It requires further consideration.

(iii) *Kinds of Destruction* :

(a) Kumārila, while presenting the Buddhist view, has mentioned two types of destruction : one in subtle form and the other in gross form. 'When the homogeneous series of production (*sadṛśa santati*) goes on, the destruction, being in subtle form, remains unnoticed (e.g. the gradual decay of a jar); but when some heterogeneous cause (*vilakṣaṇa hetu*) falls upon the homogeneous series of production, the heterogeneous series of production (*vilakṣaṇa kārya*) comes forth and the destruction which is naturally existent there, is manifested

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1. (i) विनाशे च निरन्वये ।।
Śl. Vār., Nirālambana, Kā 181 d
(ii) निरन्वयविशिष्टत्वात् ... । Ibid., Kā. 189 a
(iii) निरन्वयविनाशिन्यः कुर्युः कार्यं कथं क्रमात् ।
Ibid., Kā. 193 ab

2. पूर्वक्षणविनाशे च कल्प्यमाने निरन्वये ।
Śl. Vār., Śabda-nityatā, kā 428

3. cf. (i) S.N. Shastri, BDV, p. 187-88
(ii) D.N. Shastri, CIR, p. 35, line 8-11

4. BL, I, p. 95, line 22-24

through that heterogeneous production, e.g. when the stroke of a hammer falls upon a jar, pot-sherds (*kapālas*) are produced and the destruction appears itself in gross form.'[1] Here it is worthnoticing that from the heterogeneous cause, only the heterogeneous production comes forth and the destruction, not being caused by that, has only been manifested.

Kamalaśīla also mentions two kinds of destruction - 'the one in positive form (*vidhi-rūpa*) and the other in negative form (*pratiṣedha rūpa*). The gradual decay of a thing by every moment is called positive destruction and an abrupt downfall of a thing from its natural form is called negative destruction or *pradhvaṁsa*.[2] In fact this division of destruction is the same as mentioned by Kumārila, only the names applied to the kinds are different. Prof. Stcherbatsky explains the two kinds of destruction as follows :

> "There are indeed two kinds of annihilation, empirical annihilation called destruction (*pradhvaṁsa*) and a transcendental one called evanescence or impermanence (*anitya-kṣaṇika*). The first is the annihilation of the jar by a stroke of the hammer. The second is, so to speak, the destruction of the jar by time, an imperceptible infinitely graduated, constant deterioration or impermanence which is the very essence of reality."[3]

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[1] cf. सूक्ष्मः सदृशसन्तानवृत्तेरनुपलक्षितः ।
यदा विलक्षणे हेतुः पतेत्सदृशसन्ततौ ॥
विलक्षणेन कार्येण स्थूलोऽभिव्यज्यते तदा ।
तेनाऽसदृशसन्तानो हेतोः संजायते यतः ॥
तेनैवाक्रियमाणोऽपि नाशोऽभिव्यज्यते स्फुटः ।
Śl. Vār., Śabda-nityatā, Kās. 27, 28, 29 ab

[2] cf. द्विविधो हि विनाशो विधिप्रतिषेधलक्षणः । तथाहि—क्षणस्थितिधर्माभाव एव चलो विनश्यतीति कृत्वा विनाश इत्याख्यायते । यद्वा भावस्य भावप्रच्युतिलक्षणप्रध्वंसापरनामा विनशनं विनाश इति ।
TSP, p. 173, line 21 ff.

[3] BL, I, p. 94.

(b) Kumārila, while repudiating the opponents' arguments adduced by them against the eternal nature of word, has also referred to the three eternal elements (*asaṁskṛta dharmas*) of the Buddhists, viz. *pratisaṁkhyā-nirodha*, *apratisaṁkhyā-nirodha* and *vyoma*.[1] Explaining the two *nirodhas* Kumārila says : "Destruction preceded by consciousness is called *pratisaṁkhyā-nirodha*, while destruction withont a prior knowledge of it, is called *apratisāṁkhyānirodha*. Both of them are regarded (by the Buddhist) as non-caused because of their indestructible nature."[2]

But this presentation of the Buddhist view by Kumārila is not in accordance with the things. According to the Buddhists, the two types of *nirodhas* are not two types of destructions, but they are only the two entirely different sets of *dharmas*.[3] Vasubandhu says : "*pratisaṁkhyā-nirodha* is the cessation of the *sāsrava dharmas* by means of transcendental knowledge (*prajñā-viśeṣa*)."[4] This is the *summum bonum* of the Sarvāstivadins who consider it to be synonymous with *nirvāṇa*, although the Vijñānavādins consider it merely a stage leading to *nirvāṇa*.[5]

Apratisaṁkhyānirodha is totally a different type of *dharma*. Vasubandhu briefly defines it as : 'Complete cessation of the coming elements (*dharmas*) due to the unavailability of the required conditions, *pratyaya-vaikalyāt* is called *apratisaṁkhyā-nirodha.*'[1] That is, sometimes, it happens that a person is so deeply engrossed in perceiving a particular colour, say blue, that he is not able to cognise any other kind of objects like sound, odour, taste, touch, etc. passing through him at the same time. All his attention is absorbed in cognising only one particular object and the rest of the objects, which pass through him remain unperceived and unnoticed. Such incidents occur only because the conditions (*pratyayāḥ*) required for the cognition of those objects are not present i.e. consciousness of mind required for the realisation of them is engaged somewhere else. This type of cessation of *dharmas* (elements) is called *apratisaṁkhyā-nirodha* or 'cessation without consciousness.'[2]

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[1] शाक्यस्यापि त्वनैकान्तः क्षणिकव्यतिरेकिभिः ॥
प्रतिसंख्याऽप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधव्योमभिस्त्रिभिः ।
Śl. Vār., Śabda-nityatā, Kās 21 cd, 22ab.

[2] बुद्धिपूर्वं विनाशे हि प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधीः ॥
अबुद्धिपूर्वकस्तेषां निरोधोऽप्रतिसंख्यया ।
तौ च द्वावप्यनाशित्वादिष्टावकृतकावपि ॥
Ibid., Kās 22cd, 23.

[3] Yamakami Sogen, SBT, p. 167.

[4] cf. प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधो यो विसंयोगः AK, I.6 ab.
यः सास्रवैर्धर्मैः विसंयोगः स प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधः दुःखादीनामार्यसत्यानां प्रति प्रतिसंख्यानं प्रतिसंख्या—प्रज्ञाविशेषस्तेन प्राप्यो निरोधः प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधः, AKBh., 1.6

[5] Yamakami Sogen, SBT, p. 165.

It is, thus, obvious that Kumārila's presentation of the two types of *nirodhas* as two types of destruction is simply a misrepresentation of the Buddhist view as has been clearly shown by Śāntarakṣita[3] and Kamalaśīla.[4] In the later period,

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[1] cf. उत्पादात्यन्तविघ्नोऽन्यो निरोधोऽप्रतिसंख्यया ॥ AK. I.6 cd.
अनागतानां धर्माणामुत्पादस्यात्यन्तं विघ्नभूतो विसंयोगाद् योऽन्यो निरोधः सोऽप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधः । न ह्यसौ प्रतिसंख्यया लभ्यते, किं तर्हि ? प्रत्ययवैकल्यात् । AKBh, I.6 cd

[2] cf. यथैकरूपव्यासक्तचक्षुर्मनसो यानि रूपान्तराणि शब्दगन्धरसस्प्रष्टव्यानि चात्ययन्ते तदालम्बनैः पंचभिर्विज्ञानकायैर्न शक्यमुत्पत्तुम्, न हि ते समर्था अतीतं विषयमालम्बयितुमिति । अतः स तेषामप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधः प्रत्ययवैकल्यात् प्राप्यते । AKBh, I.6, p.23.

[3] cf. न च नाशात्मकाविष्टौ निरोधौ साश्रवैर्यतः ।
प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधो यो विसंयोगः पृथक् पृथक् ॥
उत्पादात्यन्तविघ्नोऽन्यो निरोधोऽप्रतिसंख्यया ।
तस्मादज्ञानसिद्धान्ताः प्लवन्तेऽलोकमानिनः ॥
TS, Kā 2747-48

[4] अथ वैभाषिकमतेन व्यभिचारः, तत्रापि तादृशो भवता नाशाद्यात्मको वर्णितः प्रतिसंख्यानिरोधादिः, तादृग्वैभाषिकैर्नेष्ट इति ।
TSP, p. 886, line 10-11.

Śaṅkarācārya has also mistaken in representing the said two *nirodhas*,[1] as has been pointed out by Yamakami Sogen.[2]

4. 6. THE BUDDHIST ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THE THEORY OF FLUX :

Now the question arises : on what grounds the Buddhists prove the momentary nature of things? They have given many arguments in favour of their theory of flux. Here we shall try to find out their arguments on the basis of the Śloka-vārttika only.

(*i*) *Gross Destruction Proves Momentary Nature of Things* :

One of the most important grounds of the Buddhists for proving the momentary nature of things is the gross destruction. Having seen the gross destruction and not having found any other cause for its occurrence, the Buddhists induce that every thing perishes by every moment and then graudually reaches its gross destruction. Representing this very argument Kumārila says : "the Buddhists, due to inexplicability of the gross destruction otherwise, assume an intermediate subtle destruction of things at every moment."[3]

It means that the Buddhists have accepted a subtle destruction at every moment in between the origination and the final destruction of things. Uddyotakara[4] and Vācaspati Miśra[5] also tell us that the early Buddhists inferred the idea of momentariness by an inductive method. They at first noticed that such objects as fire, light, etc. were changing at every moment. After a minute observation they also found that body also changes constantly at every moment. It is another

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1. BSŚBh, 2.2.22, p. 533.
2. SBT, p, 167-68.
3. cf. येऽपि स्थूलविनाशानामन्यथाऽनुपपत्तितः ।
   कल्पयन्त्यन्तरा सूक्ष्मं विनाशित्वं प्रति क्षणम् ॥
   Śl. Vār., Śabda-nityatā, Kā 424.
4. cf. NV. 3.2.10, p. 824 (Cal. SS).
5. cf. (i) NVTṬ, p. 541, line 15-20 (Ch.SS); (ii) BL, I, p. 102.

body, different to the previous one at every consecutive moment and then it reaches its final destruction. It does not fall down suddenly, but vanishes away gradually just like the flames of a lamp. Similar must be the case with crystal gem etc. From such constant observations, the Buddhists formulated a general idea that every existent thing perishes momentarily and then finds its gross destruction. Prof. Stcherbatsky also observes: "There is nothing at all that would have no end, This trivial truth which is known to every body, when minutely examined, cannot mean anything else than that evanescence is the very core of existence."[1]

(*ii*) *Momentariness is proved by Existence* (*sattā*):

Refuting the Buddhist arguments, given in support of the theory of flux, Kumārila argues that there would be a contradiction with sense-perception etc., if the Buddhist with the example of lamp etc. speaks that existence (*sattā*) is the means of proving momentariness.[2]

From the refutation and also from Pārthasārathi's comment over it,[3] it is evident that here, Kumārila is referring to the well-known Buddhist dictum '*yat sat tat kṣaṇikam*' *i.e.* 'everything is momentary, in as much as it is existent (*sat*)'. A question, naturally arises as to what does the word 'existent' (*sat*), mean? According to the Buddhist, an 'existent or real thing is that which is capable of efficient action.'[4] A thing capable of efficient action is existent and consequently it is momentary.

Repudiating the efficiency-to-act (*arthakriyā-kṣamatā*) in momentary things, Kumārila asserts: In assuming the

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1. BL, I, p. 102, line 9-12.
2. साधनं तु ब्रुवाणस्य दीपज्वालादिदर्शनात् ।
   पूर्वोक्तेनैव मार्गेण प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धता ॥
   Śl. Vār., Śabda-nityatā, Kā 427.
3. यस्तु सत्त्वात् ज्वालादिवत् क्षणिकत्वं साधयति तस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रत्यक्षविरोधः पूर्वोक्तेनाऽनुमानेन चेति । NR, p. 840, line 11-12.
4. अर्थक्रियासमर्थं परमार्थसद् उच्यते NBṬ, 1.15. p. 78.

destruction of the previous moment as without leaving any residue, there would occur no production of the succeeding moment, because of the absence of any cause. It (the previous moment), being totally non-existent, would have no capacity to act for the next moment. When it itself, is swallowed up by destruction, in which moment would it work (for the production of the next one)?"[1] Here the Buddhist view, that "efficiency-to-act (*artha-kriyā-kṣamatā*) is possible only in the momentary things and not in the permanent ones, has been repudiated, which is evident from Pārthasārathi's commentary also.[2]

From the above discussion it can be inferred that the theories—'what is existent, is momentary'[3] ! and 'what is efficient in aciion, is existent'[4] were prevalent in the Buddhist system even at the time of Kumārila. But it is difficult to say as to whom (Buddhist thinker) they can be ascribed.

Kamalaśīla has quoted a verse from some ancient Buddhist text, in which Lord Buddha himself asserts : "All (real) forces are momentary. (But the question is—) how a thing which has no duration to act, can produce the next one ? (The reply is—) only 'existence' (*bhūtiḥ*) is its efficiency to act and it is this very efficiency which is called a creative cause."[5] Dr. Nagin J. Shah has also noted in his work,

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[1] पूर्वक्षणविनाशे च कल्प्यमाने निरन्वये ।
उत्तरस्याऽनिमित्तत्वादुत्पत्तिर्नोपपद्यते ॥
अत्यन्ताऽसन्नसौ तस्मिन्न तावद्व्यापृतिक्षमः ।
स्वयं चाभावदष्टत्वात् कस्मिन् काले करिष्यते ॥
Śl. Vār, Śabda-nityatā, Kās 428-29.

[2] यदपि सौगतैः स्थायिनोऽर्थक्रियाकारित्वं न सम्भवतीत्युक्तं, तदपि विपरीतमिति । NR, p. 840, line 14-15.

[3] यत्सत् तत्क्षणिकम् ।

[4] अर्थक्रियासमर्थं यत् तदत्र परमार्थसत् PV, Pratyakṣa, 3 ab.

[5] (i) क्षणिकाः सर्वसंस्कारा अस्थिराणां कुतः क्रिया ।
भूतिर्येषां क्रिया सैव कारकं सैव चोच्यते ॥ TSP, p. 14.
(ii) cf. BL, I, p. 119.

"Vasubandhu criticises the Vātsīputrīya concept of soul by saying that such an eternal uncaused and unchanging entity would be without any practical efficiency which alone is what ensures the reality of an entity."[1] In the light of these statements, it can be conjectured that the seeds of above mentioned theories were present in the early Buddhist literature and were propounded as doctrines by some later thinker anterior to Kumārila. Anyhow it remains a problem for further consideration.

Dharmakīrti has, however, expounded, these doctrines in his Pramāṇa-vārttika. He says: 'whatever is existent, is invariably destined to decay',[2] 'ultimately existent thing is that which is capable of efficient action.'[3] Vācaspati Miśra has also presented the Buddhist view in a clear and lucid manner. He explains that efficiency to act (*artha-kriyā-kṣamatā*) which can appear only in two ways—either simultaneously (*yugapat*) or successively (*krameṇa*), is possible only in momentary things and not in the non-momentary ones. Efficiency-to-act, either simultaneously or successively, requires a change in the object, but it is not possible in a permanent object due to its nature of being always in one and the same position.[4] Hence it can be concluded that only momentary thing is efficient in action and that alone is real.

(iii) *Momentariness is proved through Impression* (*vāsanā*) :

In the Nirālambana chapter of the Ślaoka-vārttika, Kumārila has refuted the Buddhist view of *vāsanā* (impression). He asserts : "There can be no existence of impression (*vāsanā*) because of (i) the ideas (*citta*) being momentary, (ii) the destruction being 'without leaving any residue' and (iii) thus there being no association between the impressed and the

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1. Nagin J. Shah, ACDP, p. 44.
2. सत्तामात्रानुवन्धित्वात् नाशस्य PV, III. 270.
3. स पारमार्थिको भावो य एवार्थक्रियाक्षम: । PV, III. 166.
4. NVTṬ, pp. 552-53 (Ch,SS); Also see S.N. Shastri, BDA, p. 180.

impresser (*Vāsya* & *Vāsaka*)."[1] According to him, the state of being impressed and the impresser can be accepted only in the Realists' theory of permanence (*avasthiti*).

In response to it, the Buddhist says: that the state of being impressed and the impresser is possible only in their theory of flux, "If the subsequent conscious moment, being permanent (enduring for some time) does not differ from the previous one, then, definitely *vāsanā* (impression) cannot be present there, just as it was not present in the previous moment, inasmuch as there is no difference (in the previous and the succeeding moments); while in (the Buddhists') theory of flux, *vāsanā* can exist, inasmuch as there is similarity as well as difference between the preceding and the succeeding moments."[2]

This argument implies that the *vāsya-vāsaka-bhāva* (the impressed and the impresser relationship) can be possible only in the theory of flux. The difference, which is necessarily required to prove the *vāsya-vāsaka-bhāva* between the two moments, can be possible in between the two successive moments which are regarded in the Buddhist system as totally different from one another; and the similarity (*sādṛśya*) which is likewise required to prove the said relationship, can also be found in the preceding and the succeeding moments. But in the theory of permanence, there being no difference in between the two moments, there can occur no *vāsanā*.[3]

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[1] क्षणिकेषु च चित्तेषु विनाशे च निरन्वये ॥
वास्यवासकयोश्चैवमसाहित्यान्न वासना ।
Śl. Vār., Nirālambana, Kā 181 cd and 182 ab.

[2] अवस्थितो हि पूर्वस्माद् भिद्यते नोत्तरो यदि ॥
पूर्ववद्वासना तत्र न स्यादेव विशेषतः ।
भङ्गुरे पूर्वसादृश्याद् भिन्नत्वाच्चास्ति वासना ॥
Ibid., Kā 185 cd. & Kā 186.

[3] cf. अवस्थिते पूर्वाऽपरकालयोरेकरूपस्य रूपान्तरजननाऽनुपपत्तिः स्यात्, अस्मत्पक्षे तु पूर्वस्माज्ज्ञानक्षणादुत्तरक्षणस्य भिन्नत्वात्सादृश्याच्च युक्तैव वासना । NR, p. 262. line 18-21.

As such the Buddhist has established that *vāsanā* is possible only in the theory of flux.

4. 7. CONCLUSION :

From the above discussion the following conclusions can be derived ;

(i) Theory of causation, called *pratītya-samutpāda,* is the fundamental Buddhist doctrine, upon which the whole structure of this philosophy has been built up. The meaning of *pratītya-samutpāda* has been changed from time to time. It originally meant as 'origination after getting the causes'. Its another interpretation is 'origination after the destruction of the causes'. In Prasannapadā, it is explained as 'origination in relation to the causes and conditions'.[1]

(ii) Only sequence (*ānantarya*) between the cause and the effect is necessary for causation and no action of the cause is required. In fact the very existence of the cause before the appearance of the effect is the action (*sattā eva vyāpṛtiḥ*).[2]

(iii) Some of the Buddhists have accepted simultaneity *yaugapadya*) also of the cause and the effect.[3]

(iv) According to the theory of flux or *kṣaṇa-bhaṅga,* all things in the universe are momentary (*ksaṇika*). The thing which vanishes away as soon as it appears, is called '*ksaṇika*' (*utpanna-vinaṣṭa*). It does not stand even for a moment after having been accomplished.[4]

(v) Destruction is natural in an entity, it requires no extraneous cause for its occurrence.[5]. It is also of the nature of without leaving any residue (*niranvaya vināśa*).[6] 'Destruction can occur in two forms—either in subtle form or in gross form. These two forms are also called the positive form and the negative form.[1] The two *asaṁskṛta dharmas* viz. *pratisaṁkhyānirodha* and *apratisaṁkhyānirodha,* presented by Kumārila as two kinds of destruction, are, in fact, the two entirely different sets of *dharmas* of the Buddhists. They are not the two kinds of destruction.[2]

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[1] See supra 4.1.
[2] See supra 4.2
[3] See supra 4.3.
[4] See supra 4.4.
[5] See supra 4.5. (i)
[6] See supra 4.5. (ii)

(vi) The Buddhists have given several arguments in support of their theory of flux. One of their most important grounds for proving momentariness, is the gross destruction of things. They assume an intermediate subtle destruction of things at every moment due to the inexplicability of gross destruction otherwise.

Their other important argument is: Everything is momentary, inasmuch as it is existent (*sat*) just like the flame of a lamp etc.[4]

Evanescence is also proved through *vāsanā* (impression) because *vāsya-vāsaka-bhāva* can exist in two similar but different moments and it is possible only in the theory of flux and not in the Realists' theory of permanence.[5]

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1. See supra 4.5. (iii). (a)
2. See supra 4.5. (iii). (b)
3. See supra 4.6. (i).
4. See supra 4.6. (ii).
5. See supra 4.6. (iii).

CHAPTER V

THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF NO-SOUL (*Anātmavāda*)

5. 1. THE CONCEPT OF SOUL AND THE BUDDHISTS :

There are mainly two streams of thought regarding self or soul (*ātman*) in Indian Philosophy : The first one is the advocate of soul-theory (*Ātmavāda*) and the other believes in the no-soul-theory (*Anātmavāda*).

All the Vaidika systems, and the Jainas, are unanimous in assuming that there is a permanent and independent entity in the form of 'soul' which is different from the body, the senses and the mind. However, there is a difference of opinions about its nature. Some systems such as the Sāṁkhya,[1] the Vedānta[2] and the Jainas[3] maintain that consciousness is the nature (*svarūpa*) of 'soul', while the others like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika[4] hold that consciousness is a quality which resides in its substratum—'the soul'. The thinkers of Pūrva-mīmāṁsā School have divergent views. Śāstra-dīpikākāra[5] and Māna-meyodayakāra[6] have given us a definition, which is similar to that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, according to which 'soul' is the substratum of consciousness. But according to Kumārila, the nature of soul is consciousness, it is eternal,[1] yet subject to change of states and moods.[2]

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[1] चैतन्यं पुरुषस्य स्वं रूपम् । TSP, p. 102, line 13-14.

[2] अतस्तत्तदभासकं नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तसत्यस्वभावं प्रत्यक्चैतन्यमेवात्मवस्तु इति वेदान्तविद्वदनुभवः । Vedāntasāra, p. 63

[3] (i) तत्र बोधात्मको जीवः । SDS., p. 143.
(ii) चिल्लक्षणं नरम् । TS, Kā., 311, p. 150.

[4] अन्ये पुनरिहात्मानमिच्छादीनां समाश्रयम् ।
स्वतो चिद्रूपमिच्छन्ति नित्यं सर्वगतं तथा ॥ TS, Kā, 171,

[5] ज्ञानसुखादीनां शरीरगुणत्वासंभवात् ततोऽन्य एतेषामाश्रयः स एवात्मा । ŚD, p. 120, line 33-14.

[6] आत्मा चैतन्याश्रयः MM, p. 191.

The other stream of thought does not accept soul (*ātman*) as an independent and permanent entity. The Cārvākas and the Buddhists may be regarded as the upholders of this view, but their concepts of soullessness totally differ. The Cārvākas identify soul with the body qualified by consciousness.[3] According to them, consciousness arises in the body due to a particular combination of the four elements—earth, water, fire and air—just like the intoxicating quality of wine arising from fermented yeast.[4] Consciousness is a bye-product of material elements and it vanishes when the body is vanished.[5]

The Buddhists, on the other hand, do not maintain that consciousness arises from matter and vanishes away when the body is vanished. They accept consciousness (*vijñāna*) in the form of *vijñāna-skandha* as separate from material elements and it is always present in the form of ceaseless flow (*jñāna-santāna*). Further, unlike the Cārvākas, the Buddhists believe in the law of action and result (*karma-phala-vyavasthā*) as well as in the law of rebirth (*punarjanma*).[1] These characteristics distinguish the Buddhists from the materialist Cārvākas with regard to the soul.

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[1] cf. (i) ज्ञानशक्तिस्वाभावोऽतो नित्यः सर्वगतः पुमान्
Śl. Vār., Ātma, Kā 73 ab.
(ii) नित्यचैतन्याः पुमांसो देहवृत्तयः
Ibid., Śabda, Kā 407 ab.

[2] cf. सुखदुःखाद्यवस्थाश्च गच्छन्नापि नरो मम ।
चैतन्यद्रव्यसत्तादिरूपं नैव विमुञ्चति ॥
तस्मादुभयहानेन व्यावृत्यनुगमात्मकः ।
पुरुषोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः कुण्डलादिषु स्वर्णवत् ॥
Ibid., Kās. 26.&.28.

[3] तच्चैतन्यविशिष्ट देह एवात्मा । SDS, p. 4

[4] अत्र चत्वारि भूतानि भूमिवार्यनलानिलाः ।
चतुर्भ्यः खलु भूतेभ्यश्चैतन्यमुपजायते ॥
किण्वादिभ्यः समेतेभ्यो द्रव्येभ्यो मदशक्तिवत् ।
SDS, Kā 6 & 7 ab, p. 10

[5] विनष्टेषु सत्सु स्वयं विनश्यति । SDS, p.4., line 18.

5.2. REFUTATION OF ĀTMAVĀDA BY THE BUDDHISTS :

The Buddhists, being the advocates of no-soul theory, have refuted the soul theory with several arguments. In the Śloka-vārttika, their arguments have been presented as follows :

(i) Refuting the law of action and its result, (*karma-phala-vyavasthā*) of the Mīmāṁsakas, the Buddhists argue : If, somehow, the eternality of the soul and its nature of being the agent (*kartā*) and the enjoyer (*bhoktā*) are assumed, there would be no use of this assumption, inasmuch as, at the time of the enjoyment of the result (*bhogakāla*), the enjoying soul would not be able to establish any relationship beetween the action and its result. That is, the enjoying soul would not realise that 'the result I am enjoying, is the effect of the action—good or bad—performed by me alone'.[2]

(ii) And when one does not recognise that the result has been brought about by his own action, there would be no difference whether it is enjoyed by one's own self or by some-one else.[3]

(iii) And while doing a vicious deed, one may think that at the time of enjoyment of its result, he would not remember (that it is the result of his own vicious deeds), and hence he would not avoid it.[4]

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[1] See Infra, 5.4, 5.

[2] cf. नित्यकर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वे प्रतिपन्नोऽपि सन् यदा ।
न कर्मफलसम्बन्धं भोगकालेऽवबुध्यते ॥
मया यत्तु कृतं कर्म तस्येदं भुज्यते फलम् ।
शुभाऽशुभं मयैवेति तदा कोऽस्य रसो भवेत् ॥
Śl. Vār., Ātma., Kās 8,9.

[3] cf. अपरामृश्यमाने हि स्वकर्मप्रत्यये फले ।
न विशेषो भवेत्कश्चित् स्वपराऽऽत्मोपभोगयोः ॥ Ibid., Kā 10.

[4] कुर्वन्नप्यशुभं कर्म तेनैवं चिन्तयेन्नरः ।
न स्मरिष्यामि भोगेऽहमिति नैतद्विवर्जयेत् ॥ Ibid., Kā 11.

(iv) Thus, even in accordance with the theory of eternality of soul, the objections of 'the loss of earned merit and the enjoyment of unearned deserts (*kṛtanāśākṛtāgamau*)' remain the same (as have been urged by the opponents against the Buddhists). Therefore, it is useless to establish the eternality of soul.[1]

(v) Another argument of the Buddhists is : If your souls, being eternal and all-pervasive, are devoid of action (*niṣkriya*) and are unmodified (*avikārya*) by pleasure and pain how they can possess the nature of being the agent and the enjoyer ?[2] If, it be held that at the time of the performance of an action and at the time of the appearance of pain etc., there is a difference in the soul from its previous form, its eternality would be lost.[3]

A similar objection against the soul theory of the Mīmāṁsakas has been quoted in Nyāyaratnākara, where refuting the eternality of soul, the Buddhists argue : "If at the emergence of cognition, there is any modification (*vikṛti*) in the *puruṣa* (i.e. the soul), he would be regarded as non-eternal; and if he is accepted as unmodified (*avikṛtiḥ*), the assertion, 'this soul is the cogniser' would be proved wrong."[4] Advancing in his arguments, the Buddhist further asserts : "There can be no change in the sky by the rain and the sun, but their effect can be seen on the skin, so, if the soul is like the skin, it would be non-eternal, and if it is like the sky, it would be as non-existent."[1] Among these two verses, quoted in Nyāya-ratnākara, the first one is found in the first chapter of Pramāṇa-samuccaya,[2] hence it definitely belongs to Diṅnāga and the second one also can be attributed to the same authority, as it has been quoted by Uddyotakara in his Nyāya-vārttika.[3] It is to be noted that Diṅnāga is the chief Buddhist opponent of Uddoytakara.

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[1] तत्र नित्यत्वपक्षेऽपि कृतनाशाकृताऽऽगमौ ।
फलतस्तुल्यरूपौ चेद् वृथा तत्प्रतिपादनम् ॥ Śl. Vār., Kā. 12.

[2] तव नित्यविभुत्वाभ्यामात्मानो निष्क्रिया यदि ।
सुखदुःखाऽविकार्याश्च कीदृशी कर्तृभोक्तृता ॥ Ibid., Kā. 20.

[3] अथ कर्तृत्ववेलायां दुःखादेश्चापि जन्मनि ।
प्राग्रूपादन्यथात्वं स्यान्नित्यताऽस्य विरुध्यते ॥ Ibid., Kā. 21.

[4] बुद्धिजन्मनि पुंसश्च विकृतिर्यद्यनित्यता ।
अथाऽविकृतिरात्माऽयं प्रमातेति न युज्यते ॥

(vi) According to the Vaiśeṣikas, the psychical facts like pleasure, pain, etc., being qualities, must have some substrate. Due to certain reasons, body cannot serve the purpose of being the substrate, hence soul is assumed as the substrate of pleasure pain, etc.[4] But the Buddhist, not agreeing with this wiew, says that pleasure, pain, etc. are not accepted as qualities in the Buddhist system, so there is no use of postulating a substrate in the form of soul.[5] According to the Vijñānavādins, consciousness is the only reality; it is an independent entity and is not the quality of any other entity. Pleasure, pain, etc. are nothing but only different forms of consciousness.[6] Thus the existence of soul is not proved on the ground of pleasure, pain, etc.

Having refuted thus, the theory of soul of the Mīmāṁsakas and of other *ātmavādī* systems, the Buddhist now establishes his own theory of no-soul or *Anātmavāda.*

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[1] वर्षातपाभ्यां किं व्योम्नश्चर्मण्यस्ति तयोः फलम् ।
चर्मोपमश्चेत्सोऽनित्यः खतुल्यश्चेदसत्समः ॥ Śl. Vār., p. 150.

[2] PS, I, Kā. 48, (Adyar).

[3] NV, 3.1.5, p. 355 (Ch. SS.)

[4] cf. गुणत्वादाश्रितत्वं हि सुखादेः स्यात् रसादिवत् ।
य आश्रितः स आत्मेति ब्रवाणस्यैतदुत्तरम् ॥
Śl. Vār., Ātma, Kā. 101,

[5] cf. गुणानां परतन्त्रत्वाद् गुणवाननुमीयते ।
सिद्धे गुणत्वे तत् त्वस्मान् प्रत्यसिद्धं सुखादिषु ॥
Ibid., Kā. 102.

[6] cf. ज्ञानविशेषा हि सुखादयः ज्ञानं स्वतन्त्रं न कस्यचिदन्यस्य गुणः,
अतो नाऽन्यस्तद्वानस्ति । NR, p. 714, line 17-19

5. 3. NATURE OF ANĀTMAVĀDA (NO-SOUL THEORY):

What is the nature of the no-soul theory of the Buddhists? In the Śloka-vārttika there are only a few words which can give us a brief idea about the no-soul theory. Kumārila has used the word '*nairātmya*' at two or three places in *Ātmavāda* chapter.[1] Meaning of the word '*nairātmya*' is—'devoid of *ātman* or soul.' So a theory in which every being is devoid of any *ātman* or soul, is called *Nairātmyavāda* or *Anātmavāda* or the theory of no-Soul.

After having enlightenment, Lord Buddha gave his second sermon about *Anātmavāda*. It has been preserved in the Vinayapiṭaka with the name '*Adatta-lakhaṇa-sutta*'. In this sermon, he preached to his disciples that the five *skandhas* i.e. corporeal form (*rūpa*), feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*saṁñā*), primary-mental-formation (*saṁskāra*) and consciousness (*vijñāna*) are transitory (*kṣaṇika*), they are painful (*duḥkha*) and they are no-self (*anātma*). He preached so because such type of thinking produces righteous knowledge in one's mind.[2] In fact, he always preached about no-self, because the feeling of self (*ātma-bhāvanā*) is the first and foremost cause of one's bondage.[3] The nature of *Anātmavāda* is beautifully illustrated by the Buddhist sage Nāgasena through the example of a 'chariot' in the 'Questions of King Milinda.'[4]

The Buddhists maintain that everything in the universe is in perpetual flux. Everything is merely a link in the chain, a spoke in the wheel, a transitory phase in the series. Every thing is dependently originated (*pratītya-samutpanna*).[5] There is nothing that may be regarded as an independent and permanent entity like soul.[1] The so-called individuality is nothing but a combination of five constituent elements—the five *skandhas*.[2] "Thus all questions relating to individuality are solved by the law of dependent-origination and no room is left for the intervention of self."[3]

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[1] Śl. Vār., Ātma, Kās. 3, 32 & 136

[2] Paṭisambhidāmagga, 2.1.0.4, 34-38.

[3] cf. आत्मीयदृष्टौ च सत्यामात्मीयस्नेहः । एवमेषां दृढतरात्मात्मीयस्नेहपरिगाहितबन्धनानां मोक्षो दूरीभवेत् ।
AK, VIII., Pud. Vini, p. 1215, line 3-4.

[4] Milinda-pañho, ii. 1.1.

[5] cf. सर्वे इमे धर्मा अनित्याः संस्कृताश्चेति ताः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्ना ।
AK. VIII, Pud. Vini, p. 1202, line 7-8.

There are some sects of the Buddhists like Vātsīputrīyas and Sammitīyas, who, on the basis of the Bhāravāha-sūtra,[4] have accepted a permanent entity in the form of '*pudgala*'.[5] According to them internal *skandhas* at a given moment constitute a certain unity called *pudgala*, which is related to them just as fire is related to fuel.[6] For all other schools of the Buddhists, '*pudgala*' was but another name for *ātman*, and hence, they refuted it by those very arguments, with which they refuted the theory of soul.

While refuting the Buddhist theory of *anātma*, Kumārila refers to the Buddhist school of *Jñānamātra-ātmavādinaḥ* (i.e.

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1. cf. आत्मैव ह्यात्मनो नास्ति विपरीतेन कल्प्यते ।
   नास्तीह सत्व आत्मा च धर्मास्त्वेते सहेतुकाः ।। AK, p. 1203
2. cf. (i) स्कन्धसन्तान एवेदमात्माभिधानं वर्तते. नान्यस्मिन्नभिधेये इति । Ibid., p. 1189.
   (ii) एवं स्कन्धानुपादाय संवृत्या सत्त्व उच्यते । Ibid., p. 1202
3. V.S. Bhattacharya, BCB, p. 90.
4. भारं च वो भिक्षवो देशयिष्यामि भारादानं च भारनिक्षेपणं च भारहारं च ।······भारः पंचोपादानस्कन्धाः ।······भारहारः कतमः ? पुद्गल इति स्याद् वचनीयम् ।
   Cited in Sphuṭārthā, p. 1206.
5. केचित्तु सोगतम्मन्या अप्यात्मानं प्रचक्षते ।
   पुद्गलव्यपदेशेन तत्त्वान्यत्वादिवर्जितम् ।। TS, Kā. 336.
6. cf. (i) आध्यात्मिकानुपात्तान् वर्तमानान् स्कन्धानुपादाय पुद्गलः प्रज्ञप्यते······यथेन्धनमुपादायाग्निः ।
   AK, VIII. Pud. Vini, p. 1192-93
   (ii) Stcherbatsky, CCB, p. 70-71.

those who hold mere consciousness as self). According to them consciousness is momentary, devoid of movement (*niṣkriya*) and devoid of all pervasiveness (*avibhu*).[1] This Buddhist school of Yogācāras (Vijñānavādins), not accepting the plurality of elements, maintain that consciousness is the only reality,[2] which is a beginningless and never ending continuum.[3] It is of two kinds—*ālaya-vijñāna* and *pravṛtti-vijñāna*. *Ālaya-vijñāna* (Store consciousness) is just like an ocean, in which the waves of *pravṛtti-vijñānas* appear and disappear momentarily. It may be argued that the so called store consciousness is nothing but another name for soul or *ātman*. But such type of thinking would be a misconception only, inasmuch as it is altogether different from soul. It is not an eternal and independent entity like soul, but is only a ceaseless flow of consciousness (*vijñāna-santāna*), in which each succeeding conscious-moment is dependently originated by its preceding conscious-moments.[4]

Thus, the Buddhism adopts a middle path, leaving aside the two extremes of eternalism (*śāśvatavāda*) of the Upaniṣads and annihilationism (*ucchedavāda*) of the Cārvākas. It accepts only the ceaseless flow of the five *skandhas* (*pañca-skandha-pravāha*) or of consciousness (*vijñāna-santāna*). The idea of an individual or personality or a living being is merely empirical, formed under the law of dependent origination and there is no *ātman* or soul in its eternal sense. Prof. Stcherbatsky rightly observes: "Buddhism never denied the existence of a personality or a soul in the empirical sense, it only maintained that it was no ultimate reality (not a *dharma*)."[5]

5. 4. KARMA-PHALA-VYAVASTHĀ (LAW OF ACTION AND ITS RESULT) IN ANĀTMAVĀDA :

Now the question naturally arises, how 'the law of action and its results' i.e. *karma.phala-vyavasthā* can be maintained in a system like Buddhism, having momentariness and the no-soul theory as its chief doctrines. From the very beginning, there have been long discussions about the no-soul theory of the Buddhists among all the *ātmavādī* systems of Indian philosophy. Nyāya-vārttika of Uddyotakara,[1] Śloka-vārttika of Kumārila,[2] Nyāya-vārttika-tāptparya-ṭīkā of Vācaspati Miśra,[3] Nyāya-mānjarī of Jayanta,[4] Nyāya-kandalī of Śrīdhara[5] and Ātma-tattvaviveka of Udayanācārya[6] are clear illustrations of such discussions. In the Śloka-vārttika, Kumārila raises mainly the following objections against 'the law of action and its result' (*karma-phala-vyavasthā*) in the no-soul theory of the Buddhists :

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[1] Śl. Vār., Ātma, Kā. 33.

[2] विज्ञप्तिमात्रमेवैतद् Vini śatikā Kā. 1.

[3] Satkari Mookerjee, BPUF, p. 205, line 8-9.

[4] S.N. Shastri, BDV, p. 228-29.

[5] CCB, pp. 25-26.

(i) A person, already knowing about his destruction in the next moment, would never wish to perform his duties as he knows that the result of his present actions would be enjoyed by someone else.[7]

(ii) Identity between the agent and the enjoyer would not be possible due to the momentary nature of consciousness in the system of *jñāna-mātra-ātmavādin* (those who hold pure consciousness as self)[8] and thus there would be a discrepancy in the form of *kṛtanāśa-akṛtāgama* (i.e. one's loss of what he has done and one's gain of what he has not done).[9]

(iii) What to talk of identity between the agent and the enjoyer, even identity of the agent in one action (to be performed in more than one moments) is hard to be got at in this system, as every moment of consciousness is different from the next one, one action, would be performed by several moments of consciousness just as an action, begun by a father is completed by his son, grandson and so on.[1]

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[1] NV, pp. 64 ff., pp. 333ff. (Ch. SS.).
[2] Śl. Vār., Ātmavāda, passim.
[3] NVTṬ, pp. 211-20, pp. 589ff. (Ch. SS).
[4] N. Mañjarī, II, pp. 15ff.
[5] N. Kandalī, pp. 175ff.
[6] ĀTV, Chap. III, IV.
[7] Śl, Vār., Ātma., Kā 32 & 33a.
[8] Ibid., Kā. 33cd. and 34 ab.
[9] Ibid., Kā. 23ab.

The Buddhists have met with the above objections in their own treatises. Kumārila has also set forth the Buddhist reply in the Śloka-vārttika as follows :

> "We hold that the same series of consciousness (*jñāna-santān*), which is the performer of an action is the enjoyer of its result (and hence the discrepancy in the form of '*kṛta-nāśa akṛtāgama*' cannot be imposed upon us). As far as the difference in moments is concerned, it is just like the different conditions of soul assumed by you (i.e., the Mīmāṁsaka)."[2]

The sence is : just as Kumārila maintains that pleasure, pain, etc. are different conditions of soul which appear and disappear in it successively, but the nature of soul remains the same,[3] similarly different moments come and go successively in one series of consciousness which always flows in one continuum.

In Bodhicaryāvatāra also, it has been observed that the agent and the enjoyer are assumed as one on the basis of oneness of series of consciousness (*citta-santāna*)."[4] In fact series of consciousness is nothing but a chain of moments appearing and disappearing one after another under the cause and effect relationship. The succeeding moments of one series (*santāna*) are always impressed upon by the preceding moments and thus, the moments (*kṣaṇāḥ* or *santāninaḥ*), inspite of their difference and fleeting nature, give an idea of one series, assumed to form an empiric sense of oneness. Thus the series of consciousness (*citta-santāna*) is regarded as the cause of oneness between the agent and the enjoyer.[1]

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[1] Śl. Vār., Ātma., Kā. 36, 37 and NR thereon

[2] कर्ता य एव सन्तानो ननु भोक्ता स एव नः ।
विज्ञानक्षणभेदस्तु त्वदवस्थान्तरैः समः ॥ Ibid., Kā. 35.

[3] Ibid., Kā. 26.

[4] cf. सन्तानस्यैक्यमाश्रित्य कर्ता भोक्तेति देशितम् । BCA, p. 222.

This idea can be more intelligible by an illustration. If a farmer gives a tinge of *lākṣārasa* (liquid of *lākṣā*) to the seed of cotton, the flower coming out from it would be reddish, or if he gives a tinge of sugar to the seed of mango the fruit, coming out from it, would definitely be sweet. Similar is the case with the series of consciousness (*citta-santāna*). An action performed by one series of consciousness (*citta-santāna*) will bring fruit to the succeeding moments of the same series alone.[2] If an action of mercy is performed by the moments a,b,c,d belonging to series No. 1, the result of this merciful action would be enjoyed by the moments e,f,g,h belonging to the same series and not by the moments belonging to some different series—say No. 2.


Citta-santāna No. 1.
Citta santāna No. 2.
Action of mercy performed by the moments a, b, c, d.
Result of that action enjoyed by the moments e, f, g, h.
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h

It may, however, be objected : Inspite of there being succession (*pāramparya*) between the agent moments (*kartṛ-kṣaṇaḥ*) and the enjoyer moments (*bhoktṛ-kṣaṇāḥ*) there is no identity (*tādātmya*) between them.[1] Hence the discrepancy in the form of *kṛtanāśa-akṛtāgama,* would remain the same in their theory. The Buddhist reply to this objection has been presented in the Śloka-vārttika thus :

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[1] cf. (i) संतानस्य उत्तरोत्तरानेकक्षणपरम्परालक्षणस्य कार्यकारणभावेन प्रवर्तमानस्य ऐक्यमाश्रित्य अनेकेषु एकत्वं लोकाध्यवसायवशादारोपितमेत्र निमित्तीकृत्य कर्ता भोक्तेति देशितम् —य एव कर्मणः भोक्ता स एव तत्फलस्योपभोक्ता ।

BCAP, p. 222.

(ii) NKC, Pt. I, p. 6-7

[2] cf. यस्मिन्नेव हि संताने आहिता कर्मवासना ।
तस्मिन्नेव बध्नाति कर्पासे रक्तता यथा ।।

Quoted in BCAP, p. 223.

> "Just as fathers perform duties for the accomplishment of (certain) results for their sons, although they are fully acquainted with the difference (between themselves and their sons), similarly in our (Buddhists') theory, too, the moments in a series of consciousness (*jñāna-santāninaḥ*) (performs actions although they know that the result would be enjoyed by the coming moments of the same series)"[2]

This Buddhist view has been explained by Vācaspati Miśra also in his Tattva-vaiśāradī, where he asserts : "There is no inconcomitance in the Buddhist philosophy, because the law of action and its result is assumed on the basis of cause and effect relationship".[3] Hence there is no harm if the action is performed by the preceding moments of one series and the result is enjoyed by the succeeding moments of the same series.

Further, it has also been objected by Kumārila 'how the Buddhist would be able to distinguish between the enjoying moments of the series which perform the action and the enjoying moments belonging to some other series, inasmuch as the enjoying moments of both the series are equally different from the preceding moments of that series which has performed

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1. Śl. Vār., Ātma., Kā. 46; NR., p. 700
2. नन्वन्यत्वं विदन्तोऽपि पुत्रादिफलसिद्धये ।
प्रवर्तन्ते यथा तद्वज्ज्ञानसन्तानिनोऽपि नः ॥
Śl. Vār., Ātma, Kā. 51.
3. cf. ननु नातिप्रसज्यते कार्यंकारणभावे सतीति विशेषणात्
T. Vaiśāradī, 1, 32, p. 39.

the action.[1] The Buddhist reply to this objection is : "Just as childern born in different families do not enjoy the result (of the actions performed by the fathers of different families), although the difference (between the childern of the performer's family and those of the other's) is just the same; so in the same manner the moments, originated in different series of consciousness (do not enjoy the result of the action, performed by a moment of different series)."[2] It is indicated here indirectly that owing to the cause and effect relationship, the result can be enjoyed by the moments belonging to the performer's series only and not by some other series.

It is, thus, obvious from the above account that inspite of not holding any permanent entity like 'soul', the Buddhists have established *karma-phala-vyavasthā* in their system through the oneness of series of consciousness which is formed of different moments (*kṣaṇāḥ*), inter-related with each other through cause and effect relation and thus all the objections like *kṛta nāśa akṛtāgama* etc. have also been subverted.

5. 5. PUNARJANMA-VYAVASTHĀ (LAW OF REBIRTH) IN ANĀTMAVĀDA :

The Buddists have maintained the law of rebirth in their system, although they do not accept any permanent entity like 'soul' or '*ātman*'. But all the *Ātmavādī* system of Indian philosophy and also the Cārvākas, have objected against the law of rebirth in the Buddhist system. Kumārila's main arguments are as follows :

> "When consciousness is momentary, devoid of any movement (*niṣkriya*) and devoid of all pervasiveness (*avibhu*) according to *jñāna-mātra ātmavādī* Buddhists, how can it

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1. Śl. Vār., Ātma. Kā. 47; NR, p. 700.
2. अन्यत्वे च समानेऽपि यथा वंशान्तरोद्भवाः ।
न लभन्ते फलं तद्वत्सन्तानान्तरजाः क्षणाः ॥
Śl. Vār., Ātma, Kā. 52.

> go to the other body (after leaving the previous one by death)?"[1]

Explaining this very argument Kumārila further says :

> "Transferance of consciousness from one body to the other is not at all tenable, inasmuch as neither the exit nor the entrance of consciousness from one body to the other is ever experienced. Flames etc. travel from one place to the other, being inspired by the air, but there is no one to inspire in case of consciousness. Nor can it, owing to its incorporeal nature, go to the other body by jumping."[2]

Refuting the intermediate-astral-body i.e. *antarā-bhava-deha*, assumed by the Buddhists, Kumārila further asserts : "The hypothesis of an intermediate-astral-body (*antarā-bhava-deha*) has been thoroughly rejected by Vindhyavāsin, inasmuch as no proof has been found for its existence. And the assumption, that this 'intermediate-body', associated with a subtle form of '*rūpa*' (corporeal) etc., suddenly comes into being (at the time of death) and suddenly disappears (at the time of rebirth), is purely an imagination. If, somehow, the intermediate-body is accepted, even then transferance of consciousness (from the vanishing body) into it (i.e. in the *antarā-bhava-deha*) and the assumption of transmitting the consciousness again into the other (new) body is totally groundless."[3]

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[1] ज्ञानानां क्षणिकत्वाद्धि……।
निष्क्रियत्वाऽविभूत्वाभ्यां न च देहान्तराऽऽश्रितिः ।
Śl. Vār., Ātma, Kā. 34.

[2] देहान्तरे च बुद्धीनां संचारो नोपपद्यते ।
पूर्वदेहाद्बहिर्भावो न च तासां प्रतीयते ॥
वायुना प्रेर्यमाणं हि ज्वालाद्यन्यत्र संचरेत् ॥
बुद्धेः कारणदेशात्तु प्रेरणं नास्ति केनचित् ॥
अमूर्तत्वात्स्वयं नासावुत्प्लुत्याऽन्यत्र गच्छति ।
Ibid., Kās., 59, 60, 61ab.

[3] अन्तराभवदेहस्तु निषिद्धो विन्ध्यवासिना ।
तदस्तित्वे प्रमाणं हि न किञ्चिदवगम्यते ॥

The above criticism, thus, throws light on some important aspects of the Buddhists' theory of rebirth, such as, transference of consciousness from one body to the other, and assumption of an 'intermediate-astral body' (*antarā-bhava-deha*).

In the absence of any permanent soul a question naturally arises about the Buddhist theory of rebirth : What is that entity which is assumed to be transmigrated from one body to another ? An answer to this querry is found in the Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya, where Vasubandhu asserts that it is not soul, but an aggregate of five *skandhas* (*pañca-skandha-samudāya*), conventionally called 'living beings', which, having a craving for life (*tṛṣṇopādānaḥ*), wanders from one body to another, just as fire, though momentary, is supposed to be wandering on account of its contineous series.[1]

In the later period, the Buddhists maintained that 'there is a beginningless and never-ending continuum of consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna-santāna*), in which the conscious-moments successively come and vanish away under the causal-relationship. The present, past and future lives are nothing but different conditions of one continuum of consciousness, delimited by a certain period of time'.[2] In the words of Dr. Satkari Mookherjee, "Consciousness-continuum as delimited by a

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सहसा जायते तच्च सहसैव विनश्यति ।
सूक्ष्मरूपादियुक्तं चेत्युत्प्रेक्षामात्रमेव तत् ॥
सत्यपि ज्ञानसंचारस्तत्र स्यान्निष्प्रमाणकः ।
तेन चान्यशरीरेषु पुनर्निक्षेपकल्पना ।

Śl. Vār., Ātma, Kās. 62, 64.

[1] cf. यथा तु क्षणिकोऽग्निः सन्तत्या संचरतीत्युच्यते, तथा सत्त्वाख्यः स्कन्धसमुदायस्तृष्णोपादानः संसरतीत्युच्यते ।

AkBh, VIII, Pud. Vini., p. 1214, line 7-9.

[2] cf. तदत्र परलोकोऽयं नान्यः कश्चन विद्यते ।
उपादानतदादेयभूतज्ञानादिसन्ततेः ॥
काचिन्नियतमर्यादाऽवस्थैव परिकीर्त्यंते ॥
तस्या अनाद्यनन्तायाः परः पूर्वं इहेति च ॥

TS, Kās. 1871-72

period of hundred years or its neighbourhood is conventionally regarded as the present life and its survival after this fictitious limit is considered to be after life or post mortem existence."[1] Although this series of consciousness is of impermanent nature, yet there is no difficulty in its transmigration from the previous existence to the new one due to its ever-recurring continuity under the causal-relationship.[2] Even after death the moments of consciousness go on reproducing their next moments as before.[3] Thus it is not necessary to assume, an intermediate-astral-body (*antarā-bhava-deha*) according to the Vijñānavādins.[4]

Some Buddhists have, however, assumed an intermediate series of *skandhas* called '*antarābhava*' in between the period of death and rebirth, though they do not use the term *deha* or 'body' for this intermediate-series.[5] There is no soul or *ātman*, but there is only a collection of the *skandhas*, having impressions (*vāsanā*) of the actions and desires of the previous life. It enters like light into the new body at the time of rebirth through the series of *antarābhava*.[6] The transferance of the five *skandhas* from one body to the other, is not visible due to the incapability of our physical organs in perceiving the subtle forms. The non-perception of something does not necessarily mean its non-existence.[1]

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[1] BPUF, p. 205.

[2] cf. TS, p. 649-55; PV, I, 45-47.

[3] cf. मरणक्षणविज्ञानं स्वोपादेयोदयक्षमम् ।
रागिणो हीनसङ्गत्वात् पूर्वविज्ञानवत् तथा ।।
येन रूपेण विज्ञानं जनयत् परिनिश्चितम् ।
प्राक् पश्चादपि तद्बिभ्रदखण्डं किं न कारकम् ।।
TS, Kās. 1898-99.

[4] cf. केवलाऽपि मनोबुद्धिर्यंदेवमविरोधिनी ।
नातोऽन्यदेहसद्भावसिद्धये यत्निनो वयम् ।। Ibid., Kā 1935

[5] मृत्यूपपत्तीभवयोरन्तरा भवतीहयः AK, 3.10

[6] cf. नात्मास्ति स्कन्धमात्रं तु क्लेशकर्माभिसंस्कृतम् ।
अन्तराभवसंतत्या कुक्षिमेति प्रदीपवत् ।। AK, 3.18

Kumārila has also asserted that consciousness cannot exist in an embryonic stage, as no sense-organ is there.[2] This contention is not based on sound observation, as it is not necessary that consciousness should exist only in its objective form. It can exist in its own nature without there being any object or sense-organ as is found in case of swoon.[3] Dr. Satkari Mookerjee has also observed :

> "Since subjective consciousness as distinguished from objective cognition is independent and absolutely unconditioned by external stimuli, the existence of consciousness in the embryonic stage is not barred out."[4]

It is, thus, evident from the above discussion that inspite of holding the doctrines of momentariness and of no-soul, the law of rebirth can be maintained in the Buddhist system on the basis of the continuity of consciousness or of the five *skandhas* (*vijñāna-santati* or *skandha-santati*), which can be transferred from one body to the other under causal-relationship.

5. 6. DESIRE, RECOLLECTION AND RECOGNITION IN ANĀTMAVĀDA :

The Mīmāṁsakas and other Ātmavādī systems of Indian philosophy have tried to establish the exist ence of a perma-

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1. cf. गत्यागती न दृष्टे चेदिन्द्रियाणामपाटवात् ।
— — — — — — —
— — — —नादृष्टंनासदेव वा ॥ PV, 1.84-85

2. cf. कललादिषु विज्ञानमस्तीत्येतच्च साहसम् ।
असञ्जातेन्द्रियत्वाद्धि न तत्रार्थोऽवगम्यते ॥
Śl. Vār., Ātma. Kā. 75.

3. कललादिषु विज्ञानमस्तीत्येतन्न साहसम् ।
असञ्जातेन्द्रियत्वेऽपि ज्ञानं तत्र न किं भवेत् ॥ TS, Kā. 1919
रूपमर्थंगतेरन्यदप्यस्य व्यवसीयते ।
मूर्च्छादावपि तेनास्य सद्भाव उपपद्यते ॥ TS, Kā. 1921.

4. BPUF, p. 230.

nent entity—'the soul' on the basis of some psychical facts, such as, desire, recollection, recognition, etc. The Mīmāṁsakas argue that desire for an object does appear in a person who has already cognised the object on some previous day and this fact establishes the identity between the cognising entity and the desiring entity. Similar is the case with recollection and recognition, which also presuppose past perception and prove the continuity and identity of the agent. Only consciousness cannot serve the purpose, inasmuch as it, being momentary, would disappear in the next moment and hence the identity of the agent would not be maintained. If, on the other hand, a cogniser, different from consciousness, is assumed, which is of permanent nature, the identity of agent would be established. Thus, the phenomenon of desire etc. proves the existence of a permanent entity—'the soul.'[1]

But the Buddhists do not agree with the above view. They contend that existence of 'soul' cannot be accepted as it is not based on sound proofs. In fact no other entity except consciousness is ever known, and the entity, which is never experienced, should be regarded as non-existent like a hare's horn.[1] As far as the position of desire etc., is concerned, that is not impossible in the Buddhist system. Kumārila has pointed out that according to the Buddhists, desire etc. can be maintained on the basis of impressions (*vāsanāḥ*) belonging to the same series of consciousness, no matter if the conscious-moments differ from one another.[2] This very view has also been explained by Pārthasārathi Miśra.[3]

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[1] cf. (i) भवति चान्येद्युरुपलब्धेऽन्येद्युरिच्छा । येन उपलम्भनेन समानकर्तृका सेत्यवगच्छामः । यदि विज्ञानमात्रमेवेदमुपलम्भकमभविष्यत्, प्रत्यस्ते तस्मिन्कस्यापरेद्युरिच्छाभविष्यत् । अथ तु विज्ञानादन्यो विज्ञाता नित्यस्तत एकस्मिन्नहनि य एवोपलब्धाऽपरेद्युरपि स एवेषिष्यतीति । इतरथा हीच्छा नोपपन्ना स्यात् ।……स्मृतिरपीच्छावत्पूर्वज्ञानसदृशं विज्ञानं पूर्वविज्ञानविषयं वा स्मृतिरित्युच्यते ।

ŚBh, p. 63-65.

(ii) ………तुल्यन्यायेच्छया स्मृतिः ।
उभयं न ह्यदृष्टेऽर्थे………॥

Śl. Vār., Ātma, Kā 103.

(iii) ननु ज्ञानस्य क्षणिकत्वात् कथं पूर्वेद्युरुपलब्धेः स्मरणमिच्छा प्रत्यभिज्ञा च । न हि स्वयमुपलब्धे तानि सम्भवन्ति—न हि देवदत्तेनोपलब्धेऽर्थे यज्ञदत्तस्य स्मरणादीनि सम्भवन्ति ।

ŚD, p. 120-121.

Thus, desire, recollection, etc. can be maintained in the Buddhist system on the basis of impressions (*vāsanāḥ*). The consious-moments tinged with the impressions (*vāsanāḥ*) are produced one after the other under causal-relationship, but it is necessary that the moments should belong to one and the some series of consciousness. The idea of causal-relationship, though not mentioned by Kumārila in clear words, can be inferred from his reference to impressions. Nyāya-vārttikakāra, Uddyotakara has also mentioned it clearly with reference to recollection etc.[4] and it has been explained by Kamalaśīla thus :

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1. अनुपपन्नमिति नः क्व संप्रत्ययः । यन्न प्रमाणेनावगतम् । विज्ञानात्तावदन्यं नोपलभामहे । यन्नोपलभामहे तच्छशविषाणवदेव नास्तीत्यवगच्छामः ।
ŚBh, p. 64

2. cf. (i) भेदेन किमुपन्यस्ता तुल्यन्यायेच्छया स्मृतिः ।
उभयं न ह्यदृष्टेऽर्थे वासनातश्च सिध्यति ॥
तत्रापि तु समानायां सन्ततौ वासना यतः ।
तस्मात् सत्यपि भिन्नत्वे स्मरणं व्यवतिष्ठते ॥
स्मरणप्रत्यभिज्ञाने भवेतां वासनावशात् ।
Śl. Vār., Ātma, Kās. 103, 106 & 109ab.
(ii) एकसन्तानसम्बन्धात् प्रत्यभिज्ञानकल्पना
Śl. Vār., Śabda-nityatā, Kā. 441 ab.

3. cf. ŚD, p. 121.

4. कार्यकारणभावादेव, यत्कायचित्तसन्ताने स्मृतिरनुभवोत्पद्यते सः कायचित्तसन्तानः स्मर्ता चानुभविता च भवति ।
NV, p. 66 (Ch. SS.).

> "Recollection etc. can occur only in the same series of consciousness in which the seed of remembrance etc. has been laid down. They cannot be produced in any other series of consciousness due to the restriction of causal relationship."[1]

It can, thus, be concluded in the words of Dr. Satkari Mookerjee "Memory, therefore, is not impossible of explanation in the theory of flux and recognition, enquiry and such like psychical phenomena . ..., are likewise explicable in the light of causality."[2]

5.7. CONCLUSION :

From the above account, we come to the following conclusions :

(i) There are two viewpoints in Indian philosophy: The first one believes in the existence of a permanent entity—the soul, while the other is the advocate of the no-soul theory.[3]

(ii) The Buddhists, being the advocate of no-soul theory, have refuted the soul theory on several grounds.[4]

(iii) Meaning of *Nairātmyavāda* or *Anātmavāda* is : there is no existence of soul in its eternal sense. The socalled individuality is nothing but a combination of the five *skandhas*. According to the Vijñānavādī Buddhist, consciousness is the only reality, which is a beginningless and neverending continuum. Feeling of self (*ātmabhāvanā*) is the main cause of bondage, hence it should be subverted.[5]

(iv) *Karma-phala-vyavasthā* (Law of action and its result) is maintained by the Buddhists through the oneness of series of the five *skandhas* or of consciousness. The series is formed of

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1. यत्र सन्ताने······स्मृत्यादिवीजमाहितं तत्रैव स्मरणादयः समुत्पद्यन्ते, नान्यत्र, प्रतिनियतत्वात् कार्यकारणभावस्येति । TPS, p. 229.
2. BPUF, p. 84, line 21-25.
3. supra 5.1.
4. supra 5.2.
5. supra 5.3.

different moments, related with each other through causal-relationship.

(v) The Buddhists also accept the law of rebirth (*punarjanma-vyavasthā)* on the basis of the continuity of consciousness or of the five *skandhas* which can be transferred from one body to the other under causal-relationship. Some Buddhists have assumed an intermediate-astral-body (*antarābhava-deha*) in between the period of death and rebirth.[2]

(vi) The psychical facts such as desire, recollection, etc. are possible in the Buddhist system through the impressions (*vāsanāḥ*) belonging to one and the same series of consciousness The different conscious-moments of the same series are related with each other under causal relationship.[3]

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1. supra 5.4.
2. supra 5.5.
3. supra 5.6.

CHAPTER VI

THE DOCTRINE OF THE NON-EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL WORLD (*Bāhyārthabhaṅgavāda*)

6.1. REALISM VERSUS IDEALISM :

The first and foremost problem before every philosophical system is, 'what is the ultimate reality in the universe' ? Broadly speaking, there are two main categories in this regard, the Realism and the Idealism. According to Realism, the external world is real and it exists in its material form, independent of our experience, while according to Idealism, the external world, as such, does not exist independently of our knowledge, the objects of our experience are mind-dependent.[1] Baldwin in his 'Dictionary of Philosophy', speaking of Realism says : 'The realist is one who considers that in sense-perception, we have assurance of the presence of a reality, distinct from the modification of the perceiving mind and existing independently of our perception."[2] The same authority defines Idealism thus : "In metaphysics, any theory which maintains the universe to be throughout the work and embodiment of reason and mind, In epistemology, the view, which holds, in opposition to Realism—that the reality of the external world is the perceptibility".[3]

Apart from these two broad divisions there are various sub-divisions which approach to the problem in different manners. Among the Indian systems, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika,

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1. cf. D.N. Shastri, CIR, p. 39.
2. Dictionary of Philosophy & Psychology, p. 502, col. 2.
3. Ibid., p. 500, col. 2.

the two Pūrvamīmāṁsā schools, the Sāṁkhya, the Jaina and the Vaibhāṣika school of Buddhists represent the realistic approach. The Cārvākas believe in Materialism, which, in fact, is a branch of Realism, as it holds the reality of external things.[1] The Sautrāntika school of Buddhists is the upholder of the theory of Representationism,[2] which, too, is considered to be a branch of Realism.[3]

Idealism has several branches, such as, Subjective Idealism, Objective Idealism, Absolute Idealism, Transcendental Idealism and so on.[4] Among them, the Subjective Idealism is represented in India by the Yogācāra Buddhists,[5] while the Mādhyamika Buddhists have been regarded as the Transcendental of the Critical Idealists.[6] Here we are mainly concerned with the Idealism of the Buddhist schools, as they are the chief opponents of Kumārila.

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1. cf. CIR, p. 46, lines 4-6.
2. According to the theory of Representationism, the external objects are real, but their existence can be inferred only through their cognitions, which acquire the forms of the objects and thus become their representatives, cf. IR, p. 35.
3. cf. CIR, p. 41.
4. All these branches of Idealism have been defined and discussed by different authors of philosophy, but it is not very desirable here to explain them in detail. For details see the following books :
    - (i) D.N. Shastri, CIR
    - (ii) J.N. Sinha, Indian Realism
    - (iii) S.N. Dasgupta, Indian Idealism
    - (iv) P.T. Raju, Idealistic Thought of India
    - (v) Nagin, J. Shah, ACDP
    - (vi) T.R.V. Murti, CPB
5. J.N. Sinha, IR, p. 1.
6. T.R.V. Murti, CPB, p. 318.

6. 2. IDEALISM OF THE BUDDHIST SCHOOLS :

Among the four schools of the Buddhist philosophy, the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika represent the realistic approach; while the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra represent the idealistic outlook.

As mentioned above, the Mādhyamika has been regarded as the transcendental or critical Idealist who "accepts the empirical reality of things (object and the knowing subject) with their transcendental or ultimate unreality."[1] Dialectic is the chief characteristic of the Mādhyamika system. Through its dialectical method, it shows that 'everything is relative, conditioned and dependently-originated; everything is *niḥsvabhāva* i.e. without any particular nature of its own.[2] *Śūnyatā* is the ultimate reality, but it does not mean '*abhāva*' or non-existence, as has been generally mistaken.[3] The real, in fact, is transcendent to thought ;[4] it cannot be conceived in terms of the empirical, that is why it has been called as '*Śunya*'. The "no-doctrine about reality" attitude of the Mādhyamika is mistaken for the "no-reality" doctrine.[5]

The Yogācāra, on the other hand, is the upholder of Subjective Idealism. "A content is said to be subjective, when it is merely in thought and has no grounding in external reality."[6] Subjective Idealism, hence, is that philosophical theory, according to which there is no objective world independent of the preceiving mind.[7] The Yogācāra holds that cognition alone is transcendentally real and the external world is unreal.[8] The external world is projected and created out of the cognition itself. It is to be noted that the Yogācāras give a definite name—*Vijñāna* (consciousness) to the Absolute Reality, while the Mādhyamikas do not. According to them the Ultimate or the Absolute is inaccessible to thought and reason.

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[1] T.R.V. Murti, CPB, p. 318.

[2] cf. सर्वस्य हि प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नस्य पदार्थस्य निःस्वभावता पारमर्थिकं रूपम् BCAP, p. 171, line 25.

[3] MK, XXIV, 7; MKV, pp. 491, 499 and also cf. CPB, p. 234.

[4] cf. यज्ज्ञानान्न प्रवर्तेत तद्धि तत्त्वस्य लक्षणम् । MVTS, 3.5 ab.

[5] T.R.V. Murti, CPB, p. 313.

[6] A.K. Chatterjee, YI, p. 1.

[7] D.N. Shastri, CIR, p. 42.

[8] cf. विज्ञप्तिमात्रमेवैतदसदर्थावभासनात् Viṁśatikā, Kā. 1 in VMS.

The Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra theories have been represented and refuted by many non-Buddhist philosophers like Śabara-svāmin,[1] Uddyotakara,[2], Kumārila,[3] Śaṅkara,[4] Jayanta Bhaṭṭa,[5] Vācaspati Miśra,[6] Prabhā-candra[7] etc. In the Śloka-vārttika of Kumārila, doctrine of the non-existence of external world of the Buddhist idealists has been presented and repudiated in two sections—Nirālambanavāda and Śūnyavāda. The title 'Śūnyavāda' appears to be referring to the Mādhyamika theory of Śūnya, but, in fact, it refutes only the Yogācāra theory of *bāhyārtha-śūnya* instead of *vijñāna-śūnya* of the Mādhyamikas. This fact is explicitly clear from the commentaries of Prabhākara[8] and Kumārila,[9] on Śābara-bhāṣya.[10] It is, however, true that the Mādhyamika view has

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1. ŚBh, 2.1.5, pp. 28-35 (Ānandāśrama series).
2. NV, pp. 519-25 (Ch. SS.).
3. Śl. Vār., Nirālambana and Śūnya.
4. BSŚBh, 2.2-28.
5. NM, Pt. II, pp. 103-7.
6. NVTṬ, pp. 653-64, Bhāmatī, pp. 541ff.
7. PKM, p. 77-94.
8. ननु शून्यस्तु इति सैव निरालम्बंनतोपन्यस्ता प्रत्ययस्यार्थशून्यतां वदतां
   Bṛhati p. 74.
9. ज्ञानप्रवृत्त्यशक्त्या तु परः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते ॥
   × × × ×
   प्रवर्तितुं हि किं शक्तं स्तम्भाद्यर्थे बहिः स्थिते ।
   अथवाऽऽत्मांश एवैतद् ग्राह्ये क्षीणे न वस्तुनि ॥
   Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kās. 1, 3.
10. cf. G.N. Jhā, PMS, p. 55; Eng. trans. of ŚBh, p. 13.

indirectly been refuted in these sections, as has been clearly expressed by Kumārila in the concluding verse of the Śūnyavāda section.[1] In the beginning of the Nirālambanavāda also Kumārila referring to the Yogācāra and Mādhyamika theories, says: "Among the Buddhists, the Yogācāras maintain that the cognition exists without any corresponding object in the external world, while the Mādhyamikas wish to establish the non-existence not only of the external world, but also of the cognition. The non-existence of external world is, thus, common to both the schools, because the Mādhyamikas' denial of the existence of cognition is based upon his denial of the external objects. Hence an attempt has been made by the Bhāṣyakāra Śabara-svāmin to examine the reality or unreality of the external world."[2] It is, thus, obvious that alongwith the refutation of the Yogācāras, the refutation of the Mādhyamikas has been undertaken only indirectly.

6. 3. KINDS OF REALITY ACCORDING TO THE IDEALIST BUDDHISTS:

Refuting the Realists' view regarding the external reality, the Buddhist, as shown by Kumārila, says:

> "When, even in the existence of cognition alone, all this external world can be assumed through Pheno-

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[1] (i) इति बहिर्विषयप्रतिपादनान्नदभावकृता मतिसंवृतिः ।
Śl. Vār, Śūnya. Kā. 263 ab. (Madras edition).
(ii) सिद्धे बाह्यार्थे यन्मध्यमिति माध्यमिकैरुक्तम्, अर्थाभावादेव ज्ञानमपि नास्तीति तदपि मूलनिरासादेव निरस्तमिति ।
NR, p. 245.

[2] cf. तत्राऽर्थशून्यं विज्ञानं योगाचाराः समाश्रिताः ।
तस्याप्यभावमिच्छन्ति ये माध्यमिकवादिनः ॥
तत्र बाह्यार्थशून्यत्वं तुल्यं तावद् द्वयोरपि ।
निवृत्त्याऽस्य ततो ज्ञाने तद्वत्संवृतिकल्पना ॥
तस्मात्साधारणत्वेन तन्मूलत्वेन नाप्ययम् ।
बाह्यार्थसदसद् भावे यत्नो भाष्यकृता कृतः ॥
Śl. Vār., Nirālambana, Kās. 14, 15, 16.

> menal Reality, why do you (the Realist), uselessly insist upon the assumption of external objects?"[1]

This refutation by the Buddhist refers to their two kinds of Reality the Transcendental Reality (*paramārtha-satya*) and the Phenomenal Reality (*saṁvṛti-satya*). Commenting upon it, Pārthasārathi also quotes a verse from Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika-Kārikā as : "The teachings of Buddha regarding *dharma* are based upon the two kinds of Reality, the Reality which is true only phenomenally . and the Reality which is true in its transcendental or ultimate sense."[2]

The supermost thing is the *paramārtha-satya* which, being free from all extraneous effects, remains in its natural form.[3] The Absolute Reality is beyond all empirical endeavours, distinctions, origination and destruction. It is inexpressable, unnamable, and unknowable.[4] *Saṁvṛti-satya*, on the other hand, is that which appears due to ignorance. Ignorance i.e *saṁvṛti* covers up the real nature of things and makes them appear otherwise.[5] There is nothing real in the *saṁvṛti-satya* from the transcendental point of view.

These two kinds of Reality have been regarded as the vital force of Mādhyamika system The Yogācāras, on the other hand, have accepted three kinds of Reality, namely

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[1] यदा संवृतिसत्येन सर्वमेतत प्रकल्प्यते ।
ज्ञानमात्रेऽपि कस्माद्वो वृथाऽऽग्रहोऽर्थकल्पने ॥
Śl. Vār., Nirālambana, Kā. 5.

[2] द्वे सत्ये समुपाश्रित्य वुद्धानां धर्मदेशना ।
लोके संवृतिसत्यं च सत्यं च परामार्थतः ॥
MK, XXIV,1, as quoted in BCAP, p. 175; NR, p. 218.

[3] cf परमार्थः अकृत्रिमं वस्तुरूपम् BCAP., p. 171.

[4] cf. परमार्थसत्यं सर्वव्यवहारसमतिक्रान्तं निर्विशेषम् असमुत्पन्नम् अनिरुद्धम् अभिधेयाभिधानज्ञेयज्ञानविगतम् ।
Quoted in BCAP, p. 366.

[5] cf. संव्रियते आव्रियते यथाभूतपरिज्ञानं स्वभावावरणादावृतप्रकाशनाच्च अनयेति संवृतिः । BCAP, p. 170

pariniṣpanna, *paratantra* and *parikalpita*.[1] Among them, the first two are just the equivalent of the two kinds, accepted by the Mādhyamikas. *Parikalpita.satya*, however, is not recognised separately by the Mādhyamikas, although it has been submerged by them in the two kinds of *saṁvṛti-satya*.[2]

A point is to be noted in this regard that Kumārila has intermixed the views of the two Buddhist systems. In the kārikā, mentioned above,[3] he has referred to only two kinds of Reality—the transcendental and the phenomenal ones and apparently this distinction belongs to the Mādhyamikas. But from the word *jñāna-mātre api* it is evident that the view of the Yogācāras is being referred to. Hence it can be assumed that this presentation by Kumārila regarding reality is a mixture of the views of two Buddhist schools—the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra.

6. 4. EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL WORLD IS NOT PROVED BY COGNITION :

The Realists accept the reality of the external world. They try to prove its existence with the help of cognition and experience. But the Yogācāra Buddhist, refuting their view, has emphatically denied the existence of external world. He argues that our cognition is not able to apprehend the external world.[1] He undertakes an examination, whether cognition at the time of perception, apprehends the form of the external object or it is exhausted in apprehending its own form.[2] He discusses the problem in the following way :

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[1] कल्पित: परतन्त्रश्च परिनिष्पन्न एव च ।
त्रय: स्वभावा घीराणां गम्भीरज्ञेयमिष्यते ।।
Trisvabhāvanirdeśa, Kā. 1.

[2] (i) सा च संवृतिर्द्विधा लोकत एव, तथ्यसंवृतिर्मिथ्यासंवृतिश्चेति ।
BCAP. p. 171.

(ii) विनोपघातेन यदिन्द्रियाणां
षण्णामपि ग्राह्यमवैति लोक: ।
सत्यं हि तल्लोकत एव शेषं
विकल्पितं लोकत एव मिथ्या ।।
MA, 6.25 as quoted in BCAP, p. 171,

[3] Supra, p. 160 fn. 1.

(i) *The Cognition and the cognised are Identical* :

It is a well-known fact, realised by every body, that at the time of cognition, there appears only one form like blue, yellow, etc. or of extensiveness etc., which is the object (*viṣaya*) of cognition,[3] and hence it cannot be established, on the basis of diversity of forms, that there exist two separate entities—the cognition and the cognised (*jñāna* and *jñeya*), nor can it be apprehended clearly whether the form belongs to the cognition or to the object (i.e. *bāhyārtha*).[4] If it is accepted that the form belongs to the cognition, then the power of cognition would be exhausted in cognising its own form and there would be no question of the existence of external world.[5] If, on the other hand, it is posited that the form belongs to the external object, the existence of the external object would have to be accepted due to its cognisibility while the existence of its cognition has already been proved.[1] Explaining this, Pārthasārathi says that the existence of cognition is to be admitted as the cognising entity of the object, because the object, being inanimate, is unable to grasp itself.[2] Between the two alternatives, the first one is accepted by the Yogācāra Buddhist, inasmuch as only one entity having form has been experienced by all, not two.[3]

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[1] cf. (i) ज्ञानप्रवृत्त्यशक्त्या तु परः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते ।

Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā 1.

(ii) प्रत्यक्षस्य बाह्येऽर्थे प्रवर्तितुं शक्तिर्नास्तीति । SVTṬ., p. 239.

[2] cf. प्रवर्तितुं हि किं शक्तं स्तम्भाद्यर्थे वहिः स्थिते ।
अथवात्मांश एवैतद् ग्राह्ये क्षीणे न वस्तुनि ॥

Śl. Var., Śunya, Kā 3

[3] तत्र तावदिदं सिद्धं सर्वप्राणभृतामपि ।
ग्राह्यत्वं नीलपीतादिदीर्घाद्याकारवस्तुनः ॥

Ibid., Kā. 5.

[4] cf. न चाऽप्याकारभेदेन ज्ञानज्ञेयाऽवधारणा ।
न चाऽन्यतरधर्मत्वं विस्पष्टं तत्र गृह्यते ॥

Ibld., Kā. 6.

[5] cf. अतः परीक्षमाणानां ज्ञानमाकारवद्यदि ।
तन्मात्रे च प्रभा क्षीणा ततो नास्त्यर्थकल्पना ॥

Ibid., Kā. 8.

Moreover, the assumption that the cognition possesses form, is more desirable than the assumption that the external object possesses form, because the former is to be accepted by both the parties i.e. by the Idealist as well as by the Realist. The Realist, even after the assumption of the external object, has to accept the existence of cognition possessing form,[4] because if cognition has not been endowed with form, it would not be able to apprehend the external objects.[5] Pārthasārathi says, if the forms like blue etc. are not assumed in the cognition, the apprehension of the object in the form, 'this is blue, this is yellow, etc.' would not be possible, because in that case, the cognition would remain as one and the same at all times.[6]

Besides, if it is assumed that form belongs to the external object and the cognition remains without any form, there would be a sense of remoteness between the object and its cognition,[1] while in the Yogācāra's theory, the form like blue etc., being in close proximity and relationship with the cognition, would be easily apprehensible (*grāhya*).[2]

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[1] cf. यदि वाऽऽकारवत्ता स्याद्बाह्यस्यैवेह वस्तुनः ।
तदस्ति गृह्यमाणत्वात्तत्सिद्धैवाऽस्ति धीरपि ॥
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 9.

[2] अथ तु बाह्यस्यैवाऽयमाकारवत्तया प्रकाशस्तावत्प्रकाशमानत्वादस्ति, तस्य च जडत्वेन पराधीनप्रकाशत्वात्तत्प्रकाशोपपत्तये ज्ञानमपि कल्पयितव्यमिति सिध्यति द्वैतम् । NR., p. 270.

[3] cf. किं तावदत्र युक्तं स्याज्ज्ञानमाकारवत्कुतः ।
एकमाकारवद्वस्तु-ग्राह्यमित्यध्यगीष्महि ॥
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā., 10.

[4] cf. तस्मादुभयसिद्धत्वाज् ज्ञानस्याऽऽकारकल्पना ।
ज्यायसी भवतस्त्वर्थं कल्पयित्वा भवेदियम् ॥ Ibid., Kā. 19.

[5] cf. तदसिद्धावशक्तत्वात् । Ibid., Kā. 20a.

[6] NR on the above, pp. 273-74.

Showing the discrepancy in the assumption of two entities, the Yogācāra Buddhist further argues: if it is accepted that the form belongs to the external object, its cognisibility would not be possible without any cognising entity and therefore, a separate cognising entity (the cognition) would have to be admitted.[3] In that case, the cognition would have to be postulated without any form, as the object-to-be-cognised (i.e. *grāhya*) has already been accepted having form. But this assumption is not tenable as there is no proof in the existence of a formless cognition. The Yogācāra,[4] thus, establishes that the existence of only one entity—the cognition having form—should be admitted.

If, somehow, the Realist also accepts the existence of only one entity in the form of the external object and attributes the cognising ability (*grāhakatā*) to the same, the difference between the Realist and the Idealist would remain only the names; because in that case, both would be establishing the identity of the cognised and the cogniser (*grāhya* and *grāhaka*), and this is what the Yogācāra Buddhist wishes to establish.[1] If the Realist objects that the thing is external and the cognition is internal, hence, the difference between the two remains as it is,[2] the Yogācāra's reply would be : "The assumption of externality or of internality is totally groundless, because any such distinction is false with regard to a single entity.[3]

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[1] cf. (i) तेनैवं विप्रकृष्टता । Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 20b.
(ii) NR on the above, p. 274.

[2] cf. प्रत्यासन्नं च संबद्धं ग्राह्यं मम भविष्यति ।
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 20 cd.

[3] cf. तद्यद्याकारवानर्थो बाह्यः कल्प्येत तस्य च ।
ग्राह्यत्वमन्यथा न स्यादिति ग्राहककल्पना ॥
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 11.

[4] cf. तेनाकारवतः क्लृप्ताद् ग्राह्यादाकारवर्जितम् ।
वस्त्वन्तरं प्रकल्प्यं स्याद् ग्राहकं निष्प्रमाणकम् ॥
Ibid., Kā. 12

Thus, by establishing the identity of the cognition and the cognised, the Yogācāra has proved that the power of cognition in apprehending its own form, hence it is not able to apprehend the external world.

The above presentation of the Buddhist view by Kumārila must have been expressed somewhere in Dinnāga's works, which are not totally extant to us in Sanskrit. Dharmakīrti has also expressed some similar ideas in his Pramāṇa-viniścaya and Pramāṇa-vārttika. According to him, the object blue and its cognition are identical with each other, because they are always apprehended at one and the same time under a definite rule. They seem to be distinct only due to illusion, just as the moon seems to be having two forms due to the misconception.[4]

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[1] cf. तस्याऽकल्पनमिच्छंश्चेदर्थे ग्राहकतां वदेः ।
संज्ञामात्रे विसंवादः सिद्धा त्वेकार्थकल्पना ॥
ग्राह्यग्राहकयोरैक्यं सर्वथा प्रतिपाद्यते ।
Śl. Vār., Śūnya., Kās. 13 and 14ab.

[2] cf. नन्वर्थो बाह्यः, विज्ञानं त्वान्तरं क्षणिकं, तत्कथं न वस्तुनि विशेषः ।
NR, p. 271.

[3] cf. (i) बाह्याभ्यन्तररूपश्च परिकल्प्यो मृषेष्यते ॥
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 14 cd.
(ii) एकमपेक्ष्येतरद् बाह्यं, तदपेक्ष्य चाऽन्यदान्तरम्, अद्वितीये तु वस्तुनि मृषैवाऽयं विभागः ।
NR, p. 271.

[4] cf. (i) सहोपलम्भनियमादभेदो नीलतद्धियोः ।
भेदश्च भ्रान्तिविज्ञानैर्दृश्येतेन्दाविवाद्वये ॥
Cited in Bhāmatī, p. 544.

(ii) *Cognition is Self-luminous* :

According to the Yogācāra Buddhist, cognition is self-luminous. It requires no other cognition to reveal itself. To prove the self-luminosity of cognition, the Yogācāra argues as follows :

The Realist also holds that the external object, being of non-luminous nature, depends upon the cognition for its own illuminations.[1] So long as the cognition has not been apprehended, it cannot illumine the external object, inasmuch as the illumination of the object depends upon the illumination of cognition, just as the illumination of a jar depends upon the illumination of the lamp.[2] Dharmakīrti also asserts that until the cognition has been apprehended, the object would not be cognised.[3]

(ii) सहोपलम्भनियमादभेदो नीलतद्धियोः ।
P. Vini, chap. I, as mentioned in TSP, p. 691
Also see SVTṬ., p. 239-40.

(iii) सकृत् संवेद्यमानस्य नियमेन धिया सह ।
विषयस्य ततोऽन्यत्वं केनाकारेण सिध्यति ।।
भेदश्च भ्रान्तविज्ञानैर्दृश्येतेन्दाविवद्वये ।
PV, Pratyakṣa, Kās. 388, 389ab.

[1] cf. इतश्चाऽऽकारवज्ज्ञानं यस्मात्तद्धः प्रकाशकम् ।
स्वयं प्रकाशहीनस्य बाह्यस्योपायसम्मतम् ।।
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 21.

[2] cf. (i) न चाऽगृहीते ज्ञानाख्ये प्रकाश्योऽर्थोऽवधार्यते ।
तदधीनप्रकाशत्वाद् दीपाऽऽभासे यथा घटः ।। Ibid., Kā. 22.
(ii) न ह्यगृहीतं प्रकाशकं प्रकाश्यं प्रकाशयति दीपप्रभावदिति ।
NR, p. 276.

[3] cf. (i) अप्रत्यक्षोपलम्भस्य नार्थदृष्टिः प्रसिध्यतीति ।
Citen in NR, p. 276, Bhāmatī, p. 67, TSP, p. 705.
(ii) इत्यर्थस्य धियः सिद्धिः नार्थात् तस्याः कथञ्चन ।'
तदप्रसिद्धावर्थस्य स्वयमेवाप्रसिद्धितः ।।
PV, Pratyakṣa, Kā. 475-76.

Self-luminosity of cognition is established from this fact also that the object, even when it is produced, cannot be apprehended so long as there is the absence of light or there is any hindrance, say a wall, present in the way.[1] But in case of cognition, it is apprehensible as soon as it is originated. Neither it is devoid of self-luminosity, nor is there any impediment in its way, on account of which it may not be apprehended.[2] It is always produced and grasped by itself before the apprehension of the object, because if it is assumed that it is not apprehensible at the time of its origination, it would never be apprehended even afterwards.[3] And in the absence of its own apprehension, the apprehension of the object would never be possible as has already been mentioned.

Refuting the Mīmāṁsaka's view of cognisedness (*jñātatā*) or manifestedness (*prakaṭatā*), the Yogācāra further contends that cognition, being of self-luminous nature, does not require the origination of any other cognition for its own illumination. If it is held that the apprehension of previous cognition depends upon the latter one, there would occur *regressus ad infinitum.*[4]

It is, thus, established by the Yogācāra Buddhist that cognition is self-luminous and illumines its own form.

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1. cf. उत्पन्नेष्वपि चाऽर्थेषु प्रकाशाऽभावतः क्वचित् ।
प्रतिबन्धकयोगाद्वा संवित्तिर्नोपजायते ॥
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā 23.

2. cf. ज्ञानस्योत्पद्यमानस्य प्रतिबन्धो न कश्चन ।
न चाऽप्रकाशरूपत्वं येनास्याग्रहणं भवेत् ॥
Ibid., Kā. 24.

3. cf. प्राक् चाऽर्थग्रहणादिष्टा तस्योत्पत्तिस्तदैव च ।
संवेदनं भवेदस्य न चेत् कालान्तरेऽपि न ॥
किं हि तस्य भवेदूर्ध्वं प्राक् च नासीन्न येन तद् ।
पूर्वं गृहीतं पश्चाच्च गृहीतमिति भाष्यते ॥ Ibid., Kās. 25, 26.

4. cf. ज्ञानान्तरस्य चोत्पत्ति प्रकाशो न प्रतीक्षते ।
तस्य तस्यापि चाऽन्येन संवित्तावस्थितिर्भवेत् ॥ Ibid., Kā. 27.

(iii) *Recollection etc. Proves That Form Belongs to the Cognition* :

The Yogācāra Buddhist further argues : "The fact that apprehension of an object is always preceded by cognition and that the form belongs only to the cognition, is proved through the recollection of our past experiences too. When one perceives an object directly and recollects it afterwards or transfers its knowledge to somebody else through words, a mental image of the object, experienced previously, arises in his mind, although the object is not externally present at this very moment. How could it be possible, if cognition had not appeared with the form of the object and if, in the past, the object had not been apprehended as preceded by the cognition".[1]

The Vijñānavādin further points out that even in case of the cognition, being experienced just as present, people are found saying : 'this object is blue, because the cognition with regard to this object, is appearing in the form of blue.'[2] This assertion also proves that cognitions can apprehend their objects, only if they themselves have already been apprehended; and cognitions can never be apprehended; if they are regarded as devoid of any form.[3] Therefore, it must be admitted that cognitions possess forms and that they are apprehended before the apprehension of the objects.

(iv) *Some Other Arguments Showing That Form Belongs to the Cognition* :

(a) The Yogācāra further points out : Because of the absence of any discriminative notion regarding two forms and also because of the apprehension of some thing having form, it follows that it is only cognition which is apprehended with form.[1] The assumption that originally cognition is formless, and it appears with form only when the object is apprehended, is not at all tenable, inasmuch as an assertion about the distinction of form can be made only after having a distinct knowledge about it.[2] If it is urged that the object is apprehended before the apprehension of the cognition and hence the form belongs to the object, it also is not plausible, because it has already been proved that apprehension of the object can never take place before the apprehension of the cognition.[3] It, thus, seems to be appropriate to assume that the form, apprehended at the time of preception, belongs to the cognition alone.

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[1] cf. ज्ञानपृष्टेन योप्यूर्ध्वंमर्थाऽभावेऽपि दृश्यते ।
परामर्शोऽर्थरूपस्य स कथं वोपपद्यते ।।
तद्रूपमर्थमालिख्य यदि धीर्प्रोपजायते ।
भूतकाले च यद्यर्थस्तत्पूर्वं नोवलक्षितः ।।
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kās. 28-29.

[2] cf. वक्तारश्चाऽपि दृश्यन्ते वर्त्तमानाऽर्थबुद्धिषु ।
नीलोऽर्थोऽयं यतो मेऽत्र तद्रूपा जायते मतिः ।। Ibid., Kā. 30.

[3] cf. तस्मात् पूर्वंगृहीतासु बुद्धिष्वर्थोपलम्भनम् ।
न चोपलब्धिरस्तीह निराकारासु बुद्धिषु ।। Ibid., Kā. 31.

(b) Through the method of logical agreement (*anvaya*) and logical difference (*vyatireka*), it appears that form belongs to the cognition alone, because in the absence of cognition, form, belonging to the external object, has never been preceived, while in the absence of any external object, there are instances in the existence of form being related to the cognition, just as we find in case of recollection and dream-cognitions etc.[4] It can, therefore, be assumed that form arises in the pure cognition only through the contact with the past impressions (*vāsanāḥ*) and not through the contact with the external objects.[1]

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[1] cf. विबेकबुद्ध्यभावाच्च साकारस्य च वर्शनात् ।
आकारवत्तया बोधो ज्ञानस्यैव प्रसज्यते ॥
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, 32.

[2] न ह्येवं कल्पनाशक्या निराकाराऽऽदितो मतिः ।
गृह्यतेऽर्थस्ततः पश्चात् साकारः संप्रतीयते ॥
आकारवत्त्वभेदो हि ज्ञात्वा शक्येत भाषितुम् ।
Ibid.. Kās. 33, 34 ab.

[3] cf. (i) प्राग्बुद्धिग्रहणादर्थे संवित्तिर्नेति साधितम् ॥ Ibid. 34cd.
(ii) यदि त्वगृहीतैव बुद्धिरर्थं गृह्णीयात् ततस्तस्या निराकारत्वमर्थस्यापि च साकारत्वं सिद्ध्येत्, न तु तदस्तीत्युक्तम् ॥
NR, p. 279.

[4] of. (i) अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामेव ज्ञानस्य गम्यते ।
आकारो, न हि बाह्यस्य ज्ञानाऽपेतो, निदर्श्यते ॥
बाह्यापेतो मया यद्वत् । Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kās. 53, 54a.

(c) Similarly, the misconceptions (*bhramajñāna* like that of two moons etc.) also prove the fact that the forms of cognition are not dependent upon the external object, but they are the creation of our own mind.[2]

(d) Further, the words *nakṣatram*, *tārakā* and *tiṣyaḥ* all signify only one object—'the star', but each of them belongs to different gender; similarly the word *dārāḥ*, which is always used in masculine plural, means 'a woman' which is feminine and is singular in number. Such uses of different genders and numbers for one and the same object show that form is not an attribute of external object. If the form would have belonged to the external object, how could it be possible to accommodate different numbers and genders in one and the same object. So, it is proper to assume that there is no extra-mental reality and form is the creation of our own mind.[3]

(ii) स्वप्नादावसत्यप्यर्थे ज्ञानान्वयादेवाऽऽकाराऽन्वयो दृश्यते, ज्ञानाभावे तु न क्वचिद्दृश्यते । NR, p. 284.

(iii) NM, Pt. II, p. 106, line 11-13.

[1] cf. (i) ————तस्मात् संसर्गवागियम् ।
निराकारोऽपि विज्ञाने वासनास्वेव युज्यते ॥
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 54.

(ii) NR, p. 284.

[2] cf. (i) तथा द्विचन्द्रमायादावन्यथाऽर्थे व्यवस्थिते ।
या स्यादाकारसंवित्तिर्नाऽसावर्थनिबन्धना ॥
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 57.

(ii) NR, p. 285.

[3] cf. (i) नक्षत्रं तारका तिष्यो दारा इत्येवमादिषु ।
नैकत्राऽर्थे विरुद्धत्वाल्लिङ्गाऽनेकत्वसम्भवः ॥
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 58.

(ii) NR, p. 285-86.

(iii) NM, Pt. II, p. 106, line 20-23.

(e) Further, one and the same object causes different feelings in different persons. The same body of a woman is looked upon by an ascetic as a disgusting corpse, by a licentious person as an object of enjoyment and by a carnivorous animal as an article of food, If the external object really exists and possesses one single form, all individuals should see and feel it in the same way. But the fact is not as such. Different persons regard an object in different manners and this fact proves that form does not really belong to the external object, it is caused by different impressions of mind alone.[1]

(f) Similarly, with regard to one and the same object, there are notions of its being long or short due to its relative position,[2] and in case of a jar, there are notions of its being a jar, an earthly object, a substance, a cognisable object and so on.[3] But these diverse ideas should not be possible simultaneously in different cognisers due to the oneness of the object, because contradictory forms cannot exist at one and the same time in one object.[4] According to the Yogācāras, diversity of forms is possible due to the diversity of cognitions, which are caused by different types of impressions or forces (*vāsanā or śakti*).[1]

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[1] cf. (i) परिव्राट्कामुकशुनां कुणपादिमतिस्तथा ।
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 59ab.
(ii) यच्चेदमेकस्यामेव प्रमदातनौ परिव्राजकादीनां कुणपं, कामिनी, भक्ष इति व्यवस्थितोपजनं विकल्पत्रयं तदपि न स्यात्, बाह्यार्थो यद्येकाकारः तथैव सर्वैः प्रत्येतव्यः, अथ त्र्याकारः, तत्र त्रयाणामपि विकल्पत्रयं स्यात्, तदवश्यमात्मीयवासनानिर्मितैषा विकल्पव्यवस्थाऽऽश्रयितव्या । NR., p. 286.
(iii) NM, Pt. II, p. 106, lind 21-22.

[2] cf. (i) दीर्घह्रस्वत्वबुद्धिश्च ह्येकस्मिन्नप्यपेक्षया ।
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 59 cd.
(i) NM, Pt. II, p. 106, line 24-25.

[3] cf. घटत्वाद् पार्थिवद्रव्यसंज्ञेयादिमतिस्तथा ।
Ibid., Kā. 60 ab.

[4] cf. युगपद्ग्राहकाणाञ्च न स्यादैकात्म्यवत्तया ।
नाऽर्थे ह्येकत्र युगपद्विरुद्धाकारसम्भवः ।
Ibid., Kās. 60cd. & 61 ab.

It is, thus, proved by the Yogācāras through various arguments that the form, which appears at the time of perception, belongs to the cognition itself and not to any external object. Power of cognition is exhausted in apprehending its own form and hence, is not able to apprehend to external world.

6. 5. REFUTATION OF THE ADVERSARIES : VIEWS REGARDING FORM :

A theorist can never feel satisfied unless and until he has refuted the views of his adversaries with sound arguments. The Yogācāra also, in order to establish his theory of non-existence of the external world, has to repudiate the views of all his adversaries. They attribute the form, being experienced at the time of perception, either to the external object, or to the both i.e. to the cognition as well as to the object, or to their contact alone.

The Sautrāntika Buddhist who regards the external world to be real, is one of the chief opponents of the Yogācāras. According to the Sautrāntika, although it is true that cognition is always apprehended with a form like blue etc., it does not mean that form is an attribute of cognition itself, because form originally belongs to the object and is apprehended as super-imposed upon the cognition.[2] Repudiating this view, Vijñānavādin argues : The idea that the form of the object is super-imposed upon the cognition, does not seem to be plausible, because the form of the object is able neither to enter into the internal entity 'the cognition', nor to leave its own place 'the object'.[1] Moreover, there is no proof in such an assumption that the form, which is being experienced alongwith the cognition, is an attribute of the object.[2]

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[1] cf. (i) प्रत्ययानां तु भिन्नत्वाद् भवेच्छक्त्यनुसारतः ।
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 61 cd.
(ii) NR on the above, p. 287.
(iii) NM, Pt. II, p. 106, line 25-26.

[2] केचिदाहुः सत्यं, नीलाकारतया ज्ञानं गृह्यते न त्वसावाकारस्तस्यैव, किं त्वर्थाकार एवायं ज्ञान* समारूढो दृश्यत इति । NR, p. 279.
*It should be read as 'ज्ञाने'

If the opponent urges that the form does not leave its object, but staying at its own place, it gives its reflection to the cognition just like mirror,[3] the Vijñānavādin repudiates that the idea of reflection cannot be admitted in the absence of any proof.[4] When one perceives water without any reflection of moon during the day and then perceives moon in the sky as well as in the water during the night, he then understands the fact that the moon is reflected in to the water.[5] But in case of cognition, neither has the cognition ever been perceived without the form, nor has any external object ever been cognised with form in the absence of cognition. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that the form of the object is reflected in formless cognition.[6] If, somehow, the reflection of visible objects in the cognition is accepted, how can the incorporeal objects like sounds, odours and tastes, etc. be reflected in cognition ? Besides, when the form is being experienced in the cognition, how can it be attributed to the object ?[1]

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[1] cf. न चाऽर्थाकार एवायं ज्ञानरूढः प्रतीयते ।
न हि सोऽन्तःप्रवेशाय पर्याप्तो नार्थहानये ॥
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 35.

[2] cf. (i) इत्थंभावे प्रमाणं च तस्य वक्तुं न शक्यते ।
Ibid., Kā. 36 ab.
(ii) ज्ञानधर्मतया च गृह्यमाणस्य निष्प्रमाणकमर्थधर्मत्वमित्याह इत्थमिति । NR, p. 279 .

[3] cf. मा नामाऽर्थं विहासीदर्थस्थस्यैव प्रतिबिम्बमिदं नीलरूपस्यादर्शसंकाशे ज्ञाने प्रकाशत इति । NR, p. 279.

[4] cf. तदीयप्रतिबिम्बत्वमेयस्तादेव नेष्यते ।
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 36 cd.

[5] cf. निश्चन्द्रे बिम्बरूपं हि दृष्टं येन दिवा जलम् ।
स रात्री खे च तं दृष्ट्वा जानाति प्रतिबिम्बताम् ॥
Ibid., Kā. 37.

[6] cf. विज्ञाने न कदाचित्तु प्राङ्निराकारदर्शनम् ।
बाह्ये वाऽऽकारवत्ताधीर्येनैवं कल्पना भवेत् ॥

The opponent may further argue that the form, which is an attribute of the object, seems to be related with the cognition due to misconception, caused by the close contact between the object and its cognition.[2] Refuting this view, the Vijñānavādin says that the object is external, while its cognition is internal ; hence there cannot be any mutual contact between the external object and the internal cognition, on account of which there might arise any non-discriminative notion (*avivekamatiḥ*) owing to misconception. That is, it cannot be said that the form of the object is mistakenly apprehended to be belonging to the cognition due to their close contact.[3]

Some other opponent may urge that the form belongs neither to the object nor to its cognition, it is an outcome of their mutual contact, just as reddishness comes out of the contact, of flour and turmeric.[4] But this view also is not tenable according to the Vijñānavādin, inasmuch as there can be no such contact. Firstly, the object is external and the cognition is internal ; secondly, a form cannot come forth from the contact of two incorporeal objects or from the contact of two objects—one corporeal and the other incorporeal.

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[1] cf. शब्दगन्धरसानां च कीदृशी प्रतिबिम्वता ।
ज्ञाने च गृह्यमाणस्य कथं स्यादर्थधर्मता ॥
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 39.

[2] cf. मा भूत्प्रतिविम्वं, ज्ञानार्थौ तु संसृष्टो संमोहादविविञ्चन्नर्थधर्ममेव नीलं ज्ञानेऽध्यवस्यतीति । NR., p. 280.

[3] cf. बाह्याभ्यन्तरदेशत्वान्न चाऽर्थज्ञानयोर्मिथः ।
सम्पर्कोऽस्ति यतो मोहादविवेकमतिर्भवेत् ॥
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 40.

[4] cf. केचित्त्वाहुः न ज्ञानधर्मो नीलादेः न चार्थस्य निराकरयोः संसृष्ट्योराकारे निष्पद्यते, चूर्णहरिद्रयोरिवाऽरुणिमेति । NR, p. 280.

So, in the present case, form cannot be produced out of the two—the object and its cognition, even if the object is assumed as corporeal and the cognition as incorporeal, or if both are assumed as incorporeal.[1]

The opponent, insisting upon his view, may further assert that the contact between the object and its cognition can take place due to their existence at one and the same time (*ekakālatayā*).[2] Rejecting this assertion, the Vijñānavādin says that this is not admissible, because in that case, all the three worlds or whole universe being present at the same time would come in contact with the cognition. Consequently the forms of all the three worlds would appear in one and the same cognition.[3]

Nor can be contact of the two be possible through their confrontation with each other (*ārjavataḥ*), because the cognition does not posses any particular front, it is all-sided.[4] Further, if the cognition is held to be in contact with its object in its entirely, no aspect of the object then, should be left unapprehended. Even the taste and sound etc. and the forms of its constituent atoms should also be apprehended through the visual cognition. But this view is not at all plausible.[1]

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[1] cf. (i) संसर्गधर्मं आकारस्तस्मादेव न युज्यते ।
देशभेदादसंसर्गो मूर्ताऽमूर्ततया तथा ॥
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 42
(ii) मूर्त्तयोरेव संसर्गादाकारो निष्पद्यते, न मूर्त्ताऽमूर्त्तयोर्नाप्यमूर्त्तयोः, तदिह ज्ञानं तावदमूर्त्तम्, अर्थस्तु यदि मूर्त्तो यदि वाऽमूर्त्तः द्वेधाऽपि नाऽनयोराकारो निष्पद्यत इति ।
NR, p. 280-11.

[2] cf. ननु सत्यपि देशभेदे कालैक्यात्संसर्गो भविष्यतीति ।
NR, p. 281.

[3] cf. (i) त्रैलोक्येन प्रसंगाच्च संसर्गो नैककालता ।
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 43 ab
(ii) ज्ञानसमयवर्तिनां सर्वेषाम् ईदृशसंसर्गसम्भवात् सर्वेषामाकारा ज्ञान एकस्मिन्नुपलभ्येरन्निति । NR, p. 281.

[4] cf. (i) न चाऽप्यार्जवतः स्थानं ज्ञाने नाऽर्थस्य विद्यते ।
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 43 cd.
(ii) NR, on the above, p. 281.

The opponent may further plead that the contact of a thing with its cognition, implies that the thing should exist only as an object (*viṣaya*) of cognition.[2] The Vijñānavādin rejects this plea also, since there can be no objectiveness of a thing until its form is apprehended.[3] An unapprehended entity cannot be accepted as the object (*viṣaya*) of cognition, because in that case, there would arise a discrepancy of mutual-inter-dependence. The objectiveness would depend upon the form and the form would depend upon the objectiveness.[4] Any assertion can be made about the formless existence of the object and its cognition and also obout their mutual contact, only if they have already been apprehended in their true nature ; but it is never possible to apprehend a formless object or a formless cognition.[5] Hence, in the absence of any proof, it can not be said that the form is a property of the contact between the object and its cognition.[1]

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[1] cf. (i) सर्वथा कल्पनायां च चक्षुषाऽपि रसादयः ।
गृह्येरन् सर्वभावानामण्वाकाराश्च तद्गताः ॥
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 44.
(ii) NR, on the above, p. 281.

[2] cf. विषयतयाऽत्रस्थानमर्थस्य संसर्गः NR, p. 281.

[3] cf. न चाऽपि विषयत्वेन स्थाने संसर्गकल्पना ।
विषयत्वं हि कीदृक् स्यात् प्रागाकारोपलम्भनात् ॥
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 45.

[4] cf. (i) न ह्यसंचेतितो भावो विषयत्वेन कल्प्यते ।
विषयत्वात् तदाकार आकारद्विषयश्च सः ॥ Ibid., Kā. 46.
(ii) NR, on the above, p. 281-82.

[5] cf. द्वयोराकारनिर्मुक्तं सत्त्वं संसृष्टता तथा ।
स्वरूपतः परिच्छिद्य वक्तुमित्यादि युज्यते ॥
न चाऽप्यस्येह सद्भावः प्राग् गृहीतो न चोपरि ।
न ह्याकारविनिर्मुक्तं ग्राह्यमस्तीति भाषितम् ॥
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kās. 47-48.

There is no need to assume the existence of an external object to prove the variety of cognitions, inasmuch as none has ever seen that the variety of cognitions depends upon the variety of objects.[2] If the contact-theorists hold that the object and its cognition are formless before their mutual contact, then, their contact should also be formless; and a contact which itself is formless, can never give rise to the variety of form in cognition.[3] It is also very surprising to assume that the form in cognition is caused by a formless object.[4]

If it is admitted that form is an outcome of contact between the object and its cognition, there would arise another discrepancy that the cognitions like that of recollection, dream, etc. would, then, appear as formless in the absence of any contact with the object. But the fact shows that such type of cognitions always appear with form, which are caused by the past impressions (*vāsanāḥ*) and not by any external object. The Yogācāra believes that the same impressions (*vāsanāḥ*) should be regarded as the cause of waking-cognitions too.[5]

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[1] cf तस्मादर्थेन संसर्गो निष्प्रमाणक एव ते ।
Śl. Vār.; Śūnya, Kā. 49ab.

[2] cf. ज्ञानवैचित्र्यसिद्ध्यर्थं न चाऽस्त्यर्थस्य कल्पना ।।
तदधीनं हि वैचित्र्यं क्व दृष्टं येन कल्प्यते ।
Ibid., Kās. 49 cd. & 50ab.

[3] cf. (i) निराकारेण चोत्पत्तिर्वैचित्र्याऽऽकारयोः कथम् ।।
Ibid., Kā. 50 cd.
(ii) किं च संसर्गधर्माकारवादिनां प्राक्संसर्गान्निराकारोऽर्थो ज्ञानं च, तत्कथं तत्संसर्गादाकारो निष्पद्यते, कथंतरां च तद्वैचित्र्यमिति ।
NR, p. 282-83.

[4] cf. निराकाराच्च विषयाद् बुद्ध्याकारोऽतिविस्मयः ।
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 51ab.

[5] cf. (i) स्मृतिस्वप्नादिबोधेन स्यादनाकारता तव ।।
न हि तत्राऽर्थसंसर्गः केवला वासनैव तु ।
हेतुत्वेनोपपन्नेति सैवं जाग्रद्धियामपि ।।
Ibid., Kās. 21 cd. & 52.
(ii) NR, on the above, p. 283.

Some other opponent may assume that there exists only one single form, which is common to both – the object and its cognition, just as a single form of *lākṣā* can belong to two transparent stones, kept nearby.[1] The Vijñānavādin refutes this assumption due to the absence of any proof.[2] He says that there can be no contact between the object and its cognition, firstly, because they occupy different places and secondly, because they both are not yet recognised as two distinct entities.[3]

The other opponent may assert that the object and its cognition possess two separate forms which are indistinguishable due to their extreme likeness.[4] But it is not proper to assume, because the apprehension of likeness can take place only when there is an apprehension of difference between the two things.[5]

Having, thus, refuted the adversaries' views, the Yogācāra Buddhist comes to the conclusion that the form, which appears at the time of perception, belongs to the cognition and not to the external object. "Cognition is independent by nature. It does not depend upon the external object for its form ; on the contrary, with whatever form the cognition

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1. cf. अपरे त्वाहुः—एक एवाऽयमाकारः द्वाभ्यामर्थज्ञानाभ्यां साधारण्येनानुभूयते लाक्षासंनिहितेनेव मणिद्वयेन लाक्षारूपमिति ।
   NR, p. 285.
2. द्वयोरप्येक आकार इत्येतस्य ऽप्रमाणता ।
   Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 55 ab.
3. cf. देशभेदादसंसर्गो द्वयोश्चाऽनवधारणात् ।। Ibid., Kā. 55 cd.
4. cf. ये त्वाहुः द्वावपि ज्ञानाऽर्थौ पृथगेवाऽऽकारवन्तौ तथापि त्वत्यन्तसादृश्यादाकारविवेको नाऽवभासत इति NR., p. 285.
5. cf. एवमेवाऽर्थबुद्ध्योः स्यात् सादृश्यान्नाऽविभक्तता ।
   भेदे ज्ञाते हि सादृश्यं नाऽज्ञाते स्यात् खपुष्पवत् ।।
   Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 56,

appears, the object assumes the same."[1] When the form, thus, is dependent upon the cognition alone, who would, then, assume the existence of external object ? The cognition, being free from the imposition of form by the external object, rests only in itself.[2]

6. 6. ALL WORLDLY COGNITIONS ARE UNREAL LIKE DREAMS :

The Yogācāra Buddhist holds that all worldly cognitions like that of pillar etc. are false, because they are cognitions : it has always been found that whatever is cognition, is false, e.g. dream cognitions.[3] Just as all our dream-cognitions are found without any corresponding reality in the external world and yet they are cognitions, similarly all our waking-cognitions like that of a pillar or a wall etc., being cognitions, are without any real external substratum.[4] Śaṅkara has also presented this view of the Yogācāras in his Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya.[5]

The opponent may object that this argument of the Yogācāra Buddhist is not at all tenable, inasmuch as there is no counter-invalidating-cognition to prove it unreal in case of waking-consciousness, while in dream-cognition, there exists

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1. cf. निरपेक्षं स्वरूपेण तस्माज् ज्ञानं यदाकृति ।
   तथाऽर्थो न यथार्थं तु ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते क्वचित् ।
   Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 62.
2. cf. (i) इत्थं विज्ञानतन्त्रत्वे को न्वर्थं कल्पयिष्यति ।
   धीरनारोपिताऽऽकारा स्वात्मन्येवोपयोक्ष्यते ।। Ibid., Kā. 63.
   (iii) अर्थाऽनारोपिताऽऽकारैव धीरद्वितीयाऽर्थशून्या स्वात्मन्येव
   पर्यवस्यतीति । NR, p. 287.
3. cf. स्तम्भादिप्रत्ययो मिथ्या प्रत्ययत्वात्तथा हि यः ।
   प्रत्ययः स मृषा दृष्टेः स्वप्नादिप्रत्ययो यथा ।।
   Śl. Vār., Nirālambana, Kā. 23.
4. cf ननु सर्व एव निरालम्बनः स्वप्नवत्प्रत्ययः । प्रत्ययस्य हि निरालम्बतास्वभाव उपलक्षितः स्वप्ने । जाग्रतोऽपि स्तम्भ इति वा कुड्य इति वा प्रत्यय एव भवति तस्मात्सोऽपि निरालम्बनः ।
   ŚBh, I. 1.5, p. 28.
5. BSŚBh, 2.2.28, p. 544.

counter-invalidating-cognition in the form of waking-consciousness.[1] In reply to this, the Yogācāra argues that 'the counter-invalidating-cognition of the waking-consciousness does exist in the form of yogic cognition, when one perceives the ultimate reality of pure consciousness through yogic perception, all the worldly objects seem to him as false.'[2]

If it is further objected that yogic perception can occur in a very few cases of *yogis* and, therefore, the problem of proving unreality of waking-cognition with regard to common man, remains unsolved,[3] the Yogācāra again comes forward with a counter reply, that every human being, having reached the yogic stage sooner or later, would realise the invalidity of the waking cognition. It is, thus, with all means right to assert that the yogic perception is the counter-invalidating-cognition of waking-consciousness.[4]

This representation of the Yogācāra view by Kumārila about the unreality of the external world, is in full accordance with the view expressed by Vasubandhu in his Viṁśatikā-vijñaptimātratā-siddhi. Proving the falsity of waking-cognitions Vasubandhu gives example of the dream cognition.[5]

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1. cf. प्रतियोगिनि दृष्टे च जाग्रज्ज्ञाने मृषा भवेत् ।।
स्वप्नादिवुद्धिरस्माकं तव भेदोऽपि किङ्कृतः ।
न चान्यत् प्रतियोग्यस्ति जाग्रत्ज्ञानस्य शोभनम् ।।
यद्दर्शनेन मिथ्यात्वं स्तम्भादिप्रत्ययो व्रजेत् ।
Śl. Vār., Nirālambana, Kās. 88cd, 89, 90 ab.

2. cf. योगिनां जायते वुद्धिर्वाधिका प्रतियोगिनी ।
जाग्रत्स्तम्भादिवुद्धीनां ततः स्वप्नादितुल्यता ।।
Ibid., Kā. 91 cd, 92ab.

3. cf. ननु कतिपयानां योगिनां ज्ञाने कथ लोकसिद्धस्य जागज्ज्ञानस्य वाध्यत्वम् । NR, p. 238-39.

4. प्राप्तानां तामवस्थां च सर्वप्राणभृतामपि ।
वाधोऽयं भविता तेन सिद्धा सप्रतियोगिता ।।
Śl. Vār., Nirālambana, Kās. 92 cd., 93ab.

5. cf. प्रत्यक्षवुद्धिः स्वप्नादौ यथा······· ।
Viṁśatikā, Kā. 16 (in VMS).

Just as a person, under the influence of sleep, does not realise the unreality of the objects of the dream, until he gets up from the sleep, similarly a man of this world, being under the influence of impressions (*vāsanāḥ*), caused by false *vikalpas*, does not understand the unreality of external objects, until he gets transcendental knowledge. When he becomes the enlightened one by getting the transcendental knowledge, which is the counter-invalidating-cognition of the waking-consciousness, he fully understands the unreality of the external world. It is, thus, right to assert that the waking-cognition is unreal like the cognition of a dream.[1]

6. 7. VARIETY OF COGNITIONS IS CAUSED BY THE VARIETY OF IMPRESSIONS :

According to the Realists the external world is real and the variety of forms in cognitions is caused by the variety of external objects. But the Yogācāra Buddhist, being the subjective Idealist holds that cognition is the only reality and that the external world does not exist as such. Therefore, a question naturally arises as to how can the Yogācāra account for the variety of objective forms like that of blue, yellow, etc. and for the cognising form 'I' (*grāhakākāra*) in one single entity 'the cognition.'[2]

Replying to these queries, the Yogācāra Buddhist, as presented by Kumārila, asserts :

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1. cf. स्वप्ने दृग्विषयाभावं नाप्रबुद्धोऽवगच्छति ।।
एवं वितथविकल्पाभ्यासवासनानिद्रया प्रसुप्तो लोकः स्वप्न इवाभूतमर्थं पश्यन्नप्रबुद्धस्तदभावं यथावन्नावगच्छति । यदा तु तत्प्रतिपक्षलोकोत्तरनिर्विकल्पज्ञानलाभात् प्रबुद्धो भवति तदा तत्पृष्ठलब्धशुद्धलौकिकज्ञानसम्मुखीभावाद् विषयाभावं यथावदवगच्छतीति समानमेतत् ।
Viṁśatikā, Kā 17 and its Svavṛtti (in VMS).

2. cf. यदि विज्ञानमात्रमेव तत्त्वं ततस्तस्य सच्चिन्मात्ररूपत्वान्नीलादेर्ग्राह्याकारस्य कथमाभासो नीलमिदमिति। कदाचिच्चाऽस्मदर्थस्य ग्राहकाकारस्याऽहमिति । NR, p. 272.

> "Although the cognition, in its ultimate sense, is pure i.e. without any mixture of duality, yet it appears like two distinct entities—the cognised 'blue' etc. and the cogniser 'I'. This varigation is caused by the contact of various impressions (*vāsanāḥ*), produced by the foregoing cognitions in this beginningless world. The cognition, thus, does not require the existence of the external objects to prove the variety of forms."[1]

At another place also, a similar idea of the Yogācāras has been expressed in the Śloka-vārttika, where it is asserted that all such differentiations like that of *anumāna-anumeya, dharma-dharmin*, etc. are possible in the Yogācāra theory of *bāhyārthabhaṅga* due to the different *vikalpas*, imposed upon cognition by the different impressions and words.[2] The expression has been attributed to Diṅnāga by Bhaṭṭoṁveka,[3] Pārthasārathi Miśra[4] and also by Vācaspati Miśra.[5]

Dharmakīrti also explains this idea thus: Although cognition is indifferentiated i.e. one, it seems to be differentiated into the cognised and the cogniser due to the false conceptions.[1]

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[1] cf. (i) मत्पक्षे यद्यपि स्वच्छो ज्ञानात्मा परमार्थतः ।
तथाऽप्यनादौ संसारे पूर्वज्ञानप्रसूतिभिः ॥
चित्राभिश्चित्रहेतुत्वाद्वासनाभिरुपप्लवात् ।
स्वानुरूप्येण नीलादि ग्राह्यग्राहकदूषितम् ॥
प्रविभक्तमिवोत्पन्नं नाऽन्यमर्थमपेक्षते
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kās. 15, 16, 17 ab.
(ii) NR, on the above, p. 272.

[2] cf. नन्वसत्यपि बाह्येऽर्थे बुद्ध्यारूढेन सिध्यति ।
वासनाशब्दभेदोत्थविकल्पप्रविभागतः ॥
न्यायविद्भिरिदं चोक्तं धर्मादौ बुद्धिमाश्रिते ।
व्यवहारोऽनुमानादेः कल्प्यते न बहिः स्थिते ॥
Śl. Vār., Nirālambana, Kās. 167-68

[3] SVTṬ, p. 231.

[4] NR, p. 258.

[5] NVTṬ, p. 183 (Ch. SS)

It may be objected against this theory that the variety of impressions depends upon the variety of cognitions, and the variety of cognitions, in its turn, depends upon the variety of impressions, and hence there would occur mutual interdependence.[2] Meeting with this objection, the Yogācāra says that this discrepancy would not arise, because mutual causality between the cognition and its force i.e. *vāsanā* is going on from the time immemorial.[3] That is to say, a particular impression (i.e. *vāsanā*) produces a particular cognition and this cognition produces another impression which is different to the previous one; and this impression again produces another cognition which is different from the former one. Thus, the relationship of cause and effect between the cognition and its force (i.e. *vāsanā*) is continuing in this cycle of universe from the beginningless time just like the seed and the sprout. Hence, there can occur no mutual interdependence.[4] This presentation by Kumārila is in accordance with the views expressed by Diṅnāga in his Ālambanaparīkṣā: The force i.e. *śakti* or *vāsanā* conforms with consciousness. The objective aspect of consciousness and the force go mutually conditioned from the time immemorial.[5]

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[1] cf. अविभागोऽपि बुद्ध्यात्माविपर्यासितदर्शनैः ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तिभेदवानिव लक्ष्यते ॥
PV, Pratyakṣa, Kā. 354.

[2] cf. ननु ज्ञानवैचित्र्याद्वासनावैचित्र्यं ततश्च तद्वैचित्र्यम् इतीतरेतराश्रयः स्यादिति । NR, p. 272.

[3] cf. अन्योन्यहेतुता चैव ज्ञानशक्त्योरनादिका
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā 17cd.

[4] cf. एकया वासनयैकं ज्ञानं जन्यते, तेनाऽप्यन्या वासना, तयाऽप्यन्यज् ज्ञानमिति नेतरेतराऽऽश्रयम् । NR, p. 272-73.

[5] सा चाविरुद्धा विज्ञप्तेः एवं विषयरूपकम् ।
प्रवर्ततेऽनादिकालं शक्तिश्चान्योन्यहेतुके ॥
ĀP, Kā. 8.

The Realist may point out that even the Yogācāra has to accept more than one entity in the form of the cognition and the impressions and hence, there is no utility of assuming a single entity.[1] The Yogācāra says that impression (*vāsanā*) is simply the force of cognition and hence, the assumption of a diversity in the impressions is better than that of a diversity in the external objects.[2]

6. 8. THE TWO FORMS—GRĀHYA AND GRĀHAKA—BELONG TO THE COGNITION ALONE :

The Yogācāras accept one entity 'the cognition' as the only reality, even then they assume that cognition, at the time of perception, appears empirically in two forms -- in the objective form (*grāhyākāra* or *viṣayābhāsa*) and in the subjective form (*svābhāsa* or *grāhakākāra*).

Kumārila presents this Buddhist view of two-formed-cognition (*dvi-rūpa-jñāna*) in the Śūnyavāda section as follows :

"The conception of the subjective form of cognition (*grāhakākārasaṁvittiḥ*), which is assumed on the basis of the distinction in successive cognitions can be inferred from recollection also."[3] Explaining the same, Kumārila further adds : "If the cognition, at first, is assumed as having only one form (either the objective form—*grāhyākāra* or the subjective form—*grāhakākāra*, the other cognition, which cognisess the first one, would arise in the same form (in the same objective form or subjective form which had been cognised previously). In that case, the difference between the cognition of the jar and the cognition of that cognition would not be possible. If, (on the other hand), it is assumed that the first cognition, appears in two forms, in the objective form (*grāhyākāra*) as well as in the subjective form (*grāhakākāra*), there would be an accumulation of forms (*ākāra-pracaya*) in the subsequent cognitions.[1]

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[1] cf. भवतामपि ज्ञानवासनयोः कल्पनाभेदादस्त्येवानेककल्पना।

NR, p. 273.

[2] cf. (i) अनेककल्पनायाश्च ज्यायसी ह्येककल्पना ।
शक्तिमात्रस्य भेदस्य वस्तुभेदाद्विशिष्यते ॥

Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 18.

(ii) ज्ञानस्यैव हि शक्तिमात्रं वासना, तन्मात्रकल्पनावस्तुभेदकल्पनाल्लघीयसी ।

NR, p. 273.

[3] cf. (i) उत्तरोत्तरविज्ञानविशेषाद्या प्रकल्प्यते ।
ग्राहकाऽऽकारसंवित्तिः स्मरणाच्चाऽऽनुमानिकी ॥

Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 110.

(ii) NR, on the above Kārikā, p. 298-99.

If it is asked, how this accumulation-of-forms (*ākāra-pracaya*) in subsequent cognitions is proved, the Buddhist, as presented by Kumārila, says :

> "The first cognition appears in two forms i.e. in the objective form as well as in the subjective form, the other cognition, which cognises the previous one, appears in three forms, i.e. it takes the two forms of the previous cognition as its objective form (*viṣayākāra*), and it takes its own form (*svākāra*) as its subjective form (*grāhakākāra*). . And thus owing to the increasing number of forms in the subsequent cognitions, the distinction from the

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1. cf. (i) एकाऽऽकारं किल ज्ञानं प्रथमं यदि कल्प्यते ।
ततस्तद्विषयाऽप्यन्या तद्रूपैव मतिर्भवेत् ॥
घटविज्ञानतज्ज्ञानविशेषोऽतो न सिध्यति ।
ग्राहकाऽऽकारसंवित्तौ त्वाकारप्रचयो भवेत् ॥
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kās. 111-12.

(ii) यदि घटज्ञानं घटविषयं केवलं विषयाऽऽकारं स्यात्ततस्तस्य घटाकारत्वात्तद्विषयमपि द्वितीयज्ञानं केवलविषयाकारं घटाकारमेव स्यात्, एवं तृतीयादिकमपीति नोत्तरोत्तरविज्ञानविशेषः स्यात्, एवं केवलग्राहकाकारत्वेऽपि सर्वेषां संविन्मात्ररूपत्वादविशेष एवेति । यदा तु प्रथमज्ञानं ग्राह्यग्राहकोभयरूपं तदाऽऽकारप्रचयात् सिध्यति विशेष इति । NR, p. 299.

previous ones would be established."[1]

Having thus, explained the first reason (*uttarottara-vijñāna-viśeṣāt*) given by the Yogācāras in support of the two-formed-cognition (*dvi-rūpa-jñāna*), Kumārila, now elaborates their second reason (*smaraṇāt ca anumānikam*) in the following way :

"After having the cognition of an object, when one recollects it afterwards, he recollects its objective form (*grāhyākāra*) as well as its cognising form (*grāhakākāra*), and from this fact, it is inferred that the cognising form (*grāhakākāra*) was also there in the cognition alongwith its objective form (*grāhakākāra*)."[2] Therefore, at the time of recollection, one recollects not only the object, say the jar, but also its cognising form that 'I had the knowledge of the jar.' From this two-formed-recollection, it is inferred that cognising form (*grāhakākāra*) was also present in the cognition at the time of perception.

This presentation of the Buddhist view of two-formed-cognition by Kumārila is in full conformity with the account given by Diṅnāga. Accounting for the appearance of cognition in two forms, Diṅnāga says in his Pramāṇa-samuccaya :

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[1] cf. (i) जायते पूर्वविज्ञानं द्व्याकारं यत्र तत्पुनः ।
तस्याऽऽत्मीयश्च पूर्वौ च विषयस्थावुपप्लुतौ ॥
परेष्वाकारवृद्ध्यैवं पूर्वेभ्यो भिन्नता......।
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 113-114ab.

(ii) प्रथमस्य हि विषयाकारेण ग्राहकाकारेण च द्व्याकारत्वे तद्विषयं द्वितीयं तद्विषयाभ्यामाकाराभ्यामात्मीयेन च ग्राहकाकारेण त्र्याकारं भवति । एवमेकाऽऽकारप्रचयादुत्तरोत्तरेषां पूर्वंपूर्वोभ्यो भिन्नता सिध्यतीति । NR, p. 300.

[2] cf. (i) ... ... तथा ।
ग्राह्यवत्स्मरणात्पश्चात्संवित्तौ ग्राहकः पुरा ।
Śl. Vār., Śūnya, Kā. 114.

(ii) ज्ञातो घट इति सहैव ज्ञानेनाऽर्थं स्मरति, न चाऽगृहीतस्य स्मरणं सम्भवति, अतो ज्ञानमपि गृहीतमिति ।
NR; p. 300.

> "That cognition has two forms, is (known) from the difference between the cognition of the object and the cognition of that (cognition). Later also, from (the fact of) recollection, (it follows that cognition has two forms), because it (i.e. recollection) is never of that which has not been (previously) experienced."[1]

Diṅnāga's own Vṛtti on it elaborates his view more clearly.[2] Some other Buddhist logicians like Dharmakīrti,[3] Manorathanandin,[4] Prajñākara Gupta,[5] etc. also explain the idea of two-formed-cognition in their respective treatises.

The theory of accumulation-of-forms (*ākāra-pracaya*) in successive cognitions has been elucidated very clearly by Prajñākara Gupta in his Pramāṇa-vārttika-bhāṣya[6] and it is intelligiable through the following diagram also :

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1. विषयज्ञानतज्ज्ञानविशेषात्तु द्विरूपता।
स्मृतेरुत्तरकालं च न ह्यसावविभाविते ॥ PS, I, Kā. 11

2. PSV on Kā 11 in 'Dignāga, on Perception', p. nil and also its English translation in the same work on p. 29-30.

3. PV, Pratyakṣa, Kās. 374-81.

4. MNV on PV, pratyakṣa, Kās. 374-81.

5. PVBh, p. 403.

6. तथाहि उत्तरमुत्तरं एकैकेनाकारेणाधिकमधिकं भवति नान्यथा। तथाहि पूर्वकेण नीलं गृहीतं तदुत्तरेण नीलज्ञानं तदुत्तरेण नीलज्ञानज्ञानं, तदुत्तरेणाऽपि तदधिकमिति निश्चिनोति। तदेतदन्यथा न स्यात्।
PVBh., p. 407.



(i) objective form (*grāhyākra*) =sensation of the object, say jar.

(ii) Subjective form (*grāhakākara*)=svābhāsa of cog. No. 1.

Thus, in cog. No. 1 there are *total two forms*=1 *Viṣayābhāsa*+1 *svābhāsa* ·

(i) Objective form (*grāhyākāra*) =Perception of the object i.e. 'It is jar.' It contains two forms of cog. No. 1, because it appears thus : 'The thing apprehended by me previously is jar.'

(ii) Subjective form (*grāhakākāra*)=*svābhāsa* of cog. No.2 Here there are *total* 3 *forms* =2 forms of cog No. 1+1 form of *svabhāsa* of cog. No. 2.

(i) Objective form (*grāhyākāra*) =apprehension of the cognition of the object i.e. 'I know the jar.' It contains 3 forms of cog. No. 2, because it appears thus "I know that the thing apprehended by me previously is jar'.

(ii) Subjective form (*grāhakākāra*)=*svābhāsa* of cog. No. 3.
Here there are *total* 4 *forms* =3 forms of cog. No. 2+1 form of *svābhāsa* of cog. No. 3.

Similar will be the ease with other cognitions, coming in succession.

Prof. Hattori has explained this idea of 'accumulation of forms' in symbolic terms which is also noteworthy.[1]

A point is to be noted regarding this view that the appearance of cognition in two forms—the *grāhya* and the *grāhaka* is true in the Yogācāra's theory empirically only, not transcendentally. As already mentioned, cognition is pure and non-dual by nature, but it seems to be appearing in two distinct forms—the *grāhya* and the *grāhaka*—due to the diversity of impressions (*vāsanā-vaicitryāt*).[2] Dharmakīrti clearty points out in his Pramāṇa-vārttika at several times that inspite of the existence of one unitary entity—the cognition, the distinction of *grāhya* and *grāhaka* appears only due to the misconception. It does not exist in reality.[3]

6.9. CONCLUSION

The following conclusions can be derived from the above discussions :

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1. Viṣaya-jñāna = C1 Viṣaya-jñāna-jñāna = C 2 Svābhāsa in C 1 = S 1 Svābhāsa in C2 = S2 arthābhāsa in C1 = O1, arthābhāsa in C2 = O2
In the same manner, the third and the succeeding cognitions C3, C4,...Cn are distinguishable from the preceding ones only when they are acknowledged to possess "dvi-rūpa". Dignāga on Perception, pp. 108-9.

2. cf. अविभागोऽपि बुद्ध्यात्मा विपर्यासितदर्शनैः ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तिः भेदवानिव लक्ष्यते ॥
PV, Pratyakṣa, Kā 354.

3. cf. (i) परिच्छेदोऽन्तरन्योऽयं भागो बहिरिव स्थितः ।
ज्ञानस्याभेदिनो भिन्नो प्रतिभासो ह्युपप्लवः ॥
Ibid., Kās. 330-331.

(ii) …… ………यथा भ्रान्तैर्निरीक्ष्यते ॥
विभक्तलक्षणग्राह्यग्राहकाकारविप्लवा ।
तथा कृतव्यवस्थेयं केशादिज्ञानभेदवत् ॥
Ibid., Kā. 212.

(iii) भावा येन निरूप्यन्ते तद्रूपं नास्ति तत्त्वतः ।
यस्मादेकमनेकं च रूपं तेषां न विद्यते ॥ Ibid., Kā. 360

(i) There are two main philosophical groups regarding the reality of the external world: Realism and Idealism. The Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra schools of the Buddhists belong to the latter group.[1]

(ii) The Mādhyamika is regarded as the Transcendental or Critical Idealist, while the Yogācāra is held as the Subjective Idealist. The Mādhyamika holds that *śūnyatā* i.e. voidness, which is transcendent to all thought-modes, is ultimately real and the external objects with their cognitions are real only empirically, not transcendentally. But the Yogācāra maintaining that the cognition, which is the basis of all our endeavour, cannot be denied. Hence, according to him, cognition is the ultimate reality, the external world, of course, is unreal. It is, thus, clear that the unreality of external world is common to both the systems, But Kumārila's presentation of the doctrine of non-existence of external world is mainly based upon the Yogācāras.[2]

(iii) According to the Mādhyamika Buddhist there are two kinds of Reality—Transcendental reality (*paramārtha-satya*) and phenomenal reality (*saṁvṛti-satya*). The Yogācāras have accepted a third kind also called *parikalpita.*[3]

(iv) Proving the non-existence of the external world, the Yogācāra argues that our cognition is not able to apprehend the external objects. He, on the basis of some arguments, such as, the identity of the cognition and the cognised, self-luminosity of cognition, recollection, etc. tries to establish that the form, which appears at the time of perception, belongs to the cognition and not to the external object, and thus the power of cognition exhausts in apprehending its own form.[4]

(v) To prove that form belongs to the cognition, the Yogācāra has to face many adversaries, who do not believe in the non-dual existence of cognition having form. The Yogācāra refutes their views with several arguments and establishes his own theory.[5]

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1. supra, 6.1.
2. supra, 6.2.
3. supra, 6.3.
4. supra, 6.4.
5. supra, 6.5.

(vi) The Yogācāra holds that all wordly cognitions like that of pillar etc. are unreal like dream-cognitions. Just as the dream-cognition is invalidated by the waking-consciousness, similarly the waking-consciousness can be invalidated by the transcendental-knowledge.[1]

(vii) According to the Yogācāras, although cognition is transcendentally pure and non-dual, yet it appears like two distinct entities—the cognised (*grāhya*) blue, yellow, etc. and the cogniser (*grāhaka*) 'I' due to the various impressions (*vāsanāḥ*), produced by the foregoing cognitions of this or that life. The cognitions and the impressions go on producing one another in a continuous series from time immemorial under the rule of mutual causality (*anyonya-hetutā*) and hence mutual-interdependence does not occur in their theory.[2]

(viii) The Yogācāra holds that the two forms—the *grāhya* (objective-form) as well as the *grāhaka* (subjective or cognising-form) belong to the cognition alone and this fact can be proved on the basis of the 'accumulation-of-forms' in the subsequent cognitions and of recollection. But it is also noteworthy that this idea of two-formed-cognition is true only empirically as cognition is transcendentally pure and non-dual in the Yogācāra system.[3]

The Yogācāra Buddhist has, thus, established the doctrine of the non-existence of the external world.

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1. supra, 6,6.
2. supra, 6.7.
3. supra, 6.8.

CHAPTER VII

APOHA : THE BUDDHIST THEORY REGARDING THE MEANING OF WORDS

7.1. VARIOUS THEORIES OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY REGARDING THE MEANING OF WORDS :

The problem of the import of word [is a very trickle one. Almost all the systems of Indian philosophy have taken this problem in their own way and have given different kinds of solution. Kumārila in his Tantravārttika informs us that there are innumerable theories which seek to explain the denotation of a word.[1] Here we shall take in account only a few which are very important amongst them.

(i) *Vyaktivāda* (*Theory of Individuals*) :

According to the upholders of this theory, the primary meaning of a word is *Vyakti* or the individual.[2] Their main plea is that in our practical purposes, we have to deal with the individual alone. It is the individual alone that is endowed with the power of efficient action and is capable of doing a work and desisting from it.[3] If a cow is required, obviously, we shall go to bring an individual cow and not the universal existing in the entire class of cows, past, present and future.

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[1] TV, p. 293; cf. G.N. Shastri, PWM, p. 136.

[2] NS, and NBh, II. 2.60 (Cal. SS).

[3] (i) व्यक्तो तावत्क्रियायोगो……। N. Mañjarī, p. 291.

(ii) अत्र या शब्दादिप्रयोगसामर्थ्याद् व्यक्तिरेव पदार्थः ।

NVTṬ, p. 495.

(iii) ……अर्थक्रियाकारितया प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तियोग्या व्यक्तिरेव

Kāvya-prakāśa, Vṛtti on II. 3.

Another argument of the Vyaktivādins (Individualists) is that it is the individual and not the abstract universal which forms the content of our perceptual knowledge and hence, it is proper to regard the individual alone as the import of word.[1] It is also pointed out by them that there are many expressions in our languages, which can refer only to the individual (*vyakti*), and not to the universal, such as Sun, Moon, Ganges, etc.[2] In such cases, even the Jātivādins (Universalists) have to admit the individual as the import of word. It is, therefore, proper to recognise the individual (*vyakti*) as the meaning of word.

This theory has been held by the Sāṁkhyas[3] and some of the Neo-Naiyāyikas.[4] Vyāḍi, an old vaiyākaraṇa, also supports this view.[5]

(ii) *Ākṛtivāda* (*Theory of Configuration*) :

The Ākṛtivādins hold that the word denotes only the shape or configuration of a thing. The main contention of this

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1. cf. प्रत्यक्षविषये वृत्तिः पदस्येष्टा परैरपि ।
   निष्कृष्टं न च सामान्यमात्रं प्रत्यक्षगोचरः ॥
   व्यक्तेरेव पदार्थत्वं तस्मादभ्युपगम्यताम् ।
   N. Māñjarī, I, p. 292.
2. cf. (i) D.M. Datta, SMK, p. 266.
   (ii) K.K. Raja, ITM, p. 71.
   (iii) G.N. Shastri, PWM, p. 138.
3. व्यक्तिः सांख्यादिभिः VPS of Vidyāraṇya, p. 599.
4. (i) व्यक्तावेव शक्तिः, न तु गोत्वादिजातावपि इति नव्या प्राहुः ।
   Nyāya Kośa, p. 855.
   (ii) D.M. Datt, SWK, p. 265;
   (iii) K.K. Raja, ITM, p. 71.
5. द्रव्यपदार्थवादिव्याडिनये शब्दस्य व्यक्तिरेवाभिधेतया प्रतिभासते ।
   SDS, Pāṇinī-darśanam, p. 612,

theory is that the accertainment of a thing as a cow or a horse or anything else depends upon the perception of its configuration. We can apply the word 'cow' to a thing, only if it possesses a dewlap, horns and the like.[1] The theory has been favoured by the Jainas and some others.[2]

This theory has been rejected on the ground that there are things which, inspite of having individuality as well as configuration, cannot be called by a specific name e.g. a clay cow. A clay cow, although possesses the shape of a cow cannot be the denotation of the word 'cow' due to its incapability to be consecrated by sprinkling the holy water etc.[3] So, the theory that the denotation of a word is configuration, is not plausible.

(iii) *Jātivāda* (*Theory of Universals*) :

According to the Jātivādins (Universalists) the denotation of a word is universal (*Jāti*). Mīmāṁsakas[4] are the chief advocates of this theory and it is also accepted by the Vedāntins[5] and some of the old grammarians like Vājapyāyana[6] and Bhartṛhari.[7]

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[1] (i) आकृतिः तदपेक्षत्वात् सत्त्वव्यवस्थानसिद्धेः
NS and NBh, II. 2.63 (Ca. SS.).
(ii) अतः प्रत्यक्षविषये पदं प्रवर्तमानं आकृतावेव वर्तितुमर्हति
N. Māñjari, I, p. 291.

[2] (i). अवयवसंस्थानाख्याऽऽकृतिरार्हतादिभिः । VPS, p. 291.
(ii) D.M. Datta, SWK, p. 286.
(iii) K.K. Raja, ITM, p. 71

[3] cf. व्यक्त्याकृतियुक्तेऽप्यप्रसङ्गात् प्रोक्षणादीनां—मृद्गवके जातिः
NS and NBh II. 2.64 (Cal. SS).

[4] सामान्यं शब्दगोचरम् Śl. Vār., Ākṛti, Kā. 4b.

[5] तादृशशक्तिविषयत्वं शक्यत्वम् तच्च जातेरेव न व्यक्तौ ।
VP, IV. p. 70.

[6] जातिशब्दार्थवाचिनो वाजप्यायनस्य मते गवादयः शब्दा भिन्नद्रव्यसमवेत जातिमभिदधति । SDS, Pāṇini-darśanam, p. 610

[7] सम्बन्धिभेदात्सत्तैव भिद्यमाना गवादिषु ।
जातिरित्युच्यते तस्यां सर्वे शब्दा व्यवस्थिताः ॥
Vākyapadīya, 3.1. 33.

It is to be noted regarding *jāti* (universal) and *ākṛti* (configuration) that the Naiyāyikas have drawn a distinction between the two terms. According to them, *jāti* (universal) is that which produces a notion of sameness in different individuals,[1] while *ākṛti* (configuration) is that which indicates *jāti* (universal) and its characteristics.[2] It is nothing apart from the particular arrangement of the parts of an object and the component of these parts.[3] The Mīmāṁsakas, on the other hand, have drawn no distinction between *jāti* and *ākṛti*. Kumārila distinctly says that *ākṛti* is the same as *jāti*, by which the individual (*vyakti*) is characterised. It is also called *sāmānya* and is the cause of the concept of oneness (*ekabuddhi*) among different individuals.[4] If a child is told the animal standing before him is horse and if he chances to see another horse, he himself calls it a horse. Why ? Because there are some common features in both the horses, which enable the child to apply the term 'horse' to each one of them. 'It is, therefore, *jāti* or *ākṛti*, which is denoted by a word.'[5]

The Vyaktivādin (Individualist) has expressed this view that the primary meaning of a word is 'individual' but the 'universal' is also obtained by logical implication as being the determinant or attribute of the 'individual'.[6] But the Universalist argues that it is not proper to accept individual as the primary meaning and the universal as the logical implication ; because it is an admitted fact that knowledge of the attribute precedes to that of the qualified substance, and in the present case also, the universal (*jāti*), which is regarded as the attribute of individual (*vyakti*), should be apprehended first before the apprehension of the qualified individual.[1] It is, therefore, urged by the Universalist that it is only in the fitness of things to hold the universal (*jāti*) as the primary meaning of a word and the idea of the individual is obtained by logical implication or as a secondary meaning. There is no need of assuming verbal convention in *jāti* and *vyakti* both.[2]

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[1] समानप्रसवात्मिका जातिः NS and NBh, II.2.69 (Cal. SS).

[2] आकृतिर्जातिलिङ्गाख्या NS, II. 2.68 (Cal. SS).

[3] NBh on II. 2.68.

[4] जातिमेवाऽऽकृतिं प्राहुर्व्यक्तिराक्रियते यया ।
सामान्यं तच्च पिण्डानामेकबुद्धिनिबन्धनम् ॥
Śl. Vār., Ākṛti, Kā. 3.

[5] तस्माज्जातिरेव शब्दार्थं इति । N. Mañjarī, p. 255.

[6] cf. (i) जातिविशिष्टव्यक्तौ शक्तिः इत्यपरे
Nyāya Kośa, p. 855.
(ii) तस्मात्तद्वानेव पदार्थः,—तद्वानिति विशेष एव सामान्यवानुच्यते । N.Mañjari, p. 295.
(iii) D.M. Datta, SWK, p. 270

Besides, it is also noteworthy that a person who is commanded to bring a cow, brings any cow he likes in the absence of specific instructions. The factor of 'cowness' (*gotva*) alone works in his mind and nothing else.[3]

(iv) *Jātyākṛtivyaktivāda* (*Theory of Composite-denotation*) :

The Nyāya-sūtrakāra Gautama establishes a different theory regarding the meaning of word. He points out that none of the three entities, mentioned above, can denote the word exclusively. He is of the opinion that the three entities—individual (*vyakti*), universal (*jāti*) and configuration (*ākṛti*) are denoted by a word conjointly and not separately,[4]

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1. cf. शब्दाच्चेत् तर्हि शब्दः प्रथमतरं गोत्वे वर्तितुमर्हति नाऽगृहीतविशेषणाविशिष्टे बुद्धिरिति नियमात् ।

N. Mañjarī, I, p. 292.

2. cf. (i) जातेर्विशेषणत्वात्पूर्वतरं प्रतिपत्तिरिति सैव शब्दार्थो भवितुमर्हति तस्यां च शब्दादवगतायां तत् एवं व्यक्त्यवगमः सेत्स्यतीति नोभयत्र शाब्दो व्यापारः ।

N. Mañjarī, I, p. 293.

(ii) जातावेव शक्तिर्व्यक्तिलाभस्त्वाक्षेपात् इति तौतातिकाः ।

Nyāya-Kośa, p. 855.

3. cf. G.N. Jha, PMS, p. 146.
4. व्यक्त्याकृतिजातयस्तु पदार्थः

NS and NBh, II. 2.66 (Cal. SS).

It may, however, be true that according to the particular context, the word may give one sense as its primary meaning and the rest as its secondary meanings. In some cases emphasis is laid on the Universal (*jāti*) and the other two factors—individual (*vyakti*) and configuration (*ākṛti*) remain in subordination e.g. 'cow should not be touched by feet', here the word 'cow' mainly denotes all the cows having *gotva* universal, although it refers to its individual and configurative aspects too. In some cases, emphasis is given on individual (*vyakti*) e.g. 'hold the cow' or 'let the cow free' and in some cases the configuration (*ākṛti*) is mainly denoted, the individual (*vyakti*) remains in background and the Universal (*jāti*) is totally absent e.g. 'make a cow out of the flour'.[1]

This theory, thus, tries to reconcile with all the three contending views, mentioned before.

(v) *Jāti-viśiṣṭa vyakti-vāda* (*Theory of Individual qualified by the Universal*) :

Some other Naiyāyikas have proposed a somewhat different solution to the problem. They maintain that only the individual qualified by the universal should be accepted as the primary meaning of a word, inasmuch as it is the individual characterised by the universal, that is capable of performing efficient actions.[2]

It is this meaning by which our conception remains unobstructed and the word is not over-burdened by the assumption of two or more than two meanings. Moreover, this type of denotation (*jāti-visiṣṭa-vyakti*) can be attained from a word directly, not through logical implication. It is, therefore, proper to admit the 'individual qualified by the universal,' as the denoted sense of a word.[1]

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[1] व्यक्त्याकृतिजातयस्तु पदार्थं इति तु शब्दो विशेषणार्थः किं विशिष्यते गुणप्रधानभावस्य नियमेन शब्दार्थत्वम्, स्थितेऽपि तद्वतो वाच्यत्वे क्वचित्प्रयोगे जातेः प्राधान्यं व्यक्तेरङ्गभावः यथा गौर्न पदा स्प्रष्टव्येति सर्वगवीषु प्रतिषेधो गम्यते, क्वचिद्व्यक्तेः प्राधान्यं जातेरङ्गभावः यथा गां मुंच गां बध्नानेति नियतां काञ्चिद् व्यक्तिमुद्दिश्य प्रयुज्यते, क्वचिदाकृतेः प्राधान्यं व्यक्तेरङ्गभावो जातिर्नास्त्येव यथा पिष्टकमय्यो गावः क्रियन्तामिति——। N. Mañjarī, I, p. 297.

[2] तद्वतोऽर्थक्रियायोगात्तस्यैवाहुः पदार्थताम् ॥

Ibia., I, p. 295.

(vi) *Apohavāda (Theory of Exclusion)* :

As shown above, the Realist schools of Indian Philosophy like Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya-vaiśeṣika believe that a word refers directly to the objective realities like individual or universal or universalised individual or so forth. But the other type of approach, which is accepted by the Buddhists, is that there is no objective reality, denoted by a word.[2] According to them, a word can never touch a real ; it is only the generic form (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) that is denoted by a word. But this denotation always happens to be through negation, called *apoha* or *anyāpoha*.[3]

The Buddhist establishes his theory of '*apoha*' after having refuted the opponents' theories (like that of *jāti*, '*jātimad*' etc.), which were prevalent at that time regarding the import or words.

7. 2. CRITICISM OF THE OPPONENTS' THEORIES BY THE BUDDHIST :

According to the Mīmāṁsakas, *jāti* (the universal) is the essence of an individual and is the cause of the concept of oneness (*eka dhī*) among different individual.[4] But they do not accept any further *sāmānya* (universal) for the concept of oneness anong different *sāmānya*, like *sattā*, *aśvatva* etc. owing to the discrepancy of *regressus ad infinitum.*[1] On the basis of this, the Buddhist here argues that 'just as there arises a sense of sameness in different kinds of universal like *sattā*, *aśvatva*, *gotva*, etc. even without there being any further *sāmānya* (universal), it should also be acceptable to the Mīmāṁsakas that the sense of oneness (*eka-buddhi*) arises in different individuals without there being a separate entity, the *sāmānya* or *jāti* (universal) in them.[2]

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[1] न च व्यवहिता बुद्धिर्नच भारस्य गौरवम् ।।
सामानाधिकरण्यादिव्यवहारोऽपि मुक्यया ।
वृत्त्योपपद्यमानः सन्नान्यथा योजयिष्यते ।।
तस्मात्तद्वानेव पदार्थः । N. Māñjarī, I, p. 295.

[2] cf. Satkari Mookerjee, BPUF, p. 107.

[3] Infra VIII. 3.

[4] तेनात्मधर्मो भेदानामेकधीविषयोऽस्ति नः ।
सामान्यमाकृतिर्जातिः शक्तिर्वासोऽभिधीयताम् ।
Śl. Vār, Ākrti, Kā. 18.

Besides, Kumārila is of the opinion that *jāti* is *piṇḍa-sarva-gata* i.e. it resides in all the individuals ralated to it, but is not perceived in the intervals of the two.[3] He also holds that the universal (*jāti*) is manifested by itself in the individuals related to it and hence there is no need of assuming any other *sāmānya* for its manifestation.[4] Likewise its non-manifestation in other individuals is also natural.[5] On the basis of this, the Buddhist now rejects the idea of *sāmānya* or *jāti* thus :

> 'If you do not want to postulate a further *sāmānya* or *jāti* as the governing agency of the relationship between the universals and the individuals (*vṛtter niyāmakaḥ*) why do you not admit that the concep-

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1. न हि सामान्येऽप्यपरं सामान्यमस्ति, अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् ।
NR, p. 550.

2. cf. (i) ननु भिन्नेऽपि सत्तादौ सामान्यमिति जायते ।
बुद्धिर्विनाऽपि सामान्यादन्यस्मात्सा कथं भवत् ॥
Śl. Vār, Ākṛti, Kā 19.

(ii) Also see its NR.

3. पिण्डष्वेव च सामान्यं नाऽन्तरा गृह्यते यतः ॥
Ibid., Kā 25.

4. स्वाभाविकश्च सम्बन्धो जातिव्यक्त्योर्न हेतुमान् ।
तेनैतस्य प्रसिद्ध्यर्थं नाऽन्यत्सामान्यमिष्यते ॥
Ibid., Kā. 31-32.

5. न व्यञ्जन्त्यपरे कस्माद्यतस्तेषु न दृश्यते ।
तेभ्योऽपि न निवृत्त्यर्थं मृग्यो हेतुः स्वभावतः ॥ Ibid., Kā. 34.

> tion of oneness (*eka-buddhi*) among different individual cows, arises without the assumption of *gotva*.'[1] Just as, inspite of the difference being equal (among all the individuals), the universal (*jāti*) resides only in a few, and leaves the rest aside (and it occurs just by itself), similarly the conception of oneness (among different individual cows) arises (by itself) without being caused by *gotvādi sāmānya*.[2]

It is, this, emphasized by the Buddhist that there is no need of assuming a different entity—*sāmānya* or *jāti*, to establish the concept of oneness among different individuals.

Further, Kumārila holds that the relation between the universal and the individual is of identity-in-difference (*bhedābheda*), i.e. the universal is neither entirely different from the individual nor it is entirely identical with it.[3] This view of the Mīmāṁsakas has been repudiated by others[4] because of the incongruity. It is argued that the assumption of identity (*eka-vastu-ātmatā*) between the universal and the individual is not proper because the universal (*jāti*) extends over many (individuals) and the individual (*viśeṣa*) over nothing but itself.[5] It is also argued that in case of identity (*tādātmya*) between the universal and the individual, the universal (*jāti*), being identical with different individuals, would have to adopt their nature of being different, and the individuals (*vyaktayaḥ*), being identical with one (*sāmānya*), would have to adopt its nature of oneness.[1] Moreover, in case of accepting identity, the universal and the individual would become one single entity and then, the discrepancy would arise—how would one and the same entity be both one and many, different and non-different, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* at one and the same time.[2] It is, therefore, not proper to accept identity (*tādātmya*) between the universal and the individual.

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[1] सामान्यं नाऽन्यदिष्टं चेत्तस्य वृत्तेर्नियामकम् ।
गोत्वेनाऽपि विना कस्माद् गोबुद्धिर्न नियम्यते ॥
Śl. Vār, Ākṛti,. Kā. 35.

[2] यथा तुल्येऽपि भिन्नत्वे केषुचिद् वृत्त्यवृत्तिता* ।
गोत्वादेरनिमित्तापि तथा बुद्धिर्भविष्यति ॥ Ibid., Kā. 36.
*Chaukhamba edition reads वृत्त्यपेक्षिता

[3] Ibid., Kās. 5-11.

[4] The name of the opponent is not mentioned here by Kumārila, we can understand only from the Nyāya-ratnākara that the opponent is none else than Buddhist (NR on Ākṛti Kā. 51).

[5] अनेकाऽनन्यवृत्तित्वान्न सामान्यविशेषयोः ।
एकवस्त्वात्मता युक्ता किंचित्तेनोपचारिकम् ॥ Ibid., Kā. 51.
Also see NR thereon.

The above criticism of *jāti* by the Buddhist has been presented in the Śl. Vār. directly. But there are some instances where the arguments adduced by the Buddhist against the theories of *jāti, jātimat* etc. have only been referred to indirectly. It is only the Nyāyaratnākara and Śarkarikā commentaries, which directly mention and explain these arguements by the name of *Bhikṣu*. And the fact that this *Bhikṣu* is none else than Diṅnāga, has been verified by Dr. M. Hattori[3]. A few of them are being given below :

While explaining the Buddhist refutation by Kumārila, the Śarkarikākāra and Pārthasārathi Miśra have quoted a verse from Pramāṇa-samuccaya, in which the theory of universal (*jāti*) as the denotation of word, has been rejected by Diṅnāga. It is argued that the '*jāti-śabda*' (i.e. word used on account of

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1. भिन्नेभ्यश्चाप्यभिन्नत्वाद् भेदस्तत्स्वात्मवद् भवेत् ।
   एकस्माद्वाऽप्यभिन्नत्वाद् व्यक्त्येकत्वं प्रतीयते ।।
   Also see NR and Śar. thereon
   Śl. Vār., Ākṛti, Kā. 52.
2. एकाऽनेकत्वमेकस्य तथाऽन्याऽनन्यता कथम् ।
   तत्सामान्यं विशेषश्चेत्येवमादि च दुष्करत् ।। Ibid., Kā. 53
   Also see NR & Śar. thereon,
3. M. Hattori, 'A study of the Chapter on 'apoha' of the Mīmāṁsā ślokavārttika' Pt. I & II, Pub. in Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, Kyoto, No. 14 and 15, 1973 and 1974 respectively.

jāti can neither signify the particulars (*bhedān*) owing to the discrepancy of infinity (*ānantya*) and violation (*vyabhicāra*), nor can it signify the relation i.e. *yoga* (between the *jāti* and *jātimat*) and nor can it signify pure *jāti*, because of the inseparable hearing of the qualifying words.[1] The verse is not very clear in itself, and requires explanation, but it cannot be explained until the relevant matter of Pramāṇa-śamuccaya is available.

In the words '*tadvato nāsvatantratvāt*'[2] quoted in Śarkarikā and Nyāya-ratnākara, Diṅnāga refutes the theory of *jātimadabhidhāna* (denotation of particular characterised by the universal). It is argued here that the view of *jātimadabhidhāna* is not acceptable, in asmuchas the co-extensiveness (i.e. *sāmānādhikaraṇya*) is not possible in that case. In *sanghaṭaḥ*, the word '*san*', denotes a substance (*dravya*) qualified by existence (*sattā*), but it is not able to refer to, at the same time, its special aspect—'*ghaṭa*' and hence there would be no *sāmānādhikaraṇya*' in '*san*' and '*ghaṭa*'; just as the word 'sweet' (*madhuram*), denoting a sugar-substance qualified by sweetness, is not able to refer to its other qualities—whiteness etc. and thus, the word 'sweet' (*madhuram*) cannot show co-extensiveness (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) of 'sweet' and 'white' in the sugar-substance.[3]

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1. न जातिशब्दो भेदानामानन्त्यव्यभिचारतः ।
   वाचको योगजात्योर्वा भेदार्थैरपृथक्श्रुतेः ॥ PSV., Kā. 2 (vide Dr. Hattori's article mentioned supra p. 201 fn. 3; quoted in Śarkarikā, p, 41; NR, p. 592; TSP. p. 342,. 10-11.
2. PS, Kā. 4a (vide Dr. Hattori's article see supra p. 201 fn. 3); Quoted in Śarkarikā, p. 60; NR, p. 592; TSP, p. 382-5.
3. (i) अत्र भिक्षुराह—जातिशब्दः सदादिस्तद्विशिष्टमेव द्रव्यमभिदधन्न तद्गतमेव घटादिविशेषरूपमाक्षिपति । परतन्त्रो ह्यसौ सत्तां निमित्तीकृत्य द्रव्ये प्रवर्तते न तु स्वतन्त्रः ।——ततश्च घटादेस्तेन सच्छब्देनानाक्षेपान्नास्ति तद्वाचिना सामानाधिकरण्यम् । —यथा मधुरशब्देन माधुर्योपाधिविशिष्टं खण्डद्रव्यमभिदधता

Apart from these two instances, there are some other lines also from Pramāṇa-samuccaya, quoted in Śarkarika and Nyāyaratnākara,[1] which refute the theories of *'jātimadabhidhāna'* etc. It is not possible here to explain all of them. They can be the subject of a separate research paper. Now we have to see how the Buddhist theory of *apoha* has been presented in the Śloka-vārttika.

7. 3. APOHA : MEANING OF THE WORD

The Buddhists, as noted before, maintain that words cannot signify the reality. Real is only the thing in itself (*sva-lakṣaṇa*), which is momentary, comes and vanishes away at one and the same time and therefore, is out-side the grasp

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तद्गता परशुक्लाघनाक्षेपात्-तेन न सामानाधिरण्यं यथैतन्मधुरं श्वेतम् इति तथैतेनापि न भाव्यं सन् घटः इति—इति ।

Śarkarikā, p. 60.

(ii) NR, p. 598.

1. (a) सच्छब्दोऽपि भूतार्थेन स्वरूपं जाति वाह । तत्र प्रवृत्तस्तद्वत्युपचर्यमाणे गौणः स्यात् ।

PSV, Kā. 4b; cf. Śar., p. 61.

(b) तद्वांस्तु भेद एवेष्टः स च पूर्वं निराकृतः ।

PSV, Kā. 8cd; cf. Śar. p. 62; NR, p. 600

(c) तद्वन्मात्रेऽपि सम्बन्धः सत्ता वेति विचारितम् ।

PSV. 9ab; cf. Śar., p. 62, NR, p. 601.

(d) तद्वानर्थो घटादिश्चेन्न पटादिषु* वर्तते सामान्यमर्थः स कथम्—॥

PS. V. 9 cd, 10a; Śar., p. 63; NR, p. 601(*घटादिषु)

(e) यथैकेत्रासितादिवत्

PS. V. 10d; Śar., p. 64; NR, p. 601.

(f) नैतज्जातैरजातितः

PS. V. 11b ; Śar., p. 64; NR, p. 602.

(g) अर्थाक्षेपोऽप्यनेकान्तः

PS. V. 11c; Śar., p. 64; NR, p. 602.

Note : For the verification that the above lines belong to PS or PSV, see Dr. M. Hattori's article mentioned supra, p. 201 fn. 3

of word.[1] It is clearly said by Diṅnāga that 'the names are product of conceptual constructions, vice-versa the conceptual constructions are the product of names ; they are related with each other causally, the names cannot even touch the real.'[2] The name and the real are two different things. 'A man can feel what a burn is like, when he is burnt by fire, but the meaning that he gathers from the word 'burn' is quite different from this burnful feeling.'[3] It is, thus, evident that the name cannot signify the real. It can signify only the generic-form (*sāmānya lakṣaṇa*) of a thing. But this denotation of generic form always occurs in a negative form through 'the exclusion of others' called *apoha* or *anyāpoha*, inasmuch as there is no real or positive entity like 'nniversal' or '*jāti*' in the Buddhist view.

The theory of *apoha* was promulgated in the Buddhist system first by Diṅnāga in his Pramāṇa-samuccaya Chapter

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[1] cf. (i) K. Kunjunni Raja, 'Theory of Meaning according to Buddhist Logiciāns' Adyar Lib. Bulletin, Vol. 18, 1954, p. 182, 11-13.
(ii) Dhirendra Sharma, DTM, p. 27.1-5.
(iii) R.R. Dravid, PUIP, p. 264, 24-29.

[2] विकल्पयोनयः शब्दा विकल्पाः शब्दयोनयः ।
कार्यकारणता तेषां नार्थं शब्दा स्पृशन्त्यपि ॥

Quoted in NUTṬ, p. 691 (Cal. SS.).
A verse ascribed to Diṅnāga by Prof. Stcherbatsky, see BL, II, p. 405, fn. 1.

[3] अन्यथैवाग्निसम्बन्धाद् दाहं दग्धोऽभिमन्यते ।
अन्यथा दाहशब्देन दाहाद्यर्थः प्रतीयते ॥

Vākyapadīya Book II, verse 425.
This verse has been often quoted by many Indian philosophers coming after Bhartṛhari, to support the Buddhist view regarding meaning ;
Vyomavatī, p. 584; NM, Pt. II, p. 29, NKC, p. 553; PKM, p. 447; TSP, p. 345.

V.[1] The word '*apoha*' which is the abridged form of *anyāpoha*' means the 'exclusion or negation of others' (*atadvyāvṛtti*).[2] The word 'cow' gives its own meaning only by the exclusion of all those things which are other than cow. In the very first verse of Pramāṇa-samuccaya, Chapter V, Diṅnāga declares :

> "– – – In fact word can express its own meaning only by repudiating the opposite meaning just as the words like '*kṛtaka*' i.e. that which has origin (designate their meanings only through the exclusion of their opposites like '*akṛtaka*' i.e. that which does not have origin)."[3]

In the Apoha chapter of the Śl. Var., Kumārila also refers to this view, while he says : "Those who assume the universal (*sāmānya*) in the form of 'exclusion of non-cow' as the denotation of word – – –."[4] Pārthasārathi's exposition of the Buddhist view is more vivid. He writes :

> "There can be nothing similar in the particulars, having totally isolated natures ; nor can the particulars, which are not the object of determinate perception (*avikalpatvāt*), be the denotation of words due to the discrepancies of infinity (*ānantya*) and violation (*vyabhicāra*). It is, therefore, only the exclusion or negation of other,' related with each

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1. (i) BL, II, p. 404
   (ii) Satkari Mookerjee, BPUF, p. 131, 19-20.
   (iii) Dhirendra Sharma, DTM, p. 25.
2. DTM, p. 28.
3. — — — — —तथाहि तत् ।
   कृतकादिवत् स्वार्थमन्यापोहेन भाषते ॥
   PS. V. Kā. 1 bcd. vide Dr. Hattori's article mentioned supra p. 201 fn. 3; BL, I, p. 459. The Kārikā is also quoted in TSP, p. 529 without ascribing to Diṅnāga.
4. अगोनिवृत्तिः सामान्यं वाच्यं यैः परिकल्पितम् ।
   Śl. Vār., Apoha, Kā. I, ab.

> and every object, which can be the import of word. . . ."[1]

7. 4. NATURE OF APOHA :

(i) *Apoha is Negative* (*abhāvātmaka*)

From Kumārila's refutation of the theory of *apoha*, it is easily intelligible that the Buddhists used to maintain the nature of *apoha* as pure negation. Kumārila during refutation has several times used the terms *abhāva, avastu, nirupākhya,* etc. to denote the negative character of *apoha*.[2] Meaning of the word *apoha* itself tells us that *apoha* is nothing but 'the negation or exclusion or others.' Words can give their exact and proper meanings only through the exclusion of others. In fact, negation of others provides a sense of definiteness and individuality to the meaning of the word concerned. In the words of Dr. Satkari Mookerjee, "That it is a definite idea means that it is not any other and this definite individuality cannot have a meaning and a *raison d'etre* unless it negates what it is not. So negation constitutes its fundamental individuality, negation is its very life and soul without which it will be an empty nonsense."[3] With reference to the refutation of the negative character of *apoha*,[4] Śarkarikākāra and Pārthsārathi have quoted a line from Diṅnāga, which declares :

> "Having assumed the 'unknowable' (i.e. *ajñeya*), the word *jñeya* sets out to denote its own meaning through the exclusion of that (i.e. *ajñeya* or that which is not knowable)."[5]

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[1] न तावद्व्यावृत्तरूपाणामत्यन्तविलक्षणानां स्वलक्षणानामनुवृत्तः कश्चिदात्मा सम्भवति, न च स्वलक्षणान्यविकल्पत्वादानन्त्यव्यभिचाराभ्यां शब्दाभिधानीयकं लभन्ते, अतोऽतद्व्यावृत्तिरेव सर्वाऽनुगता शब्दार्थ इति । NR, p. 566.

[2] Śl. Vār. Apoha, Kās. 15, 45, 91, 100, 145, 163 and others

[3] BPUF, p. 117.

[4] Śl. Vār, Apoha, Kā. 145.

[5] अज्ञेयं तु कल्पितं कृत्वा तदपोहेन ज्ञेयशब्दः प्रवर्तते ।
Hetumukha, vide TSP, p. 385.
The line is quoted in Śar. p. 608 and is ascribed to Diṅnāga.

In order to establish the theory of negative denotation, the Buddhist repudiates the positive way of meaning, accepted by the Realists. He, as presented by Kumārila, argues thus:

> "In case of positive denotation of words, the apprehension of meaning with regard to the words like tree, earthly, substance, knowable, etc. should occur in all its aspects, whether the words are pronounced in reverse order or in successive order."[1]

This verse, in fact, is a reproduction of a verse of Diṅnāga, quoted in Śarkarikā and Nyāya-ratnākara,[2] where it has been explained thus: If the positive denotation of words is accepted, all the words should denote their meanings as a whole i.e. all the probable aspects related to a word should be denoted. In case of the series of words like tree, earthly, substance existent and knowable all the successive meanings are apprehended by the preceding words (when pronounced in successive order); similarly all the preceding meanings should also be apprehended by the succeeding words (when pronounced in reverse order), but the fact is not as such. There arises a sense of doubt about the meaning of the fourth, third, second and first words, when we speak them in reverse order starting from the word 'knowable', but a sense of certainty about the meanings of the second, third, fourth and fifth words arises, when we pronounce them in successive order starting from the word 'tree'. It can, therefore, be said that words do not have a positive denotation.[3]

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1. वृक्षत्वपार्थिवद्रव्यसंज्ञेयेषु यदुच्यते ।
   प्रातिलोम्याऽऽनुलोम्येन विधौ सर्वाऽर्थबोधनम् ।।
   Śl. Vār., Apoha, Kā. 158.
2. वृक्षत्वपार्थिवद्रव्यसज्ज्ञेयाः प्रातिलोम्यतः ।
   चतुस्त्रिद्वयैकसन्देहे निमित्तं निश्चयेऽन्यथा ।।
   PS. V. Kā. 35, vide Dr. Hattori's article mentioned Supra., p. 201 fn. 3; quoted in Śar. p. 73; NR., p. 609.
3. cf. (i) विधौ वस्तुस्वरूपशब्दार्थत्वपक्षे वस्तुनो निर्भागत्वात्सर्वैः शब्दैः सर्वात्मकार्थग्रहणं स्यात्, यथैव वृक्षपार्थिवद्रव्यसज्ज्ञेयशब्देषु

(ii) *Apohas are different* :

Repudiating the negative nature of *apoha*, Kumārila, has objected that words signifying different classes, as also the words signifying different individuals, would all come to be synonymous, if the signification of word were to consist in *apoha*,[1] because *apoha*, being of negative nature (*abhāvātmaka*) would be one and the same in all the cases.[2] Meeting with this objection, the Buddhist asserts that this odjection does not apply to him, because the *apohas* are accepted as different.[3] The difference in *apohas* can be proved on account of the diversity in their *apohyas* (the things negated).[4]

Now the question arises how the *apohyas* are different. The *apohyas* belonging to one word are different from the *apohyas* belonging to the other due to the difference of one particular *apohya* (thing negated).[5] For instance, if we consider to words 'cow' and 'horse', there is only one particular *apohya* i.e. cow with reference to horse and horse with reference to cow, which is the cause of diversity in the *apohyas* of cow and that of the

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पूर्वपूर्वैः शब्दैरुत्तरोत्तरार्थेषु निर्णयो भवति तथोत्तरोत्तरैः पूर्वनिर्णयः स्यात्, न चैवमस्ति, ज्ञेयशब्दात्प्रभृति प्रातिलोम्येन चतुस्त्रिद्वयेकेषु संदेहादानुलोम्येनैव वृक्षशब्दात्प्रभृति चतुरादिषु निर्णयात्, अतो न वस्तुवचनाः शब्दा इत्युक्तम् ।

NR, p. 609.

(ii) Also Śarkarikā, p. 72.

[1] cf. भिन्नसामान्यवचना विशेषवचनाश्च ये ।
सर्वे भवेयुः पर्याया यद्यपोहस्य वाच्यता ॥
Śl. Vār., Apoha, Kā. 42.
for translation see Eng. trans. by G.N. Jhā, p. 303.

[2] तस्यावस्तुस्वरूपार्थात् सर्वत्राभिन्नरूपत्वम् ।

[3] ननु भेदादपोहानां प्रसङ्गोऽयं न युज्यते ।
Śl. Vār., Apoha, Kā. 43ab.

[4] ननु चापोह्यभेदेन भेदोऽपोहस्य सेत्स्यति । Ibid., Kā. 47ab.

[5] cf. सर्वशब्देषु चैकैकमपोह्यमतिरिच्यते ।
तत्रासाधारणत्वेन तन्मात्रापोह्यता भवेत् ॥ Ibid, Kā. 56.

horse, although the other negated objects (like elephant, camel, lion, etc.) are common in each case.[1]

Word	*Apohyas* (things-negated)					*Apoha* (meaning of the word)
Cow	horse,	elephant,	lion,	camel & so on		exclusion of non-cow i.e. cow itself
	↓	↓	↓	↓		
	diffe-rent	common	common	common	—	
	|	↑	↑	↑		
Horse	cow,	elephant,	lion,	camel, & so on		exclusion of non-horse i.e. horse itself.

It is, thus, evident that the *apohyas* of the words –'cow' and 'horse' are different from one-another only due to one particular *apohya*, and on account of the diversity in *apohyas* the resultant meanings—the *apohas* are also different.[2] Hence, the words are not proved as synonymous. Diṅnāga has already expressed in Pramāṇa-Samuccaya: "The words denote different meanings on account of the diversity in their *apohyas* (things-negated), although, they, by themselves, are inefficient to express the same."[3]

(iii) *Apohas seem to be positive also* :

A different view was also accepted by the Buddhists about the cause of diversity and also positivity in *apohas*. The Buddhist logician, Kamalaśīla tells us that according to some Buddhists the diversity and the positivity of *apohas* are not caused by the diversity in *apohyas* (things– excluded) or diversity substrate, but they are caused by different impressions

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[1] cf. यथा गव्यश्वेन सहाऽऽलोच्यमाने गोरपोह्येऽश्वापोह्यादश्वमात्रमतिरिच्यते, अश्वापोह्ये च गोमात्रं, हस्त्यादिकं तु द्वयोः साधारणम् । NR, p. 580.

[2] Ibid., p. 580.

[3] अपोह्यभेदाद्भिन्नार्थाः स्वार्थभेदगतौ जडाः ।
PS. V. Kā 14 ab (vide Da. Hattori's article mentioned supra p. 162 fn. 2; quoted in TSP, p. 379, 5-6 and p. 365-10.

(*vāsanās*) continuing from time immemorial.[1] Before Kamalaśīla this view has been referred to and rejected by Kumārila while, He says, "nor can there be assumed diversity and also positivity in *apohas* due to the diversity in impressions (*vāsanābhedāt*), because there can be no impression (*vāsanā*) with regard to a negation."[2] This refutation by Kumārila is a clear indication that this view was present in the Buddhist system even before Kumārila. It might be introduced there either by Diṅnāga or by some other Buddhist master. It has been explained in Śarkarikā[3] as well as in Nyāya-ratnākara as pūrvapakṣa. The Nyāya-ratnākarakāra says :

> "The Buddhists have said 'we do not assert that the meaning of a word appears in the form of 'exclusion of non-cow' or 'exclusion of the non-existent' on account of which there may occur mutual-dependence, but we do accept that it appears in a positive form alone. It is only the investigators, who having found the impossibility of a positive common attribute extent in different individuals, declare that the meaning of a word, in fact, happens to be in the form of 'exclusion of others, and this negative form of meaning seems to be positive and different (in each case) due to the impressions (*vāsanāḥ*) flowing from time immemorial. Hence there can occur no synonymity of words and mutual dependence in our theory."[4]

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[1] cf. तत्र केचिद् बोद्धाः परिहारमाहुः न खल्वपोह्यभेदाद् आधारभेदाद्वाऽपोहानां भेदः——वासनाभेदाद् भेदः सद्रूपता चापोहानां भविष्यति । TSP, p. 376.

[2] न चापि वासनाभेदाद्: भेदः सद्रूपताऽपि वा ।
अपोहानां प्रकल्प्येत न ह्यवस्तुनि वासना ॥
Śl. Vār, Apoha, Kā. 100.

[3] Śarkarikā, p. 54.

[4] शाक्यास्त्वाहुः, नाऽगोनिवृत्तिः असन्निवृत्तिरित्येवरूपं शब्दार्थऽवभासं ब्रूमः, येनेतरेतराश्रयः स्यात्, किं तु वस्तुरूपतयैव शब्दार्थो भासते,

The Buddhists, thus, accept diversity as well as positivity in *apohas*, because they seem to be such due to the influence of beginningless impressions (*vāsanāḥ*)

It is to be noted regarding the nature of *apoha* that although the whole refutation of the theory by Kumārila is mainly based on the assumption of *apoha* as pure negation, Dr. Satkari Mookerjee's contention is somewhat different. According to him "Kumārila misunderstood the real significance of Diṅnāga's doctrine."[1] "When Diṅnāga declared that word imports a negation, and neither an objective universal, nor a particular, he only emphasised this negative implication of verbal import. He did not mean that negation was the primary and apparent connotation."[2]

The later Buddhist thinkers, such as Śāntarakṣita, Karṇakagomin, Jinendrabuddhi, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti, in view of the vehment criticism from the Realists, reinterpreted and modified the *apoha* theory. Not going through all the details how the theory underwent modifications in the hands of different Buddhist thinkers,[3] we here briefly state only the final interpretation of Ratnakīrti. He rejects Śāntarakṣita's view that a word conveys a positive meaning first, and a negative meaning later by logical-implication.[4] According to him

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परीक्षकास्तु व्यावृत्तेऽवनुवृत्तं वस्तुरूपमसंभावयन्तो तद् व्यावृत्तिरूपमाचक्षते, अनादिकालवासनावशाच्च व्यावृत्तिरूपमपि सद्रूपमिव भिन्नमिवाऽवभासते, अतो न पर्यायत्वं नेतरेताश्रयत्वमिति ।

NR. p. 592.

[1] BPUF, p. 118, line 29-30.

[2] Ibid., line 25-29.

[3] For details see Dr. Satkari Mookerjee, BPUF, pp. 130ff.,
Prof. Stcherbatsky, BL, I, pp. 461 ff;
K.K. Raja, ITM, pp. 90 ff;
H.K. Ganguli, PLC, pp. 211ff.
RR. Dravid, PUIP, pp. 282 ff;

[4] न हि विधि प्रतिपद्य कश्चिदर्थापत्तितः पश्चादपोहमवगच्छति

As in RN, p. 54, line 1-2.

the denotation of a word consists neither in affirmation only, nor in negation only, but it consists in affirmation qualified by the negation of all other things.[1] According to some scholars[2] this interpretation is based upon a brief statement of Diṅnāga that a word conveys positive meaning qualified by the negation of others.[3]

It is, thus, evident from the above account that the Buddhists before Kumārila had accepted positivity in *apohas*, although they, with the logical point of view, emphasised more on its negative aspect alone.

(iv) *Apoha Possesses some Characteristics of the Universal* (*jāti*) :

The Buddhist, specially Diṅnāga, maintains that the characteristics like oneness (*ekatva*), eternality (*nityatva*), complete subsistence in each individual (*pratyeka parisamāpti*) etc. which belodg to the positive universals (*jāti*) of the Realists, can also belong to the negative (*abhāvātmāka*) *apohas*. That the view belongs to Diṅnāga, is clear from the Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛtti, quoted in Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā and Śarkarikā.[4] The Śarkarikā and Nyāyaratnākara have also quoted a line from Pramāṇa-samuccaya, according to which the characteristics of the universals (*jāti*) can reside in *apoha*.[1] The view has been referred to and repudiated by Kumārila also with the remark that this assumption is just like trying to weave a cloth without yarns.[2]

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[1] नास्माभिरपोहशब्देन विधिरेव केवलोऽभिप्रेतः । नाप्यन्यव्यावृत्तिमात्रम् । किन्त्वन्यापोहविशिष्टो विधिः शब्दानामर्थः ।

As in RN, p. 54, line 1-2.

[2] Dhirendra Sharma, DTM, p. 29-30, fn. 42.

[3] शब्दोऽर्थान्तरव्यावृत्तिविशिष्टानेव भावान् आहेति ।
PSVV, on Kā 36d (vide Dr. Hattori's article mentioned supra p. 162, fn. 2); quoted in PVS, p. 251; PVST, p. 248; TSP, p. 371; PKM, p. 436.

[4] सर्वत्राभेदादाश्रयस्यानुच्छेदात् कृत्स्नार्थपरिसमाप्तेश्च यथाक्रम जातिधर्मा एकत्व(नित्यत्व)प्रत्येकपरिसमाप्तिलक्षणा अपोह एवावतिष्ठन्ते ।
PSV, V. on Kā 36d. (vide Dr, Hattori's article mentioned supra p. 162 fn. 2); quoted in TSP, p. 389.9-12; partially quoted in Śar, p. 74.

7. 5. APOHA IS APPREHENSIBLE THROUGH WORD AND INFERENCE :

The Buddhist holds that *apoha* can be apprehended only through words and inference and not through sense-perception.[3] Referring to and rejecting this view, Kumārila argues that the apprehension of *apoha* through inference and words is not possible, because there would occur mutual dependence. Inference and verbal cognition would be required for the apprehension of *apoha* and *apoha* would be required for the apprehension of inference and verbal-cognition.[4]

In reference to this refutation, the Śarkarikākāra has quoted two verses which throw light on the Buddhist view that *apoha* is apprehensible through words and inference. The first verse taken from Pramāṇa-vārttika, declares that *apoha* is the object of inference[5] and the second one, quoted from Pramāṇa-sammuccaya, asserts that the signification (*abhidheya*) of a word, being multifarious, the word cannot express all of them directly. It denotes its meaning through the 'exclusion or negation of others' according to its own relationship,[1] It is, thus, established by the Buddhists that *apoha* (the exclusion or negation of others) is apprehensible through word and inference.[2]

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[1] जातिधर्मव्यवस्थितिः
PS, V. Kā 36 (vide Dr. Hattori's article mentioned supra p. 162 fn. 2); quoted in Śar, p. 74 and NR, p. 116.

[2] अपि चैकत्वनित्यत्वप्रत्येकसमवायिता ।
निरूपाख्येष्वपोहेषु कुर्वतोऽसूत्रकः पटः ॥
Śl. Vār, Apoha, Kā. 163.

[3] अपोहस्त्वप्रत्यक्षः केवलं शब्दलिङ्गाऽवसेयः NR, p. 584, line 18.

[4] cf. (i) न चान्वयविनिर्मुक्ते प्रवृत्तिलिङ्गशब्दयोः ।
ताभ्यां च न विनाऽपोहो न चाऽसाधारणेऽन्वयः ॥
अपोहश्चाप्यनिष्पन्नः साहचर्यं क्व दृश्यताम् ।
तस्मिन्नदृश्यमाने च न तयोः स्यात् प्रमाणता ॥
Śl. Vār, Apoha, Kās. 73-74.
(ii) NR, on Kā. 72-74, p. 584.

[5] तस्मादपोहविषयमिति लिङ्गं प्रकीर्तितम् ।
PV. Svārtha, Kā. 47; quoted in Śar. p. 46.

7.6. APOHA DEPENDS UPON THE LAW OF CONTRADICTION AND NON APPREHENSION (*adarśana*).

(a) The Buddhist maintains that *apoha* (exclusion of others) depends upon the law of contradiction. The words blue and non-blue negate each other just because they are opposites to each others.[3]

Referring to and repudiating the view, Kumārila argues that there would occur mutual dependence, if *apoha* (exclusion of others) is assumed due to the contradiction in different objects. *Apoha* would depend upon contradiction and contradiction would depend upon *apoha.*[4]

Commenting upon this, the Śarkarikākāra and Pārthasārathi Miśra have quoted a line from Pramāṇa-samuccaya, which explicity asserts that one particular word negates the meaning of other particular word because of the contradiction.[5]

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[1] वहुधाप्यभिधेयस्य न शब्दात् सर्वथा गतिः ।
स्वसम्बन्धानुरूपेण व्यवच्छेदार्थकार्यसौ ।।
PS, V. Kā. 12 (vide Dr. Hattori's article mentioned supra p. 161 fn. 2); quoted in Śar. p. 46.

[2] अपोहः शब्दलिङ्गाभ्यां प्रकाश्यत इति ।
JN, p. 201; quoted in TTP, p. 367. This verse has been ascribed to Diṅnāga by Dr. Dhirendra Sharma, See DTM, p. 15.

[3] cf. Prof. Stcherbatsky, BL, I, p. 409.

[4] विरोधित्वेन भेदानामपोहा यदि कल्प्यते ।
विरोधोऽपोहतस्तत्र विरोधाच्चाप्यपोहनम् ।।
Śl. Vār, Apoha, Kā. 147.

[5] भेदो भेदान्तरार्थं तु विरोधित्वादपोहते ।
PS, V, Kā. 28ab (vide Dr. Hattori's article mentioned supra, p. 162 fn. 2); quoted in Śar, p. 69, 71; NR, p. 605

The words *palāśa* and *śiṁśapā* negate each other, because they are contradictory to each other.[1]

But a different view, which, in fact, is an exception to the above, has also been reflected in Kumārila's refutation,[2] according to which, general and particular words like *vṛkṣa* and *palāśa* and also the words which are synonymous like *vṛkṣa* and *taru*, do not negate each other because they do not have mutual contradiction.[3] Diṅnāga has expressed this view in Pramāṇa-samuccaya, which has been quoted in Śarkarikā and Nyāyaratnākara thus :

> "Although the general (*sāmānya*) and particular (*bheda*) words as well as the synonymous words are different from one another, they do not negate each other as they are not mutually contradictory."[4]

(b) Diṅnāga has given another reason also as to why words exclude the meaning of others. According to him, exclusion of others is due to non apprehension (*adṛṣṭvāt*).[5] A particular word excludes the other particular word just because its own meaning is not apprehended in the other one. For example, the word *śiṁśapā* excludes the word *palāśa* because its own meaning is not available in the latter one.[6] This view has also been referred to and refuted by Kumārila.[7]

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1. Śar. p. 69, line 6-7.
2. Śl. Vār, Apoha, Kā. 149.
3. cf. यदपि सामान्यविशेषशब्दानां शिशपावृक्षादीनां पर्यायाणां च तरुवृक्षादीनामविरोधेनाऽनपोहकत्वमुक्तम् NR. p. 606.
4. अन्यत्वेऽपि च सामान्यभेदपर्यायवाचिनाम्
   PS. V. Kā 25cd (vide Dr. Hattori's article mentioned supra, p. 162 fn. 2); quoted in Śar, p. 78, NR, p. 606.
5. अदृष्टत्वाद् व्युदासो वा
   PS, V. Kā 31a (vide Dr. Hattori's article mentioned supra, p. 162 fn. 1); quoted in Śar, p. 71; NR, p. 608.
6. cf. Śar. p. 71, line 7; NR, p. 708, line 8-10.
7. Śl. Vār, Apoha, Kā. 154.

7. 7. NOTION OF SIMILARITY IN THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF APOHA :

According to the Realists, the notion of similarity or of oneness among different individuals is caused by a positive entity called *jāti* or *sāmānya* (universals). It resides in each and every object.[1] It is the essence of all the individuals and causes the notion of identity among them.[2] But the Buddhists, being the advocates of *apoha* theory, do not accept the positive entity *sāmānya*. According to them "there can be nothing that resides in common in a number of unique particulars, which are shorn of all adjuncts and there can be no question of any common entity residing in them."[3]

In such circumstances, a question naturally arises as to how can the Buddhist account for the notion of similarity or of oneness with reference to many particulars ; how can he call the different cows, such as white, black, red, spotted, etc. by one designation 'cow' ? The Buddhist reply to this querry, as presented by Kumārila as well as by Pārthasārathi Miśra, is that "the capacity of producing the concept of oneness among different particulars belongs to the individuals alone."[4] It has not been mentioned by Kumārila how the Buddhist assumes the capacity of producing the concept of oneness among different individuals. But it has been elucidated by Dharmakīrti as well as by the other later Buddhist thinkers like Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. According to them, the identi-

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1. cf. प्रत्येकं समवेता च Śl. Var., Ākṛti, Kā. 17c
2. cf. तेनात्मधर्मो भेदानामेकधीविषयोऽस्ति नः ॥
Śl. Vār., Ākṛti, Kā 18 ab.
3. See Dr. D.N. Shastri, CIR, p. 352.
4. (i) सामान्यबुद्धिशक्तत्वं विशेषेष्वेव यो वदेत् ।
Śl. Vār., Ākṛti, Kā. 12 ab.
(ii) शाक्यास्त्वाहुः, अवश्यं तावदङ्गीकृत्यापि सामान्यं तस्य तुल्याकारबुद्धिजननशक्तिरङ्गीकर्त्तव्या, तद्वरं विशेषाणामेवोभयसिद्धानां सा शक्तिराश्रिता—किं सामान्येनेति' । NR, p. 548.
See also NR, p. 555, line 20-21.

cal concept in absolutely different and discrete individuals is caused by uniform causal-efficiency, inhering in each one of them by nature. Just as different types of medicinal herbs, although different from one another in form, express uniformity among themselves by performing similar type of actions of curing diseases like fever etc. ; similarly the other objects like different types of cows black, white etc. produce the concept of onenees by their very nature expressed through uniform actions.[1]

Kumārila informs us that "the notion of similarity, according to the Buddhist, arises through the 'exclusion of non-cow' which is assumed as the denotation of word."[2] Pārthasārathi Miśra explains this view thus : "The cause of similarity in absolutely dissimilar things, has been found in the form of 'exclusion of others'. Just as different animals like cow, horse, elephant, etc. can be classed together only by excluding them all from the camels, similarly the concept of similarity in different cows such as black, white, red, brown, etc. is caused by the exclusion of all other animals. Therefore, it is the 'exclusion of non-cow' alone that is the cause of similarity (*sāmānya*) and is the denotation of a word."[1] The Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti says, 'although the form of *śābaleya* cow is totally different from that of the *bāhuleya* cow, but they both are similar in one respect that they both exclude all other animals other than cow.'[2] To establish their view of negative way of similarily, the Buddhists have put forth many arguments, among which a few have been presented in the Śloka-vārttika and have been explained in the Śarkarikā and Nyāya-ratnākara :

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[1] cf. (i) एकप्रत्यवमर्शार्थज्ञानाद्येकार्थसाधने ।
भेदेऽपि नियताः केचित् स्वभावेनेन्द्रियादिवत् ॥
ज्वरादिशमने काश्चित् सह प्रत्येकमेव वा ।
दृष्टा यथा वौषधयो नानात्वेऽपि न चापराः ॥
PV, Svārtha, Kā. 73.74

(ii) MNV on the above Kārikās, p. 282-83.
(iii) Karṇakagomin, PVST, p. 110, line 11-12 and pp. 177-78.
(iv) TS, Kās. 722-25; TSP. pp. 296-97.
(v) Śarkarikā, p. 26.
(vi) Satkari, Mookerjee, BPUF, p. 91 and 121-22.
(vii) D.N. Shastri CIR, pp. 352-53.

[2] cf. (i) अगोनिवृत्तिः सामान्यं वाच्यं यैः परिकल्पितम्
—Śl. Vār, Akṛti, Kā. 1

(i) Just as the notion of oneness arises with regard to the four kinds of negations, such as *prāgabhāva*, *atyantābhāva* etc., due to the negative form of similarity (*abhāvātmaka sāmānya*), similarly the concept of oneness should be accepted in case of 'cow' due to the 'negation of non-cow'.[3]

(ii) What would be the meaning of 'non-Brāhmaṇahood' (*abrāhmāṇatva*) with regard to different classes like *Kṣatriya* etc. ? If 'manhood' is regarded as its denotation, it cannot be accepted, inasmuch as 'manhood' belongs to all the four classes equally. If some particular form (*viśeṣa-rūpa*) like kṣatriyahood etc., is regarded as its denotation, it also cannot be acceptable, because the word 'non-Brāhmaṇahood' does not aim at any particular class, but it aims at all the three classes commonly. It causes a similar notion of *abrāhmaṇatva* in each of the three classes separately, not collectively. Hence, it is the negation of 'Brāhmaṇahood', which cause the concept of oneness in the other three classes. In the same way, the concept of oneness in case of cow etc. should be accepted only due to the negative form of similarity.[1]

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[1] यदत्यन्तविलक्षणानां सादृश्याऽऽपादकं तदन्यव्यावृत्तिरूपं दृष्टं, यथा गवाश्वकुंजराणामनुष्ट्रत्वं तथा गौरयमिति विकल्पाकारो विलक्षणानां शावलेयादीनां सादृश्यमापादयतीति स्वभावहेतुः, तस्मादगोनिवृत्तिरेव सामान्यं शब्दवाच्यमिति । NR. p. 566.
Also cf. NVTṬ, p. 486, (Kāśi SS 24)

[2] यद्रूपं शाबलेयस्य बाहुलेयस्य नास्ति तत् ॥
अतद्रूपपरावृत्तिर्द्वयोरपि न भिद्यत । इति
PV, Svārtha, Kā, 139-40.

[3] cf. (i) ननु च प्रागभावादौ सामान्यं वस्तु नेष्यते ।
Śl., Vār., Apoha, Kā 11ab
(ii) प्रागभावादिचतुष्टये ह्यभावत्वमेव सामान्यं न वस्तुरूपं सामान्यमस्ति, यद्भावात्मनां गृह्येतेति ॥ NR, p. 569
(iii) नावश्यमेकाकारप्रत्ययः सर्वत्रैकवस्त्वालम्बन एव भवति विनापि तेन स्वतन्त्रस्य क्वचिद्दर्शनात् । एवमिहाप्यगोव्यावृत्तिप्रत्ययः किमिति नेष्यते । Śar, p. 29.

From the above discussion, two points come into light about the Buddhist view as :

(i) The capacity to produce the concept of oneness in different individuals is inherent in them, which is expressed through their uniform efficient action and is not caused by any external entity like *sāmānya* or *jāti* (universal).

(ii) Although the particulars (*viśeṣa*) are absolutely different from one another, a notion of similarity among them arises on the basis of negation or exclusion of others (*anyāpohas*). Kumārila is of the opinion that the Buddhist has, in fact, spoken of the positive entity 'cowness' alone in the

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1. cf. (i) अब्राह्मणत्वं किं तु स्याद् भिन्नेषु क्षत्रियादिषु ॥
पुरुषत्वं चतुःसंस्थं विशेषषु च नास्तिधीः ।
सामान्यप्रत्ययश्चैषु प्रत्येकमुपजायते ॥
तेनात्र ब्राह्मणाऽभावः सामान्यं स्यादवस्तु तत् ।
गोत्वादावपि तेनैव सामान्यप्रत्ययो भवेत् ॥

Śl. Vār., Apoha, Kās. 13 cd. 14,15.

(ii) त्रिष्वप्यस्त्येवाऽब्राह्मण इति सामान्यबुद्धिः, न च तेष्वस्ति वस्तुरूपं सामान्यमिति । पुरुषत्वाऽवलम्बनत्वं ब्राह्मणोऽप्यब्राह्मणबुद्धया गृह्येतेति । ...क्षत्रियत्वादिकं तु विशेषरूपं नालम्बनं, त्रयसाधारणत्वात्तद्बुद्धेरिति ...न च त्रयसमुदायालम्बनत्वमेकैकविषयत्वादब्राह्मणबुद्धेरिति...एवं गवादावप्यभावात्मकमेव सामान्यमस्तु सामान्यबुद्धेरालम्बनत्वमिति ।

NR, p. 570.

(iii) Śarkarikā, p. 30-31

words 'exclusion of non-cow'.[1] But this assumption of Kumārila is not in accordance with the things, because there is a vast difference in the Realists' conception of the universals and the Buddhist conception of *apoha*. The Realists accept the universal (*sāmānya*) as the real external entity, while the Buddhists assume *apoha* merely as a concept (*vikalpa*) based on negation (*abhāva*).[2] The Buddhist does not recognise the positive reality of the universal (*sāmānya*), although he does accept its conceptual form as negation.[3]

7.8. CONCLUSION :

On the basis of the above discussion, we can derive following conclusions :

(i) There are various theories in Indian Philosophy regarding the meaning of words. The Sāṁkhyas, some of the Neo-Naiyāyikas and an old grammarian Vyāḍi are the upholders of the theory of Individuals (*Vyaktivāda*);[4] The Jains accept the theory of configuration (*Ākṛtivāda*);[5] The Mīmāṁsakas, the Vedāntins, some old grammarians like Vājapyāyana and Bhartṛhari support the theory of Universal (*Jātivāda*);[6] The Nyāya-sūtrakāra, Gautama, accepts the theory of composite denotation (i.e. Jātyākṛtivyaktivāda);[7] some other Naiyāyikas have proposed to accept the theory of individual qualified by the Universals[8] and lastly, the Buddhists have established the theory of *apoha* (exclusion of others).[1]

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[1] गोत्वं वस्त्वेव तैरुक्तमगोऽपोहगिरास्फुटम्
Śl. Vār., Apoha Kā. 1cd

[2] नन्वस्त्येव महान् भेदः परैः पारमार्थिकार्थविषयत्वेनेष्टस्य विकल्पस्य बौद्धैः कल्पितविषयत्वेनेष्टत्वात कल्पितश्चाकारोऽपोहाश्रितत्वादपोह उच्यते ।
PVSṬ, p. 114.

[3] पारमार्थिकस्य गोत्वस्य निषेधः क्रियते न तु कल्पितस्येति ।
Ibid., p. 111.

[4] See supra 7.1. (i).

[5] See supra 7.1. (ii).

[6] See supra 7.1. (iii).

[7] See supra 7.1. (iv).

[8] See supra 7.1. (v)

(ii) The Buddhists, before establishing their theory, have refuted the opponents views of *jāti, jātimad*, etc. on several grounds [2]

(iii) According to the Buddhists, word cannot signify the real (the thing in itself), it can signify only the generic form of a thing through the exclusion of others (*apoha* or *anyāpoha*).[3]

(iv) The theory of *apoha* was introduced first by Diṅnāga. According to him, a word can express its own meaning only by repudiating the opposite meanings.[4]

(v) *Apoha* is negative (*abhāvātmaka*) in nature.[5]

(vi) *Apohas* are different due to the diversity in *apohyas* (things-excluded).[6]

(vii) According to some Buddhists, *apohas* seem to be different and also positive due to the diversity in impressions (*vāsanābhedāt*) flowing from time immemorial.[7]

(viii) Kumārila presents the theory of *apoha* as pure negation, but the later Buddhist thinkers reinterpreted and modified it. According to Ratnakīrti, meaning of a word consists in affirmasion qualified by the negation of all other things.[8] It is also thought that Ratnakīrti's interpretation of the theory is based on Diṇnāga's own assertion.

(ix) According to Diṅnāga, *apoha* can also possess some characteristics of the Realists' universals such as oneness, eternality, complete subsistence in each individual etc.[9]

(x) *Apoha*, is not the object of sense perception (*pra-*

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1. See supra 7.1. (vi)
2. See supra 7.1.
3. See supra J.3
4. See supra 7.3
5. See supra 7.4 (i)
6. See supra 7.4 (ii)
7. See supra 7.4 (ii)
8. See supra 7.4 (ii)
9. See supra 7.4 (iii)

tyakṣa). It is apprehensible only through word or inference.[1]

(xi) Concept of *apoha* depends upon the law of contradiction and non-perception (*adarśana*).[2]

(xii) The Buddhists do not accept (*sāmānya* or *jāti* (universals) as the the cause of the concept of oneness among different individuals. According to them, this capacity belongs to the individuals alone. They express this capacity through uniform causal efficiency.[3]

They also accept that the notion of similarity in absolutely dissimilar individuals is caused by negation of others i.e. *apoha*.[4]

Thus, the theory of *apoha* has been established by the Buddhist as the denotation of word as well as the cause of the notion of similarity among different individuals.

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[1] See supra 7.5
[2] See supra 7.6
[3] See supra 7.7
[4] See supra 7.7

CHAPTER VIII

CONTRIBUTION OF KUMARILA'S ŚLOKA-VĀRTTIKA TO THE BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

8.1. SOME POINTS OBSERVED THROUGH THE PRESENT STUDY :

In the present work the Buddhist views regarding *pramāṇa* (means of valid cognition), *prāmāṇya* (validity of cognition), *pratītya-samutpāda* (dependent-origination), *kśaṇa-bhaṅga* (momentariness), *anātma* (no-soul), *bāhyārthabhaṅga* (non-existence of external world) and *apoha* (meaning of word according to the Buddhist) have been discussed in detail on the basis of the Śloka-vārttika. Some findings of this study are as follows :

(i) Through a detailed discussion on the date of Kumārila, it has been concluded that Kumārila was later than Bhartṛhari and Diṅnāga, but was senior contemporary of Dharmakīrti, Prabhākara and Śaṅkarācārya. His dates can be assumed in between the second half of the 6th century and first half of the 7th century A.D.[1]

(ii) Kinds of *pratyakṣa* were not clear in the works of Diṅnāga. Kumārila's refutation of the Buddhist view also does not give any definite idea about it. It was only Dharmakīrti who clearly mentioned four kinds of *pratyakṣa*.[2]

(iii) From a detailed study of the Buddhist theory of *prāmāṇya*, it appears that the view of 'no-definite-regulation' (*aniyama-pakṣa*) regarding *prāmāṇya* had its seeds in the

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[1] See supra 1.4

[2] See supra 2.7. iv

Buddhist philosophy even before Kumārila, but was clearly mentioned in the later period by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.[1]

(iv) *Hetu* or *liṅga* (mark or middle term) of *anumāna* is of generic form (*sāmāṇya-lakṣaṇa*). It does not require another inference for its own apprehention, but can be apprhended through *vikalpa* which follows *pratyakṣa*.[2]

(v) There are different interpretations of *pratītya-samutpāda.* Originally it meant "origination after getting the causes." Further it was interpreted as 'origination after the destruction of the causes'. Both these interpretations have been mentioned in the Śloka-vārttika. In the later period, Prasannapadā explained this theory as 'origination in relation to the causes and conditions'.[3]

(vi) Only sequence (*ānantarya*) between the cause and effect is required for causation and no action. Existence of the cause is action itself (*sattā eva vyāpṛttiḥ*).[4]

(vii) Some Buddhists like the Yogācāras have accepted simultaneity (*yaugapadya*) also in the cause and effect.[5]

(viii) Destruction is natural, without leaving any residue (*niranvaya*). It is of two kinds-subtle (positive) and gross (negative).[6]

(ix) Momentariness (*kṣaṇikatā*) is proved through gross destruction of things, existence (*sattā*) and impressions (*vāsanā*)

Vāsya-vāsaka-bhāva can exist in two, similar but different moments and is possible only in the theory of flux.[7]

(x) Low of action and its result (*Karmaphala-vyavasthā*) has been maintained in the Buddhist 'theory of No-Soul' (*anātma-vāda*) through the oneness of series of the five *skandhas* or of consciousness (*vijñāna*). The series is formed of different moments which are related with each other through causal-

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1. See supra 3.3. iii
2. See supra 2.8. ii
3. See supra 4.1
4. See supra 4.2
5. See supra 4.3
6. See supra 4.5 (a)
7. See supra 4.6

relationship. If an action of mercy is performed by the moments a,b,c of the series No. 1, the result would be enjoyed by the later moments—d,e,f belonging to the same series and not by that of some other series. The Buddhist, thus, establishes the identity of the performer and the enjoyer through the sameness of series.[1] (see diagram on p. 195)

(xi) Law of rebirth (*punarjanma vyavasthā*) has also been accepted on the basis of the continuity of the five *skandhas* or of consciousness from one body to the other. Some of the Buddhists have assumed an 'intermediateastral-body' (*antarābhava deha*) in between death and rebirth.[2]

(xii) The Yogācāra Buddhist establishes his doctrine of the 'non-existence of the external world' with sound arguments. He, on the ground of identity of the cognition and the cognised, self-luminosity of cognition, and several other arguments, tries to establish that the form, which appears at the time of perception, belongs to the cognition and not to the external object, and thus, the power of cognition exhausts in apprehending its own form.[3]

(xiii) Just as the dream cognition is invalidated by the waking-consciousness, similarly the waking consciousness can be invalidated by the transcendental knowledge.[4]

(xiv) According to the Yogācāras, cognition (*vijñāna*) is transcendentally pure and non-dual, but it appears like two distinct entities—the cognised (*grāhya*) blue, yellow etc. and the cogniser (*grāhaka*) 'I'—due to the various impressions (*vāsanāḥ*) produced by the foregoing cognitions of this or that life. The cognition (*vijñāna*) and the impressions (*vāsanāḥ*) go on producing each other in a continuous series from time immemorial under the rule of mutual-causality (*anyonyahetutā*).[5]

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1. See supra 5.4
2. See supra 5.5
3. See supra 6.4
4. See supra 6.6
5. See supra 6.7

(xv) The Yogācāras hold that the two forms—*grāhya* and *grāhaka* belong to the cognition itself and this fact can be proved on the basis of accumulation of forms (*ākāra-pracaya*) in the subsequent cognition and in recollection etc.[1] (see diagram)

(xvi) *Apoha* (Exclusion of others) has been recognised by the Buddhist as the denotation of word[2] and as the cause of the notion of similarity among many individuals.[3]

(xvii) Diṅnāga, the propounder of the theory of *apoha*, before establishing his own view, refuted the opponents views of *jāti*, jātimad etc. in his Pramāṇa-samuccaya. Kumārila's refutation of the theory of *apoha* throws a good deal of light on Diṅnāga's criticism, set forth by him against the opponents' views regarding meaning of word.[4]

(xviii) Study of the Śloka-vārttika reflects upon the nature of *apoha*, according to which apoha is negative (*abhāvātmaka*), but seems to be positive due to the diversity in impressions (*vāsanābhedāt*); *apohas* are different due to the diversity in *apohyas* (things to be negated).[5]

(xix) According to Diṅnāga, *apoha* can also possess some characteristics of the Realists' *jāti* or *sāmānya*, such as, oneness. enternality, complete subsistence in each individual etc.[6]

(xx) *Apoha* is not the object of *pratyakṣa*. It is apprehensible only through word or inference.[7]

(xxi) Concept of *apoha* depends upon the law of contradiction (*virodha*) and non-perception (*adarśana*).[8]

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[1] See supra 6.8 How the 'accumulation of forms' occurs in the subsequent cognitions, has been shown through diagram.

[2] supra 7.3.

[3] supra 7. 7.

[4] supra 7. 2.

[5] supra 7. 4 (i-ii)

[6] supra 7. 4. (iii)

[7] supra 7. 5.

[8] supra 7. 6.

8. 2. POST-KUMĀRILA BUDDHIST TREATISES AND THE ŚLOKA-VĀRTTIKA.

The Vaidika philosophers established their doctrines only after repudiating the views of their opponents and the Buddhists, in their turn, established their own tenets only after giving a convincing reply to the objections raised against them. In such a position it is quite obvious that the study of Vaidika treatises will be incomplete and unintelligible, until one is fully acquainted with the rival theories. Similarly study of the Buddhist works like Pramāṇa-vārttika, Tattva-saṅgraha etc. would be difficult rather impossible to grasp, if one is not conversant with the text of their opponents like Kumārila and Śaṅkarācārya.

In the post Kumārila philosophical literature, there are many such Buddhist works, in which the authors have reproduced and referred to the kārikās from Kumārila as *pūrvapakṣa* and hence these portions can be properly understood only in that background. Arcaṭa or Dharmākaradatta,[1] in his Hetubindu-ṭīkā, has quoted many verses from the Śloka-vārttika, while repudiating *sāmānya*[2] and *sahetuka-vināśa.*[3] So also his commentator, Durveka Misra has referred to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa[4] several times and presents many kārikās from the Śloka-vārttika[5] in his Āloka-ṭīkā.

Śāntarakṣita, in his Tattva-saṁgraha, quotes a number of kārikās from the Śloka-vārttika on several issues just as soul,[6] momentariness,[7] action and its result,[8] perception,[9]

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1. The other name of Arcaṭa is Dharmākaradatta as mentioned by Durveka Misra in his Āloka Ṭīkā pp 233, 261.
2. HBṬ., pp. 30, 31, 32.
3. HBṬ, p. 78.
4. HBṬ. Āloka pp. 252, 266, 269, 280, 286, and so on.
5. HBṬ. Āloka pp. 272, 279, 280, 286, 306, 405 & so on.
6. TS.I. Ātma-parīkṣā, kās. 222 ff.
7. TS.I. Sthira-bhāva-parīkṣā kās. 480 ff.
8. TS.I. Karma-phala-sambandha parīkṣā kās. 480 ff.
9. TS.I. Pratyakṣa lakṣaṇa parīkṣā, kās. 1285 ff.

inference,[1] non-existence,[2] self-validity of cognitions,[3] and so on. After presenting the kārikās Śantarakṣita refutes them with sound arguments and gives some convincing reply from the Buddhist view point. His commentator Kamalaśīla also refers to and explains the quoted kārikā, of the Śloka-vārttika.

In some later period, Jnanashri-mitra and Ratnakīrti, the two renowned Buddhist logicians have been found quotnig and referring to the kārikās of Kumārila. Among them, Jnanashri-mitra quotes him a little,[4] while Ratnakīrti presents the verses very profusely from the Śloka-vārttika[5] and also from the Bṛhaṭṭīkā[6] (which is a text of Kumārila not extant to us as yet). His re-interpretation of the Apoha theory can be understood well, only when one is fully acquainted with the views and objections of his former antagonists like Kumārila and others[7]

Many other such references can be traced from the later Buddhist literature, which clearly reflect the importance of the study of Kumārila's Śloka-vārttika and his other works from the point of view of post-Kumārila Buddhist treatises.

8. 3. EVALUATION OF KUMĀRILA'S PRESENTATION OF THE BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY :

Kumārila's presentation and refutation of the Buddhist philosophy bear a clear evidence of his profound knowledge and scholarship regarding the Buddhist doctrines. A comparative study of his presentation and the original Buddhist sources shows that his presentation of the Buddhist view is mostly clear and correct, when he presents them directly. But there are a few cases, which do not seem to be correctly represented as in case of the *pratisaṁkhyā-nirodha and apratisaṁkhyā-nirodha*.[1] It might have happened due to some misunderstanding or negligence on his part. Probably on the basis of such instances, Prof. Stcherbatsky, has observed about Kumārila and his Śloka-vārttika :

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[1] TS.I. Anumāna parīkṣā, kās. 1441 ff.

[2] TS.I. Abhāva vicāraḥ, kās. 1647 ff.

[3] TS.II. svataḥ prāmāṇya parīkṣā, kās. 2812 ff.

[4] JN. pp. 162, 196.

[5] RN. pp., 6, 21, 22, 26, 27, 38, 91, 92, 98, 105, & so on.

[6] RN. pp. 7, 8, 22, 27, 38, 105, 106 & so on.
Note : These are 23 verses from Bṛhaṭṭīkā quoted in RN.

[7] supra VII. 4.

> The information to be gathered from this work about the teachings of Buddhist logicians is, however, scanty and very often unclear. The author is an ardent controversialist and cares much more for brilliant repartees and witty retorts, than for impartial quotation of his enemy's opinions.[2]

This observation may be said to be justified to some extent, as Kumārila's style seems to be vague and confusing at some places, where in fact he indulges himself in direct refutation without giving the Buddhist view as *pūrvapakṣa*. At such places, he bears the opponents view in mind only and starts refuting him abruptly and directly.

Nevertheless, Kumārila's presentation of the Buddhist philosophy occupies a very important place in Indian philosophy, firstly because his presentations and refutations are mostly based on clear understanding of the rival theories ; secondly because they throw light on some important aspects of the Buddhist doctrines, laid down by Diṅnāga, whose works are not extant or partially extent to us in original form in Sanskrit; thirdly because they can prove helpful in establishing the chronological order of some great philosophical personalities of India like Bhartṛhari, Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, whose not only the exact dates, but chronology is also ambiguous.

It is, thus, obvious that the study of the non Buddhist treatises like Mīmāṁsā-Śloka-vārttika is of great value from the view point of the Buddhist philosophy. Scholars of modern age have also accepted this fact. Prof, Satkari Mukerjee observes.

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1. supra 4.5. iii.
2. BL.I. p, 51.

"There are a good many Brahmanical writers who possessed first hand knowledge of Buddhist philosophical works and who have tried to criticise the Buddhist position on fair grounds. Barrings a few inaccuracies here and there, the account of Buddhist doctrines as given by Kumārila, Vācaspati Miśra and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in their works appears to be faithful representation of the Buddhist position and so will continue to attract the attention of students of Buddhist philosophy."[1]

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[1] Buddhist philosophy of universal Flux, p. 275, fn. 1.

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ERRATA

Page No.	*line or FN.*	*Incorrect*	*Correct*
24	line 19	A.C.	A.D.
54	FN 3	4 Kā. 7	Kā. 74
57	line 4	Hance.	Hence
66	line 11	'3' in the end of line	11, should be read in the end of line 10
66	FN 3	....	NB. 1.7-11
73	FN 1	PVS	PSV
75	FN 1	in HIL, p.	in HIL, p. 288
76	FN 5	NV, p. (Ch. SS.)	NV, p. 131 (Ch SS.)
97	line 15	extraneouse	extraneous
101	line 11	adsence	absence
102	line 6	Cause	case
103	line 16	visual and one	visual one,
106	line 4	saṁgati);[1]	saṁgati);[2]
114	line 13	reducced	reduced
115	line 7	indipendent	independent
119	line 17	diffcrent	different
123	line 14	is it	it is
125	line 1	withont	without
126	line 2	pratyaya-vaikalyāt	(pratyaya-vaikalyāt)
129	line 14	aciion	action
130	FN 4	BDA	BDV
135	FN 1 (ii)	Śabda	Śabdanityatā
137	FN 1	Śl. Vār. Kā.	Śl. vār. Ātma. Kā.
137	FN 4	,, ,, ,,	NR, p.1 50
138	FN 1	Śl. Vār. p. 150	NR, p. 150
139	line 12	Adatta	Anatta

141	FN 2	Vini śatikā	Viṁśatikā
148	line 5 of FN	kās. 62, 64	kās 62, 63, 64
153	FN 1	TPS	TSP
157	FN 4	MVTS	MVS
172	line 9	ADVERSARIES: VIEWS	ADVERSARIES VIEWS
173	FN 6	,, ,, ,,	ibid Kā. 38
177	FN 5 (i)	Kās. 21 cd.	Kār. 51cd
185	line 1	grāhakākāra	grāhakākāra)
193	FN 2 (i)	SMK	SWK
200	line 9	this	thus
204	line 13	nniversal	universal
204	FN 2	NUTṬ	NVTṬ
208	line 8	odjection	objection
208	line 15	to words	two words
209	line 26	sity substrate	sity in substrate
210	line 3	while, He says	while he says
212	line 16	belody	belong
212	FN 3	PSVV	PSV.V
214	FN 2	TTP	TSP
221	FN 3	supra J.3	supra 7.3
224	line 26	Low	Law
229	line 27	extent	extant

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